




INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL MOBILIZATION: 








































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL MOBILIZATION: 








ANG MING CHEE 
(MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,  
UPPSALA UNIVERSITET, SWEDEN) 
(BACHELOR OF COMMUNICATION (HONOURS), 







A THESIS SUBMITTED 
FOR THE DEGREE OF 








DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 








My utmost gratitude goes first and foremost to my supervisor, Associate Professor 
Jamie Seth Davidson, for his enduring support that 
I would like to thank the National University of Singapore for providing the 
research scholarship that enabled me to concentrate on my thesis as a full-time 
doctorate student in the past four years. In particular, I would also like to thank the 
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences for partially supporting my fieldwork expenses and 
the Faculty Research Cluster for allocating the precious working space. My 
appreciation also goes to members of my department, especially the administrative 
staff, for their patience and attentive assistance in facilitating various secretarial works.       
has helped me overcome many 
challenges during my candidacy. His critical supervision and brilliant suggestions have 
helped me to mature in my academic thinking and writing skills. Most importantly, his 
understanding of my medical condition and readiness to lend a hand warmed my heart 
beyond words. I also thank my thesis committee members, Associate Professor Hussin 
Mutalib and Associate Professor Goh Beng Lan for their valuable feedback on my 
thesis drafts.  
This thesis would not have been possible without the support from the 
following institutions and individuals that facilitated my fieldwork in Malaysia. The 
hospitable staff at the Dongzong Department of Resource and Information, Dongzong 
Department of Organization Affairs, Jiaozong Executive Office, members of the 
Damansara Save Our School movement and all interviewees who willingly participated 
in this study. My special appreciation goes to the following facilities that allowed me to 
access their valuable collections: National University of Singapore, Universiti Sains 
Malaysia, Kwangwahyitpoh; Sinchew Daily and Centre for Malaysian Chinese Studies.   
ii 
 
My sincere thanks to Cuc, Chuan Yean and Cui Fen for their critical peer review 
and feedback; Dom, Kim and Serena for their cheerful companionship; Siew Keen for 
assisting with the technical application, and Pika for scanning the books from the 
library. Most importantly, I sincerely appreciate the endless efforts by Tey Li Li for 
proofreading and assisting me to overcome the grammatical challenges of completing 
this thesis.  
Special appreciation goes to the following friends and family members: Lay 
San, Siew Yeong and Gaik Tin for facilitating the interviewees’ contacts; Siew Hong 
and Seng Chin for enabling me to wheel freely in Malaysia with their car; Sheau Fung 
for sharing her office as my workspace in Penang; Sharon Koay for providing delicious 
food supplies; Sara Koay for providing cozy accommodation in Selangor; Ananya for 
listening to my complaints; Hwee Siang for his cheerful companionship and free rides 
to the university; and Supawan for her patience and useful advice during my ups and 
downs. I also would like to thank all the medical personnel who took care of me during 
my eventful candidacy. For those whom I have not named, please call me up and let me 
thank you in person.   
Lastly, I owe my achievements today to my beloved family: my father Ang 
Cheng Siah, my mother Koay Saw Lye, and my younger brother Ang Ming Chieh. My 
family has been supportive and understanding during my long absence all these years; 
their love has been the source of my motivation to continue pursuing my dreams and to 
be a better person. I hope this doctorate thesis will make them proud. 
May the force be with you. 
 
Ang Ming Chee 
Singapore, May 2011 
iii 
 




Acknowledgements .................................................................................................... i 
Table of Contents ..................................................................................................... iii 
Summary .................................................................................................................. vi 
List of Tables.......................................................................................................... viii 
List of Figures .......................................................................................................... ix 
List of Maps ............................................................................................................. xi 
List of Abbreviations  .............................................................................................. xii 
 
Chapter One Institutions and Social Mobilization 
1.1. Introduction   ................................................................................................... 1
1.2. The Chinese Education Movement   ................................................................. 4
1.3. Research Questions and Propositions   ............................................................. 7
1.4. Social Movements, Resources, Opportunities and Identities   ......................... 11
1.5. Social Movements in Non-Liberal, Democratic States   .................................. 16
1.6. Social Mobilization in Malaysia   ................................................................... 30
1.7. Malaysian Social Movements   ....................................................................... 33
1.8. Studies on the Chinese Education Movement   ............................................... 37
1.9. Research Methodology   ................................................................................. 44
1.10. Scopes and Limitations   ................................................................................ 47
1.11. Roadmap of the Thesis   ................................................................................. 49
 
Chapter Two Nation Building and Formation of Social Movement 
2.1. Introduction   ................................................................................................. 53
2.2. Impact of Communist Threats   ...................................................................... 54
2.3. Barnes and Fenn-Wu Reports   ....................................................................... 59
2.4. The Grand Three Associations of Chinese Education   ................................... 64
2.5. The 1955 Malacca Meeting and 1957 Independence  ..................................... 68
2.6. Razak Report and Citizenship Registration Movement   ................................. 72
2.7. Lim Chong Eu and New MCA   ..................................................................... 77
2.8. Rahman Talib Report   ................................................................................... 79
2.9. Formation of Malaysia   ................................................................................. 83
2.10. Dongjiaozong and Merdeka University Campaign   ....................................... 86
2.11. Barisan Nasional and MCA Chinese Unity Movement   ................................ 90
2.12. Conclusion   ................................................................................................... 92
 
Chapter Three Challenges and Adaptations 
3.1. Introduction   ................................................................................................. 95
3.2. State Structural Control and Constraints on Chinese Schools  ........................ 98
3.3. The Turning Point   ...................................................................................... 105
3.4. The Taming of the Schoolteachers   ............................................................. 111
3.5. Competition with the National Union of the Teaching Profession   ............... 114
3.6. School Principals Dominated Chinese Schoolteachers’ Associations   .......... 115
3.7. The Trojan Horse   ....................................................................................... 117




Chapter Four Leaders, Alliances and Politics 
4.1. Introduction   ............................................................................................... 132
4.2. Political Pressure, Process and Opportunities   ............................................. 134
4.3. Merdeka University Lawsuit   ...................................................................... 137
4.4. The Alliance of Three   ................................................................................ 140
4.5. Alliances with the Chinese Guilds and Associations   ................................... 143
4.6. Tianhou Temple Assembly and Operasi Lalang   ......................................... 149
4.7. Reform and Reconciliation   ......................................................................... 152
4.8. The Dual Coalition System   ........................................................................ 154
4.9. From Resistance to Negotiation  .................................................................. 156
4.10. Formation of Tanglian and Challenges of Chinese Unity  ............................ 159
4.11. Resource Mobilization   ............................................................................... 162
4.12. Interactions with the State (1995–2000)   ..................................................... 164
4.13. Reformasi and Suqiu   .................................................................................. 167
4.14. Post-Mahathir Mohamad Malaysia   ............................................................. 171
4.15. The 2008 Political Tsunami  ........................................................................ 174
4.16. Conclusion   ................................................................................................. 178
 
Chapter Five Mobilization Machinery 
5.1. Introduction   ............................................................................................... 181
5.2. Duzhong Revival Movement   ...................................................................... 183
5.3. Duzhong-WC Organization   ........................................................................ 186
5.4. The Subcommittees   .................................................................................... 194
5.5. The Executive Branch   ................................................................................ 198
5.6. Executive Branch Departments   .................................................................. 204
5.7. Departure of Bock   ...................................................................................... 209
5.8. Huaxiao-WC Organization   ......................................................................... 211
5.9. The Executive Branch   ................................................................................ 214
5.10. Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center and New Era College   ..................... 219
5.11. Fundraising Campaigns   .............................................................................. 221
5.12. A Dream Come True, or the Beginning of a Nightmare?   ............................ 223
5.13. Students, Staff and Programs  ...................................................................... 225
5.14. New Era University   .................................................................................... 232
5.15. Conclusion   ................................................................................................. 240
 
Chapter Six Damansara Save Our School Movement 
6.1. Introduction   ............................................................................................... 245
6.2. Dilemmas of Malaysia’s Chinese Schools   .................................................. 247
6.3. Damansara Save Our School Movement Committee   .................................. 251
6.4. Institution Design and Constraints   .............................................................. 260
6.5. The Temple School   .................................................................................... 263
6.6. Defending the School Premises   .................................................................. 269
6.7. Encountering the Police Force   .................................................................... 271
6.8. Media Coverage   ......................................................................................... 272
6.9. Networks and Alliances   ............................................................................. 278
6.10. Tug of War between Political Parties   ......................................................... 280
6.11. The Impact of General Elections   ................................................................ 284
6.12. Resource Accumulation   ............................................................................. 287




Chapter Seven Discussion and Conclusion 
7.1. Introduction   ............................................................................................... 294
7.2. Chapter Summaries and Their Significance   ................................................ 295
7.3. Social Mobilization in Non-Liberal Democracies   ....................................... 299
7.4. Constant Resource Mobilization   ................................................................. 299
7.5. Relationship with the Non-Liberal Democratic Regime   .............................. 307
7.6. Unification of Diversity   ............................................................................. 313
7.7. Suggestions for Future Research   ................................................................ 318
7.8. Concluding Remarks   .................................................................................. 320
 
Bibliography  ......................................................................................................... 322 




Why do certain movements persist
Two important players of this movement, the United Chinese School 
Committees’ Association (Dongzong) and the United Chinese Schoolteachers’ 
Association (Jiaozong) were established in the backdrop of Malayan nation formation 
stage during the 1950s. The movement started in opposition against the British colonial 
administration’s threats (and attempts) to marginalize Chinese vernacular schools in the 
national education system. Over the years, both Dongzong and Jiaozong have survived 
a host of challenges from many quarters, and have endured for six decades while many 
other movements have long since been disbanded.  
 over a significant period of time while some do not? 
How do those that persist sustain themselves and overcome contraints over time, 
especially those imposed by non-liberal, democratic states? This thesis examines the 
persistence of a minority social movement, despite facing considerable constraints 
imposed by a majority-dominated state. Utilizing the Chinese education 
movement—arguably Malaysia’s longest-running social movement—as its case study, 
this thesis argues that both structural and relational institutions are crucial in a 
prolonged movement’s efforts to overcome constraints and sustain social mobilization 
in a non-liberal, democratic state. 
One significant factor behind such persistence has been the structured 
mobilization system that has effectively linked movement communities at the school, 
local, state and national levels. These strong links have been important for solidifying 
the movement’s organizational efforts in facing state-imposed constraints and 
suppression. The bottom-up democratic leadership selection system has also bolstered 
the legitimacy and the power of negotiation of the movement’s leaders in dealing with 
various states agencies. 
vii 
 
The thesis also examines the internal dynamic of the movement, one topic that 
has been downplayed by social movement studies. Using interviews and archives 
materials in Chinese, Malay and English, this thesis traces the dynamics of the agencies 
in mobilizing movement campaigns in the context of various opportunities and 
constraints affecting domestic contentious politics. The thesis highlights three factors 
that have been crucial to the movement’s endurance: inter-elite networking and 
brokerage in mediating the changing relationship between movement and state; the 
unique mobilization mechanisms in the form of movement working committees; and 
the role of the professional and full-time executive branch that has developed over time 
to fulfill the specific needs of the movement.  
To link the six-decade-old movement into contemporary Malaysian political 
context, the thesis illustrates the participation of the Chinese education movement 
activists in the community-based Damansara Save Our School movement in Selangor. 
This case study provides crucial discussions on the aforementioned themes, and 
articulates the conditions that induce different types of mobilization and processes of 
social change in the Chinese community in Malaysia.  
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Chapter One                                  
Institutions and Social Mobilization 
 
1.1. Introduction   
The Chinese education movement in Malaysia is arguably one of the oldest nationwide 
social movements in Asia. The Kisan Sabha movement in India has, since 1936, been 
fighting to end peasants’ political and economic exploitation,1 and, since 1949, the 
Taiwanization movement has been highlighting ideological differences between the 
United States-allied Taiwan and mainland China. The former, however, transgressed 
into violent resistance, while the latter was co-opted by the state’s propaganda machine. 
The Chinese education movement in Malaysia—the focus of this study—is a rare 
example of a movement that has ceaselessly engaged in non-violent contentious 
politics against an ethnic-majority, non-liberal, democratic regime since 1951. 
Over the years, the state has sought to constrain the movement, its organizations 
and its supporters through a range of restrictive regulations and discriminatory policies. 
Unlike in liberal-democratic regimes, the state in Malaysia has been dominated by a 
powerful executive branch, especially so under Mahathir Mohamad’s tenure 
(1981–2003). A weak system of checks and balances has enabled the National Front 
coalition (Barisan Nasional, BN) ruling regime, led by the United Malays National 
Organisation (Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu, UMNO), to manipulate 
democratic institutions, weaken the rule of law, restrict media freedom, control and 
manipulate law enforcement, and politically exploit the distribution of state resources.2
The lack of recourse to democratic institutions, coupled with the imposition of 
state-directed restrictions, has yet to bring the Chinese education movement to its 
  
                                               
1 Sen (1987: 37–57); Hauser (2004). 
2 Diamond (1999; 2002); Crouch (1996); Epstein et al. (2006: 555). 
2 
 
knees, however. It has adroitly adapted and established clientele relationships with 
ethnic-Chinese politicians within the ruling regime in exchange for benefits for the 
movement. While other social movements in Malaysia—such as the trade union 
movements or the Islamic movements—have either faded or have been crushed, this 
tactic by the Chinese education movement has prevented it from facing a similar fate.3 
In return, these politicians, mostly those associated with the Malaysian Chinese 
Association (马华公会, MCA)4
Notably, the broader social movement literature has paid insufficient attention 
to the survival of oppositional social movements in repressive states. These studies 
have been largely predicated on the experience of Western industrialized and stable 
democratic states. Concomitantly, they have emphasized the important role of 
structural institutions—namely, resources, political opportunities and identities. 
Problems and tensions arise, however, when these concepts are applied 
indiscriminately across cultures and state systems.
—the political party that has served as a junior partner 
in the BN—make opportunistic use of the collaboration to achieve political gains by 
acting as brokers between the Malay-dominant ruling regime and the Chinese 
movement. 
The nature and practice of institutions within single-party-dominated or 
non-liberal, democratic states (commonly found in developing countries) have a 
different, yet significant impact on the understanding of social movements and the 
importance of social movement organizations (SMOs). The frequent emergence of 
social movements as vehicles for channeling social—and sometimes 
  
                                               
3 About trade union movement, see Stenson (1970); Wong L (1993); Jomo and Todd (1994); Ramasamy 
and Rowley (2008). The Islamic movements included the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, Darul 
Al-Arqam and Tabligh groups. See Mutalib (1993); Jesudason (1996: 156); Nair (1999: 97); Lee CH 
(2010). 
4 It was known as the Malayan Chinese Association prior to 1963. 
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political—grievances in non-liberal, democratic states points to the urgent need to 
better understand such phenomena empirically and theoretically. 
This thesis argues that structural institutions within non-liberal, democratic 
states are, in various degrees, significantly influenced by informal relationships—that 
is, those built on interpersonal networks and trust. Such informal relationships seem to 
have similar effects, if not more so, on state-social movement interactions than official 
and structural relations. In other words, social movements in non-liberal, democratic 
states develop parallel—at times overlapping—both formal and informal institutions to 
prolong their existence and increase their opportunities to affect change. Utilizing 
Malaysia’s longest-running social movement, the Chinese education movement, as a 
case study, this thesis seeks to shed light on the persistence of a minority social 
movement that has been facing ongoing and changing constraints imposed by a 
majority-dominated, non-liberal, democratic state.  
This introduction first surveys the background of the case study, proposes the 
study’s research questions and makes four explanatory propositions. The chapter then 
examines the mainstream social movement literature, identifies its gaps and traces the 
rise of such studies in non-liberal, democratic contexts.   
The thesis’ main theoretical framework correlates with the three perspectives on 
the role of extra-institutional variables in the execution of structural institutions: the 
intra-movement perspective focuses on the roles of SMOs and movement leaders in 
mobilizing movement activities within non-liberal, democratic states; the movement 
and state perspective concerns the dynamic interaction among the movement’s actors 
through various movement repertoires; and the inter-movement perspective explores 
the role of interpersonal bonds in engaging and strengthening networks and alliances. 
Subsequently, this chapter presents the study’s significance in the context of 
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Malaysia’s pluralistic society and non-liberal democracy. An elaboration of the 
research methodology, limitations of the research, and a general roadmap of the thesis’s 
chapters concludes this introduction. 
 
1.2. The Chinese Education Movement  
As early as 1920, leading Chinese community leaders in the Straits Settlements of 
Penang and Malacca protested against the British colonial administration’s effort to 
exert ‘order’ over Chinese vernacular schools in Malaya through the 1920 Registration 
of Schools Ordinance. 5  Loosely structured and lacking the capacity to respond 
uniformly to changing developments, pre-World War II resistance was confined to 
towns or districts. Although activists enjoyed the support of the local Chinese 
population (in particular, the Chinese-speaking community), which at the time 
numbered roughly 1.1 million,6 most attempts to oppose colonial policies ended poorly. 
The British simply expelled these ‘agitators’. 
Not until after World War II did the movement coalesce into an 
organization-led entity. The Chinese educational movement was formally begun in 
1951, 
                                               
5 A similar law was passed by the Federal Council of the Federated Malay States on November 20, 1920. 
Under this education enactment, all schoolteachers and school committees had to register with the 
Department of Education and comply with various regulations. Many believe that the regulation was 
imposed due to the increase in Chinese nationalism and anti-imperial sentiments in Chinese schools 
strongly influenced by the 1919 May Fourth Movement in China. From 1925 to 1928, 315 Chinese 
schools’ registrations were revoked for failure to comply with curriculum, administration and 
management, or sanitary standards. See MICSSWC (1992: 76–77) and Choong WC (2004: 183). 
led by a group of Chinese schoolteachers who precipitated a sense of crisis in the 
local Chinese society after the release of the controversial Report of the Committee on 
Malay Education (also known as the Barnes Report) in 1951. This government report 
6 The Chinese population in the Malaya Federation in 1921 was 1,174,777 or about 35% of the total 
population. See A Report on the 1931 Census (p. 36). 
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had recommended all vernacular schools to be abolished and replaced by a single 
system of primary school teaching in English.7
Early on the movement witnessed collaboration among three major Chinese 
associations of the time: The United Chinese Schoolteachers’ Association  
(华校教师会总会, Jiaozong), the United Chinese School Committees’ Association  
(华校董事联合会总会, Dongzong) and MCA. They were drawn together under the 
framework of the Grand Three Associations of Chinese Education (三大机构华文教
育中央委员会, Sandajigou) and sought to defend the status of Chinese education 
during Malaya’s rocky and uncertain transition from a colony into a new nation state.  
  
Nevertheless, their collaboration began to break apart in 1960 when 
pro-Chinese education MCA leaders, led by party President Lim Chong Eu (林苍佑), 
left the party over disagreements with the then Prime Minister Abdul Rahman 
(1957–1970). The deterioration of this collaboration marked a historical turning point 
for this movement, where Dongzong and Jiaozong began their long journey of 
resistance as the Dongjiaozong (董教总) alliance, without the direct patronage of 
MCA.  
The Federation of Malaysia, formed in 1963, saw the merger of former British 
colonies: Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak. However, political 
disputes between Singapore’s leaders and Malaysia’s federal government resulted in 
the departure of Singapore from Malaysia two years later. The Chinese population in 
Malaysia suffered a dramatic drop from 42% in 1963 to 25% in 1965, putting the 
                                               
7 The Barnes Report (1951) recommended that all vernacular schools to be abolished and replaced by a 
single system of primary school teaching in English and Malay. It triggered strong reactions in the 




Chinese in the new state of Malaysia at a political disadvantage.8
Today, outside China and Taiwan, only Malaysia has a complete Chinese 
education system, and it is the only country in Southeast Asia perpetuating the Chinese 
education system established during the colonial era. The Chinese education movement 
remains as a legitimate organization in the eyes of the Chinese-speaking community in 
Malaysia and regularly conducts activities such as seminars, donation campaigns, 
submissions of memorandums and press conferences. In the face of a repressive and 
ethnic-Malay-controlled state, the movement has restrained from organizing 
extra-constitutional, anti-government activities to avoid open confrontation with the 
state.  
 Dongjiaozong made a 
name for itself nationally through its unsuccessful efforts to establish Malaysia’s first 
independent Chinese university, Merdeka University (独立大学) in the late 1960s. 
Thereafter, many Chinese communities began to relate the right to operate Chinese 
schools in a ‘Chinese way’ to the preservation of their culture and the security of the 
Chinese identity amid heavy-handed state-building policies and Islamization of state 
and society.  
The movement maneuvers within the country’s limited democratic space to 
conduct, mobilize and maintain resistance through the Chinese school communities’ 
networks at local, state and national levels. Thus far, it has continued to exercise its 
influence from within and beyond the state to push its agenda to promote the status of 
Chinese language and Chinese education in state policymaking. To better understand 
the conditions that induce the processes and persistence of such a movement, this study 
brings a social movement perspective to illuminate the historical and cultural 
                                               
8 Data extracted from Ongkili (1985: 154). 
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experiences of the movement’s struggles beyond the mainstream, Western-centric, 
liberal democratic state social movement literature.  
For research purposes, the dichotomous concepts of minority and majority are 
limited to exclusively-divided categories, such as ethnicity and religious differences. A 
majority-dominated state is a set of institutions in which the distribution of resources 
and power is biased in favour of the majority group. This set of institutions is largely 
controlled by (a few) leaders who belong to the majority group.  
 
1.3. Research Questions and Propositions   
A principal question this study seeks to answer is: How does a minority social 
movement persist in pushing its agenda despite facing ongoing constraints imposed by 
a majority-dominated, non-liberal, democratic state? 
 
Secondary questions include:  
a) What factors have provided motivation to the movement’s activists (and general 
supporters), and how have these factors changed over time?  
b) How do SMOs sustain a prolonged social movement? What are the mechanisms 
deployed by these SMOs that have contributed to the maintenance, mobilization 
and persistence of the movement? 
c) How have the interactions between the challengers and state authorities influenced 
the movement’s trajectory, and how have these changed over time? 
d) How has the non-liberal, democratic state constrained the movement, and vice 
versa? Why has the state yet to ‘terminate’ the movement? Has it chosen not to, or 




To come to grips with these questions, the author suggests the following four 
propositions: 
 
1. Continuous threats and attempts by state authorities to dilute the minority’s 
identity have shaped a culture of resistance that has become a key source of 
motivation for the social movement. 
 
Threats (and efforts) by the Malay-dominated regime to dilute the Chinese identity and 
assimilate the Chinese into Malay society has created a powerful desire for the Chinese 
minority to preserve its cultural distinctiveness and maintain an exclusive ethnic 
identity as a last-ditched, self-help effort.9 Such cultural resources as the vernacular 
language and the identity it symbolizes have shaped the imagined territory of the 
Chinese community. Such a desire has manifested as a culture of resistance (political 
and cultural) against the state through the Chinese education movement.10 This thesis 
argues that, generally speaking, the volume of threats from the regime is positively 
related to the collective support received by the movement from the Chinese 
community. These threats also help to promote unity, strengthen solidarity, and 
overcome meaningful differences within these communities over dialect, political 





                                               
9 Means (1991). 
10 Scott (1976: 33); Anderson (1991). 
11 There are five major dialect groups within the Chinese community in Malaysia, namely, Hokkien, 
Hakka, Cantonese, Teochew and Hainanese.  
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2. The combination of Western-style bureaucratization with a distinct Chinese 
characteristic has produced a hybrid SMO that performs as a suitable and 
sustainable platform to attend to the movement’s managerial and mobilization 
needs. 
 
The movement’s SMOs have developed adequate strength to survive Malaysia’s 
political hothouse by running a bureaucratic system that is formulated around 
loosely-defined rules and that is under the control of its powerful leaders. The 
movement’s constitution and regulated procedural system have transformed the 
traditional management operating style into one that is more result-oriented and 
responsive. A bottom-up leader selection system has empowered and strengthened the 
traditional role of movement leaders with formal legitimacy in representing the 
movement in its interactions with the state. The executive branch enables the 
movement to recruit individuals with professional capacity into the movement, thus 
expanding and deepening the inter-dependence and importance of the social 
networking among its supporters. The full-time and salaried staffs attend, maintain and 
execute various routine movement activities, thus overcoming the free rider problems 
that potentially arise from the movement’s large and extensive grassroots support base. 
 
3. Movement activists sustain interactions with the non-liberal, democratic state 
through interpersonal (and inter-ethnic) bonds that often function as a more 
effective platform than structural institutions or official mechanisms. 
 
Structural institutions within non-liberal, democratic states are imposed in varied 
degrees according to the interpersonal relationship between the power-executer and 
10 
 
power-receiver. Lacking a stable collective bargaining channel, movement activists 
rely on interpersonal bonds and offstage influences (such as brokerage and alliances) to 
deliver their demands and interact with the state. This thesis suggests that the 
significance of relational institutions is inversely related to the effectiveness of 
democratic institutions in delivering the state’s responsibility and in channeling 
demands from the people. Notably, the Chinese education movement has grown 
dependent on both structural and relational institutions, although the latter tend to be 
more effective.  
 
4. Malaysia’s non-liberal, democratic system has provided a limited but significant 
channel for political competition, which in turn has opened opportunities for 
negotiation and thereby has limited violent expression by state authorities and 
social movement activists. 
 
Non-liberal, democratic regimes may infuse state bureaucracy, mediate patronage, 
dispense clientelist benefits and avail partial democratic procedures by limiting, but not 
extinguishing, civil liberties, and distorting, but not excessively manipulating, electoral 
procedures.12 Therefore, although political contenders hardly have room to maneuver 
or curb politicking, and very often such electoral processes are symbolic rather than 
politically significant, the voters’ choice in selecting its government via elections 
remains an important political institution in non-liberal, democratic states.13
                                               
12 Ahmad (1989); Milne and Mauzy (1999: 180–181).  
 It is such 
pressure and need to legitimate power by winning elections that force the regime to 
utilize both carrots (compromise and collaboration) and sticks (pressure and threats) in 
order to win support from its citizens, and particularly from the potentially contentious 
13 Case (2004). 
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agency of social movement activists. Possible agents range from established political 
forces to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and more oppositional social 
movement groups. This thesis maintains that the state with a lower quality of 
democracy will need more legitimacy from winning elections. It is within this tightly 
contended political environment that social movement actors may maneuver by striking 
deals with politicians. For example, by providing necessary support to the ruling 
regime during elections, the Chinese educational movement has been ‘rewarded’ by the 
regime, such as the regime offering a favorable response to the movement’s demands 
for special grant allocation for Chinese schools (see Chapter Five). More importantly, 
the movement’s ability to influence and swing votes has prevented its termination by 
the state. Although tensions between the regime and the movement have waxed and 
waned over time, the latter has been safe from the fate of coercive termination by the 
state, especially when compared to the fate of other ethnic- (and religious-) based 
movements in the country.14
 
  
1.4. Social Movements, Resources, Opportunities and Identities   
Contemporary social movement studies have their origins in the collective behavioral 
literature of the 1940s and 1950s that examined riots, crowds and mass hysteria. These 
works considered the participants of these activities as irrational, dysfunctional and 
abhorrent aberrations in the functioning of a modern social system.15
                                               
14 For example, the 1985 Mamali religious school incident saw Ibrahim Libya and 13 of his followers 
killed, with 159 others arrested. See more at Barraclough (1985) and Hussein (2002: 92). 
 In contrast to 
these modernization-infused studies that stressed the integration and equilibrium 
inherent in social systems, contemporary social movement studies pointed to conflicts 
and struggles as focal points of social systems.  
15 See Durkheim (1938) and Tarde (1969) for the European tradition. See Parsons (1937), Blumer 
(1939), Park (1955) and Smelser (1963) for the American tradition. 
12 
 
Social movements, according to Tarrow (1994), Tilly (1995; 2004) and Thomas 
(2001), are a series of sustained interactions and collective actions, contentious 
performances, displays and campaigns by ordinary people outside established political 
institutions. These people share collective claims, common purposes and solidarity to 
challenge authorities in order to change elements of the socioeconomic and political 
structure, or in the distribution and exercise of power in society. Such collective actions 
are culturally oriented, socially conflictual,16 and based on the networks or movement 
areas of these individuals. 17
Social movements differ from political parties and interest groups. Political 
parties nominate candidates in elections and aim to win formal control of the state in 
order to implement its programs; interest groups and social movements do not 
principally engage in these activities. Social movements and interest groups overlap in 
terms of the flexibility of being formally (or informally) organized to influence public 
policy in their areas of concern; some social movements may transform into interest 
groups when the need arises.
 In this light, this thesis defines social movements as 
networks of ordinary people outside of political institutions that interact and challenge 
the state through a series of collective actions to demand for change. Such interactions 
are considerably influenced by local political structure and social environment.  
18 However, social movements cover broader issues, 
consist of heterogeneous membership, pursue transformational goals, engage in 
contentious interactions with the state, and possess less access to political institutions 
than interest groups customarily have.19
                                               
16 Touraine (1988: 68). 
 Social movements, interest groups and the 
state continuously and ineluctably influence each other. Movements influence state 
actors by setting agendas and suggesting new political strategies; the state, in return, 
17 Melucci (1985: 793–799). 
18 Truman (1951: 33, 135–136); Key (1964: 9–10, 155); Thomas (2001: 5). 
19 Walker (1991); Heinz et al. (1993); Bashevkin (1996: 134–159); Kitschelt (2003); Smith (2008: 109).  
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influences movements by proactively employing covert (and occasionally overt) 
repression measures, and setting the rules for counter-movement as well as movement 
activities.20
Given that social movements involve collective behaviors and actions, how or 
why rational individuals act collectively in a sustained manner has puzzled scholars. 
Despite evident diversity in their processes and outcomes, social movements share 
commonalities and principles that make comparative research and generalizations 
possible.
  
21 Resistance entails costs and usually requires such stimuli as grievances and 
deprivation, although such stimuli do not axiomatically translate into movement 
activity.22 Quite famously, Olson argued that, “unless the number of individuals in a 
group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make 
individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act 
to achieve their common or group interests”. 23
Certain scholars have begun to recognize and emphasize the importance of 
resource mobilization to solve free rider problems and achieve movement success.
 These ‘free rider’ problems are 
especially common in large social movement groups.  
24
                                               
20 Goldstone (2003: 24). 
 
Any given society possesses external resources (money, time, media, facilities and 
material), as well as internal resources (members’ capacity, commitments and moral 
support), that can be put to use by movement leaders to coordinate, organize, mobilize, 
21 Zurcher and Curtis (1973); Coy (1978); Klandermans et al. (1988); Escobar and Alvarez (1992); 
Klandermans (1993); Zirakzadeh (1997); Edelman (2001); Veltmeyer (2004); Davis et al. (2005); Della 
Porta and Caiani (2009). 
22 Zald (1992). 
23 Olson (1965: 2). 
24 Lipsky (1968); Snyder and Tilly (1972); McCarthy, Smith and Zald (1973); Wilson (1973: 131); 
Gamson (1975); Jenkins and Perrow (1977); Tilly (1978). 
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and, ultimately, agitate.25 Mobilization is facilitated by the internal organization and 
structure of the collectivity, known as a SMO.26
McCarthy and Zald (1977), two leading scholars in what came to be known as 
the resource mobilization school, placed special emphasis on the role of professional 
SMOs in solving collective action problems. They defined a SMO as “a complex, or 
formal organization that identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement 
or a counter-movement and attempts to implement these goals”.
  
27
The political opportunities school arose in response to the limitations of the 
resource mobilization approach. A principal proponent of this perspective,  
McAdam (1982), argued that political opportunities, a heightened sense of political 
efficacy and the development of institutions played a central role in shaping the civil 
rights movement in the United States, for example. The political process model places 
great emphasis on the structural constraints and opportunities that social movements 
face. These include political pluralism, internal fragmentation within political systems, 
receptivity of political systems to organized protest, as well as support and facilitation 
of political elites. McAdam asserted that the emergence of social movements was 
determined by expanding opportunities, indigenous organizational strength of the 
population, and cognitive liberation.  
 Social movement 
activities may be organized by one or more SMOs; in some cases, the SMOs 
themselves constitute the movement; in others, the movement has no SMO. 
Nevertheless, the resource mobilization school tended to overstate the importance of 
external resources without explaining where and how these resources can be generated; 
or fail to explain why social movements did not appear in all countries where there were 
grievances and sufficient resources to mobilize people to act on their grievances.  
                                               
25 Olson (1965); McCarthy and Zald (1977); Tilly (1978); Oliver and Marwell (1992).  
26 Oberschall (1993: 56). 
27 McCarthy and Zald (1977: 1217). 
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For Tarrow (1989; 1994), Tilly (1978), and McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly  
(1997; 2001), the success of mobilization (or politicization) hinges on the opportunities 
afforded the group in question. The opportunities present themselves when there is a 
shift in the institutional structure or the ideological disposition of those in power.28
 A newer European-focused social movement literature sought to tackle this 
problem. These scholars argued that advanced industrialization had created structural 
possibilities for conflicts, especially with the widening of access to higher education 
and the en masse entry of women into the labor market.
 
Although this approach was successful in justifying the growth and development of 
social movements that were based on grievances, material needs and accumulation of 
resources, it could not adequately explain how social movements based on ideas and 
grievances related to ways of life could arise.     
29 This perspective has grown 
from the phenomena where individuals opposed the state’s and market’s intrusion into 
social life, and asserted their rights to determine their private identities and affective 
lives vis-à-vis the comprehensive manipulation of the larger system.30 These new social 
movements—such as preservation of the environment, human rights, gay and lesbian 
rights—foregrounded quality of life issues. 31
The formation and creation of personal, collective and public identities were 
defined by Melucci as “an interactive and shared definition produced by several 
interacting individuals who are concerned with the orientations of their actions as well 
 Moreover, this paradigm placed 
importance on the actors and their abilities to capture the innovative characteristics of 
movements.  
                                               
28 Freedman (2000: 37). 
29 Della Porta and Diani (1999). 
30 Melucci (1980; 1989; 1996).  
31 Offe (1985). 
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as the field of opportunities and constraints in which their actions take place”.32 This 
definition is supplemented by Gusfield who saw that the members of the group “agreed 
upon definition of boundaries”33
This literature associated the formation and mobilization of movements based 
on the individualized, middle-class lifestyles and the diversity of social identity in 
post-industrial societies, especially in Western Europe. It went beyond the resource 
mobilization and political process schools that emphasized the availability of resources 
and political opportunities as key factors in giving rise to social movements. However, 
these three research agendas have been largely developed in the context of 
industrialized North American and Western European states with stable democratic 
regimes. This has meant that the limitations of these camps are thrown into stark relief 
when their concepts and arguments are indiscriminately applied across cultures and 
state systems.
 and provided the basis that enabled shared beliefs, 




1.5. Social Movements in Non-Liberal, Democratic States 
Liberal regimes are able to perform because they are based on highly institutionalized 
rules and democratic procedures (such as constitutions, elections, media, courts) that 
structure social interactions by constraining and enabling actors’ behaviors. 35
                                               
32 Melucci (1989: 34). 
 
Institutions within liberal democratic states invite comparison and evaluation, with 
emphasis on the reproduction and stability of social order.  
33 Gusfield (1994: 15). 
34 Escobar and Alvarez (1992: 317–319); Adams (2002: 24–26).  
35 North (1990: 1–4); Knight (1992: 2); Carey (2000: 735); Campbell (2004: 1); Hodgson (2004: 424). 
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Nonetheless, societies’ access to institutions varies according to local legal 
settings, institutional hierarchies, cultural orientations and type of regimes.36 In this 
thesis, the state is defined beyond the traditionally narrow, static and rigid way. Instead, 
it consists of overlapping institutions and heterogeneous agents: elites, politicians and 
bureaucrats, each with divergent interests.37
Non-liberal, democratic regimes tend to control institutional access tightly to 
strengthen their capacity in achieving economic, political or social goals. Institutions 
are frequently arranged according to the styles and preferences of the power-holders. 
Non-liberal, democratic states, either of the military or civilian type, do differ on the 
degree of legal and institutional legitimacy. Today, save for North Korea, most 
non-liberal, democracies range from semi-democracies—those with mixed or hybrid 
characteristics—to those deemed more authoritarian.
 
38
At the illiberal end, authoritarian regimes rule without accountability, which 
enables abusive state actors to enjoy absolute impunity.
 
39  According to Panizza, 
instrumental authoritarian regimes may be democratically elected but the regimes 
would not hesitate to temporarily defer democracy, such as through coercive military 
rule, or to brutally repress open demonstration to impose social order during social 
polarization or political turmoil.40
Hybrid regimes can be both competitive and authoritarian and have been 
categorized by scholars according to the proportion of authoritarian or democratic 
features.
 These regimes do not tolerate social activism, and 
tend to quell contention through hefty penalties. 
41
                                               
36 Scheingold (2004). 
 For starters, Schedler (2002) separated ‘electoral democracies’ from 
37 Skocpol (1979; 1985: 9); DiMaggio and Powell (1983); March and Olsen (1984); Evans (1989). 
38 Jopple (1995: x); Helmke and Levitsky (2006: 1–2); Marsh (2006: 1). 
39 Linz (1975: 264); Mainwaring (2003). 
40 Panizza (1995: 183). 
41 Levitsky and Way (2002). 
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‘electoral authoritarianism’, with the former having free and fair elections that comply 
with minimal democratic norms, while such criteria is absent for the latter.42 Within 
electoral authoritarianism, Diamond (1999; 2002) further categorized electoral 
authoritarianism regimes into the ‘competitive authoritarian’ and ‘hegemonic electoral 
authoritarian’ regimes, with the former instituted via multi-party electoral competition 
and a significant parliamentary opposition, while in the latter, these challenges and 
processes are politically closed. 43  There are also the ‘repressive yet responsive’ 
semi-democratic regimes, which respond to pressure and demands from society, but do 
so through co-optation, neutralization and suppression to control social conflict.44
Within the numerous categorizations of hybrid regimes, scholars generally 
agree that a hybrid system enables a regime to extend its tenure by authoritative control 
of democratic institutions.
  
45 Most hybrid regimes consist of some features of formal 
democratic institutions (such as regular elections), but liberalism is tightly contained, 
resulting in little real competition for power to assure political stability and discourage 
any challenges to power holders. 46
A hybrid system enables the country to be controlled by a small number of 
individuals rather than democratic institutions or the rule of law.
 Above all, there are low levels of political 
participation beyond voting. 
47
                                               
42 Schedler (2002: 37–38). 
 Such manipulation 
of power sees some hybrid regimes intervene aggressively in the economy through 
shrewd state policies and use performance legitimacy to substitute for procedural 
legitimacy. These hybrid regimes tend to manipulate state resources to establish 
political patronage with their supporters, or frequently abuse the law, resulting in poor 
43 Diamond (2002); Levitsky and Way (2002); Schedler (2002). 
44 Crouch (1996: 236–247). 
45 Case (2005: 138–139); Brooker (2009). 
46 Ottaway (2003). 
47 Ottaway (2003: 4–5). 
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representation of citizens’ interests and low public confidence in state institutions.48 
Although such constraints and limitations have systematically weakened civil societies 
and social organizations, they allow some political debate and the avenue of social 
mobilization remains possible within semi-democratic states, as long as it does not 
challenge the state’s political legitimacy.49
The emergence of an increasing number of hybrid state systems after the  
Cold War has yielded a better understanding of their patterns and effects on political 
system, and the influence of the domestic political environment on social movements.
  
50 
Although political inequality is acutely felt by social movement actors in varied 
degrees, the need to fulfill one’s internal motivation (such as self-expectation and 
conceptions, personal interest and political ideology) and external legitimacy (such as 
political structure and potential opposition) are elements that constrain the ability of 
institutions to achieve meaningful social change, making comparative analysis across 
states possible.51
Such a perspective was explored by Boudreau (2004). He argued that the modes 
of people’s resistance are shaped by the types, patterns and degrees of repressive 
strategies imposed by authoritarian states. Political opportunities—in particular, 
political openness—increase protests and anti-dictatorship pressure from 
democratization movements. Moreover, centralized and mediated movement 
organizational resources (such as formation of alliances) increase the power and 
capacity of contention that may lead to successful contention against an authoritarian 
regime. Boudreau’s important study also demonstrated the state’s ability to adapt its 
  
                                               
48 Foweraker (1995: 2); Jones (1997); Laothamatas (1997: 12); Diamond (1999); Goodwin, Jasper and 
Khattra (1999); Forsyth (2001).  
49 Case (1992); Gomez (1994); Khoo BT (1997:72).  
50 Carothers (2002: 5–6); Diamond (2002); Levitsky and Way (2002: 51–52); Armony and Schamis 
(2005). 
51 Scheingold (2004). 
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strategies in response to different patterns of contention, which may range from radical 
to moderate challenges.  
Boudreau covered three different democracy movements in Southeast Asia. He 
showed how Ne Win’s regime in Burma survived various challenges. The regime’s 
intolerance of protest, its use of extreme means to weaken the oppositions’ 
organizational capacities—which, among others, prevented alliances from forming 
among protest groups—resulted in a weak opposition that was easily crushed. In the 
Philippines, Boudreau highlighted how the coalition between politicians and the 
communist front survived initial repression and re-emerged as a strong oppositional 
alliance; the latter played a key role in the toppling of the Marcos regime.52
Although social movements within non-liberal, democratic states may lack the 
capacity to effectively impose checks and balances on the authoritarian state, their 
appearances (and subsequent protests) shape pressure and form a basis for political 
pluralism and structural change. Boudreau’s argument was illustrated by He Bao Gang 
(1993; 1996) using the 1989 democratic movement in China. Although the 
demonstrations at the Tiananmen Square (天安门广场) in June 1989 were brutally 
crushed by the communist regime, it had a positive impact on the gradual liberalization 
process in China. Pressure to bolster the Chinese Communist Party’s waning political 
legitimacy saw the party’s political elites begin to adjust their conceptions of 
 Finally, an 
uprising in Indonesia was delayed before ripe moments (the Asian financial crisis) 
occurred in the late 1990s, which enabled a breakthrough in collaboration among 
opposition groups to bring down Soeharto’s New Order regime.  
                                               
52 Boschi (1990). 
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legitimacy, implement economic reforms, and allow the existence of populist and 
liberal notions of democracy proposed by the democratic camp from within the party.53
Similarly, Kerkvliet (2005) studied the seemingly unorganized and 
non-confrontational way Vietnamese peasants engaged in undermining the system of 
collective farming dictated by the state. Consequently, the peasants forced the state into 
replacing collective farming with peasant family farming in the 1980s. As Kerkvliet 
convincingly argued, the character and power of everyday politics provided political 
implications for understanding Vietnamese state policy. Although a strong state 
prevented the establishment of a broad peasant SMO to conduct open protest, these 
passive and individualized forms of resistance successfully paralyzed the state’s 
farming policy. The centrality of peasants as the source of labor power and its 
significance as the foundation of political support and national unification prevented 
authorities from using force or coercive methods to crush peasant movements.  
 
Phatharathananunth (2006) explored the struggles of the Small Scale Farmers’ 
Assembly of Isan—a major grassroots movement in Thailand—in its campaign to 
protect the rights of the rural poor since 1993. The movement provided a political 
channel for peasants who have been marginalized in the Bangkok-based and 
elite-controlled electoral politics from participating meaningfully in the 
democratization process. The state, in return, tried to control the gradually powerful 
movement by co-opting key movement leaders and marginalizing the radical faction of 
the movement.54
The differences in political ideology, experience of colonization, economic 
development and social structure all have direct and powerful implications on the 
development and trajectories of social movements. Therefore, analysis of social 
 
                                               
53 He BG (1993; 1996). 
54 Phatharathananunth (2006). 
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movements in non-liberal, democratic states needs to pay special heed to cultural and 
historical contexts.55
Moreover, power relationships between challengers and authorities are in a 
constant state of flux, and even more so in non-liberal than liberal democratic states, 
ironically limiting the availability of opportunities for social movements to draw upon. 
In light of this, activists rely less on formal institutions and more on unconventional 
methods to disseminate movement messages, mobilize support and engage in 
contention action.  
 This is what mainstream social movement literature, with its focus 
on structural conditions such as the availability of resources, political processes and 
opportunities, and the construction of identity, tends to lack. 
In the social movement literature, the understanding of extra-institutional 
variables has been clumsily lumped into the categories of framing and culture without 
much systematic analysis.56 Framing is a vital strategy for many movements’ activists 
within advanced Western states to instill a sense of injustice, shape collective identities, 
attract mass media coverage, garner bystanders’ support and demobilize antagonists.57
In fact, cognitive understanding, community influences, moral missions, 
kinship links and emotional attachments tend to matter greatly in the process of social 
 
The significance of framing and the distribution of its products (speeches, images and 
writings) have different effects in the non-liberal, democratic world. Limited access to 
media, higher risk of state suppression and a fragmented society divided along 
linguistic, ethnicity, religious and cultural lines make it distinctly challenging to create 
(and sustain) a universal frame that is equally appealing to all.  
                                               
55  Anderson (1986); Smith (1986); Callaghy (1988); Migdal (1988); Shevtsova and Eckert  
(2001: 65–67). 
56 McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996); McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (1997: 154); Goodwin, Jasper and 
Khattra (1999).  
57 Snow et al. (1986); Snow and Benford (1988: 198; 1992: 137); Benford (1993); Hunt and Benford 
(1994); McAdam (1996: 340–341); Steinberg (1999: 737).  
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mobilization in non-liberal, democratic states. Here, this thesis proposes to study such 
institutions by taking into consideration the humane, organic, dynamic and flexible 
interpersonal bonds in the execution of structural institutions. The analysis will be 
conducted at three levels: dynamics within the movement (intra-movement relations); 
dynamics between the movement and the state (movement and state relations); and 
dynamics between the movement and other movements (inter-movement relations).   
 
While social movement studies focus on the logic of collective action, studies of SMOs 
expressly address the elements of agencies and institutions that harness collective 
action. Social movement institutional elements, such as regulations, the strength of 
SMOs, and financial and human resources, set the criteria for defining a social 
movement. SMOs are particularly important for legitimating the selection of leaders to 
govern and consolidate the needs of social movements, reduce uncertainty through the 
centralization of power along a line of authority, control organizational effectiveness 
through collective decision-making procedures, and mobilize the grassroots to 
overcome external obstacles and constraints—in other words, enable the movement to 
struggle for change.
(1) Intra-Movement Relations 
58
Most SMOs are loosely organized, especially during their early phases, with 
institutionalization normally taking place following the height of mobilization.
  
59
                                               
58 Alberoni (1984: 171); North (1990: 6, 37); Oberschall (1993: 28); Lounsbury and Kaghan (2001).  
 
Within many non-liberal, democratic states, the execution of these institutions and the 
delivery of their functions are shaped (and reshaped) by temporal processes and 
political struggles. Unlike in democratic states, SMOs in non-liberal, democratic 
systems face higher risks of coercive suppression, encounter more constraints in terms 
59 McCarthy and Zald (1977); Kriesi, Koopmans and Duyvendak (1995). 
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of accessing resources or mobilizing support from the community. Such limitations 
force SMOs to adapt themselves frequently throughout their lifespan in response to 
pressures imposed on them.  
The extent and sophistication of SMOs may vary throughout the process of 
achieving their objectives, but characteristically, there are divisions of labor and 
bureaucratic structures in SMOs. Formalization matures toward expansion in size and 
professionalization of staff. Appointed bureaucrats serve as committees or 
administrative officers, each adherent to a hierarchy of positions, scope of authority and 
responsibilities.60 SMOs may establish parallel institutions to confront and engage with 
state institutions more directly. For instance, movement leaders deal with cabinet 
ministers, SMOs officers deal with various federal departmental officers, state-level 
committees deal with state-level government officers, and so on.61
As will be shown in Chapter Four, the SMOs of the Chinese education 
movement were professionalized with strong local influences, such as by congregating 
the school professionals to form a hierarchical bureaucracy and structure for the 
working committee that enabled the constant flow of sustainable resources to the 
movement. Moreover, in a persistent yet amorphous condition between the 
loosely-defined and the institutionalized organizations, the movement enabled 
democratically-elected leaders with centralized authority to respond promptly and 
effectively to the rapidly changing landscape of contentious politics. 
  
Once a social movement has transformed from a ‘state of resistance’ into a 
‘state of persistence’, goal transformation occurs as leaders begin to replace 
unattainable goals with those that are more pragmatic and relevant, simply to become 
                                               
60 Wilson (1973: 8, 164). 
61 Oberschall (1993: 31). 
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more sustainable.62 These changes allow social movements to endure, especially when 
opportunities for influence are minimal; however, they may also alienate supporters 
and draw normative commitment away from members.63
What makes a capable leader is profusely subjective, and these individuals are 
rare. As will be examined in Chapter Five, the Chinese education movement suffered 
internal tensions. Factions of SMOs community led by movement activists who were 
closely affiliated with the preceding leader refused to collaborate with new leaders who 
wanted to transform the movement’s strategies from one of radical resistance into 
conservative persistence. Such a shift of repertoires was perceived by the reformist 
faction as a failure to inherit the legacy of prior leadership.
 Because the decision for such 
transformation and changes are made based on the powerful movement leader’s 
judgment, little justification or bottom-up participation is available. Such top-down 
authoritative management styles can mimic the regimes that constrain the movement in 
the first place, and the movement depends on the capacity of good leaders to 
successfully execute such relational mechanisms.  
64
The matter became more complicated when the reformist faction was supported 
by senior SMOs officers who succeeded in the oligarchization of the movement—that 
is, concentrating power by manipulating the hierarchical bureaucratic structure for 
personal desire and benefits.
  
65
                                               
62 Huntington (1968); Powell and DiMaggio (1991); Thelen (1999: 381–399; 2004: 25–31). 
 As argued by Zald and Ash (1966), the use of adversarial 
tactics increases with oligarchy. An elaboration of the twists and turns of these 
contentions will contribute significantly to the literature on internal dynamics (and 
tensions) of SMOs, something which has been downplayed by contemporary social 
movement literature.   
63 McAdam (1982: 55–56); Andrews (2002: 108). 
64 The concept of repertoires will be discussed in the intra-movement and state perspectives. 
65 Wilkinson (1971: 108). 
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Social movements within non-liberal, democratic contexts are defined by the interests 
they represent, and the ways such demands are carried out. Repertoires are relational 
products of contention between challengers and power holders, which limit both the 
strategic choice of performances, as well as the conceptual mapping of possibilities for 
action.
(2) Movement and State Relations 
66
 Repertoires can come in the form of highly conventional actions, such as 
lobbying and judicial action, or as passive as everyday resistance, which may better 
encapsulate the challenger-versus-state authority relations in non-liberal, democratic 
states. Demonstrations may be common in many mature democracies, but their absence 
(or infrequency) in non-liberal, democratic states cannot be taken as an absence of 
social movements. The state’s control of law enforcement allows little space for 
maneuver or negotiation. Therefore, high intensity social protests, open political 
opposition, or any extra-constitutional mass groupings often face harsh, coercive 
repression. Movement leaders who (successfully) organize such contention activities 
often face imprisonment and ‘follow-up’ punishment from the regime.   
 Tilly (1976; 1983; 1986; 1995) argued that since the nineteenth century, 
collective action repertoires in advanced Western countries changed from being local, 
autonomous and reactive to become national, directed and proactive as a consequence 
of the rise and formation of full-fledged nation states as the dominant political 
organizations. Yet, such shifts are absent from, or only partially exist, in most 
non-liberal, democratic and developing states which lack experience in the building of 
democratic institutions (inherited from their colonial master), in addition to having to 
deal with a host of other more critical state-building problems such as an 
underdeveloped economic sector and a polarized society. 
                                               
66 Tilly (1995: 42). 
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Lacking institutional access and facing repression, resistance often occurs 
outside the political arena, and exists in a manner that is clandestine, small-scale and 
constantly subjected to refrainment. The proliferation of everyday forms of peasant 
resistance as observed by Scott (1987) suggests that informal acts of resistance (such as 
foot-dragging, dissimulation, pilfering, or sabotage) involve no overt protest and 
require little or no coordination and organization. These resistances concern largely 
immediate, de facto gains, and at the same time minimize the risks of any direct 
confrontation with the authorities.67
 This thesis also proposes that social movement activists engage in active and 
dynamic collaboration, other than passive resistance, with non-liberal, democratic state 
regimes though brokers. Facing a regime that relies on interpersonal networks rather 
than on structured institutions galvanized movement activists to seek informal—yet 
potentially more promising—channels such as brokerage to achieve their demands.
 Scott’s discourse, however, best pertains to a small 
community with dense informal networks and historically deep subcultures of 
resistance. The potential and influence of passive resistance by a small community 
constituting powerful repertoires is elaborated in Chapter Six through the case study of 
Damansara villagers’ resistance against the state’s closure of Damansara Chinese 
Primary School. Unlike Scott’s peasant movement, which was confined to the village 
level, the Damansara resistance successfully rallied for support from the nation, and 
eventually forced the Malaysian regime to yield to their demands. 
68 
Brokerage is a process in “which intermediary actors facilitate transactions between 
other actors lacking access to or trust in one another”.69
                                               
67 Scott (1987).  
 Brokers connect and coordinate 
communication and interactions, improve access to material and state resources, and 
68 Fukuyama (1995: 7–9). 
69 Marsden (1982).  
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increase the success of promulgating changes between the movement and the regime.70
 
 
Brokers within a pluralistic society must be equipped with multi-linguistic ability and a 
good understanding of the sensitivities of traditional cultures. As will be discussed in 
Chapter Two, English- and Chinese-speaking MCA politicians have created political 
advantages for themselves by assisting the inter-movement and state collaboration 
since 1951. These politicians have received recognition from the Chinese community 
for their roles as successful gatekeepers of the Chinese’ cultural and kinship interests, 
which are critical in the eyes of this community.  
The formation of inter-movement networks and alliances is a critical strategy to reduce 
competition over resources among social movements. Strong institutional bonds based 
on a shared identity provide opportunities for routine interaction and consequently 
reduces cleavages, develops trust, and promotes sharing of information and 
experiences.
(3) Inter-Movement Relations   
71
Social movements establish both formal coalitions and informal collaboration 
with other movement organizations at local, national and international levels, but social 
movements in non-liberal, democratic states tend to rely on inter-leadership 
collaboration rather than inter-institutional coalition.
 
72
                                               
70 Foster (1961); North (1990: 37); Staggenborg (2002: 126); Roy and Sidera (2006: 4).  
 For one, not all social 
movements in such settings can afford to establish a formal organization. Moreover, 
agent-based alliance is easier to conduct—for instance, an underground meeting—and 
thus can remain under the regime’s radar. Such agent-based networks rely primarily on 
the leaders’ social reputation, professional commonalities and political connections. 
Networks and alliances that are based on personal connections can be stable and 
71 Olson (1982); Coleman (1990); Morrill (1995); Putnam (2000); Bandy and Smith (2005: 4).  
72 Meyer and Tarrow (1998: 19). 
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enduring, especially in the face of state oppression or co-optation.73
Associational relationship can be dense, such as groups that share many 
similarities and a common identity, or weak, such as groups divided ethnically, 
culturally and linguistically. Sharing the same language, life style and experience of 
being exploited by the state and its policies, along with experiences of prior 
collaboration, help to enhance collective bonds that are, over time, strengthened by 
emotional attachment and trust among these agents.
 A tight cadre of 
committed allies facilitates rapid and honest sharing of information.  
74 Because social movements in 
polarized societies tend to articulate their aims in terms of racialism or communalism 
rather than associational activities, this increases opportunities for collaboration within 
the same ethnic, cultural, or linguistic groups.75 Such prior collaboration is important 
for forming a strong associational alliance, as it was key to the success of the civil rights 
movement in the United States in the 1960s where black leaders and the non-black 
masses with similar religious backgrounds and experiences united for a common 
cause. 76  Such an alliance may survive if members of the alliance can fulfill the 
components of a strong capital, which range from economic, cultural and social to 
political needs.77
 The lack of opportunities for collaboration between social movements may also 
result in a minimal level of trust across movement organizations, and delay the 
formation of a more unified and stronger alliance to overcome the constraints imposed 
by a repressive state. It is only during times of frustration, such as the failure of 
intra-ethnic alliances, or the co-optation of former allies by the regime, that such 
inter-movement collaboration may be born. Operating in the often unpredictable 
  
                                               
73 Chwe SY (1999). 
74 Klandermans and Goslinga (1996); Koopmans (2004).  
75 Jennett and Stewart (1989). 
76 McAdam (1982). 
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environment of non-liberal, democratic regimes, every step forward and every act of 
resistance is meaningful. By joining forces, the allied movements increase their 
capacity to seize political opportunities and overcome constraints.78
 
     
1.6. Social Mobilization in Malaysia 
Unlike General Ne Win’s military regime in Burma, which refused to recognize the 
institutions of democracy such as constitution, parliament, election results and the like, 
or President Ferdinand Marcos’s martial law regime in the Philippines, which 
assassinated members of the opposition and filled key ministerial positions with family 
and friends, Malaysia’s BN regime—in particular during Mahathir Mohamad’s 
era—has taken a relatively less authoritarian approach than its neighbors, such as 
Indonesia (Soeharto’s New Order) or Singapore (Lee Kuan Yew and the People’s 
Action Party). The state does claim some form of legitimacy through its domination of 
democratic institutions. 79  Yet, Malaysia wavers between authoritarianism and 
democracy. Debate on its quality or state of democracy is notable for the variety of 
hedging adjectives scholars have used to describe it: ‘fettered’, 80  ‘modified’, 81  
‘quasi’,82 ‘illiberal’83 and ‘semi’.84
Malaysia demonstrated a promising pattern of consociational democracy under 
the Alliance coalition in the 1950s and 1960s.
  
85
                                               
78 Gamson (1975); Oberschall (1993: 31); Andrain and Apter (1995: 6); Boudreau (2002: 44). 
 Nevertherless, the Alliance was 
dissolved following the 1969 ethnic riots and was replaced by the BN alliance in 1974. 
Enhanced power was placed in the hands of the executive, which, in turn, dominated 
79 Bruun and Jacobsen (2000).  
80 Muzaffar (1989b: 144). 
81 Crouch (1992; 1993). 
82 Ahmad Z (1989). 
83 Weiss (2006). 
84 Case (1992). 
85 Case (1996: 1–2); Lijphart (1985:6; 2008: 49) 
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the once-meaningful legislative and judiciary branches of government.86 Such power 
has enabled the executive-heavy regime to control and manipulate state resources, the 
civil service and law enforcement. Elections remain the most important institution that 
confers legitimacy upon the regime, despite widely known and unfair practices that 
constitute Malaysia’s elections, including gerrymandering, short notice on the election 
dates, hurried campaign period, and domination of mainstream media by the BN 
regime.87
Not until 1998 with the rise of Malaysia’s Reformasi movement to support 
former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim (1993–1998)—who had been trumped 
up by his political opponents for corruption and sodomy, leading to his overnight 
political demise in 1999—did a strong coalition of opposition parties emerge to 
confront the BN ruling regime. The Malaysia’s Reformasi movement was inspired by 
the reformasi movement that toppled Soeharto in Indonesia. Although Malaysia’s 
Reformasi movement and the opposition coalition failed to challenge BN’s two-thirds 
majority in the parliament at the 1999 General Election, the formation of the People’s 
Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Rakyat) by Anwar’s supporters and the increase in 
demands for democratic reforms by Malaysia’s middle-class population laid important 
foundations for political change.  
 
After Mahathir Mohamad’s retirement in 2003, the political system gradually 
liberalized under the stewardship of his handpicked successor, Abdullah Badawi, the 
fifth prime minister of Malaysia (2004–2008). Abdullah Badawi promised to 
reconstitute an independent judiciary and reform the Anti-Corruption Agency to 
counter the degenerative corrupt practices within UMNO and across the civil service 
                                               
86 Abas (1989; 1989b); Roger (1989: 158); LCHR (1990); Ho KL (1992b). 




By 2008, for the first time after 1969, the opposition People’s Alliance 
(Pakatan Rakyat, PR) successfully challenged BN’s two-thirds majority in the 
parliament. It also won control of five state governments during the country’s twelfth 
General Election.
 These promises convinced Malaysian voters to support Abdullah Badawi’s 
administration and saw BN coalition win a landslide victory in the 2004 General 
Election. However, as these political promises remain unfulfilled at the end of 
Abdullah Badawi’s first term as the prime minister, Malaysians were becoming 
progressively impatient and disappointed with the administration’s inability to fulfill its 
campaign promises.  
89 Scholars and pundits hailed these developments as the dawn of a 
true democracy, especially when an increasing number of senior BN politicians 
admitted there were deficits in the BN legitimacy that required political reforms from 
within.90 Although the relatively peaceful transition of power of the state governments 
was promising, it was marred by the Perak Constitutional Crisis (that enabled BN to 
regain state government control from the PR coalition), the new sodomy trial against 
PR leader, Anwar Ibrahim, and the mismanagement of the distribution of PR-led states’ 
development funds by the centralized federal government (which channeled these 
funds to state-level federal agencies instead of the PR state governments).91
The BN regime, while competing to remain as a significant player in the formal 
political arena, also has to deal with demands from various social movements. 
Significantly, through constant interactions, the Malaysian government-Chinese 
education movement relationship has produced interesting, yet puzzling, outcomes.  
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1.7. Malaysian Social Movements 
Social movements in Malaysia can generally be divided into two main types: inclusive 
and exclusive. The former is concerned with universal issues such as the environment, 
democratization and human rights, while the latter focuses on ethnic- and 
religious-based concerns. Inclusive-based movements are often studied as part of civil 
society activities or the democratization process by movement activists who are also 
academics and researchers at local and international universities.92
The women’s rights movement has gained considerable attention. Works are 
mostly published by well-established women research centers at local universities.
 On the other hand, 
activists of exclusive-based movements tend to be in professions that are 
non-research-related, such as schoolteachers and religious teachers. More importantly, 
linguistic limitation has restricted the accessibility of research works and resources of 
these movements, resulting in most of these important developments being left 
understudied to the English-speaking scholarly world of social movement studies.  
93
                                               
92 On civil societies related studies see Mohamed Idris (1986), Saravanamuttu (2001) and Hilton (2009); 
on democratization process related studies see Tan and Ibrahim (2008), Loh KW (2009) and Tan LO 
(2010). 
 
Among the most significant works is that by Ng, Mohamad and Tan (2006). Ng and her 
associates studied the market forces that drove the politicization of feminism in 
Malaysia. Urban development and industrialization increased the number of women 
who engaged in higher education and employment, thus strengthening their economic 
mobility and political empowerment. Women’s newly acquired economic and political 
position enabled women (together with other civil society members) to participate in 
democratization struggles. Their book also highlighted the restrictions placed upon, and 
inherent limitations of the women’s movement in Malaysia—in particular, conflicting 
interests within the multi-cultural and multi-religious milieu of the broader society. 
93 Tan and Ng (2001); Lai SY (2004); Tumen (2006); Ng CS (2010; 2010b).  
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Like many other enduring movements, leaders of the women’s movements have opted 
to collaborate with, instead of confront, the state, which has enabled prominent 
feminists to influence state policies from within the government, and thereby avoid 
incurring the state’s wrath. The observations of Ng and her associates are important, for, 
as will be shown in this thesis, the persistence of the Chinese education movement, to 
some extent, has also followed a similar pattern of repertoires. 
Another noteworthy work on inclusive-based movements is by Weiss and 
Hassan (2003). They provided insights into the sociological and economic 
circumstances that gave rise to the rapid growth of civil society in Malaysia in the 
1980s. Booming in numbers in the 1980s, NGOs have adopted strategies and tactics 
that ranged from antagonism to cooperation with the state’s ideology and interests. 
According to Weiss and Hassan, the state is particularly threatened by, and will react 
with harsh repression against, three types of movements: those that advocate Islamic 
fundamentalism, those that challenge the state’s political foundation, and those that 
persist in the form of mass protests. The Chinese education movement, the subject of 
this study, has steered clear of these three criteria in the course of its history. 
Unfortunately, because Weiss and Hassan’s contributors are mostly practitioners and 
active movement entrepreneurs, their chapters, although richly detailed, failed to 
address wider social movement debates and issues. Moreover, by ignoring the 
exclusive-based movements, their work failed to consider a different kind of civil 
society envisioned by religious- or ethnic-based groups.  
In Protest and Possibilities (2006), Weiss took her analysis deeper to examine 
the conditions that prompted the formation, and the factors that have constrained the 
sustainability of coalition capital between NGOs and opposition political parties. 
Illustrative is the pro-Anwar opposition coalition that formed to challenge the BN’s 
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political hegemony in the 1999 General Election. Although the coalition fared poorly, it 
contributed to the country’s democratization. The gradual expansion of space for civil 
society activists to develop a non-communal based movement, and the opportunity to 
interact and cooperate with opposition parties, Weiss argued, helped to establish the 
coalitional capital—that is, mutual trust and understanding—necessary for groups to 
find a common cause and work in coalition.  
Weiss’ two studies debated the formation and strengthening of coalitional 
capital in mobilizing collective action among civil society agents. She concluded that 
the lack of a long-term strategy of resistance in the NGOs’ coalition ultimately 
handcuffed the 1998 Reformasi movement. The role of coalitional capital will be 
further explored in this thesis, by analyzing the Chinese community’s networks and 
coalitions that date from the colonial era (Chapter Four), and the role of these networks 
in the success of the Damansara Save Our School movement (Chapter Six). 
Exclusive-based movements, meanwhile, as argued by Fishman (1969), with 
his ‘multi-modal nations’ model, are predominantly discrete from their cultural, 
vernacular, lingual and educational differences. Linguistic familiarity brings members 
of a common linguistic group together in spite of their different social backgrounds and 
economic classes. Path dependency from Malaysia’s unique colonial experience and 
inter-cultural compromises made during its nation building process have shaped the 
fundamental differences among different linguistic groups; these differences are often 
determined by their ethnicity. Scholars of these movements have explored the 
consequences of social grievances and the politics of collective behaviors, such as the 
Islamic religious movement, the religious and socio-economical struggles of the Indian 
minorities, and the Chinese education movement.  
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The literature on the country’s religious movements is dominated by Islamic 
scholars. Since the early 1970s, Arabic- and religious-educated groups such as Jammat 
Tabligh and the Darul Arqam have been spreading fundamentalist, Islamic ideas at the 
grassroots level.94 The rise of a highly organized and well-financed Muslim Youth 
Movement of Malaysia (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia) led by Anwar Ibrahim in the 
late 1970s, in particular, captured the attention of scholars who wanted to explore the 
far-reaching political influence of the organization.95 This Islamic student movement 
questioned the gradual loss of religiosity and spiritual values among Muslim 
communities (and state actors) in the face of rapid urbanization and Westernization.96 
To appeal for the reconstruction of Malay society, the Muslim Youth Movement of 
Malaysia formed a powerful coalition with the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party  
(Parti Islam Semalaysia, PAS) in the late 1970s.97 However, its rise was quickly 
subdued after the key leaders of the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (such as 
Anwar Ibrahim) were co-opted into the BN ruling regime.98
Othman (2005) detailed the strategies adopted by the Sisters-in-Islam 
movement—comprising largely middle-class professional Muslim women—in 
negotiating for equal rights in legal, political, economic and social arena for Muslim 
women. The Sisters-in-Islam is a civil society group that professes greater religious 
expressions and demands for greater gender-equality in Malaysia’s male-dominated 
Islamic society. Tension between the movement on the one hand, and the 
male-dominated PAS (which advocates an Islamic state) and UMNO (which has 
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implemented a series of Islamization programs since the 1980s within a secular 
nationalist vision) on the other hand, continue to this day.99
Studies of the Indian community’s movements are predominantly focused on 
religious or socio-economical perspectives: Willford (2006) studied the contrast 
between Hindu ecumenical movements and the Tamil identity; Jain (2009) compiled 
the sociological and economical challenges faced by Indian plantation workers; Noor 
(2008) researched the rise of Hindu Rights Action Force—a coalition of 30 Hindu- and 
Tamil-based NGOs in 2006—that generated a new wave of collective action to protect 
the minority community. All told, this literature is underrepresented compared to the 
magnitude of grievances suffered by the Indian community in Malaysia over the years.   
 
Not surprisingly, the bulk of social movement research related to the Chinese 
community has revolved around the Chinese education movement. These studies will 
be explored in detail in the subsequent section. 
 
1.8. Studies on the Chinese Education Movement   
Studies on the Chinese education movement can be categorized into three types. The 
first comprises works written by pro-movement scholars, Dongjiaozong, and the 
latter’s affiliated organizations. Dongjiaozong has published heavily on themes 
surrounding the various campaigns it conducted. These include its collections on 
selected issues of the Chinese education movement,100 historical descriptions of the 
movement, 101  essays on its movement leader, Lim Lian Geok (林连玉 ) 102  and 
others.103
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Notably, a prominent historian of Malaysian Chinese, Tay Lian Soo (1998, 
1998b, 1999, 2001, 2003 and 2005), compiled some of the most complete encyclopedic 
references on the movement from the perspective of the Chinese community. 
Employing various vernacular sources such as school magazines and the vernacular 
presses, Tay’s historical studies covered 600 years of the development of Chinese 
education, with detailed descriptions of the roles played by local actors at the school 
and community level. Although Tay’s works are largely limited to West Malaysia, they 
are significant records on the transition of the Chinese education movement from 
before, during and after the colonial period.  
 One of the few in-house publications that examined intra-movement dynamics 
of the education movement was Lew Bon Hoi’s book (2006). It surveyed the 
contributions by Jiaozong and the movement leaders in the field of education, politics 
and culture from 1951 to 2005. The first half of the book revealed the activities 
conducted by Jiaozong in promoting Chinese culture and its involvement in domestic 
politics. Lew also detailed the relationship between Jiaozong and Dongzong as partners 
in the movement. The second half of the book focused on the contributions of former 
Jiaozong leaders. Lew concluded that Jiaozong played a significant role in 
safeguarding Chinese education in Malaysia, despite having failed to promote and 
secure benefits for Chinese schoolteachers as was suggested in its constitution. 
However, Lew’s analysis over-stated Jiaozong’s achievements during the 1950s and 
1960s, and overlooked the factors that led to its weakening afterwards. Without 
analysis of the latter, we lack an understanding of the internal problems that plagued 
Jiaozong and its strategies to overcome such challenges.   
The second type of publications on the education movement comprises works 
written by independent authors. These works revealed another side of the movement, 
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giving accounts from bottom-up perspectives, and discussing critical and sensitive 
issues regarding the movement. For example, long-serving Chinese educators,  
Wang Siow Nan (1970), Liu Pak Kui (1986) and Huang Zhao Fa (2004) published their 
experiences and personal observations obtained from running the Chinese schools—the 
most important and autonomous institutions of the Chinese education movement. Their 
writings enabled the author to observe the shared similarities of these local institutions, 
and therefore to analyze the local-central relationship within the movement (elaborated 
in Chapter Three).   
There are also such independent writers as Lin, Wang and Xu* (2006) who 
disclosed secrets related to the controversy over the alleged corruption among 
principals of Chinese primary schools (see Chapter Three). Tan Ai Mei (2006) 
discussed the embedded dilemmas faced by the Malaysian Chinese primary school 
education system. Kua Kia Soong (2009) revealed his side of the story regarding the 
2008 New Era College controversy that led to his own resignation and that of the 
college’s senior staff (see Chapter Five). Kua also criticized the current movement 
leaders, thus publicizing the internal power struggles of Dongjiaozong.   
The third type of writings on the Chinese education movement consists of 
academic publications, which can be categorized predominantly into historical, 
institutional and political approaches. Notably, Purcell’s (1948) documentation 
provided an important historical sketch of the Chinese immigrants’ political and 
sociological situation in Malaya prior to the Chinese education movement from an 
English official’s perspective. Chinese immigrants viewed themselves as an exclusive 
race, and their desire to preserve their Chinese identity became the key motivation for 
the establishment of Chinese schools as educational and sociological institutions.   
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Purcell, in another work, Malaya: Communist or Free (1954), gave a 
chronological account of the political and social developments in post-war Malaya. He 
analyzed the communist aggression in Malaya and its impact on Chinese school 
communities in particular. The threats of communism (supported predominantly by the 
Chinese community) and Chinese nationalism towards China (and not Malaya) became 
the basis for a series of public policies imposed by Malayan state authorities to control 
local Chinese schools. This marked the beginning of the Chinese education movement 
(more elaboration in Chapter Two).    
Another frequently cited work, Tan Liok Ee (1997), provided fundamental 
analysis on the emergence, challenges, controversies and dilemmas of the movement 
from 1945 to 1961. Adopting a chronological approach, Tan’s study categorized the 
movement’s trajectories into three periods: the reaction of activists towards the 1951 
Barnes Report, the collaboration of Malaya’s Alliance regime with the Chinese 
education movement leaders, and the failure of the Jiaozong-Dongzong-MCA alliance.  
Tan’s work confirmed the development of the Chinese education movement in 
Malaysia into a social movement. Not only did she show that the movement was a 
heterogeneous entity, she also showed the dynamic interactions between the state and 
the social movement across various political trajectories. Drawing on Tan’s and 
Purcell’s work, Chapter Two of this thesis broadens the analysis of the movement in its 
early stages by including issues such as the influences of the anti-communist 
movement, the role of Chinese elites and the impact of the New Economic Policy.  
Zainal Abidin Ahmad (1980) asserted that since the ethnic responses to 
education policies seemed to enhance the objectives of certain interest groups, 
educational reform efforts tended to be functionally disintegrative. However, most 
scholars who examined the impact of such policies using the Chinese education 
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movement as their case study tended to disagree with Ahmad’s position. These scholars 
were mostly fixated with the idea that manipulative institutional policies were covert 
forms of ethnic discrimination.  
For example, utilizing the development of Chinese primary schools in Malaysia 
from 1956 to 2000, Sia Keng Yek (2005) argued that the fears and resistance of the 
Chinese community towards the Ministry of Education (MOE) (when it terminated 
Chinese primary schools and turned them into national schools) became key factors in 
sustaining the movement. Sia thematically analyzed these schools’ physical 
development, managements and curriculums, to demonstrate their resistance. 
Similarly, Tan Yao Sua’s (2005) doctoral dissertation maintained that such 
manipulative state institutions exacerbated the conflicts of interests between the Malay 
majority and the Chinese minority. Tan adopted the concept of identity and framing 
from the social movement literature to analyze the role of Dongjiaozong as a SMO in 
the Chinese education movement.  
There are many authors who studied independent Chinese secondary schools in 
Malaysia. Huang Guan Qin (1984) and Ku Hung Ting (2003) both studied the 
resistance of these schools against incorporation into the national system under the 
1961 Education Act. With Huang providing perspectives from West Malaysia and Ku 
from Sarawak, they both credited the autonomy of Chinese school committees in 
school policymaking as the main factor behind their success in resisting the conversion.  
On the other hand, Tang Tze Ying’s (2004) master thesis argued that power 
relationships between Chinese schools committee members and state actors influenced 
the reactions of Chinese schools towards the 1961 education reforms. School 
committee members who had a close relationship with state agencies (Chinese 
politicians from MCA in particular) more readily accepted the government’s call to 
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include Chinese secondary schools into the converted system. In fact, the diverse 
outcomes of Huang’s, Ku’s and Tang’s research revealed the reality of the Chinese 
education movement that is now divided into factions supporting or contesting the 
conversion. The division will be further explored and discussed as one of the causes 
behind the prolonged struggle of the movement in Chapter Five. 
The struggles of the movement were also analyzed through political 
approaches, demonstrated in Lee Leong Sze’s (1999) master thesis and Cheong Yuen 
Keong’s (2007) doctoral dissertation. Both studied the dilemmas of Chinese political 
parties within the BN ruling regime and their reactions towards the Chinese 
community’s demands, such as the demand for better protection of the Chinese 
vernacular schools’ interests and better access of Chinese minorities to state resources. 
Both agreed that vernacular educational issues have been politicized to sustain the 
political interests of these political parties. Lee concluded that the politicization of 
vernacular educational issues widened the gap among ethnic groups, which, in turn, 
was one of the escalating factors that led to the 1969 riots.  
Cheong, who continued his observations in the post-1969 era, however 
concluded that both MCA and the Malaysian People’s Movement Party (Parti Gerakan 
Rakyat Malaysia, Gerakan) acted as intermediate agents, especially during general 
elections. Their roles have enabled parties to broker a compromise between the needs 
of the BN ruling regime and the Chinese education movement, and became the critical 
factor behind the survival of both Chinese political parties, while also preventing the 
movement from being terminated by the state. Such dynamic interactions between the 
Chinese political parties and the movement, and the political opportunities arising from 
such interactions, will be further elaborated in Chapter Four where we examine the role 
of elites, networks and brokerage.  
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To date, few studies have looked into the role of the Chinese education 
movement’s SMO in the movement struggles. An exception is Teoh Ai Ling’s (1999) 
master thesis that studied the institutional structure and functions of Dongzong. Her 
work provided rich 
Admittedly, much light has been shed on the Chinese education movement, 
especially its reactions and resistance towards unjust policies. Yet, almost all studies 
have treated the movement as a homogenous entity. In actuality, the movement’s 
entities are stratified (local versus central), factionalized (converted versus 
independent) and divided (conservative versus reformist). In this study, the author 
explores the intra- and inter-relationships among movement actors, comparing the 
different dilemmas faced by Dongzong and Jiaozong, the changing relationship 
between the movement and the state, as well as the transformations of the collaborative 
relationships between the movement and the Chinese guilds and associations.  
descriptions on the functions and roles of each department within 
Dongzong and clearly explained the structural relationship among these departments. 
Nevertheless, her study fell short of analyzing the competition and contentious politics 
among the departments (for this, see Chapter Five). Lai Sook Kin’s (1997) master 
thesis was a rare academic biographical work on one of the movement leaders,  
Sim Mow Yu (沈慕羽). Very often, biographies of movement leaders are in-house 
publications written rather unilaterally with much praise and few criticisms. Lai’s 
thesis provided a detailed background and described the influence of Sim’s father and 
his family on his later active roles as a politician, educator and Chinese educationalist.    
Additionally, most of the literature has taken for granted the resources 
(financial and human resources alike) that are needed to maintain and sustain the 
movement. Chapter Five investigates the role of SMOs, and their mechanisms that have 
been responsible for strategizing the generation and maintenance of resources.   
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This thesis is the first to cover the movement in its entirety from 1951 to 2011. 
The analysis of the movement in the post-1998 period is particularly important, as there 
is a vacuum in the existing literature in the analysis of the logic and impact of the 
movement’s shift from open contention to low-profile resistance. Information gathered 
during fieldwork, especially that related to the little known underground negotiations 
between the movement activists and state agencies, is a theoretical and empirical 
attempt to further understand the width and depth of the movement. 
 
1.9. Research Methodology 
The author collected primary data in Malaysia over the course of 11 months.
(1) Interviews  
104 A major 
component of the fieldwork was conducting interviews. The author conducted 74 
in-depth, open-ended and semi-structured elite interviews with 65 identified 
interviewees, and nine follow-up interviews (see Appendix 1 for the list of interviewees 
with details on the time and locations of interviews).105
Confidentiality of identity was assured to all interviewees at the beginning and 
reiterated at the end of every interview. To the author’s surprise, only seven informants 
requested to remain anonymous. However, about 30% of the interviewees refused the 
 Almost all of the interviews 
were conducted in Chinese, with about 20% conducted in a mix of local dialects such as 
Hokkien (福建话) (in Penang) and Cantonese (广东话) (in Selangor and Kuala 
Lumpur region). The choice of conducting the interviews in the interviewees’ 
vernacular languages enabled interviewees to relate to and share their thoughts with the 
author with greater ease.  
                                               
104 February–March 2008; December 2008–February 2009; November 2009–March 2010; and July 
2010. The first two trips of the fieldwork were partially financed by the National University of 
Singapore, while the rest were self-sponsored.  
105 Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2000: 274). 
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author’s request to voice-record the interview. Those who agreed tended to be 
uncomfortable and distracted—for example, they stared at the voice-recording 
machine, and enquired if the authorities would gain access to the recordings—and this 
seemingly caused some of them (especially those who were not familiar with academic 
interviews) to fail to speak their minds freely. Subsequently, the author abandoned 
recording interviews. To minimize the impact on verbatim content, the author 
depended on note-taking during the interview (with permission from the interviewees)
Many of the interviewees had witnessed important changes in the movement 
and Malaysia’s transition from a colonial to a developing country. Almost all activists 
interviewed in this research had encountered state discrimination before, and these 
experiences, instead of impeding them, motivated them to participate in the movement. 
Despite having operated in various factions, the interviewees were—and remain to this 
day—well-connected with one another, and regularly share updates and information 
regarding the movement through small talk.   
 
and afterwards. The length of each interview was restricted to an average of one hour to 
optimize concentration for both the author and the interviewee.  
Informants can be divided into the following clusters (including both current 
and retired categories): local, state and central-level movement leaders; movement 
executive officers; schoolteachers, school principals and school committees; and lastly, 
other influential Chinese community leaders (beyond the framework of Dongjiaozong), 
including commercial, political, societal and educational leaders, among others.  
No state or federal government officials agreed to be interviewed. Thus, the 
author had to operate with caution (such as not to mention sensitive keywords, or any 
anti-government sentiments) when dealing with various state agencies. The author also 
kept a low profile while conducting fieldwork to avoid unnecessary scrutiny. 
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Interviews were mostly conducted at the interviewees’ office, or at a secure location. 
Some interviewees offered conservative views and were less candid during the first half 
of the interview, but most began to shed light on the internal dynamics of the 
movement’s structures, functions, goals and framing strategies of issues as the 
interview progressed. The author has striven to corroborate all information with data 
from other sources. Follow-up interviews and countercheck interviews were 
conducted, especially with those who played critical roles in various decision-making 
processes.   
 
Primary sources included annual reports of Dongzong (1985–2009), Jiaozong 
(1951–2009), Lim Lian Geok Cultural Development Center (1995–2009) 
and 
(2) Material Collection 
Dongjiaozong
The author also explored collections of theses, newspapers clippings and 
reference books in different languages to balance different perspectives. Multiple visits 
were made to the offices of the Chinese printed media of Sinchew Daily (星洲日报) 
and Kwongwahyitpoh (光华日报) for their collection of newspaper clippings. The 
author discovered important archival documents in the Centre for Malaysian Chinese 
Studies, Dongzong, Jiaozong, as well as at the university and national libraries in 
Malaysia and Singapore.   
 Higher Learning Center Non-Profit Private Limited (1998–2009). 
These annual reports comprised important statements, official documents and strategies 
used over the years. Other vernacular sources, such as school magazines, provided 
insights about the schools’ organizations (including the managing committees), 
funding and activities.  
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Field observations, especially of significant events related to the movement, 
have been useful for corroborating reports and obtaining an independent assessment of 
the relationships among actors. The author participated in the 2008 General Election 
campaigns; the wake, funeral and memorial services of deceased Damansara Save Our 
School movement Chairman Yong Yoke Song (熊玉生) in March 2008, as well as 
those of Jiaozong’s former Chairman Sim Mow Yu in February 2009. The author also 
attended the groundbreaking ceremony of Lim Lian Geok’s Graveyard Upgrading 
Project in March 2008 and the reopening of the Damansara Chinese Primary School in 
January 2009. Such events helped the author to acquaint herself with people in various 
networks, and expand contacts useful for the research.   
 
1.10. Scopes and Limitations  
The struggle against time had been paramount. Spending only 11 months in the field 
forced the author to compromise and conduct fieldwork only in the West Malaysia. 
Despite the Chinese population in Sabah and Sarawak constituting about 14% of the 
total Chinese population of Malaysia, Chinese schools in these states developed in 
different historical settings, which makes generalizations based upon their study 
difficult.106
                                               
106 2008 Social Statistics Bulletin Malaysia. 
 Although the Sabah and Sarawak state-level Chinese schools associations 
are part of Dongjiaozong, and representatives of these states participate in movement’s 
meetings at Kuala Lumpur, they have yet to play a leading role in the movement. 
Readers who are interested in acquiring detailed perspectives about the development of 




Given the exploratory nature of this thesis, the author aims to generate useful 
insights and contribute to the establishment of general propositions in the field of social 
movement studies in Malaysia. The author is aware of the domination of the qualitative 
approach in the study of the Chinese educational movement in Malaysia and of social 
movement studies in general.107 Despite the methodological imperfections of such an 
approach, it permitted intensive examination of the selected case when time and 
resources available to the author in the course of this research were limited. 108  
Lijphart’s ‘longitudinal’ (cross-historical) extension helped to minimize the conceptual 
and analytical weaknesses of having more variables than cases. 109
This research includes many observations on human behavior, and unlike the 
precision of natural science, the ability to observe accurately the attributes of people is 
rather limited. Interview effects and sensitizing of interviewees to the topics in the 
survey process—the participants of research might guess the rationale of the study and 
thus adjust their behaviors or opinions accordingly—might reduce internal validity. 
Therefore, follow-up interviews and countercheck interviews were conducted to reduce 
these effects.  
 Moreover, the 
process of making observations in an empirical case study allowed the author to trace 
causal processes and highlight the richness of their interactions, thus enhancing the 
magnitude, depth and validity of this thesis’ findings.   
 Within the thesis, the author would like to excuse herself from acknowledging 
the various social titles (such as Tun, Tan Sri, Dato), academic titles of PhD, medical 
doctors (M.D.) and religious titles (Haji, Hajjah), as she seeks to treat all individuals as 
equals regardless of their social or political background. As most of the primary and 
secondary data were in Chinese, the thesis applies the transcription of simplified 
                                               
107 Tan LE (1997); Tan YS (2005); Weiss (2006). 
108 Collier (1992). 
109 Lijphart (1971: 686). 
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Chinese in the hanyupinyin (汉语拼音 ) system. All Chinese names are written 
according to the Malaysian Chinese custom of placing the surname before first names. 
To avoid confusion, officially registered names in the Roman script will be used, and 
then cited with the original Chinese characters in parenthesis on first mention for the 
purpose of further reference. Hanyupinyin is used for names when their official 
translation is not available, and they are marked with (*) to distinguish them.   
 
1.11. Roadmap of the Thesis
This thesis consists of seven chapters. They are arranged thematically to illustrate the 
relationships of various institutions with social mobilization. Chapter Two draws the 
readers’ attention to the nation building process and the rise of the Chinese education 
movement in Malaya. The chapter seeks to reveal many important, yet under-explored 
developments that took place from the post-World War II period 
  
to 1974—the year 
Malaysia normalized its diplomatic relations with the People’s Republ ic of China. The 
main players of the Chinese education movement, Dongzong and Jiaozong, were 
established during the nation formation stage, and played significant roles in securing 
Chinese citizenship rights and the survival of vernacular schools in Malaysia. 
Elites—especially those from 
The subsequent three chapters examine the design of the structural institutions 
and the adaptations made by various relational institutions in facing state-imposed 
challenges. Chapter Three analyzes the elements of the lowest but most autonomous 
and fundamental units in the movement’s hierarchy, such as the school committees and 
political parties and business groups—became important 
agents who initiated collaboration and brokered compromises between the state and the 
social movement until the collapse of this relational institution came about when the 
new elites failed to continue the intimate collaboration. 
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schoolteachers of Chinese schools. These include three types of Chinese schools, 
namely, Chinese primary schools, converted Chinese secondary schools and 
independent Chinese secondary schools. These schools experienced continual 
marginalization as a result of government educational policies—especially in funding 
allocation—despite the fact that Chinese schools (with the exception of independent 
Chinese schools) had been incorporated into the national educational system. The 
chapter then analyzes the role, formation and collaboration of associational capitals of 
state-level Chinese school committees and Chinese schoolteachers’ associations. The 
chapter ends with an exploration of the inter- and intra-organizational transformations 
in Dongzong and Jiaozong, and evaluates the changing roles and challenges faced by 
the central-level leadership system.  
The analysis of any SMO will not be complete without an analysis of domestic 
contentious politics. Chapter Four explores such interactions, particularly that of social 
movement leaders exploiting political opportunities through the state’s electoral 
institutions. Many new repertoires have grown out of desperation during the process, 
and resulted from changing relationships and formation of alliances between the 
movement and Chinese guilds and associations. The chapter also presents the 
emergence of various campaigns such as the alliance of three in 1982, collaboration 
amongst the leading Chinese organizations as the Fifteen Leading Chinese Guilds and 
Associations since 1983, promotion of the dual coalition system in 1986, joining of the 
opposition party in 1990, and chairing of the Malaysian Chinese Organisations Election 
Appeals in 1999. The chapter also shows how the authorities deployed carrot-and-stick 
measures to co-opt and suppress the movement, although these efforts have failed to 
terminate the movement altogether.  
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Chapter Five extends the scope of research into the functions of two nationwide 
working committees of the Chinese education movement, namely, the National 
Independent Chinese Secondary School Working Committee and the National Chinese 
Primary Schools Working Committee. The chapter reveals the working relationship 
between movement activists at the central level and the movement’s local level 
supporters. The chapter also focuses on resource accumulation and mobilizational 
mechanisms of the movement, and the role of the professional secretariats in the 
process. The chapter ends by addressing the controversy surrounding the formation and 
maintenance of the New Era College, highlighted by tensions within the movement.  
Chapter Six details the Damansara Save Our School movement to illustrate the 
participation of Dongjiaozong and its working relationship with the community-based 
Damansara movement committee, and draws crucial discussions from the previous 
chapters. Through examination of the Damansara Save Our School movement, the 
chapter highlights the potential of (and constraints on) the Chinese education 
movement’s social mobilization capacity beyond the traditional support base that has 
been limited to the Chinese-speaking community only. The chapter will analyze the 
factors that led to the dying out of such inter-ethnic collaboration opportunities, 
hopefully to provide scholars a renewed perspective of the possibility of multi-ethnic 
social movement collaboration in Malaysia.   
In Chapter Seven, the aforementioned themes are drawn together to examine 
the impact of institutions on social mobilization in the Chinese education movement, 
and to better understand various processes, stages and structures of the SMOs. It is 
hoped that by analyzing the general incompatibilities found in the Chinese education 
movement, this research would jumpstart the discussion over their resolution and 
trends, so as to acquire a better understanding of SMOs in the future. Thus by 
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comparing them with other regional and international SMOs, this chapter concludes by 





               
Nation Building and Formation of Social Movement 
2.1. Introduction 
The Chinese education movement in Malaysia was created, maintained and developed 
parallel to Malaysia’s domestic politics since the British colonial era. The 
decolonization of the Malaya Peninsula in the post-World War II years re-defined the 
balance of power, especially among the English-educated ethnic leaders. Although 
these elites dominated official state decision-making mechanisms, the Malayan state 
was vulnerable during its infancy and therefore allowed space for negotiation with the 
influential vernacular-speaking ethnic elites.  
 This chapter gives special attention to the role of elites as social capital in the 
Chinese community, namely, political parties, Chinese guilds and associations  
(华团, huatuan) and Chinese schools. It was these vehicles that gave rise to a series of 
social movements and raised political awareness among Malaya’s Chinese 
communities, especially in the bid to secure their citizenship rights, demand for 
Chinese language to be accorded official language status and ensure the survival of 
vernacular education.  
The chapter first explores the formation of political parties such as United 
Malays National Organization (UMNO) and Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) in 
reaction toward threats to their ethnic groups. UMNO and MCA subsequently formed 
the Alliance—a political coalition to make a peaceful demand for state independence 
from the British. MCA established a promising fellowship called the Grand Three 
Associations of Chinese Education (Sandajigou) with the United Chinese 
Schoolteachers’ Association (Jiaozong) and the United Chinese School Committees’ 
Association (Dongzong). This fellowship was successful in bridging the state and the 
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Chinese education movement actors until it started crumbling in 1960, when its 
pro-vernacular education leaders left MCA. From then on, the Chinese education 
movement began to nurture stronger bonds with huatuans, which laid the foundation 
for the movement’s trajectories in the later stage.  
The efforts of nation building by the Malay-dominated state unavoidably 
posited it as a threat that would dilute the vernacular identities of its non-Malay 
communities through constitutional acts and education policies, especially after the 
establishment of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963. The Chinese’ resistance against 
the state’s assimilation attempts is best demonstrated by their overwhelming support to 
Dongjiaozong’s Merdeka University campaign in 1967. The chapter ends with a 
discussion on the impact of the implementation of New Economic Policy in 1971, and 
the political consequences of normalization of diplomatic relations between Malaysia 
and the People’s Republic of China in 1974, signaling a new era of the rise of 
‘motherland’ for the Chinese in Malaysia. 
  
2.2. Impact of Communist Threats  
Despite the resumption of British colonial rule in Malaya after World War II, this 
period was characterized by a gradual transition to decolonization. Massive migration 
had resulted in the number of immigrants outnumbering the Malays, 110 making it 
possible for immigrants to challenge the status quo of the native majority.111
                                               
110 Malays are territorially allegiant to sultans, culturally to Islam. Silcock and Aziz (1953: 279). 
 The 
British’s policy and practice of ‘divide and rule’ polarized the colony’s social structure. 
In particular, it led to a discernible economic division along ethnic lines that resulted in 
111 The non-Malays comprised about 50% in the Malaya total population. Among them, 62% Chinese 
and 50% Indians were locally born. See 1952 Report of the Registrar-General on Population, Births and 
Deaths, p. 2. 
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heightened tensions, fuelling local nationalist movements that were 
ethnically-oriented.112
The Malayan Communist Party
  
113 and the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese 
Army, 114  both the backbones of resistance against the Japanese’ World War II 
occupation of Malaya, emerged as formidable political forces in the society after the 
defeat of Japan.115 In fact, the Malayan Communist Party briefly ruled Malaya from 
March to August 1945, before British authority was re-established. Aided by a power 
vacuum, the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army killed some 2,500 collaborators 
(mostly Malays), abolished the sultanates, and attempted to make Malaya part of 
China.116 The Red Bands of the Sabillah (Holy War) was formed by Malays to combat 
the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army. The intensity of this communal violence 
sealed, in the minds of many Malays, a negative stereotype of Chinese as communists 
and as a threat to both Islam and the Malay community.117
After the British re-took control of Malaya in August 1945, they introduced the 
Malayan Union government in April 1946 as a unified and more cost-effective 
government structure. It was also conceived as a form of preparation for the possibility 
of self-rule and independence. The scheme offered full citizenship rights to Chinese 
and Indians born in Malaya, and dissolved the sultanates into one secular union.
 
118
                                               
112 See Abraham (1997) for the impact of this policy on ethnic relations in Malaysia.  
 Its 
113 Malayan Communist Party, formed in 1930, comporised mainly Chinese migrant laborers. By 1955, 
the rebellion was crushed, with remnants of the party continuing military resistance against the Malaya 
federal government along the Thai-Malaya border until the 1989 peace treaty. See Ramakrishna (2002) 
for Malayan Communist Party’s struggles during the Emergency era.  
114 Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army, a political association, was controlled by the Malayan 
Communist Party, and was once equipped by the British. It grew from 200 in 1942 into a force of 10,000 
by 1945. See Purcell (1967: 258–262) and Springhall (2000: 50).  
115 Pye (1957: 8). 
116 Horowitz (1985: 398). 
117 Lomperis (1996: 204).  
118 The British ruled Malaya through ‘direct and indirect’ government. The entrepot trade centers of 
Penang, Malacca and Singapore had non-Malay majorities, which were ruled directly as crown colonies. 
Malay states with significant commercial activities (tin-mines and rubber plantations)—Perak, Selangor, 
Negeri Sembilan and Pahang—were set up as Federated Malaya States. Those states lacking in such 
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imposition shocked the Malay community and promoted the emergence of the first 
Malay nationalist party, UMNO, founded in May 1946, to oppose the Malayan Union.  
Due to strong protest and pressure from Malay aristocrats and former Malayan 
governors in London, the Malayan Union was dismantled and replaced by the 
Federation of Malaya, which reinstated the traditional prerogatives of the sultans and 
restored ‘special positions’ to the Malays as ‘sons of the earth’ (bumiputeras)119 in 
February 1948. 120  It also tightened the qualification for federal citizenship by 
disqualifying over three quarters of the Chinese population.121 Thus, disparate ethnic 
Chinese, although initially divided by their clans, dialects, social status, political views 
and economic identities, were given the impetus to unite again after the painful 
experience of the massacres during the Japanese occupation.122
Chin Peng (陈平) became the Malayan Communist Party’s secretary general in 
1947 after the predecessor, Lai Tek,
   
123 absconded with the party’s funds in March 
1947.124 In a bid to empower the weakening party, Chin emulated the successful model 
of Mao’s revolutionary movement in China and launched an armed guerilla rebellion 
under the Malayan Races Liberation Army, which prompted the British to declare a 
State of Emergency in June 1948.125
                                                                                                                                      
activities—Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu and Johore—were ruled as Unfederated Malaya States. 
See von Vorys (1975: 22, 142); Cheah BK (1983: 441–446). 
 The Emergency also gave the British—and their 
119 Bumiputera refers to two groups of people: the ethnic Malay who habitually speaks Malay, professes 
Islam and conform to traditional Malay customs (adat), and the indigenous occupants of the Malay 
archipelago. 
120 Chai HC (1977: 7). 
121  Only 350,000 (11%) Chinese and 225,000 (7%) Indians were eligible to become citizens of 
Federation of Malaya under the ‘operation of law’ condition in February 1948. See Chai HC (1977: 8).   
122  Japanese military began the Kakyo Shukusei (purge through purification)—operation wartime 
massacres on ethnic Chinese—from December 1941 until April 1942, and continued in other forms until 
August 1945. The number of victims reached as high as 50,000 in Singapore and 40,000 in Malaya. See 
Cheah BK (1983: 23); Peattie (1996: 230–231); Hirofumi (2008).  
123 Fujio (1995: 37–58). 
124 Ramakrishna (2002: 32). 
125 Pye (1957: 7); Clutterbuck (1966: 22–24); Heng PK (1988: 50); Lomperis (1996: 204); Lee KH 
(1998: 31–32); Keylor (2003: 51). 
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Malay successors—justification to mobilize a significant amount of resources in their 
war against communism.126
As members of the Malayan Communist Party were largely ethnic Chinese, and 
many Chinese schools were used as centers of the Chinese Communist Party’s 
propaganda, the British stereotyped the Chinese in Malaya as communist supporters, or 
as fence-sitters in the anti-communist campaign.
 
127 For example, the British believed 
that the many Chinese squatters who hid in the jungles during World War II had either 
provided supplies to the Malayan Communist Party, or had been recruited as new party 
members.128 One of the largest and most successful strategies imposed by General 
Gerald Templer,129 the new high commissioner in 1952, was the Briggs Plan. The 
Briggs Plan forcibly resettled almost 570,000 Chinese squatters into hundreds of new 
villages, which, in the end, helped to control and contain the communist rebellion.130
According to Ramakrishna, “the rural Chinese were the target of government’s 
emergency measures: in particular individual detention and deportation, communal 
fines and curfews”.
 
131 In total, 30,000 communist activists were jailed, and another 
15,000 were deported to China. 132  Many of them were school principals and 
schoolteachers recruited from China by the Malaya Chinese schools.133
With the establishment of the People’s Republic of China on 
 
October 
                                               
126 The lengthy guerrilla war (1948–1960) cost the British (and the Malayan government) $850 million. 
11,048 people were killed (6,710 guerrillas, 1,865 security forces and 2,473 civilians). See Pye (1957: 
15); O’Balance (1966: 177); Stockwell (1999: 486).  
1949, 
most overseas Chinese communities harbored fears that the new communist state might 
127 Chew KH (1975); Heng PK (1988: 251); Freedman (2000: 55). 
128 Chai HC (1977: 10); Lee KH (1998: 31–32). 
129 General Templer arrived in Malaya in February 1952 to replace Henry Gurney who died in a terrorist 
ambush in late 1951. Templer was both high commissioner and military director of operations, and had 
full authority to wage counter-communist insurgency operations, using policing, intelligence and 
psychological warfare. See Abdul Rahman (1986: 35); Ramakrishna (2001).  
130 Sandhu (1964). 
131 Ramakrishna (2001: 82). 
132 Lomperis (1996: 204). 
133 Choong WC (2004: 184). 
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confiscate their properties and businesses, and were, therefore, reluctant to express their 
loyalty to the new Chinese government. This included the Chinese in Malaya, who 
were beginning to think of Malaya as their only hope for a permanent homeland.134
In an attempt to alleviate the Chinese community’s dilemma, Tan Cheng Lock 
(陈祯禄),
  
135 with support from various huatuan, formed MCA in February 1949. 
Initially, the MCA sought to provide relief and welfare assistance to Chinese villagers 
displaced by the Briggs Plan, redirect Chinese support away from the communist, and 
provide an image of loyalty of the Chinese in the midst of suspicions aroused by the 
emergency decree against the Chinese community in general.136
These MCA leaders were dominated by Straits-born English-educated Chinese 
elites who enjoyed linguistic advantages and were well accepted by British and UMNO 
leaders. They incorporated wings of Chinese-educated, Kuomintang (国民党)-inclined 
leaders, established trust, and, through networking with various Chinese associations, 
successfully expanded MCA membership to 250,000 by 1953.
  
137 In return for the 
strong support from Chinese-speaking grassroots communities, MCA began to take on 
a more comprehensive role, such as awarding of immigrant citizenship, protecting the 
status of Chinese education and preservation of the Chinese identity in Malaya’s 
Independence Constitution.138
According to Hara (1997), MCA outplayed the Malayan Communist Party and 
the Chinese consulates in Malaya as the most effective legitimate Malayan-oriented 
 
                                               
134 Heng PK (1988: 251). 
135 MCA’s first president Tan Cheng Lock was Straits-born, English-educated and a nominated member 
of the Malacca Municipal Council and Straits Settlements Legislative Council, and known to British’s 
highest officials, such as Malcolm MacDonald and Henry Gurney. See Heng PK (1988: 67, 251); Tan LE 
(1988: 50–51). 
136 Roff (1965: 42–43). 
137  These Kuomintang-included leaders included Sim Mow Yu, Leong Yew Koh (梁宇皋 ) and  
Lee Hau Shik (李孝式). There were about 3,000 members when MCA was formed in 1949. For more see 
Heng PK (1983: 291–309); Lee KH (1998: 31); Lomperis (1996: 212). 
138 Chan HC (1965); Heng PK (1983). 
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organization for having successfully created a consciousness of Malayan identity 
within the local Chinese community, with strong support from the British. 139 By 
August 1951, Abdul Rahman became the party president of UMNO and established a 
multi-ethnic political alliance, first, in 1952, with MCA,140 and then in 1954, with the 
Malaysian Indian Congress. 141
  
 This marked the beginning of Malaya’s national 
politics, characterized by compromising tactics that resulted in unintended 
consequences over time. 
2.3. Barnes and Fenn-Wu Reports 
Post-war and pre-Independence Malaya was a fragile plural society that lacked social 
integration amongst its widely divided communities and capital for nation building.142 
The colonial government’s lack of interest in unifying the educational system in the 
Federation of Malaya had resulted in the “absence of a consistent educational policy 
with definite aims and objectives”. 143  The formation of the British-administered 
Central Advisory Committee on Education came as late as in 1949.144
The Central Advisory Committee on Education was intended to prepare an 
integrative and nationally-focused educational system for Malaya. There were four 
main types of school systems at that time: English, Chinese, Malay and Tamil. Each 
  
                                               
139 Hara (1997: 99). 
140 The Alliance of UMNO and MCA was first established during the Kuala Lumpur Municipal Election 
in 1952. See Abdul Rahman (1986: 35). 
141 Malaysian Indian Congress was established since 1946 to support India’s independence from British. 
After India had gained its independence, it started to support the independence of Malaya. See Lomperis 
(1996: 207). 
142 Furnivall (1948). 
143 Yeok KY (1982: 37). 
144 In 1946, the Malayan Union Council Paper No.53 marked the first official education reforms plan by 
the British. The plan proposed English as the compulsory subject for all vernacular school but it vanished 
with the rejection of the Malayan Union in 1949.  
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system was different in terms of its sponsorship base, 145  cultural orientation and 
medium of instruction. These multi-lingual educational systems co-existed to fulfill the 
needs of Malaya’s diverse ethnic groups. Harboring an optimistic faith in the value of 
education as a primary instrument in nation building, the British perceived that an 
integrated national identity could be achieved by imposing a standardized educational 
system with a common medium of instruction. 146  The 1951 Central Advisory 
Committee on Education’s Report of the Special Committee strongly proposed that 
English be used as the common medium of instruction in all schools in the colony.147
On the other hand, the Report of the Committee on Malay Education  
(Barnes Report)
 
However, it was rejected by the Federal Legislative Council due to overwhelming 
opposition from the Malay community, which saw the proposals as undermining the 
primacy of the Malay language.  
148 released in June 1951 “went beyond their terms of reference and 
advocated a system of National Schools in which the medium of instruction would be 
either Malay or English”.149 The report recommended “the end of separate vernacular 
schools for the several racial communities, and their replacement by a single type of 
primary school common to all”. 150 The Chinese community reacted to the Barnes 
Report with uproar and rebuttal.151
                                               
145 English and Malay schools received full support and control from the government. As Tamil schools 
were mostly located in rural areas and functioned independently like the Chinese schools, they faced 
more challenges to sustain the financial resources necessary to maintain the schools’ operation.  
 The report also received little support from the 
146 Chai HC (1977: 1). 
147 The Special Committee on Education was chaired by M. J. Hogan in September 1951 and consisted of 
11 members, of which two were ethnic Chinese. 
148 Barnes Committee was commissioned in 1950; it consisted of five Europeans and nine Malays, all 
who had close connections to the Government Education Service. The committee inquired into the 
adequacy of the educational facilities available for Malays. See Mason (1954: 31) and Purcell  
(1954: 154). 
149 Mason (1954: 31). 
150 Barnes Report (1951: 75). 
151 The day after Barnes Report was published in the newspapers, domestic Chinese press were filled 
their pages with articles attacking and accusing the Barnes Report of intention to abolish the Chinese 
schools and subsequently to destroy the Chinese culture. See China Press, June 12, 1951; Nanyang, June 
13, 1951.  
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Malays, who were concerned about the subordination of the Malay language and the 
existing educational system to the English system.152
Concurrently, the Report on Chinese Schools and the Education of Chinese 
Malayans (also known as the Fenn-Wu Report) was also published in June 1951 and 
released to the public a month later. Henry Gurney, the new high commissioner, invited 
William Fenn, an American who worked closely with higher learning institutions in 
China, and Wu Teh Yao (吴德耀), a Penang-born United Nations official, to the 
Fenn-Wu committee in January 1951.
   
153
Bridge the gap between the present communal system of school and the 
time when education will be on non-communal basis with English or 
Malay as the medium of instruction and other languages offered as 
optional subjects, and advising on preparation of textbooks for present 
use with Malayan textbooks distinct from Chinese textbooks in 
background and content.
 Both committee members had considerable 




It was during the various group conferences and individual interviews conducted by 
William Fenn and Wu Teh Yao in Malaya between February and April 1951, that 
Chinese education movement supporters, leaders and schoolteachers were alerted about 
the implications of the Barnes Committee’s recommendations.155
 The Fenn-Wu Report proposed that Chinese-medium schools be integrated into 
the national education system, but that Chinese-medium schools should not be 
eliminated until the Chinese themselves decided that such schools were not needed. In 
addition to the use of Chinese as the main medium of instruction in these schools, 
Chinese students would also study both English and Malay. The great disparity 
between the Barnes and Fenn-Wu reports forced the Central Advisory on Education to 
 
                                               
152 Ingham and Simmons (1987: 206). 
153 Purcell (1954: 156). 
154 Fenn-Wu Report (1951: 2). 
155 Tan LE (1985). 
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appoint Whitfield to chair a Central Advisory Committee on Education to review the 
suggestions. It released the Report on the Barnes Report on Malay Education and the 
Fenn-Wu Report on Chinese Education in 1951, which, in essence, endorsed Barnes’ 
proposals.  
On the other hand, the Chinese-speaking community generally felt that all these 
reports (Barnes, Fenn-Wu and the Report on Barnes and Fenn-Wu) failed to provide 
sufficient protection for Chinese education. 156  Fears amplified among Chinese 
intellectuals over the potential closure of all 1,319 Chinese schools in Malaya. 
Huatuans nationwide held conferences at the state level and drafted memorandums to 
protest against these reports.157
Despite continuous debates over the most appropriate educational system for 
the Federation, the impact of these educational reports led to the formation of the first 
formal Chinese education association—Jiaozong, which later became the institution 
that provided chief leadership in subsequent Chinese civic movements in Malaya. In 
December 1950, Malacca Chinese Schoolteachers’ Association Chairman Sim Mow 
Yu urged that “a national organization should convene as soon as possible, in order to 




                                               
156 Sinchew, July 8 and 10, 1951; Nanyang, July 9 and 19, 1951; Kinkwok, July 12, 1951. 
 Despite the growing numbers of Chinese schoolteachers’ 
association (华人教师公会, CSTA) at the state and district level, none of them was 
able to command a nationwide following. Mainly due to the preference of these 
associations to function as welfare associations to safeguard the interest of Chinese 
schoolteachers at the time, the proposal to form a unified CSTA was turned down in 
1950.  
157 Anti-Barnes Report gatherings were also conducted in Selangor (July 19, 1951) and Johore (August 9, 
1951). 
158 Interview with Sim Mow Yu, the pioneer leader of Malacca MCA, founder of the Malacca MCA 
Youth Division, and former Jiaozong chairman. Interview was conducted on March 26, 2008, Malacca.  
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Nevertheless, the threats posed by the Barnes Report brought many CSTA into 
action. Shortly after the report was made public, the Negeri Sembilan CSTA proposed 
to hold a National Convention of Chinese School Teachers’ Associations in Malaya  
(全马教师公会代表大会) to unify the power of schoolteachers. This time, as the 
future of Chinese schools hung in the balance, the plan was quickly agreed to by the 
Kuala Lumpur CSTA, and received tremendous support from CSTA nationwide.  
The two-day conference held from August 24 to 25, 1951 in the Selangor 
Hokkien Association (雪兰莪福建会馆) saw participation from representatives of 
CSTA from state, county and local levels.159 The conference rejected the Barnes Report 
and drafted a memorandum to the Central Advisory Committee on Education to 
demand the acceptance of Chinese schools in the national education system.160 Despite 
linguistic and geographical differences, the collective approach and standardization of 
strategy promised gains in advocating for improved welfare; this included an increase 
of grant-in-aid for Chinese schools. 161  Jiaozong was formally inaugurated on 
December 25, 1951 at the Second Pan-Malayan CSTA Conference (全马教师公会第
二次代表大会) (see list of Jiaozong’s members in Appendix 2). Jiaozong’s main 
objectives were to improve the standard of Chinese education, promote Chinese culture 
within Malaya, safeguard schoolteachers’ status and improve schoolteachers’ 
welfare.162
                                               
159 Representatives from Johore, Penang, Negeri Sembilan, Pahang, Perak, Kedah, Terengganu, Malacca 
and Kuala Lumpur attended the meeting. 
 In the first General Meeting of Member Associations, Penang CSTA was 
160 In September 1952, the representative of Jiaozong held a meeting with H. Hogan, chairman of the 
Select Committee on Education. See Lim LG (1965: 2). 
161 Interview with Sim Mow Yu, March 26, 2008, Malacca. 
162 Jiaozong Declaration (February 3, 1952).  
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selected as the presidential association. 163  Penang CSTA Chairman David Chen  
(陈充恩)164
Nevertheless, despite Jiaozong’s efforts in lobbying support from the Central 
Advisory Committee on Education and MCA representatives in the Legislative 
Council’s Education Special Committee
 became the first Jiaozong chairman.  
,165 the 1952 Education Ordinance was drafted 
based on the Barnes Report.166
 
 Chinese educationalists and community leaders who sat 
on Chinese school committees were generally displeased with MCA’s councilors who 
neither spoke nor voted against the ordinance when it was unanimously passed in 
November 1952 by the Federal Legislative Council. 
2.4. The Grand Three Associations of Chinese Education  
Although social movement and the state authorities may have conflicting interests, the 
heterogeneous nature of Malaya Alliance coalition that is formed by three component 
parties that are exclusively assembled based on distinct and exclusive ethnic groups 
enabled the movement to pursue its goal through brokerage and collaboration with 
MCA, the Chinese-political party of the Alliance. This brokerage interaction has been 
the key factor to the movement’s survival in its early phase, as well as the ensuing 
                                               
163 The presidential association (主席区) was a system practiced by Jiaozong from 1951–1954, whereby 
one of the member associations would be selected and be responsible for all office-bearer positions 
(chairman, general secretary and treasurer). The role of the presidential association was further 
consolidated in 1954 to allow the same CSTA to hold the committee position without term limits. This 
change allowed capable leaders to stabilize the organization in the fragile early phase of Jiaozong. After 
more CSTAs were established and potential leaders promoted from across Malaya, Jiaozong’s 
constitution was amended in 1954 to enable the selection of the executive committee on a personal basis. 
See Teachers’ Journal (1976: 2). 
164 David Chen was a graduate of St. John University in Shanghai and the principal of Chung Ling High 
School, one of the most reputable Chinese schools in Penang whose excellent English standard placed it 
on par with some of the best English schools in Malaya. He was assassinated on February 4, 1952 for his 
anti-communist stand. See CLHS (1952).  
165 The special committee was appointed on September 20, 1951 to make recommendations for various 
Education Reports and draft the 1952 Education Ordinance. Chong Khoon Lin (张崑灵 ) and  
Leung Cheung Ling (梁长龄) were in the Central Advisory Committee; Lee Hau Shik and Leung 
Cheung Ling were in the Special Committee. See 1951 Central Advisory Committee Member for 
Education File No. 31/51; 1951 Selangor Secretariat File No. 2143/51. 
166 1951 Education Ordinance; 1951 Proceedings of the Federal Legislative Council. 
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development of non-violent interactions between the state and the social movement. It 
was through the efforts and intervention of Wen Tien Kuang (温典光),167
Making MCA the conference sponsor, it gave MCA President Tan Cheng Lock 
an opportunity to affirm MCA’s position in supporting the joint efforts of Chinese 
educational organizations in opposing the Barnes Report, thus improving MCA’s 
political influence and collaboration with Jiaozong. By then, the latter was at the 
forefront of the Chinese education movement opposing the Education Ordinance. In a 
speech made during the November 1952 joint conference, Tan Cheng Lock delivered a 
charismatic and stirring speech to the Chinese education communities, which won him 
respect and recognition from them.   
 an active 
MCA member and an influencial member of Selangor Chinese School Committees 
Association, that the first Joint Conference of Chinese School Committees and 
Schoolteachers in Malaya (全马华校董教联席会议) with MCA representatives was 
made possible in November 1952 at the Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall  
(雪兰莪中华大会堂, SCAH).  
…if the Chinese do not know Chinese (language), they cannot be 
Chinese; they cannot be Chinese if they do not practice Chinese 
customs and traditions; and if they are not Chinese, they cannot be 
Malays or English or Indians. They will be described as pariahs.168
 
 
The conference also provided a platform for Chinese school committees’ associations 
to arrive at an initial agreement in forming an umbrella organization and approved the 
collaborative framework of the Sandajigou. Persuaded by MCA, the conference 
representatives entrusted Sandajigou’s working committee—Chinese Education 
                                               
167 Graduated from Columbia University in America, he had been the Chinese-English translator of 
MCA during the 1950s, responsible for almost all documents between Jiaozong and Dongzong with 
MCA. He was the Selangor Chinese School Committee Association general secretary (1956–1959), 
deputy chairman (1960–1964), Chinese Education Central Committee secretary, and the middleman 
between Lim Lian Geok and Tan Cheng Lock.  
168 Pariah in this context means ‘outcast of society’. Cited from China Press, November 10, 1952. 
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Central Committee—as a MCA subordinate. It was hoped that by associating 
Sandajigou with a political party, it could be an asset for Chinese educationalists in 
their dealings with the government. In return, four Chinese educationalist 
representatives (two schoolteachers and two school committee members) were 
allocated to work side-by-side three MCA representatives in the Chinese Education 
Central Committee.  
The second Joint Conference of Chinese School Committees and 
Schoolteachers in Malaya (第二次全马华校董教联席会议) held in April 1953 
inaugurated the Sandajigou and its constitution, while Tan Cheng Lock was selected to 
head the Chinese Education Central Committee. By accumulating common grievances, 
MCA, with its political resources, played a bridging role between Chinese educationists 
and the government. Although the main actors of Sandajigou and its collaborative 
networks were mainly limited to economic elites and the educated class, Sandajigou 
remained a leading force in defending the rights of the Chinese community.169 The 
Chinese Education Central Committee also became the highest authority to decide on 
matters relating to Chinese education, as well as the leading vehicle of the Chinese 
education movement, throughout the 1950s.170
Chinese school committees continued to face pressure after the 1952 Education 
Ordinance was implemented. Community leaders who sat on the Chinese school 
committees had been the main financial sponsors of most Chinese schools in British 
Malaya. Frustrated with the minimal financial aid distributed to the vernacular schools 
and increasing control by the government, and pressured by the need for a national 
body to represent Chinese school committees, the second primary component of the 
Chinese schools finalized their constitution and formed Dongzong on August 22, 1954.  
  
                                               
169 Interview with Yow Lee Fung, February 17, 2009, Kuala Lumpur. 
170 Tan LE (1988: 49). 
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The association consisted of state-level alliance of Chinese school committees’ 
association (董事联合会 , donglianhui) (see the list of Dongzong’s members in 
Appendix 3). The main objectives of these state-level donglianhui were to unify, 
strengthen and represent school committees in response to the government’s education 
policy. It also sought to promote the development of, and networking among, the 
various school committees, and the development of Chinese schools in Malaya.171
In actuality, the 1952 Education Ordinance could not be fully implemented. 
Financial constraints due to the war on communism affected the budget originally 
allocated to build new national schools and train schoolteachers to meet the sharp 
increase in student population from the post-war baby boom.
 
172
By November 1953, a special committee headed by Education Minister 
E.E.C. Thuraisinghamhad had been appointed by the high commissioner to consider 
ways and means of implementing the policy outlined in the ordinance.
 Additionally, the 
government was reluctant to take harsh measures against Chinese schools, as closing 
them would further alienate the Chinese and provide an opportunity for communists to 
recruit them. 
173
                                               
171 Choong WC (2004: 42). 
 The report of 
this Special Committee—the 1954 Education White Paper (also known as Council 
Paper No. 67)—was published in September 1954. It reaffirmed its support for a single, 
multi-ethnic system. English and Malay would be taught and a common curriculum 
would be introduced. However, the 1954 Education White Paper strongly rooted 
English as the main medium of teaching in all schools. To overcome the financial 
constraints in building new national schools, the 1954 Education White Paper 
172 Tan LE (1997: 283). 
173 MCA was represented by Lee Chang Jing* (李长景) and Yong Xu Ling (杨旭龄). 
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recommended the introduction of features of English schools in vernacular schools and 
the gradual replacement of the role of mother tongues in the curriculum.174
The 1954 Education White Paper was seen by Chinese educationalists as a 
scheme by the Malay-dominated government to gradually eliminate Chinese schools in 
the country. The Chinese Education Central Committee opposed the 1954 Education 
White Paper by submitting the Memorandum Opposing the Conversion of Vernacular 
Schools into National Schools (反对改方言学校为国民学校宣言) to the high 
commissioner in March 1954.
  
175 It further released statements through the Chinese 
media to rally support from the Chinese community to protect Chinese schools.176 The 
latter included a signature campaignand a nationwide boycott of the installment of 
English class programs in Chinese schools.177 By late 1953, Malay educationalists were 
also opposed to the domination of English teachings in Malay schools after realizing 
the Malay schools were equally under the threat of being transformed into an English 
school.
 
 In January 1955, Abdul Rahman finally pronounced the 1954 Education White 
Paper policy dead. 
2.5. The 1955 Malacca Meeting and 1957 Independence  
The first Independence Mission in 1954 failed due to the British’s reluctance to grant 
Malaya independence unless there was evidence that the party that took over 
                                               
174 1954 Education White Paper. 
175  The memorandum claimed that schooling through the ‘mother tongue’ was a basic means of 
preserving one’s culture. The memorandum also clarified, for the first time, the Chinese’ demand to 
affirm Chinese language as an official language. It warned that Chinese and Tamils should be won 
over—not forced—to become Malayans. 
176 Nanyang, October 20 and 23, 1954; Nanyang, November 10 and 15, 1954; Sinchew, October 31 and 
November 9, 1954. 
177 Protest at the state-level spread like wild fire, especially in November 1954. Open contention was 
manifested in the local Chinese communities in Perak (November 2 and 8), Batu Pahat (November 4), 
Johore (November 6), Perlis (November 11) and Penang (November 13). 
69 
 
government had the support of all the people in the colony. 178  The 
UMNO-MCA-Malaysian Indian Congress alliance successfully persuaded the British 
to hold Malaya’s first Federal Election in 1955 after a series of political bargains was 
struck. 179  Under pressure to win this election, especially after the release of the 
controversial 1954 Education White Paper, the Alliance coalition tried to garner 
support to defeat its main political opponent led by veteran Malay politician,  
Onn Jaafar and his Independence of Malaya Party.180
In a move to solidify support from the Chinese, Abdul Rahman agreed to meet 
leaders of the Chinese Education Central Committee in January 1955. At this Malacca 
Meeting initiated by Tan Cheng Lock, Abdul Rahman endorsed that “it would not be 
the Alliance’s policy to destroy the schools, language and culture of any race”.
  
181
Persuaded by Tan Cheng Lock, Dongzong and Jiaozong representatives 
softened their stand and agreed to postpone their demands on the issue of making 
Chinese an official language until after the election. From Jiaozong’s and Dongzong’s 
perspective, they only agreed to temporarily cast the issue aside for the 1955 General 
 The 
Alliance’s representatives agreed to Jiaozong’s demands to remove provisions in the 
Education Ordinance that threatened the existence of Chinese schools and consider 
providing a two million dollar subsidy to Chinese schools. However, UMNO and MCA 
rejected the demand to include Chinese as the second official language in their election 
manifesto.  
                                               
178 The first Independence Mission was led by Abdul Rahman and the delegation consisted of Abdul 
Razak and Tan Tiong Hai (陈东海). See Abdul Rahman (1986b: 213–216). 
179 The Alliance threatens to withdraw its members from all towns, municipals and legislative councils if 
the British refused to accept their suggestion to hold the state and federal elections. See Abdul Rahman 
(1983: 33–38, 94–100).  
180 Abdul Rahman and alliance representatives conducted negotiations with the Malayan Communist 
Party’s representative, Chin Peng, in the Baling Talk on December 28, 1955. See Abdul Rahman  
(1986: 63–68); Chin P (2003: 328); and the 1956 Report by the Chief Minister of the Federation of 
Malaya on the Baling Talks. 
181 Conducted at Tan Cheng Lock’s private residence in Malacca, attended by 21 people, including those 




Election. It was perceived by UMNO and MCA that these Chinese educationalists had 
agreed to dropp the petition, in exchange for citizenship for Chinese and inclusion of 
the Chinese vernacular system in the national education system. 
With support from the Chinese Education Central Committee and the majority 
of Malays, the Alliance coalition won a landslide victory at the 1955 elections, taking 
51 out of 52 elected seats on the Federal Legislative Council. The first self-government 
was formed on August 2, 1955, with Abdul Rahman becoming the territory’s chief 
minister. He was given the mandate to form a new Malayan government.182
The London Talks of January 1956 successfully won Malaya independence 
from its colonial rule.
  
183 The British promised that, under possible circumstances, it 
would allow for Malayan independence by August 31, 1957.184 The Independent 
Constitutional Survey Commission was headed by Lord Reid, who arrived in Malaya in 
June 1956 to assess views and formulate a new constitution for the colony.185
Realizing the political opportunity, the Chinese community, led by the powerful 
Federation of Chinese Guilds and Associations (马来西亚华人行业社团总会 ) 
submitted an independent memorandum to press for the cause of the Chinese in the 
drafting of the Independent Constitution.
 The 
Alliance government submitted a memorandum to the Commission in August 1956; it 
represented official views of the self-rule government.  
186
                                               
182 Members of the cabinet included Lee Hau Shik, Abdul Razak, Ismail Sardon, Sambathan, Leong Yew 
Koh, Omar Ong Yoke Lin (翁毓麟), Suleiman and Aziz Ishak. See Abdul Rahman (1986b: 221). 
 The memorandum was produced without 
the support of MCA in April 1956 during the National Convention for the Strive for 
183  The London Talks were led by Abdul Rahman, joint by Abdul Razak, Lee Hau Shik and  
Tan Tiong Hai.  
184 British Secretary of State, Oliver Lyttleton wrote to Abdul Rahman, “I am sure that whatever party 
wins the election, it will set itself with a high standard of purpose to pursue sober and progressive 
policies, and if it does, I have no doubt that it will enjoy the dependable support of a large number of the 
other nominated members”. See Abdul Rahman (1977: 25; 1984: 138–146; 1986b: 213–126).  
185 Abdul Rahman (1984: 180). 
186 The Federation of Chinese Guilds and Associations was the national union for registered huatuans. It 
officially registered in 1955 and was one of the leading pressure group in the Chinese citizenships, 
language and education movement during the pre-independence era. 
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Citizenship of Chinese Registered Guilds and Associations (全马华人注册社团争取
公民权大会 ). 187  It demanded jus soli-based citizenship, waiver of the Malay 
proficiency test in determination of citizenship, citizenship rights to foreigners who 
have lived in Malaya for five or more years, and equal rights and responsibilities for all 
citizens. Above all, the memorandum suggested that Malay, Chinese and Tamil should 
all become official languages of Malaya.188
The 1957 Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission had 
partially included some of the suggestions proposed by the Chinese groups. This 
included more reasonable citizenship rights in return for recognition of the status of the 
Malay language as the sole national language of Malaya. The deal was finally sealed by 
the Alliance’s delegation, Abdul Rahman, Omar Ong Yoke Lin (翁毓麟 ) and 
Sambanthan, who departed for London in May 1957 and successfully achieved 
consensus on a draft constitution for independent Malaya.
   
189 In spite of this, the 
Alliance leaders continued to face challenges from their respective supporters 
regarding the essential elements of the Independence Compact.190
 
  
                                               
187 The conference was in collaboration with Selangor Chinese Assemble Hall, Ipoh Chinese Assembly 
Hall and Jiaozong, and was participated by 1,094 Chinese organizations. Lim Lian Geok, Lau Pak Kuan 
(刘伯群) and three other members were selected as representatives to London to put forth their appeal at 
last resort if the negotiations with Lord Reid failed. 
188 After meeting with Donald MacGillivray in November 1952, Jiaozong leaders were aware that as 
Chinese was not Malaya’s official language, it could not be used as a medium of instruction in schools; 
nor would Chinese schools be recognized within the Malayan education system. Aware of the 
importance of gaining official recognition, Jiaozong began to demand for Chinese as an official language 
in Malaya. It was first proposed in the second Joint Conference of Chinese School Committees and 
Schoolteachers of Malaya in 1953, and the proposition was renewed during the 1956 National 
Convention for the Strive for Citizenship of Chinese Registered Guilds and Associations. See Lim LG 
(1966; 1988). 
189 Abdul Rahman (1984: 169–170). 
190 The Alliance proposed a delayed jus soli principle, where everyone born on or after Independence 
Day would be a Malayan citizen. Malays’ special privileges should be continued for a substantial period. 
Islam will be the country official religion and Malaya would be the official, national language. The 
proposal prepared by the Chinese community was dropped by Tan Tiong Hai, the sole MCA 
representative in the London Mission. See Abdul Rahman (1977: 31) and Heng PK (1988: 254). 
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2.6. Razak Report and Citizenship Registration Movement 
In September 1955, a 15-member Legislative Council Committee on Education was 
formed to review Malaya’s educational system. It was chaired by Education Minister 
Abdul Razak Hussein (1955–1959). The Report of the Education Committee (also 
known as the Razak Report), released in April 1956, favored the interests of 
non-bumiputeras more than the 1952 Ordinance, mainly through efforts of MCA 
representatives who sat in the Razak Committee. MCA politicians such as Lim Chong 
Eu, Goh Chee Yan (吴志渊), Too Joon Hing (朱运兴), Leung Cheung Ling (梁长龄) 
and Lee Thean Hin (李天兴 ) were relatively more sympathetic toward Chinese 
educationalists and had established an intimate working relationship with Jiaozong. 
With help from bilingual friends such as Wen Tien Kuang, Sha Yun Yeo  
(沙渊如), Ding Pin Song (丁品松) and Yan Yuan Zhang* (严元章),191 both MCA and 
Jiaozong exchanged information and conducted secret discussions to find solutions that 
would benefit the future of Chinese education.192 The education memorandum drafted 
by Jiaozong’s leaders was adopted by the MCA participants for negotiation with 
UMNO representatives in the Razak Committee. Working collaboratively, Sandajigou 
successfully persuaded Abdul Razak to exclude the controversial ‘ultimate objective’ 
of making Malay as the main medium of instruction in all schools as stated in Article 12 




                                               
191 Yan Yuan Zhang (1909–1996) acquired his Doctorate in Education from London University in 1951. 
He was well-respected among the Chinese scholarly community and leading Chinese education activists 
in Malaya during the 1950s. He was deported from Malaysia in 1962, but continued his involvement in 
the movement from Singapore as the head of department of education at Nanyang University 
(1960–1965). 
192 Lim LG (1990: 145). 
193 Tan PC (1980: 35–36). 
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We believe further that the ultimate objective of the education policy in 
this country must be to bring together the children of all ethnic groups 
under a national education system in which the national language is the 
medium of instruction, though we recognize that progress towards this 
goal cannot be rushed and must be gradual.194
 
   
The Razak Report recommended that Chinese, Tamil and English primary schools be 
integrated within the national educational system as national-type primary schools  
(国民型小学). The latter would use Malay as the medium of instruction. Teaching of 
Malay and English would be compulsory in all primary and secondary schools, which 
would adopt a common syllabus and their students would be allowed to sit for common 
public examinations that were conducted in English and Malay.  
The incorporation of vernacular schools into the national education system 
would allow them to receive some financial support, and, most importantly, official 
recognition from the government. Meanwhile, they would be administered by their 
respective management committees. 195
The Razak Report’s second recommendation was to use either English or Malay 
as the medium of public examinations.
 These compromises, to some degree, were 
financially motivated. At the dawn of independence, the Malayan government was 
young and faced demanding tasks in nation building. The urgency to tackle issues such 
as strengthening national security, urban development and poverty reduction was given 
priority over the vernacular schools, which had been operating short on funds and 
manpower. Thus, sustaining these schools with support from its respective 
communities was seen as the most rational option during this period for both the 
government and its people.  
196
                                               
194 Razak Report, Article 12. 
 Thus, a minimum requirement of ‘pass’ in 
195 Heng PK (1988: 255). 
196 The Lower School Certificate and Federation of Malaya Certificate of Education. 
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Malay was required for the award of these certificates.197
After approving the Razak Report in May 1956, the government conducted a 
nationwide survey—the Torch Movement (火炬运动 )—to register school-aged 
children who intended to enroll during the August–September school holidays in 1956. 
English schools had begun registering students since June that year, two months before 
the Chinese schools were informed by the Ministry of Education (MOE) of the survey.  
 The exclusion of Chinese as a 
medium in public examinations was seen as a threat to the existence of Chinese 
secondary schools and the preservation of Chinese language and culture by Chinese 
educationalists.  
Realizing the importance of the Torch Movement, Jiaozong alarmed Chinese 
schools nationwide and mobilized door-to-door visits to seek new students. Chinese 
schoolteachers conducted family visits to remind parents to register and enroll their 
children into Chinese schools, and Chinese school students were mobilized to inform 
their friends and relatives about the importance of the survey.198
With the help and intervention of the Chinese Education Central Committee, 
MOE finally agreed to allow MCA branches, state-level Chinese assembly halls  
(华人大会堂) and more Chinese schools to operate as student registration facilities.
  
199 
Through wide publicity by local Chinese newspapers and collective efforts of Chinese 
educationalists, Chinese schools successfully obtained a stable enrollment rate and 
legitimated the continued existence of vernacular schools in Malaya.200
Malaya gained independence on August 31, 1957, with Abdul Rahman as the 
first prime minister. Even so, social and political stability in the new Malaya remained 
 
                                               
197 Report of the Education Committee (1956: 1). 
198 MICSSWC (1992); Yuk Choy (2008: 263).  
199 Only 20 registration centers were located at Chinese schools among the total 133 registration centers 
in Selangor, despite there being more Chinese schools than Malay or English schools. See Tay LS  
(2001: 375–380). 
200 MICSSWC (1992: 79). 
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fragile, especially regarding the rights of minority ethnic groups. It was in the crucible 
of early independence politics and struggles over the definition of citizenship that 
provided the impetus for the Chinese education movement in Malaya. Once they 
realized there was little hope of instituting Chinese as an official language, ethnic 
Chinese activists focused their appeal on constitutional amendments to prevent further 
marginalization of the Chinese in Malaya, such as for the constitution to secure 
citizenship rights for the Chinese and safeguard the status of Chinese language and 
Chinese schools.  
However, most immigrant Chinese, especially those from the working-class, 
focused their efforts wholeheartedly on securing their livelihoods and rebuilding 
homes. Thus, the concept of Malaya as an independent nation and the importance of 
citizenship rights were relatively new to many of them. Despite two years after the 
liberalization of the 1952 citizenship requirements, the non-citizen proportion of the 
Chinese population remained as high as 50% in 1954.201 In the 1955 elections, of the 
600,000 Chinese declared eligible to vote, only 143,000 registered. In an effort to 
increase political awareness among the Chinese, the three most significant pillars of 
Chinese organizations at that time—schools, huatuans and MCA—jointly mobilized a 
nationwide Chinese citizenship registration movement between 1957 and 1958.202 By 
1959, about 24% (50,000 out of 2.1 million) of the qualified Chinese residents in 
Malaya had successfully secured Malayan citizenship despite continued influx of new 
Chinese immigrants from mainland China.203
While the negotiations between the Sandajigou and Education Minister  
Abdul Razak on the issues of overaged students and language medium for state 
examinations were ongoing, government officials continued to apply measures to 
  
                                               
201 Heng PK (1988: 83); Lomperis (1996: 210). 
202 1957 Population Census of the Federation of Malaya. 
203 Ratnam (1965: 84). 
76 
 
disqualify overaged students in Chinese secondary schools. Following independence, 
the 1960s witnessed the rise of more left-wing political leaders and the formation of a 
resistance network among the Chinese community against the Malay- and Muslim- 
dominated policies by UMNO.  
Poverty, lack of initiative for formal education from illiterate parents and school 
closure during the Japanese occupation were the key factors that contributed to many 
overaged students still residing in Chinese schools. These students, who tended to be 
influenced by both nationalist and communist influences, had been seen by the 
authorities as troublemakers and threats to their schools and younger classmates.  
Feeling frustrated and victimized by the Razak Report, a nationwide strike by 
Chinese students sparked in Penang on November 14, 1957, and spread like wildfire to 
some 20 Chinese secondary schools across the country. Students from the largest of 
these schools in Penang, namely Chung Ling (钟灵 ), Han Chiang (韩江 ) and  
Chung Hwa (中华), marched on the streets and assembled at Penang Chinese Girls’ 
High School (槟华女中).204
The (Penang Chinese Girls’) school field was full of students—about 
2,000 boys from Chung Ling, Han Chiang and Chung Hwa. Many were 
overaged students and their sympathizers who were angry at the new 
policy. The demonstration ended chaotically when anti-riots police 
started firing tear gas at those of us who had just entered the school 
assembly hall. I ran home and learnt later that some 10 students were 
injured. My school was closed for one week. I faced disciplinary action 
when the school reopened, and I was warned about being expelled from 




   
Simultaneously in Kuala Lumpur, students from Confucian (尊孔), Kuen Cheng (坤成) 
and Tsun Jin (循人) schools also organized peaceful gatherings at their schools. Prompt 
                                               
204 Lim LG (1988: 208–221). 
205 Interview with Huang CC, one of the students who participated in the Penang school strike in 1957. 
The interview was conducted on January 17, 2009 in Penang. 
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intervention by Jiaozong leaders and Chinese educationalists206 reassured the students 
and persuaded them to abandon the strikes. However, strikes continued in most parts of 
Perak and Johore.207
Facing increasing pressure from the Chinese community and the manifested 
capacity of the students’ strike, the government finally agreed to compromise. It would 
continue the grant-in-aid for most Chinese secondary schools, extend the language 
medium of the national examination to include Chinese, and end the forceful expulsion 
of overaged students.




2.7. Lim Chong Eu and New MCA 
In March 1958, Lim Chong Eu defeated Tan Cheng Lock to become MCA’s second 
party president. Nevertheless, the new MCA leadership was not endorsed by  
Abdul Rahman, who indicated his displeasure in his memoirs,  
A new group of young MCA leaders took over the party from Tan 
Cheng Lock; and with that they also introduced a new MCA policy, 
which was to acquire more rights for the Chinese, and to end—what 
they imputed—UMNO control of the Alliance and the country, and to 
make Chinese language one of the official languages of the country.209
 
 
During the 1958 National Convention on Chinese Education’ Expansion  
(全马华文教育扩大会议 ), Lim Chong Eu and MCA reform-faction leaders 
unanimously supported the demand to acquire official status for Chinese language.210
                                               
206 Liu Huai Gu* (刘怀谷), Yang Ya Ling* (杨雅灵), Chong Min Chang (钟敏章), Lim Lian Geok, 
Cheng Ji Mou* (陈济谋) and Wen Tien Kuang have played important roles in calming the students. 
 It 
was further consolidated by the Memorandum of General Demands on Chinese 
207 Teachers’ Journal (1976: 24–26). 
208 Lim LG (1988: 218–221). 
209 Abdul Rahman (1986: 70). 
210 Sinchew, September 23, 1958.  
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Education (本邦华人对教育总要求) at Sandajigou’s National Convention of Chinese 
Education in Malaya (三大机构华文教育中央委员会全国华文教育大会) in 1959.211
By July 1959, tension within the Alliance coalition reached a boiling point 
when a letter—written by Lim Chong Eu to Abdul Rahman to demand 40 out of 104 
parliamentary seats in the coming general election, along with other requests to enable 
the Chinese to safeguard their position within the Alliance—was released by the press. 
Other demands stated in this letter included a pledge to petition for vernacular schools 
to hold examinations in their own mediums of instruction and the government to 
recognize them as equivalent to national certificates, and objection to the requirement 




Losing almost half the contested seats (30 out of 32 seats) in the first 
post-independence general election held on August 19, 1959, Lim and his pro-Chinese 
educationalists team failed to secure unanimous support from MCA’s Central 
Committee, especially from pro-UMNO conservative leaders led by Tan Siew Sin  
(陈修信). The MCA crisis resulted in the withdrawal of radical factions led by  
Lim Chong Eu in December 1960. At the MCA Extraordinary General Meeting held on 
November 10, 1961, MCA declared its support to UMNO and appointed  
Tan Siew Sin
 The ‘Alliance Crisis’, as it was dubbed by the press, came to be seen as a 
‘Chinese versus Malays’ issue. 
213 to head a new MCA party, and Abdul Rahman took full control of the 
Alliance collaboration.214
                                               
211 See the full text of the memorandum at Teachers’ Journal (1960: 6).  
  
212 See Ho KC (1984: 12) and Abdul Rahman (1986). 
213 Tan Siew Sin served as MCA president from 1961 to 1974 and was minister of commerce and 
industry, and minister of finance, both powerful positions, from 1957 to 1974.   
214 Abdul Rahman (1986: 70); Daniel (1995: 36). 
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With most sympathizers of Chinese education leaders such as Too Joon Hing 
and Lim Chong Eu out of the party, Tan Siew Sin and his close aides who had now 
gained control over the MCA were more submissive and pro-UMNO, and dropped their 
uncritical support for the Chinese education movement. This was a serious blow to the 
movement, as MCA had been a powerful benefactor to the political negotiation in the 
Sandajigou collaboration. Now, MCA departed from its intimate relationship with 
Dongzong and Jiaozong, mainly due to lack of mutual trust and collaboration between 
Chinese educationalists and the newly installed English-educated MCA leaders such as 
Tan Siew Sin and Leong Yew Koh (梁宇皋).  
The movement’s leaders were thus forced to rely heavily upon huatuans for 
support in their battle to preserve Chinese education in Malaya. Chinese leaders from 
the Federation of Chinese Guilds and Associations, with their strong networks and 
robust financial resources, slowly replaced the role of Tan Siew Sin-led MCA.215
 
 
Consequently, the Federation of Chinese Guilds and Associations, Dongzong and 
Jiaozong became the most articulate social mobilization vehicles of the Chinese 
community.  
2.8. Rahman Talib Report  
The Education Review Committee, chaired by Education Minister Abdul Rahman 
Talib, was set up to review the implementation of the Razak Report.216
                                               
215 Yeok KY (1982: 118). 
 They had little 
progress in implementing the use of the Malay language as the main medium of 
instruction in Malaysian schools and phasing out English medium schools due to the 
lack of qualified schoolteachers and budget to build new school facilities. Therefore, 
216 Three of the committee members were ethnic Chinese, including Leong Yew Koh, Wong Pow Nee  
(王保尼) and Koh Kim Leng (许金龙). 
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when their report—the 1960 Report of the Education Review Committee (or the 
Rahman Talib Report)—was published on August 4, 1960, it proposed a more 
aggressive move by the government. This included invoking Article 21 (No. 2), which 
empowered MOE to convert any national-type primary school into a Malay-medium 
national primary school at its discretion.217
Social movement activists saw these moves as an effort to abolish Chinese 
primary schools. Jiaozong’s Chairman Lim Lian Geok
 Moreover, a definitive timetable was set to 
phase out English medium schools and convert government-aided Chinese secondary 
schools into Malay-medium schools. In addition, all national public exams would be 
conducted in one of the official languages, that is, either English or Malay.   
218 reacted angrily to the 1960 
Rahman Talib Report. He led Jiaozong in mobilizing the community to reject the report 
and accused MOE of violating the constitution, infringing the Alliance’ election 
manifesto, destroying the spirit of the Razak Report and attempting to abolish Chinese 
schools in Malaya.219
Another significant implication of the 1961 Education Act was the termination 
of the partially government-aided schools system by January 1, 1962. Most of these 
schools were Chinese secondary schools.
  
 The act would accord funding only to schools 
that converted into national-type secondary schools (国民型中学), which would use 
English and Malay as mediums of instruction and examination.220
                                               
217 A similar clause was included in the Razak Report Article 12; however, it was removed from the 1957 
Education Ordinance. 
 This forced Chinese 
secondary schools to choose between being converted to the use of English and Malay 
as mediums of instruction or becoming financially independent as a private school. 
218 Lim Lian Geok (1901–1985) migrated to Malaya in 1927 from Fujian province (福建省) of China. 
He served as teacher at Confucian Secondary School from 1934 until 1961, and was elected as Jiaozong 
chairman in 1953.  
219 Lim LG (1960: 3). 
220 Once converted, the medium of instruction in a Chinese school would no longer be Chinese, except 
for Chinese language and literature. Yeok KY (1982: 120–121); Heng PK (1988: 255). 
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In response to the government’s coercive and persuasive measures, 54 out of the 
69 Chinese secondary schools nationwide accepted the government’s terms of 
conversion and were transformed into the national-type system in 1961 (see list of these 
schools at Appendix 4). This was partly due to the need for government assistance to 
solve the financial and staffing difficulties that had been plaguing these schools. In 
addition, the Alliance regime launched a pro-conversion campaign led by MCA leaders, 
culminating in the successful conversion of Penang Chung Ling High School.  
Chung Ling was the first school that accepted the government’s special allowances and 
full assistance on school fees, resulting in the reduction of school fees and better 
salaries for the schoolteachers.221
Community-funded education can be sustained by donation from the 
Chinese community when the economy is good. However, when the 
economy is in recession and we do not have sufficient income, how can 
we support these schools? Therefore, we need the financial burden of 
these schools to be shared between the authorities and the public, 
especially from the annual education budget that has been collected 
from the people’s taxes.




Agreement from the Chinese school committees to accept the conversion kicked off a 
wave of protests from students, parents and the public alike. At its height, the  
‘1123 Protest’ took place. Although most schools successfully contained the student 
movements with strict regulations and mediation by Chinese educationalists,  
Chung Ling’s principal, Wang Yoon Nien (汪永年) and executive director of the 
school committee, Ong Keng Seng (王景成), were frowned upon as chief betrayers of 
the Chinese community, a stigma which persists to this day.223
Nevertheless, the reality of financial constraints and improvement in 
schoolteachers’ salary and benefits seen in the conversion of the high profile  
  
                                               
221 Tan LE (1997: 223); Tan KH (2007: 175).  
222 Khor Peng Teng’s (许平等) comments cited in Nanyang, November 21, 1990. 
223 Interview with Loot Ting Yee, March 24, 2008, Kuala Lumpur. 
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Chung Ling High School made it difficult for many Chinese secondary schools to resist 
conversion for long. MCA leaders at the time, including Tan Siew Sin, also strongly 
encouraged and promoted the benefits of the conversion. State-level education 
departments held informal meetings with Chinese secondary schools’ committees to 
persuade them to convert to the national-type system.224
However, it was the decision of the Ministry of Home Affairs on August 12, 
1961 to strip Lim Lian Geok’s teaching permit and soon after, revoked his citizenship 
under the pretext of “disloyal and disaffected towards the Federation of Malaya”
  
225 that 
marked the pivotal point towards conversion. Reactions from the Chinese community 
were, to some extent, constrained by self-censorship.226
On September 3, at the request of Lim, Jiaozong held an emergency meeting to 
discuss the position of the next chairman; however, none of the attendees were willing 
to take on the politically precarious position. The burden, after long hours of discussion, 
fell on Huang Yun Yue* (黄润岳)
 Extreme retaliation by the 
government had been rare, and therefore the measures taken against Lim sent a 
message strong enough to strike fear in dissidents. 
227
Lim Lian Geok, as the chairman of Jiaozong, has the responsibility to 
criticize unfair education policies, and is merely exercising his right to 
free speech under a democratic constitution. If this right is taken away, 
either it signifies the death of democracy, or that the government is 
against the Constitution.
 as the acting chairman. Jiaozong’s Advisor  
Yan Yuan Zhang, who was then based in Singapore, strongly criticized the Malayan 




                                               
224 Huang XJ (2002: 44).   
225 LLGFC (1989: 11–12).  
226 Expression of support from Kuala Lumpur Chinese Teachers’ Association came as late as August 23. 
On August 26, Sim Mow Yu, who had just concluded his visit in Indonesia, attempted to persuade Tan 
Siew Sin to retract the decision, but failed.   
227 He joined Jiaozong in 1958 and was the Teachers’ Journal editors since 1959.  
228 Jiaozong Secretariat (1989: 44). 
83 
 
In the end, Yan Yuan Zhang paid a high price for his speech: he, like Lim Lian Geok 
whom he had defended, was forbidden by law from entering Malaya indefinitely. With 
two Jiaozong leaders’ dissidence countered by draconian measures from the 
government, the rest of the Jiaozong activists were cowed into silence.229
Converted Chinese schools used English as their medium of instruction. It was 
not until the 1970s that Malay replaced English. On the other hand, the 15 schools that 
had chosen to forsake government subsidies continued using Chinese as their medium 
of instruction, mainly due to the sheer insistence of the respective school committees. 
These schools were later referred to as independent Chinese secondary schools, will be 





2.9. Formation of Malaysia   
Malaya merged with the British colonies of Sarawak, Sabah and Singapore to form an 
enlarged federation known as Malaysia on September 16, 1963. It was  
Abdul Rahman’s political ambition to ensure a non-Chinese majority in the new 
entity.231 In protest against the formation of Malaysia, Indonesia declared a policy of 
confrontation against it on January 1963.232 Indonesian President Soekarno voiced 
threats to crush what he deemed as a neo-colonial puppet state of the British. 
Meanwhile, the Philippines President Macapagal staked his claim on Sabah.233
                                               
229 Parliament opposition leader, People’s Progressive Party Chairman S. Seenivasagam, challenged 
Abdul Rahman to revoke his (Seenivasagam) citizenship too, at the October 20 parliamentary debate. 
Lim Lian Geok fought against the revocation for three years through judiciary prosecutions but was 
ultimately not vindicated at the Court of Appeals. Lim secluded himself from the society since, and spent 
the rest of his life writing memoirs. 
 It was a 
230 MICSSWC (1992: 83). 
231 Cheah BK (2002: 93–98). 
232 Mackie (1974). 
233 The confrontation ended after Suharto assumed power in March 1966. Indonesia eventually accepted 
Malaysia as an independent country during the Peace Talks in Bangkok on May 1966. See Mackie  
(1974: 318–322); Abdul Rahman (1986: 77, 81).  
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tense moment for the new Malaysian state, as armed conflict with its larger and more 
imposing neighbor, Indonesia, loomed.234
Between 1963 and 1965, Singapore People’s Action Party leader Lee Kuan 
Yew provoked a debate on a ‘Malaysian Malaysia’, whereby equality before the law 
predicated on citizenship and no one community would enjoy special privileges. Lee’s 
ideology unavoidably tapped into the brewing resentment against Malays’ political 
domination of the new state.
 
235 Lee also requested for important partnership among 
members of the Alliance, albeit junior partnership, in the governance of the country.236 
Following the outbreak of ethnic riots between Chinese and Malays in Singapore in 
1964, Singapore was asked to leave the Federation in August 1965 by Prime Minister 
Abdul Rahman due to fears that the assertive Chinese minority would undermine the 
stability of the Federation.237
With Singapore’s departure, the proportion of Chinese population in Malaysia 
dropped dramatically from 42% to 25% by the end of 1965.
 
238
In an effort to counter this trend, huatuans nationwide attended the Huatuan 
Anti-Invasion National Convention (华团反侵略大会) held in June 1965, hosted by 
SCAH. More than 180 organizations sent some 280 representatives to attend the 
assembly to demand that Chinese be instated as an official language of Malaysia.
 It was a significant 
political disadvantage for the Chinese. Despite the fact that the main opposition party, 
Democratic Action Party (DAP), continued to debate on the issue of Malaysian 
Malaysia, the Chinese community, especially its Chinese-speaking constituency, began 
to feel they were fighting a losing battle.  
 
However, the Convention Chairperson Lee
                                               
234 For more about the controversies, see Milne (1964). 
 Hau Shik (李孝式) persuaded participants 
235 Rudner (1970: 3); Cheah BK (2002: 54–55).  
236 Heng PK (1988: 254). 
237 Lee KH (1998: 35); Cheah BK (2002: 54–55); Keylor (2003: 252). 
238 Data extracted from Ongkili (1985: 154). 
85 
 
of the National Convention to entrust their appeal to MCA and wait for a more 
appropriate moment to seek legitimacy for their mother tongue.  
The participants discovered on August 1965 that their trust had been misplaced: 
in the midst of widespread objections from the Chinese community, the MCA Central 
Working Committee (马华中央工作委员会) opted to endorse the decision of the 
Alliance coalition not to support the demand for Chinese to be instated as an official 
language. Somewhat surprisingly, MCA’s Youth Division leader, Sim Mow Yu, did 
back the demand, however. Sim had been a powerful leader, especially in Malacca, 
Ipoh and Penang. Although he was elected as the chairman of MCA Youth Division in 
February 1966, he voluntarily let Lee San Choon (李三春) have the position of 
chairman and opted to be vice chairman instead. He explained his reason for doing so as 
thus, 
San Choon had a better working relationship with MCA’s party 
president, while I could work closely with the Chinese pressure groups. 
This would ideally achieve the greatest benefits for the Chinese 
community, especially in demanding for Chinese language become one 
of the official languages of the country.239
 
 
Nevertheless, Sim’s popularity, especially among MCA Youth Division branches and 
at the grassroots level, aroused much envy especially from his peers and competitors. 
Sim’s hope of forming a ‘San Choon and Mow Yu dream team’ was dashed in October 
1966 when Sim was expelled from MCA due to having purportedly breached MCA’s 
and Alliance’s rules. Sim’s insistent demands to instate Chinese as an official language 
were not well received by MCA leadership.  
 As the founder of MCA Youth Division, Sim was supported by the 
rank-and-file of the division. Great displeasure in many MCA Youth Division branches 
were manifested in boycotts and the freezing of activities in protest against the central 
                                               
239 Interview with Sim Mow Yu, March 26, 2008, Malacca. 
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committee’s decision; some supporters even quit the party in disgust. The magnitude of 
the protests, which lasted for about two years, almost paralyzed MCA. The expulsion 




2.10. Dongjiaozong and Merdeka University Campaign 
By 1966, Dongzong and Jiaozong formed the Chinese Education Working Committee 
(华教工作委员会)—a reformed collaborative body after the failure of Sandajigou. 
This marked the beginning of a closer bond between the two organizations. In 
November 1966, Chinese organizations drafted the Memorandum to Accord Rightful 
Status to Chinese Language (争取华文地位备忘录) and mobilized a nationwide 
petition.
In 1967, calls for an independent Chinese university started to grow in response 
to the restrictions by MOE requiring all students to obtain a Cambridge School 
Certification or Malaysian Certification of Education before they could leave the 
country for further studies abroad.
 Despite warnings from the government to halt the campaign, the campaigners 
successfully obtained more than 2,000 signatures.  
241  This regulation hit hard particularly the 
non-converted Chinese secondary school graduates who had only obtained a Chinese 
secondary school certificate. Thus, limited enrollment opportunities at local 
universities forced many Chinese school graduates to continue their studies at overseas 
universities, or quit school altogether.242
The Chinese community, led by SCAH, submitted a memorandum to the prime 
minister to demand that the government include Chinese as an official language under 
  
                                               
240 Interview with Sim Mow Yu, March 26, 2008, Malacca. 
241 Announced by Education Minister Mohamed Khir Johari on September 21, 1967. 
242 Chian HK (1994: 60). 
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the 1966 National Language Bill. However, these efforts came to naught. Therefore, 
when Dongzong and Jiaozong suggested the formation of Merdeka University in an 
attempt to resolve the impasse, their suggestion was met by overwhelming positive 
response from the Chinese community nationwide.243
The collaboration of Dongzong and Jiaozong as Dongjiaozong—the defenders 
of Chinese education in Malaysia—was popularized during the Merdeka University 
Movement in 1968 and 1969. The founding of Merdeka University was initiated by 
Jiaozong and led by Dongzong Chairman Ye Hong En* (叶鸿恩).
 
244
The founding of Merdeka University has a significant meaning for the 
Chinese community here, and the university has a long road ahead of it. 
Although we will face many challenges, we shall possess 
 As the founding 
committee chairman, Ye summoned support from his fellow countrymen in his opening 
speech at the Merdeka University Founders’ Assembly (马来亚独立大学发起人大会) 
held at SCAH in April 1968.   
the 
determination and courage to surmount all difficulties, and we shall not 
be daunted by repeated setbacks.  
 
The Assembly was attended by 199 representatives from registered Chinese 
organizations nationwide. 245
                                               
243 The Federation of Malaya Chinese Senior Normal Graduate Teachers’ Union (高师职总) proposed 
the establishment of a Chinese university in Malaysia, mimicking the format of Nanyang University  
(南洋大学) in Singapore on December 7, 1967. The proposal was accepted by the Jiaozong annual 
representative assembly the next day and engaged Dongzong’s involvement. Other names proposed for 
the university included Harmony and Union University (协和大学 ), Cheng Ho University  
(郑和大学), Kuala Lumpur University (吉隆坡大学), Tan Cheng Lock University (陈祯禄大学) and 
Tunku Abdul Rahman University (拉曼大学 ). It was eventually named Merdeka University to 
commemorate Malaya’s independence. See Sinchew, February 25, 1968 and Teachers’ Journal  
(1968: 18–28).  
 In this meeting, they formed the Merdeka University 
Formation Working Committee (马来西亚独立大学筹备工作委员会 ) and 
established a non-profit Merdeka University (Limited) Company (独立大学有限公司) 
in May 1969. 
244 Ye Hong En was the founder of Perak CSTA and played a significant role in supporting Jiaozong’s 
formation in 1961. He was an active leader in Selangor Donglianhui from 1958 to 1978. 
245 Teachers’ Journal (1968). 
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Merdeka University received overwhelming support from the Chinese 
community, as well as from MCA’s Youth Division and Women Wings. 246  The 
strength of its support base is most apparent in the various fundraising campaigns held 
to fundraise for Merdeka University’s formation in 1968, which successfully collected 
about two million ringgit by May 1969.247
Nevertheless, the project did not have the blessings of MCA’s central 
leaders.
  
248  MCA President Tan Siew Sin, accused Merdeka University of being 
“politically motivated and it would have been easier for ‘hell to freeze’ (almost 
impossible) than for Merdeka University to be established in this country”.249 MCA 
proposed the expansion of the University of Malaya’s Department of Chinese Studies 
into a full faculty and set up Tunku Abdul Rahman College (拉曼学院) as palatable 
alternatives.250
Flagging political strength and mounting pressure from MCA members forced 
MCA to finally back down and agree to work with Merdeka University Company. The 
registration of Merdeka University Company was approved by the government as a 
non-profit corporation under the Companies Act on May 8, 1969—two days before the 
1969 General Election. This, however, did not save the Alliance coalition from losing 
two-thirds of the parliamentary majority in the May 12, 1969 elections, resulting in 
MCA leaders declaring that the party would pull out from the cabinet. 
 
At the same time, opposition parties, mostly non-Malays who won the polls, 
celebrated their victory in organized demonstrations. The demonstrations only served 
to deepen the fear and mistrust amongst the Malays over the Chinese’ growing 
                                               
246 UMB (1978: 75). 
247 Nanda (1982: 84–85); Zeng RC et.al (1993: 149–151); Zhuan ZS (2004: 242). 
248 UMB (1978: 86); DDDC (1993: 21).  
249 Chinese educationalists and the Chinese-speaking community perceived the comments as an ultimate 
act of betrayal of ethnic Chinese by English-educated Tan Siew Sin. See Malay Mail, April 17, 1969. 
250 China Press, July 15, 1968.  
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influence and power in the country. The immediate eruption of the ethnic riots on May 
13, 1969 involved killings between ethnic Malays and Chinese communities, resulting 
in hundreds of deaths.251 As a consequence of the May 13 ethnic riots, the formation of 
Merdeka University was stalled after the subsequent declaration of a State of 
Emergency, with Merdeka University Company’s financial assets frozen by the 
government.252
 Prime Minister Abdul Rahman resigned and paved the way for Abdul Razak as 
the second prime minister of Malaysia in September 1970, who led the National 
Operation Council in governing the state with an Emergency Decree for the next 21 
months. Abdul Razak’s regime sought to restructure state and society relations in 
Malaysia, and the centerpiece of this overhaul, the New Economic Policy, was 
introduced in 1971.  
  
Aimed at restructuring state and society, the main approach of the New 
Economic Policy was to “eradicate poverty, by raising income levels and increasing 
employment opportunities for all Malaysians, irrespective of race. It also aimed at 
accelerating the process of restructuring the Malaysian society to correct economic 
imbalance, so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with 
economic function”.253
                                               
251 No precise fatality figures were made public until today. Casualties counts by the police reported 196 
dead, 439 wounded and 9,183 detained. See NOC (1969: 89–92).  
 The first decade of New Economic Policy saw rocketing growth 
of state-led bumiputera capitalist development. Civil servants’ wages were increased 
252 Zhen G (2006: 84). 
253 By 1970, Malays owned only 2% of the share capital, 22% by Chinese, 1% by Indians and 60% by 
foreigners. The New Economic Policy aimed to ensure 30% shares for Malays in the country’s corporate 
interests by 1990. See Means (1991: 19–53); Torii (2003). Citation quoted from 1971 Rancangan 
Malaysia Kedua, p. 2.  
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and an official Islamization program was promoted to nudge Muslims on the path to 
capitalism in Malaysia. 254
 
 
2.11. Barisan Nasional and MCA Chinese Unity Movement    
After the heavy setback in 1969, Abdul Razak broadened the three parties’ Alliance 
coalition and incorporated the conservative Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), 
multi-ethnic (but gradually became dominated by ethnic Chinese) Malaysian People’s 
Movement Party (Gerakan) and the smaller, yet influential multi-ethnic People’s 
Progressive Party to form a new coalition known as Barisan Nasional (BN).255
By co-opting its two main opponents, BN now re-controlled Penang (governed 
by Gerakan) and Kelantan (governed by PAS). It also ensured BN’s supreme leadership 
in the 1974 General Election. Although the expanding ranks of the ruling coalition 
enhanced UMNO’s political domination and procured more power in the hands of 
Malays, it also weakened the status of MCA as the sole Chinese representative in the 
government. 
 
Following the end of the Emergency Decree in 1971, MCA launched a series of 
nationwide Chinese Solidarity Conventions (全国华人团结大会) to garner support 
from the Chinese community in an attempt to rebound from its declining political 
status.256
                                               
254 The second phase of the New Economic Policy saw Mahathir Mohamad introduce a greater sense of 
Malay nationalism in the national economy by ‘UMNO-nizing’ ownership of European corporations, 
and through the ‘Look East’ industrialization model. See Chin BN (2000: 1043–1044). 
 Leaders and communities assembled at the Seminar of National Chinese 
Leaders in Malaya (全马华人领袖座谈会) in February 1971 in Kuala Lumpur. The 
seminar discussed the issues and challenges of unity among Chinese. Former MCA 
255 DAP, Partai Rakyat and Social Justice Party of Malaysia refused to join BN. 
256 Loh KW (1982). 
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leader, Sim Mow Yu, who remained influential and popular at the grassroots level after 
his departure from MCA, was invited to be the keynote speaker.257
Sim’s speech set forth seven counter-proposals to a statement issued by 
UMNO. The proposals included the demand to end ethnic discrimination in 
government policies and promote equal rights for all ethnic groups in economic, 
educational and cultural opportunities. The Chinese Solidarity Conventions continued a 
few days later in Perak, and in the next months at Negeri Sembilan and Penang.
   
258
Unfortunately, the movement ended dramatically when prominent Chinese 
leaders, Sim Mow Yu and Gu Hsing Kuang (顾兴光), were arrested in April 1971 
under the Sedition Act.
  
259 Despite overwhelming participation from the community in 
the National Chinese Alliance Movement, the movement neither reformed MCA nor 
improved the political status of the Chinese by means of securing the status of Chinese 
language and culture in Malaysia. 260
In December 1971, Dongzong, Jiaozong and Chinese Education Central 
Committee jointly organized the National Convention of the Chinese School 
Committees and Schoolteachers (全国华校董教大会 ) at the SCAH to discuss 
approaches to persuade the government to retain the characteristics of Chinese schools. 
Despite this being the largest gathering of Chinese educationalists with more than a 
thousand attendees (including representatives from Sarawak) in more than a decade, the 
weakened MCA failed to achieve any breakthrough in negotiations with the 
government on this issue.  
 
                                               
257 During the interview, Sim mentioned that he was persuaded by Tan Siew Sin and other senior MCA 
party leaders to be the speaker of the seminar for the sake of the Chinese. Interview with Sim Mow Yu, 
March 26, 2008, Malacca. 
258 Tongbao, February 9, 1971. 
259  They were prosecuted for giving stirring speeches in Ipoh on April 29; however, Malaysian 
authorities dropped the case on October 27, 1972, and proposed Sim to take on a senator position; 
however, the invitation was declined. Interview with Sim Mow Yu, March 26, 2008, Malacca.  
260 Lee KH (1998: 39–40); Loot TY (1997). 
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The normalization of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the People’s 
Republic of China in May 1974 signified the end of China’s state-level support to the 
Malayan Communist Party.261 It also confirmed both governments’ recognition of the 
principle of jus soli, rejection of dual nationality, and Malaysian Chinese as legitimate 
citizens of the country. Abdul Razak’s recognition and acknowledgement of China 
rewarded him with favorable support from the Chinese community, whose support led 
to his landslide electoral victory in 1974.262
The implementation of the New Economic Policy, New Education Policy and 
other pro-Malay massive affirmative action programs fostered the growth of political 
patronage in the Malay middle-class, yet it also further polarized the dichotomy 
between Malays and non-Malays. Ironically, the ethnic exploitation, inequitable 
distribution of national wealth and deliberate marginalization of the non-bumiputeras 
would become the sole factors that united the Chinese, especially in the Chinese 
education movement.    
 
 
2.12. Conclusion  
Anti-communism sentiments arising from the Cold War controversies of the 1960s and 
1970s generally targeted Chinese as supporters of communists in Malaya, especially 
those who fought against the Japanese under the Malayan Communist Party-led 
Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army in World War II. The Chinese education 
movement arose in the process of the British’s efforts to fight communism in Malaya 
and the expansion of Malayan Chinese nationalism sentiments prior to independence in 
1957.    
                                               
261 Although China promised the end of state-level support towards the Malayan Communist Party, the 
party level ties (Chinese Communist Party-Malayan Communist Party) continued until the dissolution of 
the Malayan Communist Party in 1989. For more, see Chin P (2003).    
262 Loh, Phang and Saravanamuttu (1981: 27–33). 
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The Sandajigou collaboration between MCA, Dongzong and Jiaozong in the 
1950s marked the successful birth of the movement in Malaya’s nation building 
process. Although state and movement actors did not share many of the same 
principles, interpersonal and inter-institutional working experiences had built upon 
fundamental trust to become the key factors behind the support of vernacular 
communities of the Alliance coalition in the 1955 Malacca Meeting, which eventually 
led to a peaceful transition into independence in 1957.  
Nevertheless, the honeymoon period was brief as elites in the top echelon 
changed. Pro-vernacular MCA leader Lim Chong Eu and his reformist wings did not 
have the blessings of Alliance Chairman Abdul Rahman. When Tan Siew Sin came into 
power through the help of the Alliance regime’s old guards, the Chinese education 
movement was forced to turn to the support of the mass from huatuans.  
This shift expanded the magnitude of the movement to include intellectuals, 
financially established Chinese entrepreneurs, as well as the community who shared 
everyday grievances. The Chinese education movement transformed from a claim by a 
small organization over educational issues into a full-blown campaign to secure 
citizenship rights for Chinese in Malaya, along with demands for instating the Chinese’ 
vernacular language as an official language and forming a more comprehensive and 
inclusive national education system. 
The events presented in this chapter form the backdrop for the establishment of 
various institutions in the social movement in its later stages, which will be presented in 
the upcoming chapters. Although Malaysia has grown from a new state in the 1950s 
into a successful developing country by 2011, yet the Chinese education movement, 
with its claim on constitutional discrimination, leaves an ugly scar on the country’s 
facade of political progress. The reminder by Donald MacGillivray in 1952 remains 
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eternal: lacking status as an official language in Malaysia, the Chinese and Chinese 
people will never be recognized within the Malaysia (education) system. 
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Chapter Three  
Challenges and Adaptations 
   
3.1. Introduction 
Chapter Two detailed the formation of the Chinese education movement, its early 
trajectories, and the external challenges it faced during the early stages of the 
movement—including those from the state and resource mobilization—
The Sandajigou collaboration proved its value in defending the interests of the 
Chinese schoolteachers and the Chinese school committee communities when Chinese 
primary schools were incorporated into the national education system under the 1957 
Education Ordinance. Unfortunately, the collaboration fell apart when MCA’s 
leadership was reshuffled, putting the survival of these Chinese schools under threat as 
the state’s assimilative policies of the 1960s and 1970s took hold.   
during 
Malaya’s transition from a colony into an independent state. The chapter demonstrated 
that Chinese elites’ personal social capital played a significant role in the social 
movement’s trajectories. The movement gained momentum in the 1950s through the 
collaboration among MCA, Dongzong and Jiaozong under the framework of the 
Sandajigou.  
Due to the difficulty of penetrating the movement’s stronghold at the central 
level, the state began to impose a series of limitations and soft-coercive approaches by 
manipulating state agencies, such as MOE, to weaken the movement at the local level. 
This divide-and-attack strategy significantly limited the capacities of the movement 
agencies, hitting the movement’s local-central associational linkages particularly hard.  
This chapter argues that through manipulating state institutional mechanisms 
such as education policies and distribution of financial resources, the state managed to 
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weaken the movement without using force. This strategy enabled the state to suppress 
the movement, and at the same time, secure the political interests of the non-liberal, 
democratic government to stay in power. Such an environment forced the social 
movement to learn, adapt and withstand challenges, which became the key factor to its 
survival. 
In order to better understand such challenges, this chapter is divided into four 
sections. The first section presents the challenges faced by Chinese school committee 
communities when their traditional roles as the caretaker of Chinese schools were 
severely threatened and weakened by state-imposed structural constraints through 
educational policies and distribution of state resources. These constraints altered the 
character, structure and capabilities of these local agencies, resulting in changes to their 
involvement in the Chinese education movement.  
The second section describes a critical turning point for Chinese schools in the 
1970s when English-medium primary schools were phased-out by the state. Similar to 
the Chinese and Tamil vernacular schools, English-medium primary schools (many of 
them formally Christian mission schools) were incorporated into the national education 
system as ‘national-type’ primary schools. Although these schools can retain their 
original English name, they no longer enjoy the privilege to teach in the English 
language only.  
Such phasing out of the English-medium schools resulted in a spike in student 
enrollment in Chinese schools, which in turn caused a revival in the role of Chinese 
school committees. Competition to enroll in already overcrowded urban Chinese 
schools saw the development of a patronage relationship between Chinese parents and 
school committees, which have the power to recommend candidates for enrollment into 
popular schools. Opaque policies in the allocation of state grants to these vernacular 
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schools also stimulated the participation of urban middle-class parents in the schools’ 
fundraising campaigns. Efforts to overcome state constraints also saw some school 
committees seek political intervention from MCA for assistance to obtain ‘special 
funding allocation’ or facilitate the relocation of the school to a more populated 
neighborhood to boost enrollment. 
Although the phasing-out of English-medium schools provided justification for 
keeping Chinese school committees, it did not solve the fundamental problems faced by 
Chinese schoolteachers. The third section of this chapter takes on this issue. Chinese 
schoolteachers—who, as civil servants, were prohibited from participating in 
anti-government activities—were fearful and pessimistic about the future of Chinese 
education in the country. The lack of a broad support base from the grassroots had a 
magnifying effect on most CSTA at the local and state level. Facing insufficient 
resources and lack of new leadership, most CSTA were forced to operate under the 
patronage of school principals. This weakened the central institution of Jiaozong 
considerably. 
The chapter’s final section evaluates the impact of the central agencies of the 
movement in dealing with the state’s strategy of co-optation. New challenges have 
arisen in the post-1990s period with increasingly more politically ambitious individuals 
seeking positions in various Chinese education associations, especially at the 
state-level alliance of Chinese school committees’ association (donglianhui), as a 
stepping-stone for their political career. These co-opted and (generally) corrupt 
individuals gradually made their way into the national organizations of the movement 
and held the integrity and independence of the Chinese education movement hostage in 
various accounts.  
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The implementation of the controversial 1996 Education Act also presented 
new challenges to the role of school committees and the overall sustainability of the 
movement. All these technical challenges and changes experienced by local level 
agents have a domino effect on the movement’s overall capacity and ability in 
mobilizing support from movement members and the Chinese community at large. The 
chapter ends with an evaluation of the consequences of these to the relationship 
between Dongzong and Jiaozong at the national level. 
 
3.2. State Structural Control and Constraints on Chinese Schools 
All Chinese primary schools were incorporated into the national education system 
under the 1957 Education Ordinance, and 54 out of the 69 Chinese secondary schools 
were converted into the national system under the 1961 Education Act. This also meant 
that about three quarters of the Chinese schools in Malaysia were receiving financial 
support from the state, and therefore, constrained under various state-imposed 
education policies. This left the independent Chinese secondary schools  
(华文独立中学, duzhong) (see Appendix 5 for the list of these schools) as the last 
independent standing institutions of the movement. 
 Although the Chinese primary schools and converted secondary schools are 
entitled to state funding, fierce competition for grant-in-aid with the other vernacular 
primary schools—the Malay, English and Tamil secondary schools, which are under 
the absolute control by the BN coalition government—continued to threaten the 
survival of these schools and the Chinese education movement at-large to this day.  
A significant constraint faced by the local agencies of the movement was the 
implementation of the education acts. For example, the 1957 Education Ordinance 
regulated the selection of school committees in Chinese schools. The traditional system 
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of selecting members for Chinese school committees from a pool of school sponsors 
was replaced with the new system, which required three-to-six representatives from 
each of the following clusters to form a school committee: school sponsors, alumni, 
parents of current pupils, school trustees and MOE-appointed representatives. In 
particular, the inclusion of MOE-appointed representatives was a key condition for 
continuation of government subsidy.263
Moreover, instead of working without term limits, the 1957 Education 
Ordinance also imposed a tenure of three years for each term on all Chinese school 
committee members. Although there were no limits on the number of times one’s term 
could be renewed, the regulation limited continuous participation of committee 
members in the school. The frequent turnover in school committee members resulting 
from this policy produced school committee members who were weak in 
administrating and managing schools because of the lack of the opportunity to learn 
from senior committee members who could no longer participate when their term 
expired.  
 
Illustratively, school committee members lacked the awareness to administrate 
their traditional affirmative rights, such as signing of school checks and collection of 
private funds derived from the rental revenue of the school canteen, profits from the 
school cooperative shops, and all other sources derived from the use of school property 
owned by the school committee. These sources of incomes had been important for 
meeting the expenses of school projects such as maintenance and improvement works, 
and student welfare, all which were not supported by the government. If the Chinese 
school committees were unable to defend their rights to administrate such incomes, not 
only is the sustainability of the respective Chinese schools at risk, but the impact 
                                               
263 Interview with Kho Hai Meng, January 16, 2009, Penang. 
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reverberates throughout the Chinese education movement and threatens the overall 
survival of the movement. 
 In 1960, contents of the 1957 Education Ordinance was reviewed and renewed. 
The role of school governors was defined in the 1961 Education Act as “individuals 
who actively take part in the administration of the revenues or property or in the 
management of an educational institution” 264
 In exchange, the state agreed to provide substantial financial support to these 
Chinese schools in its attempt to persuade them to accept incorporation into the national 
education system, and as part of its larger social control strategy. However, the actual 
implementation and distribution of state resources were still skewed, for, in order to 
promote Malay-medium national schools as the school of choice for all Malaysians, 
vernacular schools were not given equal opportunities to access state resources due to a 
series of structural constraints imposed by the state.  
 and accorded a title either as a ‘school 
manager’ in primary schools, or a ‘school governor’ in secondary schools and 
institutions for higher education. The school manager or governor (referred to as the 
‘school committee’ in this thesis) was regarded by the 1961 Education Act as a trustee 
institution and not the owner of the school. In contrast to its powerful role during the 
colonial era, the school committee was no longer the sole decision-maker in Chinese 
schools, nor could it continue to enjoy unquestioned power to relocate or transfer the 
school’s property without the consent and authorization of school sponsors and MOE.  
For example, under the 1961 Education Act, schools built on government 
premises are categorized as ‘fully-assisted schools’ and are therefore entitled to full 
financial assistance for capital grants from the state for school development and 
                                               





 According to this regulation, schools built on non-government-owned 
premises are categorized as ‘partially-assisted schools’, and are only entitled to state 
subsidies for executive expenses and schoolteachers’ salaries. The latest data 
accumulated in 2008 shows that about 32% of Chinese schools are fully-assisted 
schools (see Figure 3.1). Not only do these schools receive less entitlement for state 
resources in rule, in practice, they are also allocated insufficient resources for 
development.  
Figure 3.1 Premises Ownership of Chinese Primary Schools  
 
Source: Compiled by the author with data extracted from MCA Central Education 
Bureau (2008). 
 
                                               
265 According to 1961 Education Act (Part 1.2), capital grant means “a payment from public funds to an 
educational institution for the provision of land or buildings, the alteration to or extension of existing 
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Partially-Assisted Schools Fully-Assisted Schools 
879 schools (68%)                           411 schools (32%) 
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A comparison of funds allocated under the Malaysia Plan from 1972 till 2010 
demonstrated that national schools received most of the allocated budget. Chinese and 
Tamil primary schools received considerably less funds in proportion to the student 
distribution ratio in all Malaysia Plans since 1971 (for a numerical breakdown, see 
Table 3.1).  
 
Table 3.1  Public Funding for Primary Schools under Malaysia Plans 
(1972–2010) 
 National Schools Chinese Schools Tamil Schools 













Ideal distribution 174,550,943 + 73,319,229 1,323,819 



















































Ideal distribution 3,714,690,000 + 1,035,860,000 149,450,000 
















Ideal distribution 3,663,838,480 + 1,013,854,230 159,606,290 
+
 
 Ideal fund distribution = budget allocated according to student ratios. 
Source: Compiled by the author with data extracted from Educational Statistics of 
Malaysia (1981; 1991; 1996; 2001; 2006) and Dongzong (2007: 156). 
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The impact of these education acts in the 1960s and 1970s have significant 
consequences on the status of Chinese schools up to the present. Because education is 
an expensive investment, the lack of financial support from the government has 
seriously weakened the development of Chinese schools and other vernacular 
education institutions in the country alike. As many of these schools are built during the 
colonial era, their wooden and zinc roofed facilities are left unrepaired; as a result, 
many are infested with termites. The Chinese school committee community, in 
particular, has been frustrated with the state’s delay in executing its promises. The 
experience of betrayal later became the basis of the movement’s actors’ suspicion and 
lack of trust in the state, particularly in UMNO leaders.  
The lack of trust had prevented collaboration between the movement and the 
state. Instead of engaging in productive, interest-based negotiation, taking a 
position-based stand has located them at mutually exclusive and contradicting positions 
instead. The deteriorating relationship was only salvaged by the outgrowths of a 
brokerage culture—an important role played by MCA state members—which has 
bridged collaboration, linked shared interests and, above all, prevented the escalation of 
any violent confrontations. This will be explored in detail in Chapter Four.  
Other than financial and structural constraints, the state has also halted the 
formation of new vernacular schools since the independence of Malaya in 1957. All the 
slots for schools in the new housing areas have been exclusively reserved for 
Malay-medium national schools, resulting in a significant decrease in the number of 







Figure 3.2 Distribution of Primary Schools (1970–
 
2007) 
Source: Compiled by the author with data provided by Dongzong. 
Figure 3.3 Distribution of Primary School Students (1970–
 
2007) 
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As illustrated in the following figures (3.2 and 3.3), the number of national schools rose 
from 4,277 in 1970 to 5,781 in 2007—an increase of 26% or 1,504 schools. 
Correspondingly, the number of students in national schools grew from 1,046,513 in 
1970 to 2,286,328 in 2008, a 118% increase. In contrast, although the number of 
Chinese school students increased from 439,681 to 643,679 (46%) over the same 
period, but the number of Chinese schools was reduced by 57. The Tamil community 
lost 134 schools.  
 
3.3. The Turning Point 
The state’s educational policies and its control of resources successfully contained the 
development of vernacular schools in the 1960s and 1970s, and even to this day. 
However, one of these state strategies was a crucial turning point for the Chinese 
education movement. After the 1967 National Language Bill was passed to secure 
Malay as the country’s sole national language, Malay formally replaced English as the 
medium of instruction in all primary one classes in English-medium schools; the higher 
levels followed suit thereafter. By 1986, English schools in the country had been 
completely ‘eliminated’.  
The phasing out of the English schools had a strong impact on the Chinese 
education movement, especially in the 1980s. It confirmed the concern raised by 
Dongjiaozong since the 1950s that the same fate awaited the Chinese schools. It proved 
to be a timely wake-up call for fence-sitting Chinese communities to defend Chinese 
primary schools as the fundamental institution for the instruction of Chinese language 
in Malaysia. Beyond being a place to learn the Chinese language, Chinese schools 
became a symbolic institution that secured the Chinese’ ethnic identity and prevented 
the continuous dilution of their rights in the country.  
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Hence, ironically, the government unwittingly did Chinese primary schools a 
favor by eliminating all English schools—the then leading and most popular primary 
educational institution—and converting them into Malay-medium national schools. 
Chinese parents who used to favor competence in English were reluctant to place their 
children in Malay schools. So, they began to send their children to the second best 
option available: Chinese schools. Compared to national schools and Tamil schools, 
Chinese schools are more competitive academically (especially for mastering 
mathematics and science), and are reputed for strict discipline. They also offered the 
benefit of trilingual education (Chinese, English and Malay).266
Accordingly, Chinese schools began to see a boost in student enrollment 
beginning in the 1970s.
  
267
As a consequence of their popularity and the state’s refusal to build new 
Chinese schools, almost all Chinese schools located in heavily Chinese-populated 
neighborhoods are overcrowded. The situation has forced Chinese school committees 
to raise funds from the public to expand the school’s infrastructure, which, in turn, led 
to a revival of the role of these school committees as an important mechanism and key 
benefactor of Chinese schools.  
 Recognition of the quality of Chinese schools went beyond 
ethnic boundaries, however. Over time, many non-ethnic Chinese parents, including 
Malays, began enrolling their children in Chinese schools. As elaborated in Figure 3.4, 
their numbers in Chinese primary schools rose from 17,309 students (about 3%) in 
1989 to 65,000 students (about 10%) in 1999. The subcategory of bumiputera students 
constituted some 45,000 students (7%) by 2005.   
 
 
                                               
266 Interview with Lu SS, February 10, 2008, Penang; Interview with Lim KC, February 24, 2008, 
Penang; Interview with Chai Yah Han, January 17, 2009, Penang. 
267 MICSSWC (1992: 84). 
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Source: Compiled by the author with data provided by Dongzong. 
 
Chinese school committees are led by a chairman (董事长), who plays the lead role in 
fundraising. To this end, a ‘successful chairman’ must be able to assume the role of a 
‘noble beggar’—the audacity and persistence to seek donations from communities and 
maintain a good relationship with them.268
                                               
268 Interview with Quek Suan Hiang, March 23, 2010, Johore. 
 The chairman must plan strategically by 
targeting donors through his personal connections. He might not be the richest, or the 
most generous donor, but he must be resourceful in generating money. According to 
Quek Suan Hiang (郭全强), a former Dongzong chairman (1993–2005) and the school 
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To establish a successful fundraising campaign, a chairman must start 
the momentum by donating a sum of money and then mobilize a few 
individuals who can contribute impressive amounts of donations; the 
more the merrier, and this will keep the ball rolling and generate waves 
of donations by the rest of the communities.269
 
  
To raise funds, Chinese schools organize events such as temporary amusement parks in 
the school compound, stage performances, dinners and other community-related 
activities. Through these special occasions, Chinese schools committee members also 
invite participation from shops and trading companies to contribute donations to the 
schools. 270
Schoolteachers are responsible for organizing and training student participants 
in traditional performances, which are often well-received by the local community.
 Influential social figures, such as successful businessmen and active 
members of local huatuans, are also invited to grace school events so as to expand the 
school’s popularity and attract community participation.  
271 
To this day, these events remain as significant platforms for engaging and enhancing 
the bonds between schools and local communities. The success of these events reflects 
upon the reputation and status of the school committees, schoolteachers and students in 
the community.272
Because enrollment for the overpopulated Chinese schools is exceedingly 
competitive, recommendations from school committee members became the best 
means of securing enrollment for new students. In Chinese schools, each committee 
member is entitled to recommend a certain number of candidates into the school. This 
 
                                               
269 Born to one of the richest Hainanese family in Malaya, Quek was the eldest grandson of Malacca 
Tongmenghui (同盟会) leader Quek Ju Chuan* (郭巨川) and strongly influenced by his granduncle 
Quek Jing Chuan* (郭镜川) who had worked closely with Sun Yat Sen (孙中山) during the Chinese 
revolution. Quek studied in China in the 1940s and returned to Malaya in the 1950s. Interview with  
Quek Suan Hiang, March 23, 2010, Johore. 
270 In return for their financial contribution, donors who made large amount of donation are also entitled 
to name the school buildings (classrooms, school halls, and other facilities). Such ‘naming right’ has 
been widely practised by the Chinese schools communities in Malaysia as one of the most efficient ways 
to generate large donations from the public. See session 4.11 Resource Mobilization for more.    
271 Liu BK (1986: 19–26). 
272 Interview with Yeoh Ban Eng, January 7, 2009, Penang. 
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demand-and-supply relationship helps to solidify committee members’ social status 
within the Chinese community. It also motivates important, successful businessmen to 
continue to involve themselves and invest their time as members of Chinese school 
committees.   
Although the 1957 Education Ordinance has limited the maximum size of a 
school committee to 15, in reality, their numbers in Chinese schools may reach up to a 
hundred. A majority of them are “honorary school committee members who have 
contributed donations to the school, and used their donor-beneficiary relationship with 
local communities to secure their social status”.273
Incomes from the school sponsorship system are important to Chinese schools 
because they cover expenses such as water and electricity bills, which is especially 
crucial for the survival of partially-assisted schools that were not entitled to full state 
subsidies. Due to scarce financial resources, all Chinese schools, rich or poor, are 
constantly under pressure to generate new ways to operate within a limited budget. 
According to a retired Chinese schoolteacher, Madam Huang, 
 The actual management of the 
school fell under the responsibility of the school committee office-bearers (such as the 
chairman, general secretary and treasurer).  
Although we were one of the biggest schools in the state, we often 
picked up used chairs and tables from the national schools to replace 
broken facilities in our schools. They needed to discard them anyway, 
and principals of the national schools did not mind that we took them 
because they also knew that Chinese schools received much less 
funding from the government than them. The national schools received 
funds for new tables and chairs every two to three years, but we 
(Chinese schools) had been using the same set of tables and chairs for 
decades. By recycling these valuable resources, we could save a lot of 




                                               
273 Interview with Huang CC, January 17, 2009, Penang. 
274 Interview with Huang CC, January 17, 2009, Penang. 
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The above interview is reflective of the general phenomena at the grassroots level. 
Although the Chinese education movement involved the conflict between ethnic 
ideologies represented by Chinese educationalists and the Malay state, inter-ethnic 
relations at the community level can be perceived as harmonious and peaceful. School 
communities at the national schools and Chinese schools generally know each other in 
their private capacity, and enjoy good interpersonal relationships. Although they do not 
and will not interfere with each other schools’ business, requests to share ‘used and 
unwanted resources’ as mentioned above, are common and often seen as a win-win 
situation for both parties: the Chinese schools can have ‘new’ resources, while the 
national schools can dispose such resources at ease. 
Other than facing scarce school resources, many schools located in smaller 
towns have also been facing the crippling problem of diminishing community 
population and therefore shrinking student enrollment. As urbanization of larger cities 
has continued apace, many of these schools face the threat of closure.275
As shown in Table 3.2, 43 out of 75 Chinese primary schools received their 
approval for relocation prior to a general election—a timely and strategic political 
move for MCA to gain support from Chinese voters.
 To overcome 
such problems, beginning from the 1980s, Chinese school committee members, many 
of whom were also MCA members, began to seek assistance from MCA central leaders 
to obtain permission from MOE to relocate these schools into highly 
Chinese-populated areas. Although the approval rate for relocation in the 1980s was 
low, MCA politicians began to widely manipulate this mechanism to gain political 
leverage in the 1990s.  
276
                                               
275 Jiaozong (2007b; 2007c).  
 The gradual impact of political 
influence in the Chinese schools was not limited to relocation efforts and schools per se. 
276 Dongjiaozong (2010: 4). 
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The BN regime began to adopt the mechanism of co-optation since the early 1990s to 
intrude upon the Chinese education movement at the state and central levels. We return 
to this development in the final section of this chapter.   
 
 Table 3.2 Relocated Chinese Primary Schools (1999–

















Number of Schools 13 17 13 32 
Subtotal 43 (57%) 32 (43%) 
Total 75 (100%) 
Source: Compiled by the author with data provided by Jiaozong. 
 
3.4. The Taming of the Schoolteachers 
While Chinese school committees survived the various challenges they faced by ably 
re-defining their roles, Chinese schoolteachers have not fared as well. As a leading 
partner of the movement in the 1950s, Chinese schoolteachers were the most outspoken 
critics of the state. In response, to constrain the movement, the state sought to tame the 
schoolteachers via a series of tough approaches.   
First, the state removed their leaders. This included the revocation of Jiaozong 
Chairman Lim Lian Geok’s citizenship and expulsion of Jiaozong Advisor  
Yan Yuan Zhang in 1961, and dismissal of Jiaozong Chairman Sim Mow Yu from 
MCA in 1966 (as detailed in Chapter Two).  
Upon the removal of influential leaders, the state exploited the unstable political 
situation during the Indonesia Confrontation (1963–1966) (as discussed in  
Chapter Two) and instilled the ‘White Terror’ (白色恐怖). The state police, for 
example, detained suspicious individuals, leftists and social activists by force and 
112 
 
without trial under the Internal Security Act. 277
 Third, the state exerted control over schoolteachers by incorporating them into 
the civil servants system. Unlike in the old days when the salary of Chinese 
schoolteachers were paid by the school committee, the state now enjoyed absolute 
power to appoint, dismiss or regulate the posting location (such as school) of a 
schoolteacher. Via the 1961 Education Act, the state controlled schoolteachers’ training 
institutions, the registration of their teaching permits and distribution of salaries. 
Specifically, Part VI, Article 78 empowered the Registrar of Teachers to refuse to 
register (and deregister) a person if the former had reason to suspect that he or she was 
likely to promote unlawful activities in the school or would harm the interests of the 
Federation, the public or pupils.
 In all, the crackdown effectively 
ensured many outspoken critics exercised self-restraint. 
278
 In 1962, Jiaozong faced one of the first major divisions within the Chinese 
schoolteachers’ community when the Malaya Chinese Senior Normal Graduate 
Teachers Union (马来亚联合邦华文高级师范 ) was established. Jiaozong was 
accused of protecting the general interests of the majority members, and ignoring and 
sacrificing the interests of Senior Normal graduates in their negotiation with MOE over 
the terms of salaries for Chinese schoolteachers. Senior Normal graduate 
schoolteachers (about 2,000 of them) were the pioneers who received formal training 
from the newly established teachers’ training college in Malaya between 1948 and 
1957. They enjoyed a special salary allocation from the British government for their 
qualification. Therefore, the Senior Normal communities were angry when the special 
allocation was cancelled by the post-independent Malayan government.
  
279
                                               
277 Interview with Leong Tzi Liang, February 3, 2010, Penang. 
 
278 1961 Education Act. 
279 Sinchew, October 22, 1962; MCSNGTU (1990: 1, 64–78).  
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The dispute proved to be a lose-lose situation when most of these Senior 
Normal graduate schoolteachers, who were also active members of CSTA and 
promising movement leaders, began to shunt Jiaozong-related activities. The state had 
successfully created a rift within Jiaozong by manipulating schoolteachers’ salary 
scheme to significantly reducing the latter’s capacity to fight back.    
Consequently, dampened morale depressed the capability of Chinese 
schoolteachers to function as core agents for Jiaozong. Indirectly, the weakened local 
institutions also caused a more severe problem of leadership at the central level of the 
movement. Sim Mow Yu, a formerly influential MCA player who had just been forced 
to retire from politics, had led Jiaozong through the difficulties of the 1960s. According 
to Sim, when he was asked to review his years as Jiaozong chairman, 
One will be famous for being a Jiaozong chairman. It is a highly 
respected position (among the Chinese community), but you also posit 
yourself at the forefront of the battle. Everything you do must be 
accountable to the community. At the same time, you are also risking 
your safety, your official ranking (as a schoolteacher), and your 
retirement pension. If the government targeted you, you might end up 
like Lim Lian Geok—whose citizenship was revoked and teaching 
permit stripped by the government.280
 
  
Sim also revealed that during his early days as Jiaozong chairman, secret police were 
stationed outside his house to observe his daily activities. Although there were no 
serious threats to his life and freedom until he was detained under the Internal Security 
Act during the Weeding Operation (Operasi Lalang) in 1987, the fear of being targeted 
and the risk of being detained effectively discouraged the rise of new leaders to take 
over Jiaozong’s premiership.  
 
                                               
280 Interview with Sim Mow Yu, March 26, 2008, Malacca. 
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3.5. Competition with the National Union of the Teaching Profession  
To make matters worse, the formation of the National Union of the Teaching 
Profession (Kesatuan Perkhidmatan Perguruan Kebangsaan Malaysia) in 1974 
replaced the role of CSTA and Jiaozong as the schoolteachers’ clubs. The National 
Union of the Teaching Profession is currently the largest public service union in 
Malaysia, with all schoolteachers who graduated from MOE’s schoolteachers’ training 
program assuming automatic membership regardless of ranking, qualification, race, 
religion, training or political affiliation.  
Moreover, National Union of the Teaching Profession is the only official 
schoolteachers’ union recognized by MOE. It provides important information on salary 
schemes, group insurance, welfare and legal assistance. Compared to CSTA or 
Jiaozong, operating under the auspices of MOE has enabled the National Union of the 
Teaching Profession to be more efficient in protecting and improving the welfare of the 
teaching profession.  
Unlike during the height of CSTA’s and Jiaozong’s popularity in the 1950s 
where most Chinese schoolteachers were ‘imported’ from China, were not fully 
integrated into the local community in Malaya, and therefore saw CSTA and Jiaozong 
as their sanctuary. The new teachers were locally-born and did not need CSTA and 
Jiaozong to back them up. In fact, since 1948, the government has prohibited the import 
of Chinese schoolteachers from China, and has been replacing these imported 
schoolteachers with locally-born counterparts. Over time, the National Union of the 
Teaching Profession began to overtake CSTA as the association for schoolteachers.   
The state’s determination to send a message of the force of its authority to 
Chinese schoolteachers was demonstrated in the fate of the outspoken Jiaozong Vice 
Chairman Loot Ting Yee (陆庭瑜). Under political pressure, MOE transferred Loot 
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from Kuala Lumpur to the coastal state of Terengganu in 1981 in order to reduce his 
participation in Jiaozong’s activities. In protest, Loot resisted the transfer and sued 
MOE. After he suffered an inevitable loss with the lawsuit, MOE revoked his teaching 
permit. With just two years left until his retirement, Loot lost all of his pension 
benefits.281
Consequently, many schoolteachers began to refrain from engaging in open 
anti-government activities. Many CSTA members also exercised self-restraint and 
avoided making controversial statements that might endanger or draw support away 
from its members. Many female schoolteachers, for instance, who had been juggling 
school duties, household duties and motherhood, could not devote themselves fully to 
CSTA activities. Some were also reluctant to be more active because members were not 





from duzhong, although unconstrained by the government civil servant regulations, 
were too overwhelmed by their heavy workload—which included fundraising 
activities—to be active in CSTA. 
3.6. School Principals Dominated Chinese Schoolteachers’ Associations  
As discussed above, the National Union of the Teaching Profession had been gradually 
replacing CSTA as the more successful teachers’ union. After the departure (due to old 
age or death) of the older and more enthusiastic generation of Chinese schoolteachers in 
the 1980s, the younger generation lacked either the interest or motivation to be actively 
involved in CSTA.  
As elaborated in Figure 3.5, the randomly selected six CSTAs (out of 44 CSTAs 
nationwide) illustrated two general patterns in the membership growth from the late 
                                               
281 Jiaozong (1987a: 576); Interview with Loot Ting Yee, March 24, 2008, Kuala Lumpur.  
282 Interview with Lim KC, February 24, 2008, Penang. 
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1980s to 2000s: a nearly flat growth for most of them (70%) to a gradual but slow climb 
for the rest (30%) (see the detailed CSTA membership growth at Appendix 6). 
Although the overall CSTA membership continued to climb, CSTA failed to cultivate 
new leaders who were sufficiently capable of taking over the premiership.  
Facing these challenges, many CSTA committees had to be presided over by 
principals of Chinese primary schools who could and did use their schools as bases of 
the CSTA secretariats and the schools’ resources for CSTA activities.283 This worrying 




Figure 3.5 CSTA Membership Distribution (1988–
 
2009) 
Source: Compiled by the author with data extracted from Jiaozong Annual Reports 
(1998–
                                               
283 Interview with Er Joo Tiong, July 22, 2010, Selangor. 
2009). 
































































The lack of statutory restriction on term limits made Sim the longest serving Jiaozong 
chairman with 29 years (1965–1994) of service. This longevity of Sim’s term brought 
stability to the movement, but it did not solve the problem of a lack of new leadership in 
the organization. Sim tried to resign multiple times, but his resignation was repeatedly 
rejected by the movement’s supporters. His resignation was only ‘accepted’ in 1994. 
Although the soon retiring chairman openly indicated that he preferred Loot Ting Yee, 
who had been the vice chairman since 1965, as successor, Loot’s fiery resistance 
worried most CSTA leaders. Although Loot was the last schoolteacher left standing in 
Jiaozong’s central committee, he was defeated by the soft-spoken, non-descript MCA 
member, Ong Kow Ee (王超群), in the 1994 chairman election.285
We do not need to strongly disagree or become emotional to reach our 
objectives. This approach may be dysfunctional sometimes and does 
not allow you to reach your objectives… We should try to communicate 
directly with officials from MOE. We can also go through MCA or 
Gerakan to get funding for the (Chinese) schools.
 In one of his press 




At the time of writing, Ong remains as Jiaozong’s chairman. His era marks a clear 
preference by the Jiaozong central committee for a softer, more collaborative approach 
with the state. For Jiaozong and its central-level leaders, this may be their only 
available option given such challenges as the gradual loss of importance of the CSTA 
and the lack of support from most of the Chinese schoolteachers.   
 
3.7. The Trojan Horse 
Meanwhile, Dongzong also began to be troubled by partisan politicking activities by 
opportunists who sought to gain control of the Chinese school committees, state-level 
                                               
285 Dongzong (1995: 43); Interview with Loot Ting Yee, March 24, 2008, Kuala Lumpur. 
286 Sinchew, May 30, 1994. 
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donglianhui and ultimately, the national umbrella of Dongzong. Since the 1990s, their 
emergence has worried veteran Chinese educationalists. Although the membership of 
Chinese school committees has traditionally consisted of politically powerful 
individuals, most Chinese school committees exercised self-restraint and avoided 
mixing political and cultural interests to maintain collective co-existence. As former 
Dongzong Chairman Quek Suan Hiang, pointed out, “self-interest politics must be laid 
off from the school committees, or else they (committee members who engage in 
self-interest politics) should get out”.287
Attempts of these self-appointed political ‘fighters’ to enter and control 
state-level donglianhui are exemplified by the controversial 1994 Negeri Sembilan 
Donglianhui election. Negeri Sembilan MCA Deputy President and Negeri Sembilan 
Chinese Assembly Hall Chairman Hoo Huo Shan (胡火山) openly challenged the 
three-time Negeri Sembilan Donglianhui Chairman and Dongzong Vice Chairman 
Chin Choong Sang (陈松生).
 
288 Many believed Hoo’s candidacy was echoing the call 
of MCA leaders in Selangor to ‘reform Dongjiaozong from within’ (elaborated in 
Chapter Five). In the end, although 70% of the 148 representatives who attended the 
Negeri Sembilan Donglianhui General Assembly were MCA members, Hoo gained 
only 61 votes.289 All the other candidates in Hoo’s faction lost the election, strongly 
indicating that these representatives preferred to keep partisian politics out of 
donglianhui.290
 Facing increasing threats, Dongzong began to strengthen its internal institutions 
through various approaches. First, it published the Handbook of Chinese Education 
Workers (华教工作者手册) in 1989 and began to compile the Sample of Working 
 
                                               
287 Interview with Tang Ah Chai, February 23, 2009, Kuala Lumpur. 
288 China Press, April 11, 1994; Sinchew, April 12, 1994. 
289 China Press and Nanyang, April 25, 1994. 
290 Sinchew, April 25, 1994. 
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Guidelines for Malaysian Chinese Primary School Committees (马来西亚华文小学董
事会工作手册样本) which was published in 1998.291 Both publications provided 
detailed information on the rights and duties of Chinese school committees. The 
movement also republished the Chinese translation of the 1961 Education Act and 
distributed all these publications to all Chinese schools through donglianhui’s network, 
marking the first nationwide reform and uniform effort to modernize the Chinese 
school committees’ operations.292
 To solidify the school committee at duzhong—the last stronghold of the 
Chinese education movement—state-level donglianhui took turns to organize various 
sports activities to strengthen relations and foster closer bonds among duzhong 
communities. The activities included track and field championships (since 1987), ball 
games championships (since 1989),
 
293
Dongzong also tried to foster collaboration with the community of converted 
Chinese secondary schools. In 1997, Dongjiaozong organized the first National 
Seminar for Converted Chinese Secondary Schools Committees (全国国民型中学董
事交流会 ) and subsequently established the Dongjiaozong Converted Chinese 
Secondary Schools Working Committee (董教总全国国民型中学工作委员会) in 
 basketball championships (since 1990), science 
camps (since 2005) and arts camps (since 2007), among others. Although such 
activities focused more on students’ participation in various sports- and games-related 
events, the organizers, which consisted of the duzhong community (such as school 
committees and schoolteachers) from various schools, benefited from the opportunities 
to expand their networks with peers from the movement, and to strengthen collective 
solidarity and interpersonal bonds among movement communities.      
                                               
291 For the full text of the Handbook, see Dongjiaozong (1989); for the full text of the Sample of Working 
Guidelines, see Dongjiaozong (1998). 
292 Dongzong (1991: 29).  
293 This included basketball, ping pong, volley balls and others. 
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1998 as a platform to promote dialogue and reconnect with the converted school 
faction that had ‘departed’ from Dongzong since the mass conversion exercise in 1961 
(as elaborated in Chapter Two).294 However, fundamental differences in perspectives 
and approaches in the management of Chinese schools led to the premature dismissal 
of the working committee in 2001 shortly after its first term.295




The converted cluster abandoned the privilege of other Chinese schools 
when it accepted the conversion in 1961. One must comply with three 
principles to qualify as a Chinese school: (1) the usage of Chinese in 
teaching all subjects except Malay and English language,  
(2) management by the school committee, and (3) the usage of Chinese 
as the main administrative language in the school. Schools from the 
converted cluster only taught Chinese language subject in Chinese, and 
they no longer used Chinese as the main administrative language. 
Therefore, they were not a real Chinese school.
 Many conservative Chinese educationalists refused to consider 
the converted cluster as part of the movement, as explained by former Jiaozong Vice 




The converted cluster also refused to bow to Dongjiaozong’s pressure and maintained 
firmly that the converted schools system was a more pragmatic and sustainable 
approach for the continuity of Chinese education in Malaysia.298 The division escalated 
in October 2003 when the Converted Chinese School Principals’ Association—a united 
front of all 78 converted Chinese secondary schools established since 1994—suggested 
to change the name of all converted Chinese secondary schools into Chinese secondary 
schools (华文中学).299
                                               
294 Dongzong (1998: 34; 1999: 23). 
 Technically, the converted cluster shared various characteristics 
295 Jiaozong (1997: 9). 
296 Interview with Yeoh LC, January 20, 2009, Penang. 
297 Interview with Yeoh Ban Eng, January 7, 2009, Penang. 
298 Interview with Yeoh LC, January 20, 2009, Penang; Interview with Sim JT, January 15, 2009, 
Penang.  
299 MPSMCM (2006: 8). 
121 
 
of a Chinese school and should qualify as a Chinese school within Dongjiaozong’s 
context (see Figure 3.6). 300  However, these suggestions and arguments were 
resoundingly rejected by Dongjiaozong, which perceived the whole name-changing 
campaign as a move to challenge the hegemony of duzhong.301
 
  
Figure 3.6 Characteristics of a Chinese School 
 
Source: Compiled by the author with data extracted from MPSMCM (2006: 8–
 
11) and 
interview with Yeoh Ban Eng, January 7, 2009, Penang. 
At the time of writing, the two factions remain disparate in their management and 
definition of Chinese schools. Their relationship has been maintained by minimizing 
interfering and contradicting each other. Maintaining distance is one of the key factors 
that led to the prolonged persistence of the Chinese education movement. Although 
both factions share a common interest to protect and maintain the identity of Chinese 
schools, pride has been preventing them from joining together to form a more powerful 
                                               
300 MPSMCM (2006: 8–11). 
301 Interview with Yeoh Ban Eng, January 7, 2009, Penang. 
Defined by Converted Chinese School Principals’ Association 
• School has a Chinese name.  
• Chinese school song and school motto. 
• Rules and regulations for students spelt out in Chinese. 
• School committee plays an important role in school activities. 
• School alumni who identify themselves as “Chinese school graduates”. 
• Chinese-qualified teachers hold senior positions in the school 
• A school principal who speaks in Chinese during school assemblies. 
• Majority of students come from Chinese primary schools.  
• Chinese as a compulsory subject for all students. 
• Students use Chinese as the default language of communication.  
• Active Chinese cultural co-curriculum activities, such as Chinese Association, 
Chinese Chess Association, among others. 
Defined by Dongjiaozong 
• School committee is the highest authority of the school. 
• School uses Chinese as the main medium of teaching.  
• Textbooks should be mostly written in Chinese. 




collective representation of Dongjiaozong. Hurdles need to be bridged, prior 
misunderstandings and blame have to be forgiven and forgotten, before any future 
collaboration can be achieved.    
The greatest challenge faced by the Chinese education movement has been the 
division between school principals who support Dongjiaozong and those who are 
inclined towards the MOE. In early September 1998, Selangor State Education 
Department demanded all Chinese school principals to ‘take over’ authority from the 
school committee and assume full responsibility for the tender process of school 
canteens and bookshops. The education department also demanded school principals to 
include all proceeds from both tender activities in the school’s financial account and not 
that of the school committee.   
This new regulation not only ended Chinese school committees’ last vestige of 
management authority in Chinese schools, it also removed from them a significant 
source of income. Even though the policy was implemented in Selangor state, the 
potential threat that similar policies might be implemented nationwide could not be 
underestimated. Therefore, the Chinese education movement community paid much 
attention on the development of the issue.  
Although many principals who implemented the orders of the Selangor State 
Education Department tried to uphold the traditional status and established operating 
culture of the school committees at the same time, there were a few who did not.302
                                               
302 Interview with Yeoh LC, January 20, 2009, Penang. 
 The 
former were, to some extent, under pressure to fulfill their duty to preserve the identity 
of Chinese schools by resisting the changes imposed by the state’s education 
department, as those who had failed to do so (or sided with the authorities) faced severe 
criticisms from the school committee and Chinese community at large.    
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Pressure from Selangor Donglianhui and Dongzong forced Deputy Education 
Minister Fong Chan Onn (冯镇安) to intervene. Fong later explained that there was a 
misunderstanding and the regulation would be implemented in all schools in the 
country with the exception of Chinese primary schools.303 Six years later, the ‘takeover 
exercise’ returned to threaten the existence of the Chinese school committees—this 
time by the Penang State Education Department in September 2004. 304  Penang 
Donglianhui protested and demanded intervention by the Penang Gerakan state 
government. 305  The confrontation was quickly resolved by Education Minister 
Hishamuddin Hussein, who explained that Chinese school committees should have 
their rights on the disputed issues, and stressed that Chinese schools were excluded 
from the new regulation.306
One of the reasons that lead to the education minister’s rapid response was 
overwhelming pressure from the ethnic Chinese-dominated Penang Gerakan 
government. Most of the school committees in Penang are traditionally more 
influential, and have been able to resist and overwrite decisions made by the state’s 
Education Department through their social and political influence. It is believed that the 
new Education Minister Hishamuddin Hussein who had just been appointed to his 
position since March 2004 saw no gain in making more enemies out of these influential 
and potentially beneficial counterparts.      
  
Although most Chinese school committees successfully resumed their power by 
2005, the controversy continued at Kuala Lumpur Chen Moh Chinese Primary School 
(吉隆坡精武华文小学 ). Chen Moh school’s bookshop, which was managed by 
Pustaka Matu Company, had received its tender from school principal Ye Xia Guang*  
                                               
303 Sinchew, November 3, 1998. 
304 Sinchew, September 9, 2004. 
305 Kwongwah, September 22, 2004. 
306 Oriental, October 15, 2004.  
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(叶夏光) who executed the state education department’s order. Although the order was 
later recalled and cancelled, Pustaka refused to withdraw from the school. Chen Moh’s 
school committee established another bookshop, which offered more competitive 
prices for its items. Facing competition from the school committee’s store, Pustaka 
demanded that Principal Ye remove the ‘unauthorized store’.307
The conflict peaked in November 2005 when Chen Moh school committee 
Chairman Wang Guo Feng* (王国丰 ) pointed to evidence which suggested that 
corruption might be involved: Ye had failed to explain the whereabouts of four checks 
(total sum of RM20,000) issued by Pustaka for the Chen Moh school development 
project.
  
308  Furthermore, it was revealed that the two other companies that had 
supposedly competed with Pustaka for the tender of the school bookshop were in fact 
phantom companies.309
Wang and the school committee successfully pressured the Selangor State 
Education Department to transfer Principal Ye to another primary school in January 
2006. Ye was the third school principal to be transferred out of the school since May 
2003 after Wang took over chairmanship of the school committee.
  
310
                                               
307 Oriental, November 17, 2004; Interview with Chai Yah Han, January 17, 2009, Penang. 
 In defense of his 
fellow school principals, Kang Siew Khoon (江秀坤), who was chairman (2004–2006) 
of the National Union of Heads of Schools (全国校长职工会), blamed the frequent 
change of school principals in Chen Moh as a consequence of Dongzong’s call for 
school committees to seize the tender rights of the canteen and bookshop back from 
308 Merdeka Review, November 24, 2005. 
309 Merdeka Review, June 19, 2006. 
310 The previous principals who were forced to leave were Li Yi Qiang* (李毅强) in July 2004; Lin Yu 




MOE, which put Chinese primary schools principals in a exceedingly difficult 
position.311
Kang’s comment infuriated Chinese educationalists, especially (and 
predictably) school committee members, who were displeased with school principals 
who did not side with the school committees on this matter. Many were angrier with 
Kang for brushing aside a more serious issue: corruption by a school principal, for the 
evidence, if proven to be true, suggested that Ye might have been receiving bribes 
through tenders and pocketing the earnings from the sales of school magazines and 
extra school tuition classes.
 
312
The tip of the iceberg began to melt and the issue became a national debate 
when Malaysia’s cable media Astro Asian Entertainment Channel’s weekly Chinese 
forum program aired a four-episode coverage on the issue of (Corrupt) Business 
Opportunities in Chinese Primary Schools (华小处处商机) in February 2006.
  
313 
Facing increasing attacks and accusations of corruption, the National Union of Heads 
of Schools Deputy Chairman Yang Qing Liang* (杨清亮) publicly reiterated that 
“Dongzong should stop oppressing school principals and deliberately making things 
difficult for school principals on the issue of the rental rights of school canteens”.314
                                               
311 Merdeka Review, March 3, 2006. 
 In 
response, Dongzong Chairman Yap Sin Tian (叶新田 ) released a stinging press 
statement, which was splashed across the front page of the Nanyang Shangpao  
(南洋商报), one of the largest Chinese newspaper in Malaysia, entitled ‘Enmity 
312 Merdeka Review, March 9, 2006. 
313  The program (就事论事 ), invited three guest speakers: Dongzong chief executive officer  
Bock Tai Hee (莫泰熙), DAP Sungai Pinang state assembly member Teng Chang Khim (邓章钦) and 
Selangor Petaling Jaya District Chinese Primary Schools Parents Association Vice Chairman Teh Hon 
Seng (郑云城). Merdeka Review, March 9, 2006. 
314 Nanyang, February 19, 2006. 
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between Dongzong and the National Union of Heads of Schools’ (董总校长职工会交
恶). In this statement, Yap said,  
To those individuals or organizations that have accommodated the 
state’s attempts to erode the legitimate rights of Chinese schools by 
undermining the sovereignty of the school committee for whatever 
reason—consciously or voluntarily—I would like to warn and advise 
them to stop acting as the paws of the tiger and stop assisting the enemy 
in violating the general interests of the Chinese community, or you will 
be cast aside by the Chinese community.315
 
 
Badmouthing from both sides continued until Kang was replaced by the more 
soft-spoken Pang Chong Leong (彭忠良 ) , thus narrowly averting the destruction of the 
National Union of Heads of Schools-Dongzong relationship.316
This incident reflected fundamental problems of the Chinese education 
movement. Throughout the period in which this controversy unfolded, Jiaozong, with 
many of its core supporters also National Union of Heads of Schools’ members, sat on 
the fence on the issue of corrupt school principals. Moreover, the weakened Jiaozong 
leaders were neither able to constrain nor persuade some of the Chinese school 
principals from taking an antagonistic stand against the school committees, or to stop 
them from damaging the interests of Chinese schools.  
  
As a direct consequence of the conflicts with the National Union of Heads of 
Schools and its earlier problems with the Selangor and Penang states’ education 
departments, Dongzong launched a working committee in March 2006 to compile a 
Management Handbook for Chinese Primary Schools (华小管理机制指南) and an 
Awareness Campaign for Chinese Primary Schools’ School Committees  
(华小董事觉醒运动).317
                                               
315 Dongzong press statement (February 19, 2006).  
 The former was a set of guidelines, jointly compiled by 
316 Merdeka Review, March 18, 2006. 
317 For the full text of the Management Handbook, see Dongjiaozong (2006). 
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representatives from school principals, school committees and parents, which aimed to 
enhance awareness within the school community about their roles, rights and 
responsibilities in the management of Chinese schools. While the handbook provided 
detailed basic information on the dos and don’ts, it lacked the legislative machinery 
and judiciary power to take action—for instance, conduct investigations and take 
disciplinary action on those alleged for wrongdoing—should one fail to comply with 
the guidelines. The awareness campaign encouraged school committees to register 
with MOE and acquire the certificate of registration as requested under Section 88 of 
the 1996 Educational Act. 318
The fundraising dinner, (known as the Chinese Education Self-Improvement 
and Unity Dinner, 华教自强团结晚宴), was held in conjunction with the awareness 
campaign in May 2007. It raised RM1,269,956 in donations and attracted more than 
4,000 Chinese educationalists but failed to convince the Chinese community of the 
reasons why school committees had to comply with the state’s new structure for 
schools, in particular regarding the acquisition of a certificate of registration by school 
committees.  
 However, the community remained very critical of 
Dongzong’s failure to prevent the implementation of the law in the first place.  
In reality, many school committees still had not registered themselves as they 
see this as bowing down to MOE’s authority. Many school committees felt that MOE 
should instead regard them as independent partners, and appreciate the Chinese school 
committees which had been providing the necessary infrastructure for schools run by 
MOE.319
Throughout the whole awareness campaign, Jiaozong’s participation remained 
passive and conservative. Other than attending formal events and meetings, their 
  
                                               
318 Interview with Shum Thin Khee, February 27, 2009, Selangor. 
319 Interview with Leong Tzi Liang, January 17, 2009, Penang. 
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contribution to these awareness campaigns remained minimal, not to mention their 
passivity also in mobilizing support and participation from Chinese school principals 
communities. By 2009, the awareness campaign had been terminated and replaced by 
the Campaign to Strengthen the Role of School Committees in Chinese Primary 
Schools (强化华小董事会运动).320
 Jiaozong’s soft-spoken leaders and conservative strategies have severely 
threatened its collaboration with Dongzong. As a sister organization, the weakening of 
Jiaozong has become a burden to Dongzong, which has to bear the brunt of the 
operational and execution work for both organizations. It was clear that the two 
‘siblings’ of the Chinese education movement were moving in different directions. In a 
press statement in October 2006, Dongzong explained that, 
  
We (Dongzong and Jiaozong) have built strong consensus and mutual 
understanding with regard to the larger direction of the movement. 
However, being two independent organizations, having different 




Despite Dongzong’s official pronouncement of unity, a comparison of the collective 
strength of the movement over time shows that both organizations have weakened 
significantly since the 1960s as a result of the structural constraints imposed by the 
state. The fact remains that the movement’s top office-bearers in the central institutions 
of Dongzong and Jiaozong can only represent the respective group’s interests with 
support from the larger community of Chinese school committees and schoolteachers.  
The weakened local agencies not only affected the negotiation power of top 
office-bearers in their interactions with the state, shrinking membership (a critical 
problem faced by Jiaozong) also prohibited the central institutions from justifying their 
                                               
320 Interview with Choong Ee Hoong, July 27, 2010, Selangor. 
321 Dongzong press statement (October 14, 2006). 
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authority in representing the collective interests of the group, thus making it even more 
difficult for the movement to achieve its ultimate aim in securing fair and just treatment 
for Chinese schools in Malaysia.  
 
3.8. Conclusion  
By exploring the challenges faced by various levels of the movement’s institutions and 
agencies, this chapter has covered three key issues that tended to be overlooked by the 
social movement literature. First, the non-liberal, democratic state is a unique and 
complex entity. The state has proven its creativity in manipulating its legitimate power 
to constrain and suppress social movements through various soft-coercive approaches, 
exemplified by its education acts and the distribution of resources for education. 
Through these approaches, the state avoided taking extreme measures to contain and 
weaken the movement’s local supporters, in particular schoolteachers and school 
committee communities. 
This chapter’s second finding is that the presence of internal factions hampered 
the movement. The incorporation of Chinese primary schools and two-thirds of 
Chinese secondary schools into the national system significantly limited local 
members’ capacity and flexibility in participating in movement activities. Jiaozong 
suffered a massive drain in human and financial resources after Chinese schoolteachers 
became civil servants. As civil servants, the latter enjoyed a more secure salary scheme 
and better welfare coverage, thus removing their incentive to participate in 
anti-government activities. More restrictions were also placed on their participation in 
the movement as employees of the state.  
Fortunately, the closure of English primary schools in the 1970s reversed the 
crisis for the Chinese education movement. It even made Chinese primary schools the 
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most sought after academic institutions in the country. Fierce competition in enrollment 
into Chinese schools opened up another source of sustainable income—for making 
sponsorships and donations guaranteed entry to one of these popular schools. Schools 
in rural and less populated areas, however, suffered from low enrollment and faced the 
threat of closure, which led many to seek assistance from politicians to be relocated to 
urban areas.  
Although formal and institutional rules are important, but when these structural 
elements are weakened by the state, cultural and historical sentiments became core 
incentives for movement actors. The third finding of this chapter is that the strong 
cultural sentiments that Malaysian Chinese attached to their ethnic identity became the 
force that drove the continuous involvement of the Chinese community in the Chinese 
education movement. The foundation of cultural sentiments differed, however. It was 
divided between the conservatives (represented by the central committee of the 
movement) and the moderates (largely those from converted Chinese schools). Most of 
the former insisted that the movement should remain exclusive and maintain its 
narrowly defined objectives and principles at the risk of losing collective support.  
The relationship between Dongzong and Jiaozong has also been transformed 
from one of co-existence into a symbiosis. Jiaozong’s capacity in leading the Chinese 
education movement plunged significantly as a result of fading participation from the 
Chinese schoolteachers at the local level. Strong institutional bonds between these 
sister organizations based on shared identity and strong inter-leadership collaboration 
sustained the movement and helped it to survive state oppression.  
However, Jiaozong’s weak capacity in mobilizing and sustaining its movement 
organizations and supporters is also becoming a burden for the movement. Not only 
has it been hijacked by political players who have held it hostage against Dongzong’s 
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open criticism of MOE or the government; it has become (and will continue to be) a 
potential threat to the continuity of the Chinese education movement. If the 
movement’s current leaders continue to deny that their institutions are crumbling 
internally or pass it off as a ‘normal’ process in collaboration, this could become the 




Chapter Four           
Leaders, Alliances and Politics 
 
4.1. Introduction 
While Chapter Three focuses on the challenges and adaptations of the local agencies of 
the movement and the complexity of the inter-movement collaboration, this chapter 
studies the movement’s momentum at the national level and the role of movement 
leaders in engaging alliances and in sustaining the dynamics of movement mobilization 
within a larger political context. Due to limited access to political institutions, social 
movements of non-liberal, democratic state tend to rely on strong leadership and 
inter-agency capital to share information, build coalitions, strengthen networks, 
motivate support from the larger community and mobilize collective resistance against 
the state.  
The capacity of a leader is primarily concerned with the bureaucratic ability to 
implement and consolidate a movement’s organizational principles, and the 
effectiveness of tactical decision-making. 322
                                               
322 Roche and Sachs (1969: 208–209). 
 Despite differences in ‘styles’ and 
‘preferences’ in movement campaigns, all movement leaders must rise above given 
constraints in order to sustain the movement through alliances with various agencies 
and organizations. The mergence of different social movements or organizations into a 
unified alliance enables movement leaders to maximize pre-existing social structures to 
facilitate the movement’s development. These inter-agency coalitions and 
inter-organization alliances may lead to new identities, changes in membership base 
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and goals, enrichment of shared resources, enhancement of public visibility, and 
coordination of plans, while keeping organizational identities distinct.323
This chapter argues that these inter-agency and inter-organization relationships 
are based on the leaders’ capacity to gain and sustain trust through their extensive 
personal ties rather than through formal structural arrangements. Moreover, all 
movement repertoires and interactional experiences between movements, as well as 
between social movement and state authorities alike, are learnt and adapted, and then 
evolve into survival mechanisms to increase the chances of attaining one’s ultimate 
objectives, and, at the same time, reduce future risks and losses.  
 
In this regard, this chapter begins by analyzing how movement leader,  
Lim Fong Seng (林晃升), made use of grievances arising from the implementation of 
1971 New Economic Policy to build an injustice frame and adopt highly conventional 
ways of mobilizing support from the Chinese community. These include the revival 
movement of independent Chinese secondary schools (1973), Merdeka University’s 
petition (1978) and Merdeka University’s lawsuit (1980–1986).  
The chapter then analyzes the movement’s transformation whereby it moved 
out of its comfort zone to form strategic alliances in reaction to the increasing 
discriminative and assimilative policies imposed by the state. The second section of the 
chapter studies Dongjiaozong’s role in mobilizing the alliance of three campaign  
(三结合) (1982), the establishment of the the Fifteen Leading Chinese Guilds and 
Associations (十五华团领导机构, 15-Huatuan) alliance (1983), the 1987 national 
Chinese primary schools sit-in protest, and the promotion of dual coalition system  
(两线制) with opposition parties in 1990. 
                                               
323 Zald and Ash (1969: 475). 
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Although these campaigns were successful in terms of their mobilization 
capacity, they failed to achieve the movement’s ultimate goal. The third section of the 
chapter illustrates the shift of movement repertoires from resistance to a more 
collaborative approach when Chinese education movement leaders change their 
strategies—from mobilizing resistance to mobilizing resources—to establish the 
movement’s infrastructures and its headquarters’ facilities. 
The final section of the chapter looks into the impact of new political 
opportunities within the Malaysian context after the Reformasi movement (1998). The 
chapter analyzes the failure of Malaysian Chinese Organisations Election Appeals  
(华人社团大选诉求, Suqiu) (1999) and relates it to the changes in inter-huatuan 
alliance after the state introduced progressive co-optation strategies in the 1990s. The 
weaker alliance forced the movement to adopt a less confrontational stance in their 
interaction with the state, and to channel more efforts on securing underground 
collaboration with the respective government ministers.  
Movement leaders continue to change and adapt the movement’s repertoires 
along with the liberalization and democratization processes that were taking place in 
Malaysia’s political arena, especially after new movement leaders came into the power 
and the official retirement of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in 2003. The chapter 
thus ends with an analysis of contemporary movement dilemmas, especially after the 
political tsunami of 2008, and asks if these new opportunities may lead to ultimate 
success, or if they mark the beginning of the movement’s devastation.   
 
4.2. Political Pressure, Process and Opportunities 
When Abdul Razak Hussein became the second prime minister of Malaysia 
(1970–1976), he embarked on social engineering programs through the New Economic 
135 
 
Policy (1971). For starters, he geared the government toward the creation of a ‘new 
political culture’ with the formation of BN coalition in 1973. 324 State bureaucracy was 
expanded to sustain the tremendous growth of quasi-public enterprise. However, the 
pro-bumiputera policies and ‘Malayanized’ civil services inevitably and undeniably 
marginalized minority groups.325 Amendments to the national constitution and the 
implementation of Article 153 made it an offence to question existing provisions on the 
Malay language, Malay special rights, position of the Malay rulers and the citizenship 
rights of the immigrant races.326
Facing increasing assimilative measures from the state, the minority 
communities grew increasingly insecure about their ability to defend and preserve their 
ethnic and cultural identities. It was during these extraordinary times that saw the rise of 
ordinary people to become extraordinary leaders of the movement. A mining 
businessman from Selangor, Lim Fong Seng, was selected as Dongzong chairman in 
1973 and soon became the movement’s most contentious leader. Addressing his 
supporters at the Selangor Donglianhui meeting in March 1973, Lim framed the 
education movement within the larger political scene, 
  
The problems we face at Chinese schools are political problems. The 
future of Chinese schools and Chinese education depends on the 
country’s political developments and the way to save Chinese education 
is not to sit around, wait and do nothing. We must fully mobilize, 




On that note, Lim transformed the successful Perak independent Chinese secondary 
schools (duzhong) revival movement (see Chapter Five) into a nationwide duzhong 
revival movement. In this connection, he established the Dongjiaozong Working 
                                               
324 NST (1976: 58). 
325 Ho KL (1988). 
326 1971 Parliamentary Debates on the Constitution Amendment Bill, pp. 1–7. 
327 Dongzong (1988: 30); Zhan YD (2001: 301). 
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Committee for the National Development of Malaysian Independent Chinese 
Secondary Schools (Duzhong-WC) in December 1973 (see Chapter Five).  
While Duzhong-WC was successful in reforming a new curriculum and 
academic system for duzhong in the country, Lim did not forget the delayed Merdeka 
University project (as was discussed in Chapter Two). In March 1974, Lim, as the 
chairman of Merdeka University Company, proposed the formation of a smaller and 
less expensive Merdeka College (独立学院 ). 328  The government rejected this 
application on the ground that the primary language of instruction, Chinese, was 
contrary to the 1971 National Educational Policy and contravened sections 11 and 13 of 
the 1971 Universities and University Colleges Act.329
The failure to launch Merdeka College forced Lim and his followers to 
concentrate on and defend duzhong-related affairs.
  
330  In 1975, Lim confronted 
Mahathir Mohamad, the then education minister (1974–1978), at the launch of the 
Unified Examination Certificate (华文独中高初中统一考试 , UEC). UEC is a 
nationwide examination that assesses duzhong students’ academic performance and 
provides a reliable academic credential to passing candidates. On October 27, 1975, 
two months before the UEC, Mahathir Mohamad summoned Dongjiaozong 
representatives and demanded cancellation of the examination on the ground that UEC 
might disrupt the status-quo of mainstream national education, causing unnecessary 
ethnic tensions. After negotiations, Dongjiaozong was given two months to respond.331
An emergency meeting was held at Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall (SCAH) 
on November 30, 1975. The meeting was attended by 142 representatives from 
  
                                               
328 DDDC (1993: 24). 
329 Announced by Education Minister Musa Hitam on September 17, 1978 during UMNO Annual 
National Assemble.  
330 The issue was also dicussed during the National Duzhong School Committees and School Principals 
Joint Meeting (全国独中董事及校长联席会议) in August 10, 1974. 
331 Zhen G (2006: 100–101). 
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donglianhui, CSTA and Chinese school alumni association. At this meeting, they 
concluded that the UEC was intended as an internal examination for duzhong students 
and thus should share equal legal status with the London Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry Qualifying Examination, which offered recognition in accountancy. As such, 
Dongjiaozong took a firm stand and insisted that it was not contravening the law and 
thus it was not necessary to seek approval from MOE for UEC.332
The boldness of Lim Fong Seng and his fellow supporters from Dongjiaozong 
to openly challenge the state’s warnings and attempts to limit the expansion of the 
movement was motivated by both frustration and need—the frustration of being 
suppressed and marginalized by the state through various authoritative regulations after 
the 1969 ethnic riots, and the need to protect and defend Chinese identity from the 
state’s Malayanization assimilation policies. The success of campaigns, especially in 
the establishment of the UEC, became one of the key factors that led to the creation of 
sustainable incomes for the Chinese education movement (see Chapter Five). 
 Despite warnings and 
pressure from Mahathir Mohamad, UEC was successfully conducted at 42 locations 
nationwide (including Sabah and Sarawak) in December 1975. 
 
4.3. Merdeka University Lawsuit 
Motivated by the triumph of the UEC dispute, Lim Fong Seng invited a group of 
enthusiastic ethnic Chinese lawyers, such as Kerk Choo Ting ( 郭 洙 镇 ),  
Soo Thien Ming (苏天明), Low Sik Thong (刘锡通) and Ngeow Yin Ngee (饶仁毅), 
among others, to be his legal advisors. Coming from professional and middle-class, 
these lawyers enriched the central leadership of the social movement in a fundamental 
way. The collaboration between traditional Chinese school committee (many of whom 
                                               
332 Zhen G (2006: 100–105). 
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are businessmen) and schoolteachers in the Chinese education movement made the 
movement more progressive and dynamic with the participation of these members of 
the professional class. These lawyers were given direct access to the movement’s 
central decision-making process as members of the appointed committee, and continue 
to exercise their influence on the movement’s leaders up to this day.  
One of the major reasons Lim invited the participation of these lawyers into the 
movement was to enhance the movement’s legal capacity to challenge the state’s 
structural institutions, especially in terms of the limitations imposed by the revised 
Federal Constitution after the 1969 ethnic riots. In 1977, Dongjiaozong decided to put 
up a last fight. These lawyers carefully studied various limitations imposed by the 
National Education Policy and the Universities and University Colleges Act, and 
drafted the Petition for Incorporation Order for the Establishment of Merdeka 
University. Dongjiaozong mobilized support from 4,238 huatuans to sign the petition, 
which was submitted to the King in January 1978. However, the King rejected the 
petition.  
Dissatisfied with the outcome, Dongjiaozong filed a suit against the 
government and challenged the rights of the Chinese community to establish Merdeka 
University on constitutional grounds. The One-Person, One-Dollar for Merdeka 
University Legal Fee (一人一元独大法律基金) campaign launched in November 
1978 successfully collected RM292,713 over two years.333 Supported by the Chinese 
community, especially grassroots members who suffered from the implementation of 
New Economic Policy, the campaign generated donations through fundraising dinners, 
charity bazaars, charity performances and likewise events.334
                                               
333 Funds collected by September 10, 1980. See Zhen G (2006: 86). 
 
334 UMB (1978). 
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The financial resources enabled Dongjiaozong to hire Michael Beloff, a 
Queen’s Counsel, supported by a team of 10 Malaysian Chinese lawyers, to file their 
case at the Kuala Lumpur High Court in September 1980.335
1. The proposed university was contrary to the National Education Policy, since the 
medium of instruction would be in Chinese;  
 The hearing began a year 
later but the court eventually ruled against the establishment of Merdeka University in 
November 1981 on the following grounds: 
2. It would be set up by a private organization;  
3. It would only be admitting students from independent Chinese secondary schools;  
4. It violated the 1971 Universities and University Colleges Act, whereby any 
university, public or private, is a ‘public authority’ and as such, has to use Bahasa 
Melayu (Malay language) for official purposes, which is consistent with the 
Constitution, Article 152 (1).336
 
 
In July 1982, the Federal Court ruled against the appeal. Four judges vindicated their 
decision citing that Merdeka University is a public institution and therefore had no right 
to use Chinese language as its official language. The fifth, and the only ethnic Chinese 
judge, held a dissenting opinion and opined that the usage of Chinese language was not 
against the Constitution. A subsequent attempt to appeal the case through the Privy 
Council in London was unsuccessful due to the involvement of the Constitution, which 
is beyond the statutory powers of the Privy Council, thus marking the end of the whole 
court battle.337
                                               
335 These lawyers included Ker Kim Tin, Soo Thien Ming, Tan Chek Yoke, J.C. Bernatt, Soo Lim Pang, 
Lee Shan Too, Ong Tin Kim, Low Sik Thong, Ngeow Yin Ngee and Siew Yew Ming. 
 During a speech addressing Dongjiaozong’s supporters in 1993, Lim 
Fong Seng commented,  
336 UMB (1978: 349, 355, 362). 
337 Dongzong (2002: 7–8).  
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The founding of Merdeka University causes disputes (in Malaysia) 
because it is a struggle between ethnic rights activists versus political 
opportunists and racist politicians; it (Merdeka University) was banned, 
proving the suppression of vernacular language and education in this 
country. The lawsuit demonstrated Merdeka University Company’s 
determination to uphold civil rights and the rule of law. The verdict 
served to expose the flaws of the constitution’s ability to protect the 
status of Malaysian people’s vernacular languages. It is a setback to the 
civil rights movement in Malaysia.338
 
 
Dongjiaozong may have lost the verdict, but the Merdeka University lawsuit won 
applause from both the Chinese community and the government for its persistence and 
courage in defending its goal. In addition, Tunku Abdul Rahman College, which was 
under MCA’s patronage, was established as the feeder college for the needy Chinese 
community in direct response to the Merdeka University episode. The Tunku Abdul 
Rahman College became the most affordable and accessible tertiary education 
institution for Chinese secondary schools graduates until the liberalization of the 
National Education Policy in 1990 that saw the formation of the first Chinese 
community-funded college, Southern College (南方学院) (see Chapter Five).  
 
4.4. The Alliance of Three   
The lawsuit that Merdeka University brought against the ruling government 
demonstrated the cabinet’s power in controlling the executive, legislative and judiciary 
branch. Dongjiaozong needed political support to attain its objective, and it was this 
consideration that prompted Lim to participate in electoral politics in 1982. The 
conservative faction of the movement opposed Lim’s ambitious plan, however; 
Jiaozong Chairman Sim Mow Yu referred to Lim’s plan as naive and questioned the 
                                               
338 DDDC (1993: 3). 
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logic of an education movement organization getting involved in contentious party 
politics.339
Despite internal disagreement, politically ambitious members who wanted to 
use Dongjiaozong as a platform to embark on their political careers supported Lim’s 
plan.
  
340 According to movement veteran Loot Ting Yee, Lim and his supporters were 
tempted to form a Dongjiaozong political party. Due to resource constraints, they opted 
for collaboration with existing political parties.341 The campaign aimed to unite the 
political power of the ruling Chinese political parties, the Chinese 
dominated-opposition parties and Chinese social organizations to defend the rights of 
the Chinese community.342
However, MCA, the strongest ethnic Chinese party in the ruling government 
and DAP, the strongest opposition party at the time, showed little interest in the 
collaboration. On the contrary, MCA-turned-Gerakan politicians Chen Wing Sum  
(曾永森) and Lim Keng Yaik (林敬益) were keen to collaborate with Dongjiaozong. 
After a majority vote from Dongzong committees, the deal was sealed with Gerakan to 
launch the alliance of three campaign.  
  
Four Chinese educationalists, namely, Kerk Choo Ting, Ong Tin Kim (王添庆), 
Koh Tsu Koon (许子根) and Kang Chin Seng (江真诚), participated in the 1982 
General Election under Gerakan—better known as the Battle of the Four Gentlemen of 
Chinese Education (华教四君子之战). They pledged the slogan of Join BN, Rectify 
BN (打进国阵, 纠正国阵).343
                                               
339 Sinchew, August 21, 1990; Li YY (2006: 56). 
 However, among the four candidates who participated in 
this campaign with Dongjiaozong’s support, only Kerk was an active member in 
340 Interview with Sim Mow Yu, March 26, 2008, Malacca. 
341 Thock KW (1994a: 21–27; 1994b); Hew KY (1997); Interview with Loot Ting Yee, March 24, 2008, 
Kuala Lumpur.  
342 Koh TK (1986). 
343 Chian HK (1994: 82). 
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Dongzong committee. The other three ‘gentlemen’ had only brief encounters with 
Dongjiaozong. Kang was a newly appointed member of Duzhong-WC’s subcommittee; 
Ong was one of the lawyers in the legal team in the Merdeka University lawsuit. Koh 
was totally new to Dongjiaozong—he had been invited by Lim to participate in the 
campaign.
During the 1982 elections, Kerk was assigned to contest in Kepong 
constituency against DAP candidate Tan Seng Giaw (陈胜尧).
  
344  Local Kepong 
Gerakan branches boycotted Kerk’s election campaign, accusing him of being a 
‘parachute candidate’. Reluctant to leave him in the lurch, Dongjiaozong’s leaders and 
supporters came forward and supported Kerk’s election campaign relentlessly, despite 
their differences over the rationale of the alliance of three campaign.345
In Penang, Koh defeated DAP candidate Chian Heng Kai (陈庆佳)
 Although Kerk 
lost the election, the fervent effort put in by the various Chinese educationalists in the 
campaign was inspiring.  
346—also a 
Chinese educationalist—with 834 majority votes in Tanjong parliamentary 
constituency. DAP suffered the humiliation of losing its traditional stronghold of 
Tanjong constituency and a disastrous electoral setback with its parliamentary seats 
reduced from 15 in 1978 to six seats in 1982.347 DAP blamed Dongjiaozong’s alliance 
of three campaign for contesting against DAP and stirring up intra-ethnic disharmony 
by using Chinese educationalists against Chinese educationalists, thereby causing 
factions among the Chinese communities.348
                                               
344 Ong won in the Anson election in 1986. Kerk won the Taiping parliamentary seat in 1986.  
 
345 Zhen G (2006: 202); Interview with Loot Ting Yee, March 24, 2008, Kuala Lumpur; Interview with 
Sim Mow Yu, March 26, 2008, Malacca. 
346 Chian Heng Kai was an Internal Security Act detainee (1976–1981) for criticizing government’s 
discrimination policy on Chinese education. He won the 1978 Batu Gajah parliamentary seat election 
despite detained under the Internal Security Act. See Chian HK (1994: 227). 
347 LimKS Speech (March 10, 1985). 
348 DAP (1991). 
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Although Gerakan won the most number of parliamentary seats in the party’s 
history in the 1983 elections, the dream of rectifying BN was badly shattered when all 
‘four gentlemen’ were ‘reformed by BN’. Not only had they failed to prioritize, deliver 
and defend the interests of the Chinese education movement within the BN 
government, the desire to accumulate individual political capital within the reality of 
intra-party power struggle had muted these gentlemen from criticizing the state’s 
marginalization policies.  
Their loose engagement with Dongjiaozong weakened their commitment to 
Chinese education, and gradually they began to put the interests of Gerakan and politics 
before those of Chinese education.349 Lacking a shared political goal among the four 
also made it impossible for them to overcome the domination of UMNO within BN, 
despite holding important positions within Gerakan.350 It was not until 1990 that Lim 




4.5. Alliances with the Chinese Guilds and Associations  
The Mahathir Mohamad-led BN government imposed a series of Malay-dominated 
policies in the 1980s to enhance the Malay language and cultural legacy in Malaysia 
and to expand the assimilation process.352
                                               
349 Dongjiaozong backfired Kerk Choo Ting as “no longer took an active interest in Chinese education 
matters since being appointed a deputy minister”. Dongzong Newsletter (March 15, 1987), pp. 15–17. 
 The government, for instance, began to 
implement the narrowly-defined National Cultural Policy (Dasar Kebudayaan Negara) 
in 1981 by prohibiting activities that were perceived as contradictory to Malay culture 
350 Kerk served as Gerakan deputy president for 16 years before retired in 2005. Kang was the party 
deputy vice president prior to retirement in 1999. Ong was appointed as Perak state secretary but passed 
away in 1997. Koh became the Penang chief minister (1990–2008) and party president since 2008. See 
Koh TK (1986: 6–7); Chin J (2006: 79); Khor and Khoo (2008: 86–87).  
351 Zhan YD (2001). 
352 See Muzaffar (1989: 31–35) for reactions of the non-Malays on the New Economic Policy. 
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and Islam. Notably, from 1982 to 1990, the police refused to release permits for 
Chinese lion dance performances other than during Chinese New Year; the authorities 
also limited the usage of Chinese text on commercial signboards.353
To make Bahasa Melayu the dominant education medium in the country, the 
English-medium Higher School Certificate was replaced by the Malay-medium 
Malaysian Higher School Certificate (Sijil Tinggi Persekolahan Malaysia) in 1982.
  
354 
In 1983, the Malaysian National Primary Syllabus (Kurikulum Bersepadu Sekolah 
Rendah) was implemented.355 All these new policies and other acts of discrimination 
fuelled insecurity in the Chinese community, especially among the 
post-independence-born generation who regarded Malaysia as their homeland and 
believed that all Malaysian citizens should enjoy equal rights.356
In response, SCAH activist Chong King Liong (张景良)—supported by 
  
SCAH 
Chairman Khoo Seong Chi (邱祥炽) (1982–1986)—began to lobby for the support of 
huatuans in drafting the Memorandum on National Cultural Policy (国家文化备忘录) 
as a countermeasure against the official, Malay-dominated version of the National 
Cultural Policy. Among others, it demanded more inclusive and multi-cultural 
representation in national cultural policies.357 
With full support from Lim Fong Seng (Dongzong chairman) and Sim Mow Yu 
(Jiaozong chairman) from the Chinese education movement, Chong King Liong 
progressively pushed for a historical coalition among the Chinese community in 
Malaysia. In March 1983, the first Chinese Cultural Congress (全国华人文化节) was 
organized in Penang as a platform to embark on the formation of 
                                               
353 SCAH (2004: 78). 
the 15-Huatuan—an 
354 See 1981 Rancangan Malaysia Keempat, p. 390. 
355 See 1981 Rancangan Malaysia Keempat, p. 403; KPM (1985). 
356 Interview with Leong Tzi Liang, February 3, 2010, Penang. 
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alliance of state-level Chinese Assembly Hall, Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 
Dongzong and Jiaozong (see Map 4.1).  
 
Map 4.1 The 15-Huatuan Alliance 
 
Source: The author. 
 
Chinese Assembly Hall is the highest state-level huatuan authority, while states 
without a Chinese Assembly Hall (such as Malacca, Kedah, Perlis and Pahang) are 
under Chinese Chamber of Commerce. In total, these two organizations have about 
5,000 huatuans nationwide under their umbrella.358
                                               
358 SCAH (2004: 62); See Huazong (2001) for the origins and development of the Chinese Cultural 
Congress from 1984 to 2000. 
 Although early huatuans were 
exclusively divided according to members’ regional identity in China, with distinct 
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and important after independence, especially in defending the common interests of the 
Chinese community.359  
At the 1983 Chinese Cultural Congress, 15-Huatuan and its allies at the state 
level endorsed the Memorandum on National Cultural Policy and submitted it to Anwar 
Ibrahim, the Minister of Youth and Sports (1983–1984) three days later. Anwar 
rejected the Memorandum, citing that the National Cultural Policy had been finalized, 
and thus there was no need for reflection.360
By August 1984, the National Huatuan Cultural Working Committee  
(全国华团文化工作委员会) had been established as a platform to strengthen bonds 
between organizations in 
 Facing the UMNO-dominated BN regime 
which refused bottom-up input in its policymaking highlighted the importance of 
creating and maintaining strong associational bonds between the minority communities 
to boost one’s force. 
the 
Beginning from October 1984, more pro-bumiputera policies were 
implemented, causing mounting grievances in the Chinese community. Malay 
language became the sole medium in all primary schools—at assemblies and during 
curriculum activities—eventually eroding the status of Chinese language in Chinese 
primary schools. The Integrated Schools Project (Rancangan Sekolah Integrasi) 
introduced in August 1985 proposed the establishment of integrated schools, hosting 
Chinese, Tamil and national primary schools sharing the same school premises. This 
15-Huatuan alliance. It promoted sharing of resources 
(information and money), enabled routine interactions and built intimate working 
relationships among leading activists within the alliance. The strengthening of 
associational links increased 15-Huatuan’s capacity to launch a series of exciting 
Chinese civic movements in the mid-1980s. 
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project suggested that by sharing school facilities such as canteen, library and school 
hall, integrated schools would promote integration among students from different 
ethnic groups. Although each school could maintain their own administration and 
medium of instruction, the lack of a written guarantee on the preservation of authority 
within vernacular schools themselves worried Chinese educationalists. Chinese 
educationalists generally thought the project was a pretext to slowly transform all 
vernacular schools into national schools to achieve the objectives of the 1957 
Education Ordinance (Article 12), that is, to make Malay the main medium of 
instruction in all schools.361
Frustrated by all these policies and the worsening economic situation, 
15-Huatuan established the Chinese Resource and Research Centre  
(华社资料研究中心) in January 1985 as a Chinese think tank, whose first and most 
important contribution was to draft the Joint Declaration of 
  
National Huatuans  
(全国华团联合宣言).
The 15-Huatuan rose to become the most outspoken political pressure group in 
the 1986 General Election. It established the National Chinese 
 The Declaration, endorsed by 27 leading huatuans at the 
national level, demanded political reforms and greater democratization in the country. 
It also demanded just opportunities and equal rights for all Malaysians, ending 
discrimination based on ethnic, religion or gender differences.  
Civic Rights Committee 
(全国华团民权委员会) in January 1986. This committee, led by Chong King Liong 
and Lim Fong Seng
                                               
361 The first Integrated School was established in Johore Kota Tinggi in August 1985 hosted a Chinese 
primary school, a Tamil school and a national school on the same campus. The school was renamed as 
Kompleks Sekolah-Sekolah Teloh Sengat forcing the deletion of the original identity of the vernacular 
schools. Strong opposition from the Chinese community persuaded the MOE to replace the Integrated 
Schools Project with a less controversial Student Integration Program (Rancangan Integrasi Murid 
Untuk Perpaduan) in 1986 that only required extra-curriculum activities to be conducted together. See 
Dongzong (2000: 2–8; 2001: 189–219). 
 as deputy, spearheaded the formation of the dual coalition 
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system—promotion of competitive opposition political alliance—as “a more effective 
way to counter racism, uphold democracy and ensure all ethnic groups are treated with 
equality”.362 The 15-Huatuan also demanded support from political parties to adopt the 
1986 Implementation of the Joint Declaration of National Huatuans 
Nonetheless, DAP refused to form an opposition alliance with PAS, which 
insisted upon an Islamic country in its party’s manifesto. Fragmented opposition 
political parties and lack of support from Chinese-base political parties from the BN 
ruling regime resulted in the failure of 15-Huatuan’s ambitious campaign. Moreover, 
BN, which sowed seeds of fear among Chinese voters of PAS’ proposal of an Islamic 
country, successfully decertified the 15-Huatuan campaign and secured 148 out of 177 




Despite the setback, the 15-Huatuan continued their lobbying efforts and tried 
to bridge better understanding between the Malay-dominated PAS and Chinese 
communities. In September 1985, Lim Fong Seng engaged in a Dialogue of 
Understanding between Dongjiaozong and PAS, and prompted the formation of the 
PAS Communities Consultative Council. However, the Dongjiaozong-PAS 
collaboration was received with mixed responses by the Chinese education 
movement’s supporters, who were exclusively Chinese and non-Muslims.
  
364
In order to regain the confidence of Dongjiaozong’ supporters, Lim announced 
in September 1986, after an internal evaluation meeting over the Dongjiaozong 
political strategies in 1982 (alliance of three) and 1986 (dual coalition system), that: 
  
 
                                               
362 Nanyang, September 1, 1986.  
363 Lim KS Speech (May 28, 1986); SCAH (2004: 84). 
364 Interview with Sim Mow Yu, March 26, 2008, Malacca. 
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Dongjiaozong will uphold the principle of ‘going beyond political party 
but not beyond politics’ (超越政党, 不超越政治). This will allow us to 
accommodate different political views, and, at the same time, remain 
alert in critiquing and influencing policymaking. Dongjiaozong shall 
not restrict itself to any political party but it shall not be apolitical, as 
doing so will detach itself from the reality.365
 
   
4.6. Tianhou Temple Assembly and Operasi Lalang 
It was at the Tianhou Temple (天后宫) assembly of October 12, 1987 that the country 
witnessed, for the first time, the political strength of Chinese solidarity. More than 
3,000 representatives from the nation’s huatuans and Chinese political parties 
gathered at Tianhou Temple in Kuala Lumpur in protest against MOE’s appointment of 
more than 100 non-Chinese-speaking Chinese teachers to take over senior positions in 
Chinese primary schools
The event—Protest Assembly of National Chinese Huatuan and Political 
Parties (全国华团政党抗议大会议)—had an all-star turnout, with Chinese leaders and 
representatives from the ruling government, opposition parties and huatuans 
nationwide participating. Chong King Liong (SCAH), Mah Cheok Tat (马卓达 , 
Penang representative), Lim Fong Seng (Dongzong), Sim Mow Yu (Jiaozong), Lim Kit 
Siang (林吉祥, DAP), Xu Min Yan* (余明炎, Malacca representative), Hou Heng 
Hua* (侯亨桦, Social Democratic Party), Huang Zhen Bu* (黄振部, Parti Sosialis 
Rakyat Malaysia), Ong Tin Kim (Gerakan), Lee Kim Sai (李金狮 , MCA) and  
Loot Ting Yee (Jiaozong) took turns giving speeches. They were some of the most 
ardent critics from the Chinese community; one after another, their speech wooed the 
audience within the hall. Together with supporters, they uniformly demanded the 
government to resolve the controversy by removing non-Chinese qualified 
. 
                                               
365 Li YY (2006). 
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schoolteachers within three days, or face a nationwide strike of Chinese primary 
schools.366
 Recognizing the assembly’s power, Mahathir Mohamad relented. He appointed 
Deputy Prime Minister Ghafa Baba (1986–1993) to head a mediation committee, 
which comprised cabinet members Anwar Ibrahim, Lee Kim Sai, Lim Keng Yaik, 
Samy Vellu and Najib Razak, to put an end to the stalemate. Lee Kim Sai and  
Lim Keng Yaik, who acted as the government’s ‘bridge’, successfully persuaded the 
Chinese leaders to compromise and delay the strike. They failed, however, to terminate 
the movement at the grassroots level, where anti-government emotions were running 
high.
  
367  School strikes were carried out in Penang (46 schools), Malacca (seven 
schools), Kuala Lumpur and Selangor (seven schools) and Perlis (one school) on 
October 15. Subsequent strikes spread like wild fire, with at least a quarter of Chinese 
primary schools in Malaysia joining the strike.368
In response, Najib Razak, Acting Chief of the UMNO Youth Division, 
organized an anti-Chinese protest with some 7,000 demonstrators at the Merdeka 
Stadium.
 
369 Mounting ethnic tensions created an opportunity for Mahathir Mohamad to 
carry out his infamous Operasi Lalang “to contain escalating political tension”.370 The 
police detained 107 political activists under the Internal Security Act in late October, 
1987. Four activists from 15-Huatuan, namely, Dongzong Chairman Lim Fong Seng, 
Jiaozong Chairman Sim Mow Yu, Jiaozong Vice Chairman Thuang Pik King  
(庄迪君) 
                                               
366 Xinwanbao, October 4, 1987; Dongzong (1988: 9).  
and Kua Kia Soong (柯嘉逊) from the Chinese Resource and Research 
Centre, were detained for “continuously playing on various topics and fanning 
367 Dongzong (1998: 10; 2001: 239). 
368 Dongzong (2001: 243); Interview with Sim Mow Yu, March 26, 2008, Malacca. 
369 See Case (1996: 197) on the UMNO internal conflicts. 
370 China Press, Sinchew and Nanyang, October 16, 1987. See Tan SG (1989: 129–133) for the full list of 
the detainees; see 1988 White Paper Report for the official accounts of this operation.  
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anti-government sentiments in the Chinese community, thus endangering national 
security”.371
The Ministry of Internal Affairs also temporarily revoked the publishing 
licenses of three newspapers, namely, the English-medium The Star, Malay-medium 
Watan and Chinese-medium Sinchew Daily, on the grounds that they publicized 
sensitive issues and ignored the possible impact of these issues on the peace and 
harmony amongst ethnic groups and on state security.
 
372
The 15-Huatuan’s leader, Chong King Liong, who narrowly escaped from 
detention, sought to mobilize support from huatuans nationwide to demand the release 
of detainees. However, crippled by fear of a second wave of Operasi Lalang, most 
people hesitated
  
. Dongzong General Secretary Low Sik Thong, who was second-in-line 
to lead the organization, refused to take over leadership, thereby forcing Selangor 
social activist and Selangor Donglianhui committee member, Lim Geok Chan  
(林玉静), to be the acting chairman.373
 BN detainees were released fairly quickly and the cabinet proposed a ‘Four-One 
Resolution’ in April 1988 to end the controversy. The resolution suggested that all four 
senior positions in Chinese primary schools—school principal, first and second deputy 
principals, and head of the afternoon session—must have Chinese qualifications, while 
the chief of curriculum activities could be exempted. In June, Lim Fong Seng and Sim 
Mow Yu were released, followed by Thuang Pik King and Kua Kia Soong. The last to 






                                               
371 Dongzong (1989: 26–30). 
372 These newspapers received a new operation permit in March 1988. DAP (1988: 116–117); Freedman 
(2000: 83). 
373 Interview with Sim Mow Yu, March 26, 2008, Malacca. 
374 Dongzong (1989: 26–30). 
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4.7. Reform and Reconciliation 
The 1987 mass arrest changed both Dongjiaozong and Mahathir Mohamad’s 
government. For the former, Dongzong’s central institution was reformed in 1989 by 
introducing the position of deputy chairman, vice chairman and assistants to the general 
secretary and treasurer to back up the core leaders whenever necessary. Its constitution 
was amended in 1989 to strengthen its internal management by regulating the term of 
office for all committee members to two years, without a limit on the maximum number 
of terms. These changes thus allow greater direct participation from outlying states.375
For Mahathir Mohamad, using the Internal Security Act was his last resort. In 
order to quell anti-government sentiments and to appease opponents, the BN 
government invited 150 representatives from political parties, minority groups and 
social organizations to take part in the National Economic Advisory Council  
(Majlis Perundingan Ekonomi Negara) established in January 1989.
  
376
Despite knowing that the invitation was “more political than economic”,
 
377 
three leading members of 15-Huatuan, namely Dongzong, Jiaozong and SCAH, joined 
the council.378 Among the suggestions they proposed included the replacement of the 
ethnic quota in national universities by a merit system, and demanded transparency in 
state decision-making processes. 379  However, these suggestions were ‘purposely 
excluded’ from the council’s report. In response to the manipulation of the meeting 
reports and verbal insults by the officers incapacitating meaningful participation of the 
representatives, 15-Huatuan withdrew from the council in August 1989.380
                                               
375 Dongzong (1989: 51–52); Choong WC (2004: 45–47). 
  
376 MPEN (1991: 327–350). 
377 Dongzong (1990: 18). 
378 Dongzong was represented by Yap Sin Tian (from March 28, 1989), Jiaozong by Ngeow Yin Ngee 
(from March 28), SCAH by Tan Yew Sing (February 14). See Dongzong (1990: 18); MPEN (1991: 
327–350). 
379 Dongzong (1990: 3). 
380 Dongzong (1990: 3, 18–28, 32–33). 
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A year later in August 1990, MOE invited Dongzong, Jiaozong, SCAH, 
Nanyang University Alumni Association of Malaya (马来亚南大校友会) 381 and 
Federation of Alumni Associations of Taiwan Universities of Malaysia  
(马来西亚留台校友会联会总会) to sit in the Education Act Negotiation Council.382
In fact, for a very long time, the government had refused to acknowledge the 
status and qualifications of Nanyang University and university graduates from Taiwan. 
This forced many of them to remain exclusively in Chinese-based companies, 
industries and educational institutions. Nanyang University alumnus played a key role 
in the efforts to establish Merdeka University during the 1960s, and 40 out of 61 
duzhong principals in Malaysia were former Nanyang University graduates. Some of 
them, such as Chin Choong Sang, Lim Chong Keang (林忠强), Bo Sun Zhong*  
(博孙中) and Low Sik Thong, held important positions in various Dongzong working 
committees.
 
Representatives of these groups accepted the government’s invitation with mixed 
feelings. 
383
The Federation of Alumni Associations of Taiwan Universities of Malaysia, 
formed in 1974, had been harnessing the collective power of its 27 member 
associations to pressure the government to recognize degrees obtained from Taiwan.
  
384 
More than 1,000 such graduates served as schoolteachers and principals in duzhong.385
                                               
381  In actuality, this association is only the Kuala Lumpur branch, and not the national umbrella 
organization. Due to political constraint, Nanyang University alumnus in Malaysia has yet to 
successfully establish a national association. The state alumnus organizations (Selangor, Penang, Kuala 
Lumpur, Johore, Perak, Malacca and Sarawak) operate at the state level. The Kuala Lumpur branch has 
been the default representative of Nanyang University alumnus in various Dongjiaozong related 
activities. See Nanda (1982: 83, 87–102); Lee YL (2004: 421). 
  
382 Dongzong (1991: 54; 1993: 32). 
383 Interview with Low Hing King, February 23, 2009, Kuala Lumpur. 
384 In 1996, the government finally acknowledge the degrees in medicine, dentistry and pharmacy from 
eight Taiwanese Universities. Interview with Yau Teck Kong, February 18, 2009, Selangor. 
385 Yau TK (2008: 6–7). 
154 
 
The Chinese education representatives submitted the Proposals on the Draft of 
1990 Education Act (对 1990 年教育法令草案的修改建议) in March 1991 to the 
government.386
 
 Not surprisingly, none of their suggestions were included in the Act. 
Accumulated frustration with the government motivated Lim Fong Seng to go one-step 
further—to participate directly in the 1990 General Election. Lim, despite having led 
the Chinese education movement into an era of dynamism, his resistance-oriented 
strategies failed to achieve the ultimate goals of the movement. More ironically, in spite 
of the overwhelming success of the 15-Huatuan collaboration in the 1980s, the state 
was successful in co-opting key huatuan leaders in a very short time and significantly 
eliminated the influence of this alliance. Lim’s decision to participate directly in the 
1990 General Election—although justified by his frustration of the deadlock between 
the movement and the state at the time—became one of the riskiest decisions made by 
this very ambitious but not so lucky leader.    
4.8. The Dual Coalition System 
Improved relationship with Lim Kit Siang during the 1987 Internal Security Act 
detention and motivated by pro-DAP Dongjiaozong activists such as Kua Kia Soong, 
Lee Ban Chen (李万千) and others enticed Lim Fong Seng to join DAP in the 1990 
General Election, and once again, yield to the formation of the dual coalition system.387
 Although the decision was also embraced by other senior members of 
Dongjiaozong, such as Dongzong General Secretary Low Sik Thong, Negeri Sembilan 
Donglianhui Chairman cum Dongzong Vice Chairman Chin Choong Sang and others, 
  
                                               
386 Dongzong (1992b: 21–28). 
387 The other pro-DAP activists included Ngeow Yin Ngee, Yang Pei Keng, Ng Wei Siong, Chong Joon 
Kin and Lim Soon Hong. See Nanyang and Sinchew, August 9, 1990. Also, see Huayan (1990) for the 
major newspaper cuttings and articles written on the Dual Coalition System campaign; Thoch KW 
(1994a; 1994b) for the impact of this campaign. 
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there were mixed reactions from other Dongjiaozong leaders.388 Johore Donglianhui 
Chairman Quek Suan Hiang, Jiaozong Chairman Sim Mow Yu and others began to 
release confrontational statements and strongly stated their preference for the Chinese 
education movement to remain neutral.389
Dongjiaozong, as a social organization (社团), cannot and will not 
assign representatives to participate in the upcoming elections. 
However, operating on the principal of promoting democratization 
through the formation of a dual coalition system in Malaysia, 
Dongjiaozong encourages the participation of Chinese individuals in 
party politics.
 The division forced Dongjiaozong to release 
an official statement in August 1990 to reaffirm its principle of ‘beyond political party 




To avoid implicating these Chinese organizations, Lim Fong Seng and 26 Chinese 
educationalists resigned from their society positions prior joining DAP. 391  These 
‘former’ Chinese educationalists joined People’s Coalition (Gagasan Rakyat)—the 
opposition front comprising DAP, PAS, Semangat-46, Parti Bersatu Sabah and the All 
Malaysian Indian Progressive Front—to challenge BN’s political domination.392
 DAP fully utilized the Chinese educationalists to garner support from Chinese 
voters. For example, former Dongzong Chairman Lim Fong Seng was appointed DAP 




                                               
388 They included Duzhong-WC Treasurer Lee Han Kee and Perak United Alumni Alliance Chairman 
Thong Yee. See Nanyang, July 26, August 1 and 4, 1990. 
 DAP successfully acquired 20 parliamentary seats and 45 state 
assembly seats in the 1990 General Election. Unfortunately, the lack of a shared 
389  They included Perak Donglianhui Chairman cum Dongzong Deputy Chairman Foo Wan Thot  
(胡万铎); Jiaozong Vice Chairman Loot Ting Yee and Jiaozong Vice Chairman Thuang Pik King. See 
Nanyang, August 3, 6, 7, 8, 1990; Tongbao, August 7, 1990; China Press, August 15, 1990; Sinchew and 
Nanyang, August 18, 1990. 
390 Dongzong (1991: 18). 
391 Nanyang, August 5, 1990; Sinchew, August 7, 1990; Dongzong (1991: 39–40). 
392 This coalition ends in 1996 after the withdrawal of Parti Bersatu Sabah and the dissolution of 
Semangat-46. See Sinchew, August 8 and 17, 1990; Lim KS Speech (August 18, 1990); Dongzong 
(1991: 37); Case (1992: 183–205). 
393 Nanyang, August 20, 1990. 
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political manifesto and rejection of Semangat-46 by the Malay community prevented 
People’s Coalition from toppling the BN ruling government’s two-thirds majority in 
the Parliament.  
Furthermore, as part of PAS’ strategy to appease the Chinese community of its 
pro-Islamic state governance, PAS Kelantan state government, which regained control 
of the Muslim-dominated east coast state in the election, introduced a series of 
pro-Chinese policies. Notably, it allowed Chinese schools to buy Malay-reserved land 
(Tanah Simpanan Melayu) as new school premises, extended land title deeds 
unconditionally to all Chinese schools, granted 50% discount on local council tax, 
allocated an annual grant of RM20,000, and donated a piece of land measuring 1,000 
acres to Kelantan Chung Hwa Independent High School (吉兰丹中华独立中学)— 
the sole independent Chinese secondary school in Kelantan state. 
 
4.9. From Resistance to Negotiation  
Lim Fong Seng’s legacy in DAP soon ended with his withdrawal in early 1991 over 
disagreement on DAP’s approach on the Chinese education.394
Some had characterized my era as an era of confrontation while Foo’s 
was one of negotiation. Dongjiaozong was a pressure group not because 
of its leaders’ objectives or decisions, but rather, the subjective factors 
influencing decisions at the time.
 In June 1991, Foo Wan 
Thot (胡万铎), a former MCA Perak state activist, was selected as the new Dongzong 
chairman. Foo emphasized a negotiation-oriented approach as a more effective way to 




                                               
394 Lai XJ (2001).  
395 Sinchew, October 20, 1991; Dongzong (1992b: 35–36). 
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Foo’s diplomatic strategy began with friendly official visits and closed door 
conversations with Gerakan and MCA.396 Accompanied by General Secretary Yap Sin 
Tian, Treasurer Chew Saw Eng (周素英), executive officers Bock Tai Hee (莫泰熙) 
and Ong Swee Kok (王瑞国), the meeting with MCA President Ling Liong Sik  
(林良实) (1986–2003) was particularly promising. Both leaders agreed to re-establish 
collaborative efforts in the development of Chinese education. MCA also promised to 
help find funds for duzhong and gain recognition for UEC as a Tunku Abdul Rahman 
College entrance qualification.397
Foo’s sincere efforts to improve relations with the MCA were, however, 
overshadowed by the 1992 controversy of Lick Hung Chinese Primary School 
Committee (力行华小事件).
  
398 Lick Hung School was shifted to Subang Jaya a year 
earlier due to shortage of students from its old premises at Bangsar. The move created 
confusion over the legitimacy of the school committee. Attempts by Lick Hung 
School’s principal (on the order of the Selangor Education Department) to replace its 
school committee with a financial management committee (lembaga pengurus 
kewangan)—a less powerful school authority that commonly existed in national 
schools only—resulted in fears that the move was a ploy to transform the Chinese 
primary school into a national school.399
The controversy was complicated by a dispute between the original school 
committee Chairman Chew Saw Eng (who was supported by Dongzong) and school 
committee Deputy Chairman Wang Wen Han* (王文汉) (who was backed by MCA 
Selangor Branch). Both claimed that they were the legitimate leaders of the new school 
  
                                               
396 Sinchew, October 16, 1991. 
397 Sinchew, October 16 and 17, 1991. 
398 Interview with Chew Saw Eng, February 17, 2009, Kuala Lumpur. 
399 China Press, May 4, 1992; Sinchew, May 5 and 6, 1992; China Press, June 8 and 16, 1992; Nanyang 
July 27, 1992. 
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committee. The dispute consequently led to the establishment of a ‘twin’ school 
committee for the new school. 400
Debates 
 Intervention by Gerakan Deputy President  
Kerk Choo Ting was rejected by MCA supporters because he was not a member of 
MCA. This further escalated the conflict into a stalemate among Gerakan, MCA and 
Dongzong.  
in the main Chinese newspapers were intense, and by November 
1992, Selangor and Kuala Lumpur state-level MCA leaders proposed that MCA 
members, who constituted about 70% of the Chinese school committees, should form a 
‘new Dongjiaozong’. 401  There were also calls to ‘Enter Dongjiaozong, Rectify 
Dongjiaozong’ and remove Loot Ting Yee and Chin Choong Sang who had been 
sowing the idea that MCA was the mastermind of the controversy. MCA President  
Ling Liong Sik’s timely intervention prevented further escalation.402   
As a gesture to quell the heated dispute, Foo Wan Thot attended the launch of 
MCA Langkawi Project in February 1993, much to the displeasure of his fellow 
Dongjiaozong colleagues. Many of Foo’s colleagues felt that the Langkawi Project, 
which involved fundraising for the Chinese new villages and duzhongs nationwide, was 
yet another political attempt to use and replace Dongjiaozong in the long run.403 Foo, 
however, insisted on his pro-MCA strategy, which subsequently cost him more 
unpopularity within the Chinese education movement.  
                                               
400 Sinchew, May 17, 1992; Nanyang, August 8, 1992. 
This episode is an example of discredited legitimacy of the leader. Foo’s 
willingness to compromise both the policy and political stand of the movement for the 
sake of strengthening Dongjiaozong’s relationship with MCA was not welcomed by the 
movement communities. His decision was also opposed by former leader  
401 China Press, May 21, 1992; Sinchew July 27 and 28, 1992; China Press, August 11, 1992.  
402 China Press and Nanyang, May 26, 1992. 
403 Daniel (1995: 115).  
159 
 
Lim Fong Seng’s followers, who preferred to resist the state and collaborate with the 
opposition party. These former Lim Fong Seng followers, who also dominated the 
movement’s executive branch, refused to collaborate with Foo during his tenure, which 
will be discussed in Chapter Five. More importantly, Foo also failed to legitimatize his 
tactics to Dongzong’s core supporters at the local level, who were largely MCA 
members. Lacking support from most of the movement communities, Foo became one 
of the shortest serving Dongzong chairman in the movement’s history. He was replaced 
by Quek Suan Hiang in 1993. 
 
4.10. Formation of Tanglian and Challenges of Chinese Unity  
The Lick Hung School incident and the call to establish an alternative Dongjiaozong 
demonstrated the reality of diversity within the Chinese education community. The 
situation worsened since the 1990 as a result of the state’s progressive co-optation 
strategies. Since then, an increasing number of politically ambitious, pro-BN Chinese 
individuals began to gradually take over the leadership of huatuans, forcing the fragile 
Chinese community to face both external suppression from the state and internal 
threats. Most importantly, this phenomenon resulted in the dichotomization of the 
political culture of Chinese communities: the collaborative ‘politics of collaborative’ 
and the confrontational ‘politics of pressure’; and these politics continue to influence 
the strategies adopted by the Chinese education movement after the formation of 
Tanglian.404
Attempts to establish the Unified Federation of Malaysian Chinese Assembly 
Hall (中华大会堂联合会, Tanglian) were proposed by the 15-Huatuan since 1982. 
However, the BN regime delayed its establishment until October 1991, soon after MCA 
 
                                               
404 Ng TE (2003: 93). 
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had gained control of almost all state-level Chinese hall associations. 405
Those involved at the confrontational front did not want the pro-collaborative 
SCAH President Lim Geok Chan—also Dongzong acting chairman from 1987 to 
1988—to win the presidency uncontested. So, they lured Sim Mow Yu—then Jiaozong 
chairman and Malacca Chinese Assembly Hall president—to compete.  
Lim Geok Chan, however, won handily (130 votes to 40) and saw the pro-collaborative 
rift gradually dominating Tanglian’s central leadership. However, Chinese education 
movement leaders were dragged into the politics of Tanglian directly and this resulted 
in the deterioration of relationship between Dongjiaozong and Tanglian. Subsequently, 
Tanglian leaders began to claim Tanglian as the principal huatuan representing all 
Chinese in Malaysia and openly marginalize Dongzong and Jiaozong.
 Conflicts 
between the collaborative versus the confrontational factions of the former 15-Huatuan 
community became furious during the first Tanglian election in December 1991.  
406
During the negotiation on the division of the former 15-Huatuan ‘properties’ 
(as shown in Figure 4.1), Dongjiaozong was only assigned to take over the Chinese 
Resource and Research Centre and the National Huatuan Education Policy Committee, 
while Tanglian dominated the other three committees. More importantly, Tanglian had 
the authority over the Industrial Index (工商指南)—an annual publication produced by 
the Chinese Resource and Research Centre—and a key financial resource of the former 
15-Huatuan.
  
407 In addition, personnel from the three committees that were assigned to 
be under the care of Tanglian refused to surrender their authority because “Tanglian 
had not been able to clear the financial distribution among the two leading alliances”.408
 
 
                                               
405 SCAH (2004: 59). 
406 Nanyang, February 13, 1992. 
407 Nanyang, February 13, 1992; Dongzong (1993: 31). 
408 The personnel who refused to surrender their authority included the more ‘outspoken’ members, such 
as Kua Kia Soong, Lee Ban Chen, Ngeow Yin Ngee and others. Nanyang, May 25, 1992. 
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Figure 4.1 Division of 15-Huatuan into Tanglian and Dongjiaozong 
 
Source: The author. 
 
The Dongjiaozong-Tanglian relationship reached its nadir when the former withdrew 
from the Tanglian-led committee on the drafting of the National Huatuan Cultural 
Program (全国华团文化工作总纲领) in 1996. Dongjiaozong representatives were 
dissatisfied with attempts by Tanglian members to amend some of the principles in the 
1983 Memorandum on National Cultural Policy and the Joint Declaration of National 
Huatuan.409 Dongjiaozong saw these changes as “sacrificing Chinese’ interests and the 
independence of Chinese organizations”. 410  In contrast, Tanglian accused 
Dongjiaozong of being a ‘disruptive guest’ who attempted to destroy the contents of the 
Tanglian’s memorandum.411
This incident marked the beginning of the different paths that the two 
organizations, although once close and in strong alliance, would take due to their 
different strategies. Although Dongjiaozong adopted a mixture of soft-resistance and 
negotiable strategies in their interaction with the states, these Chinese education 
movement community have insisted upon defending the original 15-Huatuan demands. 
  
                                               
409 Dongzong (1998: 33, 67). 
410 Quek SH Speech (June 29, 1997). 
411 FAATUM committee meeting (March 9, 1997). 
Dongjiaozong 
Chinese Resource and Research Centre (华社资料研究中心) 
National Huatuan Education Policy Committee (全国华团教育政策委员会) 
Tanglian (renamed as Huazong after 1997) 
National Huatuan Cultural Foundation (全国华团文化基金) 
National Huatuan Cultural Consultation Committee (全国华团文化咨询委员会) 




On the other hand, vested economic interests and intimate relationship with MCA saw 
most Tanglian leaders unconditionally supporting the authorities, thus making it 
difficult for Dongjiaozong to continue trusting its former partner. As a result, 
Dongjiaozong eventually distanced itself from Tanglian and formed new coalitions, 
which will be discussed in Section 4.13. The division within the Chinese community 
also significantly reduced its power as forces to contend in the eyes of the authorities.412
 
  
4.11. Resource Mobilization  
The Chinese education movement stepped into a new phase when politically neutral 
Quek Suan Hiang was selected as the new Dongzong chairman in 1993. Among the first 
tasks Quek faced was the ambitious development of 8.5 acres of land in Kajang. This 
piece of land was originally owned by the Kajang Fah Kiew Chinese School Premises 
trustees (加影华侨学校产业受托会 ) who rented it to the Merdeka University 
Company as the future campus for the Merdeka University in 1974.  
However, the land was reclaimed by the UMNO-led Selangor state government 
for the development of low cost housing in 1978.413 After a series of interventions from 
various Chinese societies and politicians, the land was ‘returned’ to the trustees in 
1981.414 Driven by the fear of losing the land and the imperative to boost the spirit of 
Chinese educationalists after the 1987 Operasi Lalang, Lim Fong Seng proposed  
(in 1989) the development of new administrative building on the Kajang premises.415
To facilitate the development project, the land was formally transferred to 
Merdeka University Company by Fah Kiew trustees in 1989 and was leased to 
 
                                               
412 Dongzong (1998: 67–70). 
413 Dongzong (1992b: 331). 
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Dongzong for 30 years at RM1 per annum starting June 1991.416 A large campaign was 
launched then to raise funds for the construction of a four-storey administrative 
building. Commemorating the new milestone, a nationwide Torch Relay (华教火炬行) 
was jointly organized by national and state-level Chinese educationalists. It raised 
nearly RM2,000,000.417 Symbolically, the months-long relay spread the flame of hope 
for the Chinese education movement over 37 duzhongs throughout West Malaysia, 
stretching from its eastern tip of Kelantan, Kedah, Penang, Perak and Selangor. A 
second torch, lit in Johore, was carried through Malacca, Negeri Sembilan, arriving at 
the new Kajang premise on October 31, 1992 to mark the unification of the 
movement.418
Donations were also generated by other means, including charity performances 
of Chinese stage drama on legendary Princess Hang Li Poh (汉丽宝公主), charity food 
sales and singing contests.
  
419 The most successful campaign was the Room Adoption 
Program, whereby donors had the privilege of naming a room or floor for which their 
donation contributed. RM500,000 ‘sponsor’ one floor; RM20,000 for a room.420
Quek’s openness towards all donations generated positive responses from 
Chinese-dominated political parties.
  
421 Gerakan (RM527,561), MCA (RM500,000) 
and the Hope Foundation (RM1,000,000) each had a floor named after their respective 
names. 422
                                               
416 Interview with Lee Hing, July 28, 2010, Selangor. 
 The large donation by the Hope Foundation—a charity organization 
patronized by the Chairman of Malayan United Industries Khoo Kay Peng  
(邱继炳 )—was delivered by Khoo in person to Dongjiaozong in a high-profile 
417 Dongzong (2002c: 21–25). 
418 Dongzong (1992: 335; 1992b: 54; 1993: 28); Huajiaosenghui (1993: 74).  
419 Huajiaosenghui (1993: 79); Dongzong (2002c: 27–48). 
420 Dongzong (1997: 19). 
421 Interview with Quek Suan Hiang, March 23, 2010, Johore. 
422 Dongzong (1997: 19). 
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ceremony witnessed by Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in May 1994.423
Construction of the administrative building was completed in December 1993. 
It was celebrated with more fundraising events, such as charity sales and a tree-planting 
ceremony (百万松柏献华教) that symbolized the efforts to maintain Chinese schools 
for future generations. More than 2,000 pine trees were planted, generating almost 
RM2,500,000 in donations.
 Anwar 
was the highest-ranking UMNO politician to attend Dongjiaozong activities. Anwar’s 
presence was an unofficial but significant assurance of the state’s tacit acceptance of 
the movement. This occasion rallied high profile coverage by the Chinese press. 
424  In the same evening, a fundraising dinner  
(风雨同路为华教万人宴) collected another RM4,3600,000.425 Another milestone 




4.12. Interactions with the State (1995–2000)   
Other than financial resources, Quek Suan Hiang also engaged a collaborative lobbying 
approach in his interactions with the state. The collaboration produced mixed results 
and were often strongly influenced by the interpersonal relationship between the 
leaders and the politicians, and the larger political milieu at the time. The best example 
of such collaboration was that with Najib Razak during his term as the Education 
Minister (1995–2000), brokered by Deputy Education Minister Fong Chan Onn 
(1990–1999).  
Najib had responded favorably to Dongjiaozong’s request for dialogues to 
discuss the proposals and memorandums submitted by the movement. Subsequently, 
                                               
423 Dongzong (1995: 7, 42). 
424 Dongzong (1995: 36). 
425 Dongzong (1994: 33; 1995: 30, 36). 
426 Interview with Quek Suan Hiang, March 23, 2010, Johore. 
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warm-spirited negotiations became the norm between Dongjiaozong and the 
authorities during Najib’s term and such collaborative approach convinced MOE to 
grant permanent school registration status to 21 duzhongs 
Above all, the impact of these ‘soft approaches’ were magnified by the strong 
brokerage facilitation by the MCA ministers—in particular, the Deputy Education 
Minister, a ‘traditional’ cabinet position held by MCA politicians—who have been 
critical in coordinating a common agenda and promoting direct dialogues between the 
state agents and the social movement leaders. For example, Deputy Education Minister 
Fong Chan Onn brokered the interest of Dongjiaozong and those of the MOE has 
resulted in constructive follow-up. Fong capitalized on his authority in the MCA 
National Education Bureau—which has a better relationship with senior officers from 
the MOE—and enabled an alternative channel for memorandums and proposals from 
Dongjiaozong to reach these policy-makers directly.  
in 1996. Najib also instructed 
MOE to organize special schoolteachers’ training programs during the 1999 school 
holidays to overcome the shortage of Chinese primary schoolteachers.  
Over the years, it successfully brought the following issues to the fore: urgent 
problems faced by Chinese primary schools (first discussed in July 1996 and 
followed-up until April 1998) and general problems of Chinese primary schools  
(first discussed in May 1997 and followed-up until August 1999). Memorandums 
submitted to the cabinet included one on the Declaration on Vernacular Education  
(母语教育宣言) (August 1999) and another on the Establishment of New Independent 
Chinese Secondary Schools (申办华文独中备忘录) (October 1999).   
Dongjiaozong wisely applied the ‘soft but determined approach’ in managing 
the Vision Schools project (Rancangan Sekolah Wawasan) controversy in 2000.427
                                               




First proposed under the Seventh Malaysia Plan (1995–2000) in 1994, the government 
recycled the 1985 Integration Schools Project blueprint (discussed in Section 4.5) to 
place vernacular and national schools on the same premises—now renamed the Vision 
Schools—with the goal of promoting ethnic integration among schoolchildren.428
Mahathir Mohamad’s determination to implement the Vision Schools project in 
2000 invited strong opposition from Chinese educationalists who questioned the 
rationale whether a forceful, top-down government-imposed integration was the best 
way to achieve national unity.
 
 
Strong opposition from the Chinese community forced MOE to arrange a 
closed-door dialogue with representatives from MCA, Gerakan, Dongjiaozong and 
Huazong
Previous bad experiences with the state’s education 
policies, and fear of the elimination of Chinese schools saw Dongjiaozong bombard the 
Vision Schools project through press releases, submissions of memorandums and 
demands to conduct dialogues with the Education Minister.  
429  (previously known as Tanglian prior to 1997) in November 2000. 430  
However, it failed to convince Dongjiaozong to accept the controversial Vision 
Schools project. Subsequently, Dongjiaozong successfully pressured, lobbied and 
persuaded school committees from all five short-listed Chinese primary schools to 
reject the MOE’s invitation to join the Vision Schools project.431
Lacking participation from the existing Chinese schools, MOE resultantly 
launched its first Vision Schools Complex located at Subang Jaya on December 2000 
  
                                               
428 KPM (1995). 
429 Tanglian (中华大会堂联合会) was renamed as Huazong (Federation of Chinese Associations 
Malaysia, 中华大会堂总会) in 1997. See Dongzong (2000: 2). 
430 Sinchew, November 21, 2000. 
431 These schools included Soon Jian Chinese Primary School in Alor Setar, Kedah (循然华小);  
Khing Ming Chinese Primary School in Kuala Kubu Bharu, Selangor (竟明华小); Ladang Hillside 
Chinese Primary School in Negeri Sembilan (丘晒园华小 ); Eng Ling Chinese Primary School  
(永宁华小) and Wai Sin Chinese Primary School in Perak (维新华小); Segamat Central Site Chinese 
Primary School in Johore (中央华小). 
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on a new building.432 Although the Subang Jaya Vision Schools seemed promising with 
a sustainable student enrollment, nevertheless, all subsequent four pilot projects failed 
to impress the MOE or the people.433 The Johore version was terminated due to the 
presence of too many national schools,434 while the Vision School in Pundut was 
troubled by the controversy between the national school’s and Tamil school’s 
administration. All these failures eventually led the MOE to stop building more Vision 
Schools since 2002.435
The ability of the Chinese education movement leaders to persuade (or pressure) 
the Chinese school committees to resist state policies were crucial. Such collective 
actions not only justified the continued existence of the movement as essential to 
protecting the interests of Chinese schools, it also increased the negotiation capital of 
the movement leaders with state agencies.   
 
 
4.13. Reformasi and Suqiu 
In September 1998, the political scuffle between Anwar Ibrahim and Mahathir 
Mohamad resulted in the former’s expulsion from his political appointments and his 
arrest on (trumped up) charges of corruption and sodomy. The cloud of conspiracy and 
despotism surrounding Anwar’s overnight political demise led to the birth of an 
anti-Mahathir Reformasi movement.436
                                               
432 The Subang Jaya Vision School Complex house the Datuk Jaafar Onn National Primary School,  
Tun Tan Cheng Lock Chinese Primary School (陈祯禄华文小学) and Tun Sambantan Tamil Primary 
School. The other four Vision Schools Complexes were located at the Pekan Baru (Parit Buntar, Perak), 
Taman Aman (Alor Setar, Kedah), Tasik Permai (Penang) and Pundut (Seri Manjung, Perak). See 
Nanyang, December 10, 2000. 
 It is ironic that the movement was led largely 
by a new Malay class who were a generation of Malay capitalists and Malay 
433 The Star, May 25, 2002.  
434 Shum TK (2004: 543–554). 
435 Dongzong (1996: 70–78); Nanyang, December 2, 2000; Interview with Quek Suan Hiang, March 23, 
2010, Johore. 
436 For Reformasi pictorial and chronology, see Kamarudin (2001); analysis of Reformasi movement and 




middle-class engineered through various state-sponsored schemes and programs 
created during Mahathir Mohamad’s 22 years’ reign.437
With the Malay voters divided into the pro- and anti-Mahathir Mohamad 
faction, BN was forced to depend on the votes of non-Malays to sustain its political 
domination. This political opportunity was exploited by the SCAH Civic Rights 
Committee, which initiated the Malaysian Chinese Organisations Election Appeals 
Committee (Suqiu).
 Many from this new Malay 
class turned on their patrons—namely, UMNO and the BN coalition government—and 
supported Anwar’s wife in forming the National Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Nasional, 
PKR) in 1999, which contested as part of the Alternative Front opposition coalition the 
1999 General Election.  
438
Because the demands of Suqiu were related to the interests of the 
nation’s Chinese community, they needed an organization leader at the 
national level to take up the position. Although SCAH Chairman Ngan 
Ching Wen (颜清文) was interested, he was only a state level leader. 
Huazong being the largest alliance of huatuans in Malaysia, should 
have undertaken this responsibility, but they did not want to offend the 
government. In the end, I, as chairman of Dongzong, was selected to 
lead the committee.
 Quek Suan Hiang explained the process of his nomination as 




Suqiu suggested a reform program of 17 themes. Some included the removal of the 
bumiputera and non-bumiputera dichotomy especially in the implementation of 
government policies, the abolishment of the ethnic quota system and to be replaced 
with a meritocracy, among others.440 However, only some 2,098 huatuans endorsed 
Suqiu, about half from the total force as compared to the 1983 Memorandum
                                               
437 On the new Malay class (Melayu Baru) see Khoo BT (2003: 195–199). 
 on 
National Cultural Policy (discussed at Section 4.5). The split also saw Huazong and 
438 Suqiu (2002: 15).  
439 Interview with Quek Suan Hiang, March 23, 2010, Johore. 
440 Suqiu (2002: 15). 
169 
 
other business-oriented huatuans, such as the Associated Chinese Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry of Malaysia (马来西亚中华总商会) refused to participate in 
the appeal on the ground that the demands were too aggressive and it would infuriate 
the Malays.441
Despite Mahathir Mohamad’s criticism of Suqiu as “not having the support of 
all Chinese in Malaysia”
    
442  and being deployed as “a means to pressurize the 
government”, 443  the leaders of BN Chinese political parties (MCA, Gerakan and 
Sarawak United People’s Party) announced in September 1999 that “the cabinet, in 
principal, accepted Suqiu demands”.444 BN’s timely response to contain the Suqiu 
demands managed to salvage its support from the Chinese community. Despite facing 
tremendous pressure for political reform and liberalization from the 1998 Reformasi 
movement and challenges by PKR, BN maintained its two-thirds majority at the polls, 
despite losing the states of Kelantan and Terengganu to PAS, and a considerable 
decline (from 65% in 1995 into 56% in 1999) in its overall popular vote totals.445
  The fact that UMNO failed to win Malay-majority support in the 1999 General 
Election has threatened its status quo as the party with the most number of 
parliamentary seats.
 
446 A leading Malaysian studies scholar Khoo BT correctly pointed 
out that in his attempts to recapture Malay support, Mahathir Mohamad resultantly 
played the card of “the contrivance of a Chinese threat to Malay rights” by attacking 
Suqiu.447
                                               
441 Sinchew, August 27 and 29, 1999; Nanyang September 9, 1999; Ng TE (2005: 198); Loh KW (2009). 
 A series of events in August 2000 supported Khoo’s observation. It begins 
with the anti-Suqiu demonstration participated by about 200 UMNO Youth Division 
442 Sinchew, September 14, 1999. 
443 Berita Harian, September 21, 1999. 
444 Nanyang and Sinchew, September 24, 1999. 
445 Funston (2000: 49). 
446 Mohamad M (2003: 67, 77). 
447 Khoo BT (2003: 126).  
170 
 
members who protested outside SCAH headquarters. Protesters demanded the 
withdrawal of Suqiu’s petition and an apology to the Malay community.448
The protest was followed by Mahathir Mohamad’s open condemnation of the 
Suqiu committee in his 2000 National Day speech as being “not much different than 
communists who tried to destroy the special status of Malays in the country and shared 
a similar approach to Al-Maunah”.
  
449 Overwhelming political pressure forced Suqiu to 
rescind seven of its appeals after a series of closed-door negotiations with UMNO and 
Suqiu Chairman Quek Suan Hiang bore the blame of ‘bowing down to UMNO 
pressure’ although he was not the progenitor of the demands.450
The Suqiu setback was a wake-up call for Dongjiaozong to the division and 
weakening alliance with Huazong. In early 2002, the establishment of the Seven 
Chinese Education Related Guilds and Associations (华教界七华团, 7-Huatuan) saw 
closer collaboration between Dongzong, Jiaozong, Federation of Alumni Associations 
of Taiwan Universities of Malaysia, Nanyang University Alumni Association of 
Malaya, United Chinese School Alumni Association (华校校友会联合会总会 ), 
Malaysian 
 
Seven Major Clans Association (七大乡团协调委员会)451
The 7-Huatuan alliance led by Dongzong consisted of more Chinese 
educational-based huatuans. It also consisted of the Malaysian 
 and Huazong. 
Seven Major Clans 
Association which was led by a more vocal leadership that 
                                               
448 The event was widely covered (in different perspectives) in both Chinese and Malay newspapers. For 
the pro-Suqiu coverage see Nanyang and Sinchew, August 19–23, 2000; pro-UMNO coverage see 
Utusan Melayu, August 18–23, 2000. 
was dissatisfied with 
449 Mahathir Mohamad Speech (August 31, 2000). 
450 Interview with Quek Suan Hiang, March 23, 2010, Johore. 
451  This association comprised of custodian-based clan associations, guilds, occupation- and 
region-based huatuans: Malaysian Federated San Kiang Association (马来西亚三江总会), Federation 
of Hainan Association Malaysia (马来西亚海南公会联合会 ), Guangxi Association Malaysia  
(马来西亚广西公会总会), Federation of Hakka Association Malaysia (马来西亚客家公会联合会), 
Federation of Teochew Association Malaysia (马来西亚潮州公会联合会), Federation of Hokkien 




Huazong’s failure to represent the Chinese in various issues.452 Even though Huazong 
was named as one of the members of the alliance, its participation has more symbolic 
than pragmatic meaning. Compared to the 15-Huatuan, the capacity of 7-Huatuan in 
mobilizing the Chinese community has been far weaker and less impressive. More 
about the influence of 7-Huatuan alliance in the Chinese education movement will be 
elaborated in Chapter Five. 
 
  
4.14. Post-Mahathir Mohamad Malaysia 
Prior to Mahathir Mohamad’s retirement from premiership in 2003, he introduced the 
Teaching and Learning Science and Mathematics in English Program (Pengajaran dan 
Pembelajaran Sains dan Matematik dalam Bahasa Inggeris, PPSMI) in May 2002. The 
program was scheduled to be implemented in all primary schools by January 2003. 
Although there was national consensus on the urgent need to raise English proficiency 
in Malaysian schools, the policy simultaneously threatened the status of mother 
tongues as the main teaching medium in all primary schools. In addition, there was 
insufficient infrastructure and trained schoolteachers available to implement this policy. 
The effectiveness of raising English proficiency through knowledge-based subjects 
such as mathematics and science was also questionable.453
 Chinese educationalists opposed the policy strongly, and although the 
Chinese-based political parties openly worried about its effectiveness, Mahathir-led 
UMNO was reluctant to concede too much to their demands.
 
454
                                               
452 Ho KL (1992: 5). 
 The Chinese-based 
parties of BN (MCA, Gerakan, Sarawak United People’s Party, Sabah Progressive 
Party and Liberal Democratic Party) enacted a political compromise of 
453 Collins (2006: 315). 
454 Sinchew, August 8, 2002; Nanyang, August 10, 2002; Malaysiakini, October 21, 2002. 
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‘Two-Four-Three Resolution’ in October 2002.455 The formula, where two periods 
would be used for teaching English, and four and three periods would be used to teach 
mathematics and science in English, respectively, was implemented in all Chinese 
primary schools from January 2003.456
 The implementation of PPSMI had the greatest impact particularly on students 
in the rural areas. These students had had little exposure to English language and could 
hardly follow what their mathematics and science subjects schoolteachers were saying 
when they switched to teaching in English overnight. Students in the urban areas, in 
contrast, were able to attend tuition classes to help them manage the transition. 
Expectedly, the academic performance of rural students deteriorated significantly from 
bad to worse as compared to their urban counterparts.
   
457
These grievances turned into hope when 
  
Abdullah Badawi succeeded Mahathir 
Mohamad as the prime minister in November 2003. His amicable ‘Islamic credentials’ 
through civilisational Islam (Islam hadhari) 458 won support from the rural Malay 
electorate, and his publicized war on corruption by arresting and charging several 
high-ranking officials convinced the public of his determination to shape a new and 
more transparent administration. Thus, the timely upturn of the economy after the 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome crisis in early 2003 and the constituency 
delineation of electoral boundaries exercise in April 2003 also significantly maximized 
BN’s political strength in the 2004 General Election. 459
                                               
455 See Sinchew, October 10, 2002. 
 These factors ensured a 
landslide victory of more than 90% of the contested parliamentary seats for  
Abdullah Badawi.   
456 Nanyang, October 31, 2002. 
457 Dongjiaozong, “An Open Letter to All Parents”, August 19, 2002.   
458 Islam Hadhari is an approach that emphasizes development consistent with the tenents of Islam.  
See Badawi (2006: 1–29); Malaysiakini, April 28, 2001. 
459 Liow J (2005: 909–912). 
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New leadership in the Chinese education movement also came into power in 
June 2005, when Yap Sin Tian succeeded Quek Suan Hiang as Dongzong chairman. 
Yap’s active involvement in Dongzong since 1990 allowed him to build strong 
networks and collaborate with other movement actors. As a former Internal Security 
Act detainee, he had garnered significant support from the leftist faction of the Old 
Friends Association (老友联谊会) and the Twenty-First Century Old Friends Club  
(21世纪老友)—the behind-the-scenes power brokers within the movement. 
In the ensuing year, the new state leaders and the Chinese education movement 
were preoccupied by power struggles within their own institutions. As shall be 
elaborated in Chapter Five, Yap engaged in one of the nastiest fights within the 
movement with the executive branch of Dongzong; meanwhile, his collaboration with 
MCA’s new party leaders flopped as the latter were similarly preoccupied with internal 
party factions.460
In addition, power struggles within UMNO—especially with the rapid rise of 
 Unlike earlier MCA leaders, the new MCA leader, Ong Ka Ting  
(黄家定) (2003–2008) was unable and unwilling to mediate or bridge demands from 
Dongjiaozong with MOE. Ong and Deputy Education Minister Hon Choon Kim 
(韩春锦) (1999–2008) also showed little support towards Dongjiaozong’s calls to 
manage the Damansara Chinese Primary School crisis (elaborated in Chapter Six).  
Khairy Jamaluddin, the son-in-law of Abdullah Badawi, as the deputy chief of UMNO 
Youth Division—had posed a considerable challenge to Hishammuddin Hussein’s 
political position as chief of UMNO Youth Division. Hence, in his attempts to assert his 
                                               
460 Back in 1999, contentions between MCA President Ling Liong Sik’s team A (supported by Ong Ka 
Ting) and Deputy President Lim Ah Lek’s (林亚礼) team B (supported by Chan Kong Choy, 陈广才) 
over the nomination of their respective protégés for the presidential post had to be temporarily frozen by 
Mahathir Mohamad’s ‘peace formula’. Both Ling and Lim had not sought re-election and had agreed to 
retire in May 2003, paving the way for Ong and Chan’s appointment to full ministerial positions. 
Although Ong won the party president election eventually, the resultant bad blood between the two 
factions destabilized the party enough to dilute its decision-making influence within BN.  
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domination and superiority, Hishammuddin refused to meet any Dongjiaozong 
representatives in public or respond to the memorandums on Chinese education 
movement submitted during his early term of office as the education minister 
(2004–2009).461
This roadblock forced Dongjiaozong to explore and garner new support 
especially through inter-ethnic collaboration. In early 2007, Dongjiaozong engaged 
the 
 
Tamil Foundation of Malaysia, which equally dissatisfied with the PPSMI policy. 
Both vernacular organizations jointly submitted 100,000 anti-PPSMI postcards signed 
by petitioners and a Memorandum for the Return of Vernacular Education  
(还我母语教育各忘录 ) to the prime minister. Two years later, Dongjiaozong 
conducted dialogues with Hassan Ahmad, chairman of the Malay advocacy 
group—Movement to Eliminate PPSMI (Gerakan Mansuhkan PPSMI)—regarding 
joint strategies to demand the government to withdraw PPSMI. 462  However, 
complicated internal politicking among Hassan Ahmand-led movement activists and 
UMNO factions and lack of agreement from the former to revert the medium of 
teaching back to vernacular language (but replace it instead with Malay) prevented the 
collaboration from making any meaningful progress.463
 
  
4.15. The 2008 Political Tsunami 
The political storm that struck Malaysia in 2008 had been brewing steadily. Although 
Abdullah Badawi’s administration had made a glorious entrance into politics, 
                                               
461 The Sun, March 24, 2009. The memorandums submitted included the Comments on the Pelan Induk 
Pembangunan Pendidikan 2001–2010 (董教总对 2001–2010年教育发展大蓝图总体意见书) (2002), 
Suggestions on the Ninth Malaysia Plan (第九大马计划的建议书) (2005), Comments on the Pelan 
Induk Pembangunan Pendidikan 2006–2010 (董教总对 2006–2010年教育发展大蓝图总体意见书) 
(2007). 
462 Merdeka Review, March 13, 2009. 
463 Interview with Shum Thin Khee, February 27, 2009, Selangor. 
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Malaysians were getting progressively more impatient and disappointed with the 
administration’s inability to fulfill its campaign promises.  
 By November 2007, Coalition for Clean and Fair Election  
(Gabungan Pilihanraya Bersih dan Adil)—a coalition of some 60 NGOs (such as 
Suara Rakyat Malaysia, Women’s Development Collective and Writers Alliance for 
Media Independence) and five leading opposition political parties (PKR, DAP, PAS, 
Parti Sosialis Malaysia and Sarawak National Party) launched in 2006—mobilized one 
of the largest anti-government ‘gathering’ since the 1998 Reformasi movement. More 
than 40,000 civilians, NGOs and political parties’ supporters, across ethnic groups and 
lingual groups gathered at downtown Kuala Lumpur to demand for reform of the 
country’s political system, as well as to demonstrate the people’s growing 
dissatisfaction with Abdullah Badawi administration.464
Meanwhile, the Hindu Rights Action Force—a coalition of 30 Hindu- and 
Tamil- based NGOs—had been gaining support from the Indian community in 
defending its rights, which had been deteriorating in the country. The Hindu Rights 
Action Force also mobilized shared grievances of the community over the failure of 




Above all, it was the rise of Anwar Ibrahim, after his release from prison in 
September 2004 that provided a de facto leader to form a strong inter-ethnic opposition 
political coalition under People’s Alliance (Pakatan Rakyat, PR). The result was a 
 On the Chinese front, the community was increasingly 
disappointed over the prolonged internal conflicts in MCA and dissatisfied with the 
failure of new MCA leaders to represent its interests within the BN coalition; the 
community hence began to withdraw its support.  
                                               
464 Merdeka Review, November 17, 2007. 
465 The Straits Times, November 26, 2007; Case (2009: 329). 
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switchover of an overwhelming number of votes to PR at the 2008 General Election, 
breaking BN’s traditional two-thirds dominance of parliament. The parliamentary 
margin was narrowed significantly for the second time since independence. 
At the state level, PR gained control of five states (four after BN controversially 
regained Perak in February 2009). 466 The formation of a significant, albeit rather 
unstable, dual political coalition system for the first time in Malaysia’s history was 
welcomed with a mixture of excitement and anxiety. 467
 The BN-PR competition was intensified after Najib Razak succeeded as the 
prime minister in April 2009. Najib Razak sought to revive his party and BN coalition 
by launching the ‘One Malaysia’ campaign that promised economic reforms through 
the New Economic Model.
 BN’s weakened political 
domination was further threatened by Anwar Ibrahim’s landslide victory in the 
Permatang Pauh parliamentary by-election in August 2008, after he had fulfilled the 
legal bar to hold political office. The victory marked a stunning comeback for the 
opposition leader.  
468 BN and PR also adopted more accommodative principles 
toward the demands of various pressure groups, including those from the Chinese 
education movement.469
PR state governments engaged in ‘friendly’ relations with Dongjiaozong by 
offering, for instance, to waive land taxes for schools, allocate land and provide 
financial resources from the state budget to vernacular schools in their respective states. 
The Penang government, led by DAP, allocated RM1,000,000 in 2009 and 
  
                                               
466 Better known as the ‘Perak Constitutional Crisis’, BN regained control of Perak state after three PR 
state assembly members quit their parties and became a BN friendly independent assembly member, 
leaving both BN enjoying a slim majority of 31 over 28 seats. See Harakah, September 23, 2010. 
467 For analysis on impact of the post-2008 General Election, see Tan and Lee (2008). 
468 Guided by three principles–high income, sustainability and inclusiveness–the Model hope to progress 
the country’s economic growth in capital and productivty for all Malaysian. NEAD (2010: 3–30). 
469 Merdeka Review, March 14 and April 8, 2008.  
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RM2,000,000 a year later to five duzhongs in Penang.470 PR Selangor government, led 
by PKR, donated RM4,000,000 to the state’s Chinese primary schools and 
RM2,000,000 to the duzhongs. The Kelantan state government, led by PAS, donated 
2,229 acres of land to Kelantan Chung Wah Independent High School. Perak 
government similarly donated 1,000 acres of land to all nine duzhongs in Perak.471
BN government also tried to woo the Chinese community by putting an end to 
the prolonged stalemate over Damansara Chinese Primary School. The school was 
reopened in January 2009 (see Chapter Six). The government also agreed to revert to 




Yap Sin Tian also used the opportunity to foster closer collaboration with key 
MCA ministers, demand for gradual recognition of UEC and to upgrade 
Dongjiaozong-funded New Era College into a full university. Nevertheless, the 
controversy that had shrouded New Era College since 2008 caused activists of the 
Chinese education movement to be divided over the best approach for exploiting this 
political opportunity to the fullest. Intensifying conflicts within Dongjiaozong, 
elaborated in Chapter Five, will mark the movement’s struggle with internal 
challenges, while at the same time seeking to reach its ultimate objective of raising the 
status of Chinese education in the country.   
 Najib Razak’s administration responded positively to various 
demands by the activists of the Chinese education movement. For instance, UEC 
holders are now allowed to apply for the state education loan starting from May 2010. 
Chinese classes have also been introduced in the national schools, marking the formal 
entrance of Chinese education into Malaysia’s mainstream education system. 
 
                                               
470 Sinchew, April 25, 2010.  
471 Guang Ming, August 30, 2009; Kwongwah, August 21, 2010. 




The opportunity for movement mobilization varies with the transitioning realities of 
political circumstances, especially those constrained under a non-liberal, democratic 
political context and suppressive state authorities. Due to limited political access, the 
success of movement strategies is often determined by critical factors of leadership, 
brokerage and external networks.  
 The leadership of the Chinese education movement has been selected through a 
bottom-up democratic process, and therefore has enjoyed legitimacy in mobilizing its 
supporters and launching various campaigns in resisting state suppression. Strong 
leadership is not inherited naturally but is structurally created through the leaders’ 
ability to gather think tanks, utilize his social capital in engaging support from leaders 
of other organization, engage with MCA leaders for critical information, and took 
advantage of his position as a Dongjiaozong leader to mobilize appropriate strategies.  
Most importantly, leaders must outlive the external political constraints and 
sustain the movement’s goals by adapting its repertoires according to the changes in its 
supporters’ mentality, and according to pressure from the state. The impacts of these 
factors have been shown in this chapter, in particular the shift of movement repertoires 
adopted by movement leaders, which varied from resistance- to negotiation-oriented 
approaches.  
Chinese educationalists led by Lim Fong Seng resisted the state through a series 
of mass collective action and participation in politics (directly and indirectly) as a 
means to achieve their movement objectives in the 1970s and 1980s. However, these 
efforts failed to garner sufficient support from movement supporters, which were 
divided by their various political affiliations, with many of them viewing such attempts 
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to be too costly, as the state had the power and tendencies to manipulate its law 
enforcement system to crack down movement supporters.  
Learning from past consequences, Lim Fong Seng’s successor, Foo Wan Thot, 
softened the movement’s approach in 1991 and fostered closer collaboration with 
MCA. However, Foo’s pro-MCA strategy was also poorly received by the movement 
supporters. Subsequent leaders such as Quek Suan Hiang and Yap Sin Tian revised 
their strategies into a politically neutral, collaborative and negotiation-oriented 
approach. Instead of having a pro-MCA position, Quek was able to work amicably with 
the authorities through b
The movement has also relied on the support of its alliances through networking 
with other huatuans in the country. It is best exemplified by the 15-Huatuan alliance 
that was formed in the 1980s in the face of increasing assimilation threats from the 
state. The Chinese education movement leader Lim Fong Seng and Sim Mow Yu 
collaborated with leading huatuan activist Chong King Liong to form a formidable 
alliance of 15-Huatuan and led a series of Chinese civic movements in the 1980s. The 
cause of the Chinese education movement in this era was framed as one beyond 
vernacular education rights, as a fight for the values inherent in a democracy and for 
human rights; thus, its frame laid an important foundation and structure for 
cross-societal political collaboration.  
rokerage and facilitation from MCA ministers. Such indirect 
collaboration was better received by supporter, and the Chinese education movement 
was also able to deliver its demands for changes effectively. The impact of these 
lobbying efforts went beyond policymaking, but also at the policy-executing level, and 
has provided promising rewards for the movement.  
Facing mounting challenges from the Chinese community, the state reacted by 
deploying a series of carrot-and-stick measures. Through cohesive suppression 
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(Operasi Lalang) and co-optation (formation of Tanglian), the state successfully 
weakened the influence of Dongjiaozong by splitting the latter’s relationship with 
Tanglian. As the once influential 15-Huatuan alliance entered into a decline, it forced 
the movement to establish new alliances with the other huatuans and non-Chinese 
organizations. Although support from the non-Chinese communities may promise 
powerful momentum for the movement, yet the exclusive nature of the Chinese 
education movement has hindered the blossom of this collaboration.  
After 2008, the dual coalition competition between BN and PR has provided 
valuable political opportunities for the Chinese education movement. BN leader,  
Najib Razak who became the Malaysia prime minister in 2009, has adopted more 
accommodative principles toward demands from the Chinese education movement. At 
the same time, PR controlled state governments also have provided various 
pro-vernacular education policies and allocated financial resources to the Chinese 
schools in their states.  
However, facing the mounting internal factionalism within the movement, 
movement leaders have shifted their concentration to manage and resolve internal 
movement problems rather than exploiting these political opportunities. Perspectives 
and impacts of these internal factionalizations will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Five           
Mobilization Machinery 
 
5.1.  Introduction  
Chapter Four elaborated the fluctuation of movement’s trajectories from collaboration 
to resistance and from resistance to maintenance under the influence of different 
leaders. It argued that such external interactions and long-term antagonism with state 
authorities have been strongly influenced by the movement leaders who had risen 
through the grassroots and empowered by legitimacy to represent the movement in its 
interactions and negotiations with state authorities. After covering much of the 
movement’s external relationships, this chapter concentrates on the movement’s 
internal institutions in the form of mobilization machinery.  
This chapter first explores the strengths and weaknesses of two of the 
movement’s key thematic working committees, namely, the Dongjiaozong National 
Independent Chinese Secondary School Working Committee (董教总全国发展华文
独立中学工作委员会 , Duzhong-WC) and the Dongjiaozong National Chinese 
Primary Schools Development Working Committee (董教总全国发展华文小学工作
委员会 , Huaxiao-WC). The former was launched in the 1970s as a platform to revive 
and reform the dying duzhong. Duzhong-WC and its strong executive branch have been 
playing the role of ‘People’s Education Ministry’ since its establishment. The 
formation of this ‘second track’ education institution for the Chinese community 
enabled the movement to recruit individuals with professional capabilities to inject new 
insights and ideals into the movement. Input from academics and experts assisted the 
formation of a unified curriculum and examination system, and expanded 
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the Duzhong-WC with sustainable financial resources from Duzhong-WC, 
enabling Dongzong
The 
 to dominate the Chinese education movement.  
Huaxiao-WC and its executive branch was introduced and based 
at Jiaozong in the 1990s with assistance from Dongzong. Although the Huaxiao-WC 
also established working committees and hired paid staff to execute various movement 
activities like Duzhong-WC, such arrangement failed to generate significant success for 
Jiaozong. Although inter-organization collaboration helped to sustain the weaker sister 
organization and further strengthened the dominant role of Dongzong 
The later part of the chapter focuses on the establishment of the 
in the Chinese 
education movement, however, over time, the imbalance in the development of the two 
organizations transformed the relationship from one of symbiosis into a synnecrosis.  
Dongjiaozong 
Higher Learning Center Non-Profit Private Limited (董教总教育中心非营利有限公
司, HLC) in 1994 and the successful establishment of a tertiary academic institution, 
the New Era College (新纪元学院) in 1997. The milestones were celebrated with 
expanding international collaboration through the Southeast Asian Chinese Language 
Teaching Convention (东南亚华文教学研讨会)
The Duzhong-WC, Huaxiao-WC and the HLC have been important 
components of the mobilization machinery of the Chinese education movement. They 
are important institutional processes that have helped to establish recognition and 
acknowledgement from the public and the authorities as the legitimate voice for the 
movement. Such machinery also characterizes the movement’s hierarchy of 
decision-making, which came from the managerial level (led by the elected 
 and various universities in China, 
Taiwan and elsewhere. The increasing economic value of the Chinese language was 




committees) and operative level (led by the salaried executives). The chapter will thus 
explore in detail the internal dynamics and working styles adapted by each machinery 
overtime. These machineries follow a bureaucratic system that is predominantly 
agent-based (人制) and formulated around loosely-defined rules and regulations that 
are system-based (体制)
Currently the movement is taking on an ambitious and costly project: the 
upgrade of New Era College into a full-scale university on a piece of land donated by 
the politically well-connected Hong Leong Group. Nevertheless, eruption of conflict 
between the movement’s committees and the executive officers—such as the  
Yap Sin Tian and Bock Tai Hee disputes in 2006, and the New Era Collage controversy 
in 2008—had divided the movement into two (or more) confronting factions. The 
division challenged the overall solidarity of the movement, making the movement more 
vulnerable to external challenges, in particular those imposed by the state.  
. Although professionalism eventually grew out of this hybrid 
system, their impact and outcomes varied according to the relationship between the 
managerial and operative personnel.   
 
5.2.  Duzhong
As mentioned in Chapter Two, the implementation of the 1961 Education Act saw most 
Chinese secondary schools transform into converted Chinese secondary schools.  
The management authority of the schools’ buildings and facilities was also surrendered 
to the MOE. Only 15 schools upheld 
 Revival Movement 
Jiaozong’s call for survival through self-reliance  
(自立更生) to fiercely defend the dignity of traditional Chinese schools and resist the 
conversion. Most of the schools from the converted cluster also set up an 
affiliated duzhong branch within the shared school campus to accommodate overaged 
184 
 
students and dropouts.473 MOE approved these affiliated schools in 1961 as a measure 
to appease angry Chinese communities and to protect the social interests of the school 
committees that had acceded to the conversion project.474  
Duzhong’s development began to regress significantly during the period from 
1963 to 1972. The number of students in national secondary schools rocketed after the 
government abolished the Malayan Secondary School Entrance Examination475 in 
1963, resulting in the automatic enrollment of all primary school graduates into 
secondary schools. Subsequently, the implementation of nine years of free education 
for all citizens beginning in 1964 also drew new enrollment away from duzhong, which 
collected school fees. Government subsidies that allowed schools to provide better pay 
for schoolteachers in the national schools also caused a drain of schoolteachers 
from duzhong
Perak, the state with the highest number of 
.  
duzhong, faced the greatest 
challenge in sustaining these dying schools. Having failed to surpass these constraints, 
five out of 14 of Perak’s duzhong shut down in 1969. The remaining nine duzhongs 
hosted merely about 1,500 students before their impending closure.476 This nationwide 
phenomenon threatened the survival of duzhong
One month after the Emergency Decree was lifted, the Sandajigou
 and the continuity of the Chinese 
education movement at large.  
 (discussed in 
Chapter Two) hosted a nationwide meeting in July 1972 and established the Duzhong
                                               
473 By 1998, 21 converted schools had set up affiliated duzhong, sharing school facilities such as library, 
school hall, school fields and canteen with their converted counterparts. The number of duzhong 
eventually rose from 16 in the 1961 into 61 nationwide by 2008. A majority of dropouts from the Chinese 
converted schools were those who failed to pass the English-medium Lower Certificate for Education 
after completing form three, and therefore did not qualify for enrollment into form four. The list of 
Duzhong in Malaysia is available in Appendix 5. See Shen T (1975: 8); Tay LS (1998c: 266, 271–273). 
 
474 Interview with Sim Mow Yu, March 26, 2008, Malacca. 
475 Leong and Tan (1997: 308). 
476 These duzhong included Yik Ching (育青), Shen Jai (深斋), San Min (三民), Tsung Wah (崇华),  
Nan Hwa (南华), Hua Lian (华联), Pei Yuan (培元), Poi Lam (培南) and Yuk Choy (育才).   
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Development Committee (独中发展小组) to strategize ways to salvage the plunging 
status of Chinese schools in Malaysia.477 In Perak, Zeng Dun Hua* (曾敦化 ) and  
Shen Ting* (沈亭 ) from Poi Lam Duzhong (培南独中 ) facilitated the first gathering of 
all nine duzhong school principals on November 25, 1972. Carefully planned by Shen, 
a dedicated schoolteacher, and utilizing Zeng’s influence as chairman of Poi Lam’s 
school committee and a well-respected businessman in Ipoh, the gathering successfully 
laid the groundwork for cross-duzhong
A second gathering held the next month saw extended participation from 
various chairmen of 
 collaboration in Perak.  
duzhong school committees. By the third gathering in April of the 
following year, the collective collaboration had been going so well that 
Perak Donglianhui also agreed to conduct a fundraising campaign to revive duzhongs 
throughout Perak. This marked the beginning of the Perak duzhong revival movement  
(吡叻州华文独中复兴运动) and it subsequently became a nationwide campaign.478
Led by Chairman Foo Wan Thot, Perak 
   
Donglianhui reacted positively. They 
formed the Perak Duzhong Development Working Committee (吡叻州发展华文独中
工作委员会) and launched the Perak duzhong revival movement with a fundraising 
campaign on April 15, 1972. The campaign gained momentum after the organizers 
perceptively began to highlight the concept of yì (义 )—a voluntary and righteous 
behavior to protect the weak. Donations were generated through charity campaigns 
involving sales of food, fishing, trishaw-riding and ‘One-person, One-dollar’ donation, 
among others.479
The campaign garnered support from the Chinese community in Perak and 
nationwide, particularly from those who had suffered under the Emergency Decree and 
 
                                               
477 Dongzong (1987d: 614). 
478 Sinchew, April 10, 1975. 
479 Zhen G (1996: 46–48). 
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who were unsatisfied with the New Economic Policy system. The RM1,000,000 target 
was reached by 1972, and the money was used for the expansion of school buildings 
and facilities, hiring of more schoolteachers and setting up of scholarships and loans 
for duzhong students.480
In addition, the successful campaign restored in parents the confidence to send 
their children to 
  
duzhong for education. Student enrollment increased from about 2,500 
in 1970 to roughly 5,100 in 1976 in the nine duzhongs in Perak.481 As importantly, 
these duzhongs began to collaborate in drafting a unified school curriculum and 
uniform textbooks. Each school was responsible for developing a designated subject 
textbook—for example, the Chinese language textbook was developed by Pei Yuan  
(培元独中), English language textbook by Yuk Choy (育才独中) and Malay textbook 




Over the same period, Selangor 
-WC Organization 
Donglianhui organized the Duzhong Seminar  
(华文独中研讨会) in March 1973 and successfully gathered Chinese educationalists 
from Selangor state to draft the Guiding Principles of Malaysian Independent Chinese 
Secondary Schools (华文独立中学建议书 , Duzhong Proposal). This document, which 
was completed in August in the same year, was promoted as the blueprint for national 
reform of duzhong during the Dongjiaozong National Conference for Duzhong 
Development (全国发展华文独中运动大会) in December 1973.483
                                               
480 Loh, Phang and Saravanamuttu (1981: 61–62). 
 
481 Shen T (1975). 
482 There were also textbooks developed for mathematics (by Hua Lian华联独中), history (by San Min
三民独中), geography (by Yik Ching育青独中), commerce (by Shen Jai深斋独中) and science (by  
Poi Lam培南独中). See Zhen G (1996: 82) and Lim GA (2004: 6–19). 
483 Jiaozong (1983c: 25); Dongzong (1987d: 614).  
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The dominance of Selangor Donglianhui leaders in the Dongzong central 
committee resulted in the use of Selangor’s version of the duzhong proposal, despite the 
fact that Perak was the leading state in the reform efforts. In the same 1973 
conference, Duzhong-WC was established. In addition, they also established 
the Dongjiaozong Duzhong Development Fund (DDDF) and the Educational Affairs 
Working Committee. The latter was divided into the Unified Curriculum 
Subcommittee and the Unified Examination Subcommittee. 484
 
 These committees 
became the key elements in mobilizing the nationwide Dongjiaozong duzhong revival 
movement (see Figure 5.1). 
Figure 5.1 Main Elements of Duzhong-WC  
 
Source: The author. 
 
                                               
484 Jiaozong (1983c: 26). 















Unified Examination Certificate (独中统一考试, UEC) 
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The Unified Examination Subcommittee was responsible for planning and executing 
the Unified Examination Certificate (UEC) as a reliable academic assessment and 
credential tool for duzhong students. The subcommittee was assisted by full-time 
executive staff at the Department of Examination. Open only to duzhong
 
 students, the 
UEC was divided into the senior level, junior level (since 1973), vocational and 
technical examination (since 1987). As demonstrated in Figure 5.2, UEC (senior level) 
candidates rose dramatically (216% in 35 years) from 1,993 students in 1975 to 6,305 
students by 2009. Those who sat for UEC (junior level) also increased 150% over the 
same period, from 4,150 students in 1975 to 10,396 students in 2009. Comparatively, 
the number UEC (vocational and technical) candidates climbed slowly (52% growth in 
17 years), from 167 students in 1993 to 254 students in 2009. From 1975 to 2009, an 
accumulative total of 445,270 candidates had taken the three category of UEC.  
Figure 5.2 Distribution of UEC Candidates (1973–
 
2008) 
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UEC has been a proud benchmark for Dongjiaozong since its implementation, with its 
qualification widely acknowledged by universities worldwide today. For instance, 
UEC students are exempted from entrance examination by all universities in Singapore 
and are recognized as having completed up to 12 years of high school education in the 
United States. The UEC is also rated as an examination equivalent to a level between 
General Certificate of Education’s ordinary level and advanced level in Britain. With 
International English Language Testing System qualification, it is also accepted by 
universities in Australia, New Zealand and Scotland as an entrance qualification. Since 
1994, the Beijing Language Institute has been waiving UEC holders from the state’s 
Chinese Proficiency Test for enrollment into China’s universities.485
Although Malaysian authorities had been reluctant to recognize the UEC as an 
academic qualification for entry into its national universities in the 1970s and 1980s, 
signs of compromise were apparent in 1998 when University Telekom—the largest 
partially state-sponsored private university in Malaysia—began to accept it as an 
entrance qualification. Continuous lobbing and internal negotiations through the MCA 
began to bear fruit. In May 2010, the government agreed to qualify UEC holders 
enrolled in local private universities for the government university loan known as the 




Another important element of the 
 
Duzhong-WC was the unified curriculum. As 
early as 1976, Kerk Choo Ting headed the first Unified Curriculum Subcommittee. 
Through the collective contribution of duzhong schoolteachers and academics who 
worked in universities (mostly in Singapore and Taiwan), they successfully compiled 
a duzhong
                                               
485 Dongzong internal document (December 3, 2009). 
 lower-secondary textbook in 1979 with a syllabus following the MOE 
486 See Dongzong (2007: 209) and PTPTN Circular Letter 2/2010. 
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curriculum closely but adapted to duzhong and UEC requirements. These textbooks 
became an important and reliable source of knowledge, as most schools had been using 
different versions of Taiwanese textbooks, which were predominantly written in 
traditional Chinese script (繁体字), and often out of stock.487 The subcommittee, with 
administrative collaboration from the Department of Curriculum at the executive 
branch has developed more than 280 types of textbooks by 2010.488
The third element of 
 The sale of these 
textbooks was one of the most important source of income for the Chinese education 
movement, which will be discussed later. 
Duzhong-WC was the DDDF. A nationwide DDDF 
fundraising campaign was launched in March 1974, collecting almost RM3,000,000 
within the first year it was introduced. The speed and extensive mobilization power 
demonstrated by the supporters surprised state authorities, who subsequently prohibited 
all media (Chinese newspapers in particular) from covering DDDF news after 1975. 
This subsequently caused the sharp decrease of DDDF donation incomes.489 Donation 
income had become an important source to Duzhong-WC, especially for hiring 
full-time committee members as well as for purchasing facilities and hardware (such as 





                                               
487 Dongzong (1987d: 619); DDDC (2005). 
-WC was largely funded through the DDDF mechanism in its early 
phases, the committees had invested part of the donation fund on properties and in 
shares to retain its monetary value. For instance, about RM60,000 was used to purchase 
two shop-houses in 1977. With the flood of donations from the DDDF campaign, it was 
488 Dongzong (1989: 34). See MICSSWC (2004) for the detail description of the curriculum planning for 
science (pp. 39–47), commerce (pp. 48–57), technical education (pp. 58–68). For list of Dongzong 
in-house publication, see Dongzong (1997: 93–97). 
489 Interview with Sim Mow Yu, March 26, 2008, Malacca.  
490 Dongzong (1987d: 616). 
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deemed necessary to establish a DDDF Investment Committee (独中基金投资小组) 
after the launch of the second DDDF in 1985. 491
Selangor 
 
Donglianhui key member Lim Geok Chan confident guaranteed of at 
least 20% annual return (or Lim will pay back all the losses of incomes to DDDF) had 
successfully persuaded the DDDF Investment Committee invested RM1,000,000 in 
Lim’s Wembley Activated Clay Private Limited in 1985. 492 The share was sold in 1987 
with a profit of RM2,000,000 from this successful investment, albeit the conflict of 
interest. 493  In 1989, Lim persuaded the Standing Committee to invest another 
RM3,000,000 into the establishment of Wembley Rubber Products Private Limited. 
This time, Dongzong Treasurer Wong Sue Kau (黄仕寿 ), who saw the investment as a 
high-risk project, refused. Although the investment was eventually made after an 
emergency meeting, the incident polarized the financially aggressive and conservative 
factions within the committee.494
The Duzhong-WC also introduced the Duzhong-WC Sponsorship Program  




                                               
491 Dongzong (1987d: 616–617). 
 These sponsors had to make a minimal annual donation of RM100 and 
were entitled to participate in the annual sponsors meeting, which enabled them to 
monitor the planning of Duzhong-WC’s annual activities and financial budget. These  
sponsors also received a certificate of appreciation, newsletter on the Chinese education 
(华教导报), annual reports, and were rewarded as members of the Chinese Education 
Card (华教卡 ), which allowed them to enjoy discounts on Dongjiaozong’s 
publications.  
492 The DDDF Investment Committee later appointed the Klang Nominees Private Limited to manage 
this invesment. The shares in Wembley Activated Clay were later shifted into Innovest Private Limited. 
493 Dongzong (1990: 42). 
494 Dongzong (1990: 42). 
495 Dongzong (1987d: 617). 
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As demonstrated in Figure 5.3, the average number of donors prior to 1997 has 
been maintained at an average of about 350 donors per year. However, the number has 
increased from a mere 382 donors in 1996 to 1,796 donors in 1997 after Duzhong-WC 
introduced the ‘direct-sales’ networking strategy in 1996 to recruit more donors into the 
program. The same trend can also be observed from the total donation received. The 
average total donation received from 1985 to 1996 was about RM39,000. The total 
donation skyrocketed from about RM36,000 in 1996 into almost RM168,000 in 1997. 
Such successes continue to generate important financial resources to support the 
various activities of Duzhong-WC to this day.  
 
Figure 5.3 Duzhong-WC Sponsorship Program (1985–
 
2009) 
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Figure 5.4 Distribution of Duzhong Students in Malaysia (1973–
 
2009) 
Source: Compiled by the author with data extracted from Dongzong
 
 (2007: 240). 
As demonstrated in Figure 5.4, nationwide duzhong
Overall, the Dongjiaozong 
 enrollment increased from 28,318 
students in 1973 to a high of 59,773 in 1994. Although there has been a slight sign of 
reduction in student enrollment after 1994, the total enrollment numbers has remained 
above 53,000 since. Beginning from 2005, there has been a gradual increase in student 
enrollments and the total student population reached an all time high of 60,690 in 2009.  
duzhong revival movement partly achieved its 
objectives. While most duzhongs in the central and southern region of West Malaysia 
have stabilized annual students’ intakes, there are 24 middle-scale (with 300 to 1,000 
students) and 14 small-scale (less than 300 students) duzhongs nationwide—most of 




















































































































continue to face scarcity in terms of student enrollments and financial resources.496
In 2005, the Guiding Principles of Educational Reform of Malaysian 
Independent Chinese Secondary Schools (
 The 
revival movement also has yet to successfully re-establish duzhong in the state of 
Perlis, Terengganu and Pahang, which have yet to host a duzhong. 
独中教育改革纲领) was introduced to 
replace the 1973 Duzhong Proposal to establish a more comprehensive, 
quality-oriented education, and a less exam-oriented academic environment. Drafted in 
1999 after a series of working seminars, the Guiding Principles drew from case studies 
and references on the latest trends and secondary school systems from Japan, the 
United States, Korea, England, China, Sweden and Germany.497 The ambitious efforts 
to revive and reform duzhong
 
 also slowly transformed the Chinese education 
movement into a full-fledged, academic institution, and these efforts were still being 
sustained at the time of writing. 
5.4. The Subcommittees 
As Duzhong-WC was not registered under the 1966 Society Act, it was placed as a 
subordinate of Dongzong in 1975 to secure the operation and safeguard its financial 
resources and properties.498 Organizationally, Duzhong-WC consisted of committee 
members working on a voluntary basis; these committees are assisted by a full-time and 
salaried executive branch.  
Duzhong
                                               
496 Dongzong (1991: 30; 1992b: 32; 1999: 60–61). 
-WC’s committee is divided into (1) the General Committee,  
(2) the Standing Committee (which bears the responsibility for all major 
decision-making, with key positions such as the chairman, treasurer and general 
497 Duzhong-WC (1997). 
498 Interview with Choong Wei Chuan, March 17, 2008, Selangor. 
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secretary reserved for Dongzong
 
 central leaders) and (3) the Subcommittees (Unified 
Examination, Unified Curriculum, Scholarships and Loans, Teachers’ Education, 
Technical Education and Physical Education). The Unified Curriculum Subcommittee 
is further divided into various subject committees, as illustrated in Figure 5.5.   
Figure 5.5 Duzhong-WC Committees and Organization     
 
Source: The author. 




Thirteen representatives each from Dongzong and Jiaozong  
Additional committees are appointed with nomination and approval from 
members of the General Committee. 
Standing Committee 
Chairman, treasurer, general secretary: reserved for Dongzong leaders. 
All other positions: elected from the General Committee. 
Technical Education Subcommittee 
Unified Examination Subcommittee 
Unified Curriculum Subcommittee 
Scholarships and Loans Subcommittee 
Teachers’ Education Subcommittee 
Physical Education Subcommittee 
Various Subject Committees 
(Chinese, English, Malay, History, 




The Duzhong-WC Working Guidelines (董教总全国华文独中工作委员会组织细则) 
was the organization’s highest written rules; however, the two-page document only 
consisted of general guidelines. It left the implementation of work, decision-making 
and selection of committee members loosely defined and subject to individual 
discretion. As such, the Standing Committee could appoint ‘enthusiastic’ individuals 
on Chinese Education as members of the committee. The quality and background 
qualifications of these potential individuals were seldom clarified. Appointed 
committee members have been mostly scholars and (retired) duzhong schoolteachers or 
principals with special expertise in academics, or huatuan
The logic of not having clear and well-defined rules has been common across 
the Chinese education movement, and, to a larger extent, among 
 activists with influential 
networks.  
huatuans in Malaysia. 
The movement was started by a group of individuals with shared grievances; the 
inaugurated group was small in numbers—many of them friends—and highly familiar 
with the abilities, characters and limitations of one another. Therefore, the appointment 
of committee members was based on familiarity; the intimate interpersonal connections 
also secured bonds and prevented free riders among its members.499
The gradual expansion of 
 
Duzhong-WC and specialization of work from the 
1980s saw the inaugurate group begin to introduce and recommend potential candidates 
from their social networks.500
                                               
499 Interview with Choong Wei Chuan, March 17, 2008, Selangor. 
 The General Committee recommended persons fit for 
assuming office as the heads of various subcommittees, while the latter was responsible 
for identifying and recommending members to join their respective subcommittees. 
The size of each subcommittee varied, but all recommendations must be approved and 
500 Interview with Lim Kee Song, July 27, 2010, Selangor. 
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appointed by the Standing Committee. All committees of Duzhong
Relational capital, such as strong recommendations, social reputation and 
commitment to Chinese education, became the key factors for considering someone for 
appointment to office.
-WC work on a 
biannual basis but are renewable without limits on their maximum terms of service. 
501  Nevertheless, overreliance on relational capital stunted 
institutional development, for the degree of flexibility soon became an internal 
loophole of the institution and was easily corrupted by individuals with hidden 
agendas. Dongzong’s senior executive officer Lim Kee Song (林纪松
Even if we could set up the criteria, I do not think we could execute 
it. 
), gave a rather 
practical response to the problem. He said, 
Duzhong-WC and the larger Dongjiaozong worked based on sensible 
reasoning (情理法 ) and not on a standard set of rules.502
 
  
The appointment of many committee members has been renewed every term simply 
because “they have been in the position for so many years, it is very difficult and 
impolite to ask them to go”.503 Attempts to include more members from periphery 
regions to provide bottom-up input of the needs of local duzhong to the central 
decision-making unit also faced difficulty in which the new committee was unable to 
carry out its roles. The lack of written guidelines, burnout (as a result of members’ 
teaching duties), physical proximity and time consumed for travelling affected the 
functional capability of non-Selangor and Kuala Lumpur committees.504
 
 
                                               
501 Interview with Sim Mow Yu, March 26, 2008, Malacca. 
502 Interview with Lim Kee Song, July 27, 2010, Selangor. 
503 Interview with Lim Kee Song, July 27, 2010, Selangor. 
504 Interview with Choong Ee Hoong, July 27, 2010, Selangor. 
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5.5. The Executive Branch 
The executive branch of Duzhong-WC was, in practice, also the executive branch 
of Dongzong. One of the first salaried-staff of the movement, Li Da Ting* (李达庭 ) 
was the sole general officer who served Dongzong from 1953 to 1973.505 The success 
of UEC and production of duzhong textbooks saw an increasing need for staff to assist 
in administrative work. From the late 1970s, Dongzong Chairman Lim Fong Seng, 
began to employ ambitious young (mostly in their thirties) university graduates as 
full-time executives of the movement.506
Besides conducting everyday administrative work, these executive officers—in 
particular Lee Ban Chen, Kua Kia Soong, Chong Joon Kin (
  
张永庆
Such a demanding and resistance-oriented stance veered away from the 
traditional approach of seeking compromises with MCA, and has challenged the 
political role of MCA, who had been acting as the key broker between the movement 
and the UMNO state men. The influence of this group of executive officers, better 
known as executives of Lim Fong Seng’s era, returned to Dongjiaozong after the failure 
of the 1990 campaign. This ‘resistance-oriented’ faction began to exert their influence 
on the executive branch to procure their continuous role within the movement, and, 
) and so 
on—participated side-by-side with the movement’s central leader Lim Fong Seng in 
implementing new strategies to achieve their goal of procuring the rights for vernacular 
education for the minorities in Malaysia. As discussed in Chapter Four, Lee, Kua, 
Chong followed Lim Fong Seng in joining the DAP during the dual coalition system 
campaign in 1990, and have been perceived as being ‘anti-government’ and 
‘resistance-oriented’ due to their antagonistic stance against the BN regime. 
                                               
505 Most smaller huatuans, even up to this day, have only one general officer (坐办) to manage all the 
operational and administrative duties. Dongzong (1987b). 
506 Interview with Dong SA, July 22, 2010, Selangor. 
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arguably, utilized Dongzong as a platform for achieving their political goal. The 
antagonist reality within the executive branch is best proven via a few incidents during 
the post-Lim Fong Seng era. For example, Lim’s successor, the pro-MCA  
Foo Wan Thot was forced to step down after only one term in office due to his 
“inability to collaborate with the powerful executive team”.507
Another infamous example, involved the contradictions between  
Chief Executive Officer Bock Tai Hee and Dongzong Chairman Quek Suan Hiang. 
Bock, a Nanyang University graduate and a former detainee under the Internal Security 
Act, joined 
 
Duzhong-WC in 1981 as an officer for coordinating chemistry textbooks 
through the recommendation of then head of Duzhong-WC executive officer  
Lee Ban Chen. Bock was promoted as Lee’s successor in 1985, and Bock became the 
fifth and longest serving head of the executive branch.508
As Quek was residing at Kluang, Johore, he was unable to personally oversee 
movement’s daily work at the movement headquarters in Selangor. Therefore, Quek 




Bock exercised his power as chief of the executive branch to the fullest, 
gradually influencing the contents of press statements (released under the name of the 
movement chairman), recommendations and appointments of 
 However, as most committee members were 
also busy with their own full-time occupation, and only visited the office to sign 
documents. Eventually, the role of the Standing Committee eroded from that of a 
decision-maker into a ‘rubber stamp’. 
Dongzong 
and Duzhong
                                               
507 Interview with Loot Ting Yee, March 24, 2008, Kuala Lumpur. 
-WC Standing Committee members, and, most importantly, the 
preparation and allocation of annual budget. The shift in the balance of power from the 
508 Oriental, August 17, 2006. 
509 Duzhong-WC (1995: 12). 
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committee to the executive branch enabled Bock to control staff appointments, salary 
scales and distribution of benefits. Dissatisfaction from among the committee was 
muzzled by the desire for ‘unity’ and ‘face-saving’, and reluctance to be involved in 
any form of open conflict internally. 
During his term of office, Bock and his team established one of the most 
extensive executive branches among huatuans in Malaysia.510 The expansion of the 
executive branch reached its peak both in size and in power during the Dongzong 
chairmanship of the Johorian Quek Suan Hiang from 1993 to 2005. The number 
of Duzhong-WC staff reached a high of 123 in 2006, as demonstrated in Figure 5.6.511
 
 
Figure 5.6 The Growth of the Executive Branch of Duzhong-WC (1953–
 
2009)  
Source: Compiled by the author with data extracted from Dongzong (1987b: 208–210) 
and Dongzong Annual Reports (1987–
                                               
510 Interview with Choong Wei Chuan, March 17, 2008, Selangor.  
2009). 
511 Dongzong (1987b: 208; 1987c: 381, 616). 









































































































































Enjoying the upmost authority, Bock firmly controlled the movement’s executive 
branch and began to be more powerful than the committee. In 1996, Bock successfully 
persuaded the committee to grant him access to RM20,000 petty cash per month.512 
Bock also influenced the Standing Committee to provide members of the executive 
branch with health insurance, educational subsidies for their children—for example, 
discount for school fees and free textbooks at duzhong—salary increment, 21 days of 
annual leave and annual bonuses. 513  As the chief executive officer, Bock also 
introduced new system, such as the punch card system, nametags, dress code, salary 
ranking system and staff training programs to build team spirit and a better working 
environment.514
The executive branch housed predominantly younger and more qualified staff. 
As shown in Table 5.1, about 75% were under 40, and almost 45% were university 
graduates. There were about eight married couples among the staff, many of whom had 
met while working in the executive branch.
  
515 One important feature of the working 
environment within the executive branch is the relatively flexible and trusting culture. 
Work commitment depends solely on one’s own dedication and capability to 
accomplish the duties appointed onto him.516
                                               
512 Dongzong (1999: 22). 
 Such flexibility has been manipulated by 
free riders from time to time, and, inevitably, the situation became worse over time, 
especially after the eruption of the New Era controversy in 2008, which will be further 
elaborated in the next section.  
513 Dongzong (1997: 21). 
514 Interview with Dong SC, July 27, 2010, Selangor. 
515 Interview with Dong SE, July 29, 2010, Selangor. 
516 Interview with Lim Kee Song, July 27, 2010, Selangor. 
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Table 5.1 Distribution of Duzhong-WC Executive Branch Staff by Academic Qualification, Age and Years of Service (1995–2009) 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Average 
No. of Staff Members 114 101 122 103 98 92 100 108 115 114 115 123 102 92 101 107 
Academic Qualification 
PhD  1 1 2 – – – – – – – – – – – – 1 
Master 1 2 7 4 5 5 5 7 8 9 9 9 7 9 9 6 
Bachelor 35 38 42 41 36 32 34 39 44 45 47 54 51 35 38 41 
Certificate 15 10 12 11 13 9 10 12 14 15 16 23 18 19 18 14 
Form VI 56 46 55 43 39 42 45 43 40 35 33 35 23 24 32 39 
Form III 6 4 4 4 5 4 6 7 9 10 10 2 5 5 4 6 
Age 
< 30 – – – – – – – – – – 68 64 46 29 35 48 
31-40 – – – – – – – – – – 21 36 32 37 34 32 
41-50 – – – – – – – – – – 15 15 16 16 18 16 
51-55 – – – – – – – – – – 6 3 4 5 6 5 
> 56 – – – – – – – – – – 5 5 4 5 8 6 
Years of Service 
< 1 – – – – – – – 18 24 15 19 24 15 13 11 17 
1-5 – – – – – – – 33 36 44 43 48 35 25 33 37 
6-10 – – – – – – – 30 30 26 28 20 18 15 18 23 
11-15 – – – – – – – 16 15 14 12 19 19 16 16 16 
16-20 – – – – – – – 3 3 6 4 5 8 11 10 6 
21-25 – – – – – – – 2 1 2 2 2 1 7 2 2 
> 25 – – – – – – – 6 6 7 7 5 6 5 3 6 
Source: Compiled by the author with data extracted from Dongzong Annual Reports (1995–2009).   
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Table 5.2 Duzhong-WC Executive Branch Salary Scheme (2009)  
Position Qualification (Salary, RM) 
Increment based 
on Years of Service 
(RM) 




















130 145 155 






































– 65 80 90 






55 70 80 
Source: Dongzong internal document (2009
 
年实施薪金表). 
Another feature that attests to Duzhong-WC’s powerful financial capacity is its ability 
to provide a more attractive salary scheme for the executive staff compared to 
other huatuans or NGOs in Malaysia. Duzhong-WC uses eight units in its salary 
scheme, divided according to academic qualifications and years of service (see Table 
5.2). A senior officer such as the chief executive officer who has served more than 15 
years could earn up to RM9,000 per month. All heads of department enjoy a special 
allowance of RM500 per month. High salaries encourage staff retention and loyalty, 
thus strengthening the continuity and stability of the movement.  
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Nevertheless, as promotion is based on the review by one’s superior, 
maintaining good interpersonal relationship with one’s superior became critical, and 
has gradually become the sole factor for one’s promotion. Those at the bottom of the 
salary scheme often have heavy workloads, yet their grievances have been in large part 
ignored by higher officers in hierarchy.517 The top-down and leader-centric working 
relationship within the Duzhong-WC Standing Committee and the executive branch 
begin to erode with abuse of power whenever conflict of interests arose. The term,  
“I am the most senior (in position) here, so my word is the ultimate order”  
(这里我最大 , 我说了算) best described the actual implementation of orders.518
 
  
5.6. Executive Branch Departments 
Departments within the Duzhong-WC executive branch are divided into two sections, 
the general affairs and the education affairs (as summarized in Figure 5.7). Their 
functions are overseen by the operational decision-maker in the general secretariat 
office. The general affairs section is further divided into five main departments. The 
Department of Association Affairs, for example, arranges the meetings and the 
receptions of visitors, while also preparing formal speeches. 519  Publicity and 
propaganda of the movement are conducted by the Department of Promotion through 
the circulation of the newsletter.520
Other departments include the Department of Finance and Department of 
Personnel. After moving into the 
  
Dongjiaozong
                                               
517 Interviews with Dong SC and Dong SD on July 27, Selangor; Interview with Dong SF on July 29, 
2010, Selangor. 
 administration building in Kajang in 
1994, the Department of Maintenance was established to control expenses on 
518 Interview with Dong SB, July 27, 2010, Selangor. 
519 Dongzong (1997: 13, 26). 
520 Dongzong (1997: 13). 
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Figure 5.7 Duzhong-WC Executive Branch 
 
Source: The author. 
 
For education affairs section, there are eight departments: (1) Department of 
Examination, (2) Department of Curriculum, (3) Department of Students Affairs,  
(4) Department of Teachers’ Education, (5) Department of Vocational and Technical 
Education, (6) Department of Physical Education, (7) Department of Publishing and 
(8) Department of Resource and Information.522 A Department of Computer was added 
in 1996 to promote the use of information technology in networking in duzhong; 
however, due to the lack of expertise, the department only provided website 
maintenance and computer repairs services.523
As listed in Table 5.3, the Department of Examination has been the largest 
department by its staff strength (22 staff) followed by the Department of Curriculum 
  
                                               
521 Dongzong (1996: 8–14). 
522 Duzhong-WC (1990). 
523 Interview with Lim Kee Song, July 27, 2010, Selangor. 
General Secretariat Office (行政部) 
Education Affairs (学务) 
1) Examination (考试局) 
2) Curriculum (课程局) 
3) Students Affairs (学生事务局) 
4) Teachers’ Education (教师教育局) 
5) Vocational and Technical Education 
(技职教育局) 
6) Physical Education (体育局) 
7) Publishing (出版局) 
8) Resource and Information (资讯局) 
9) Computer (电脑局) 
General Affairs (总务) 
1) Association Affairs (会务与组
织局) 
2) Promotion (文宣局) 
3) Finance (财务局) 
4) Personnel (人事局) 
5) Maintainence (庶务局) 




(15 staff). Albeit the number of staff members may vary each year, however these two 
departments have been generating about 40% of the total annual income of 
Duzhong-WC (see Table 5.4) through the sales of duzhong textbooks and from the 
collection of UEC examination fees, which is about RM300 to RM400 per candidate 
(see Table 5.5).  
Data from Table 5.3 also clearly indicated that Department of Examination has 
been the sole profit-generating department within the Duzhong-WC executive branch. 
Therefore, income from this department has been important to sustain the expenses of 
other non-profit making departments, especially the departments which serve 
 
to 
maintain the everyday operational needs of the movement headquarters (such as the 
Department of Finance and Department of Computer), facilitating meetings for the 
movement central committees and working committees (such as the Department of 
Association Affairs and Department of Promotion). Such inter-dependent relationships 
have allowed the movement organization to grow into one of the most mature and 
















Table 5.3 Number of Staff Members and Expenditure of Each Department in 
the Executive Branch of Duzhong-WC  
Department 
April 2009 April 2010 





 (Profits/ Losses) 






Examination 21 358,618 (3,752,485) 22 
414,794 
(3,864,126) 
Curriculum 12 537,510 (−362,510) 15 
516,680 
(−162,069) 
Students Affairs 10 320,836 (−65,505) 10 
288,028 
(−114,811) 









Physical Education 1 14,022 (−14,022) 1 
29,484 
(−29,484) 









Computer 4 70,227 (−68,444) 5 
82,045 
(−78,160) 
Association Affairs 5 156,448 (−133,293) 6 
118,247 
(−110,747) 













Office – – 4 
100,645 
(−100,645) 
Source: Dongzong Financial Report 2010, pp. 1–2. 
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Table 5.4 Top Ten Sources of Income for Dongzong (2007–2008) (RM) 
No. Sources of Income 2007 2008 
1 Sales of Textbooks 3,516,668 4,010,618 
2 UEC Examination Fees 3,506,350 3,446,416 
3 Fixed Deposit Interest 418,331 496,432 
4 Chinese Higher Education Exhibition 354,367 – 
5 Seminar Registration Fees 323,707 99,988 
6 Sales of Majalah Pelajar 311,818 321,755 
7 Sales of UEC Past Year Papers 300,437 368,141 
8 Sales of Books 291,287 301,650 
9 Advertisement Incomes from Majalah Pelajar 110,710 153,124 
10 Australia Mathematics Competition 98,034 120,256 
Source: Compiled by the author with data extracted from 
 
Dongzong Statement of 
Income and Expenditure (2008: 10). 
Table 5.5 UEC Examination Fees (2008) 
Category 
Registration Fees (RM) Examination 
Fees (RM) For 
Malaysians For Non-Malaysians 
Senior Level  
(高中) 60 60 +100 (extra fee)  30/subject 
Vocational and 
Technical      
(技术科 ) 
60 60 +100 (extra fee) 35/subject 
 
Students who sit for both senior level and the 
vocational examinations need only to pay the 
registration fees for the senior level only. 
Junior Level  
(初中) 130 130 +100 (extra fee) All subjects 
Source: Compiled by the author with data provided by 
 






5.7. Departure of Bock 
At 55 years of age, Bock reached his retirement age in 1999; his contract subsequently 
was renewed on an annual basis.524 In a semi-retired mode, Bock spent most of his time 
delivering talks on Stories on the Chinese Education Movement (华教故事) at duzhong 
nationwide beginning from 2001. The seminars aimed to generate awareness among 
the duzhong students on the history of the Chinese education movement and to sow the 
seeds of the movement in future generations.525
Committed to ‘story telling’, Bock has been away most of his time in the 2000s. 
This has created opportunity for some senior staff within the executive branch to 
engage in office politics in the competition to become the next chief executive officer. 
Free riders and opportunists have exploited their close relationship with Bock for 
access to resources; they have asserted their official and unofficial power in bids to 
eliminate competitors.
 
526 Bock’s originally peaceful retirement plan came unglued 
when Quek’s successor, Yap Sin Tian (Dongzong
Fearful of the changes that Yap would introduce after Bock’s retirement and 
vying for the chief executive officer position, some executive members exploited 
Bock’s retirement as an issue to attack Yap. The incident was resolved after Yap 
compromised and agreed to establish a three-person committee comprising senior 
officers from the executive branch to take over the duties of the chief executive officer 
 treasurer since 1991 and deputy 
chairman since 1997), came into power in June 2005 and sought to reinstall the balance 
of power from the executive officer to the Standing Committee. 
                                               
524 Interview with Quek Suan Hiang, March 23, 2010, Johore.  
525 Dongzong (1999: 17); Bock and Huang (2006).  
526 Interview with Dong SD, July 27, 2010, Selangor. 
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for six months during the transition.527 Bock left Dongzong in January 2007 and served 
as the acting principal of Kelantan Chung Hwa Independent High School until 2008. 528
After the transition period, Yap quickly consolidated his position by installing 
soft-spoken Kuang Hee Pang (
 
邝其芳 ) as the chief executive officer, accompanied by 
implementing a series of major changes in the executive branch’s working style.  
The heads of departments in the executive branch must report directly to the chairman 
of Duzhong-WC, making Yap the key–and no longer a phantom–decision-maker. 
These changes effectively reduced the executive branch to a subordinate body within 
the Duzhong-WC system. It also undermined the confidence and limited the 
performance of the staff members.529 Staff morale was low as they felt they were 
treated as ‘salaried staff’ and no longer appreciated as ‘contributors’ to the 
movement.530 In response, five heads of department and more than 30 staff members 
resigned in year 2007.531
Yap Sin Tian also revamped and eliminated the Department of Chief Executive 
(established by Bock in 2005) into three smaller departments (Association Affairs, 
Promotion and Maintainence).
  
532 In order to strengthen the control over the executive 
branch, Yap appointed his close aids to key positions in these newly established 
departments. For instance, Wan Jia An* (万家安 ) was made the head for Department 
of Maintainence in April 2009; Lai Soon Keat (赖顺吉 ), a former Jiaozong 
                                               
527 Members of this three-person committee included Li Yue Tong* (李岳通) (Head, Department of 
General Affairs), Choong Pai Chee (庄白绮) (Head, Department of Meeting and Organization) and 
Zhang Xi Chong* (张喜崇) (Head, Department of Curriculum). See Dongzong (2008: 35). 
executive 
officer in the 1980s and a former active member of Gerakan, joined the executive 
528 Merdeka Review, October 20, 2006. 
529 Interview with Dong SE, July 29, 2010, Selangor. 
530 Interview with Choong Woei Chuan, March 17, 2008, Selangor. 
531 The heads who resigned were Zhang Xi Chong* from Department of Curriculum, Liang Sheng Yi* 
(梁胜义) from Department of Student Affairs, Chen Li Qun* (陈利群) from Department of Personnel, 
Li Hui Jin* (李惠衿) from Department of Teachers’ Training and Lin Mei Yan* (林美燕) from 
Department of Technical Education. Oriental, December 10, 2007. 
532 Dongzong (2007: 40). 
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branch in September 2009 and, shortly thereafter, was promoted as the Head of 
Department of Association Affairs.533
Yap’s right-hand man, Shum Thin Khee (
   
沈天奇 ), was appointed as head of the 
Chief Executive Office, reestablished in 2010, which executed all orders from Yap. By 
the time of writing, Shum was best positioned to succeed Kuang Hee Pang’s position as 
the next chief executive officer, as the latter was suffering from ill health.534
In the meantime, the reformist faction which was forced to leave the executive 
branch, such as Bock Tai Hee and his supporters, have been trying to establish 
the 
 One thing, 
however, remained unchanged for the executive branch: decision-making was still 
top-down and person-centered. Yap Sin Tian who is expected to continue dominating 
the chairmanship of Dongzong and Duzhong-WC will need to put in extra effort 
especially in hiring the right people (and not be constrained to hire only the people he 
knows or prefers). It is only with more healthy competition and a more transparent 
process in all decision-making (such as in hiring and promoting of staff members) that 
the institutions of Duzhong-WC would find a common ground amongst all factions.   
Duzhong Principals’ Association (独中校长理事会) and the Duzhong Education 




The earlier section elaborated on Duzhong-WC as a mobilization machinery of 
Dongzong. In this section, the author will elaborate on the strategies and challenges 




                                               
533 Merdeka Review, October 12, 2009. 
 could only be successful with the continued existence and development of 
534 The Rock News, December 28, 2009; Interview with Dong SD, July 27, 2010, Selangor. 
535 Malaysiakini, October 2, 2009. 
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Chinese primary schools was recognized by Perak Donglianhui as early as in 1974 
during the Perak duzhong
As discussed in Chapter Three, the lack of funding combined with government 
neglect led some Chinese primary schools to fall apart.
 revival movement and Perak Donglianhui had already been 
taking the lead to visit and understand the needs of Chinese primary schools.  
536  By December 
1976, Dongzong called for the school committees and state donglianhui to collaborate 
with schoolteachers, parents and alumni in developing and protecting Chinese primary 
schools as the foundation of Chinese education.537
By March 1977, the 
 In response, from December 1976 to 
February 1977, Selangor, Perak, Malacca and Penang started organizing state-level 
working committees for the development of Chinese primary schools.  
Huaxiao-WC was formally established. The working 
guidelines (董教总发展华文小学工作委员会简章) drafted soon thereafter. Lim Fong 
Seng from Dongzong was selected as the leader of the chairmen group  
(主席团). Chairmen from all state-level donglianhui, CSTA, and Chinese school 
alumni were automatically enrolled as members of the Chairmen Group.538 It was 
hoped that by consolidating power, it could attract more individuals—especially 
youths—beyond Dongjiaozong to defend the use of Chinese as the medium for 




                                               
536 Shen T (1975: 73). 
-WC was not as successful as many had expected. 
Unequal distribution of Chinese primary schools in each state and county made it 
difficult to establish uniform mobilization. The Chinese population in Kelantan and 
Terengganu was too small, while Malacca and Perlis housed a limited number of 
Chinese primary schools. Schoolteachers and school committees in Sabah and Sarawak 
537 Dongzong (1987d: 638). 
538 Dongzong (1987d: 638). 
539 Dongzong (1987d: 639). 
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had already been collaborating for years at the state level and therefore did not see the 
need to establish yet another working committee. Meanwhile, Chinese educationalists 
in Penang found a better working platform under the Penang Chinese Education 
Working Committee (槟城州华文教育工作委员会 ), which received financial 
assistance from the state government.540
Thirty years later, in July 1993,
 
 Huaxiao-WC was reintroduced 
by Dongjiaozong, and administrated by Jiaozong. It was believed that this move would 
enable funding to be channeled from the more successful Duzhong-WC 
to Huaxiao-WC, and thus help to support the administrative functions of Jiaozong.541 
The new Huaxiao
State-level 
-WC was divided into the central-level and state-level working 
committees (see Figure 5.8).  
Huaxiao-WC were administrated independently by the 
state-level donglianhui, and only collaborated with the central-Huaxiao-WC in large 
scale fundraising campaigns. Thus far, only Johore, Perak, Selangor and Pahang have 
had a functional Huaxiao-WC. 542 At the central level, seven representatives each 
from Dongzong and Jiaozong formed the General Committee that was administrated by 
a Jiaozong-
 






                                               
540 Interview with Lim Kee Song, July 27, 2010, Selangor. 
541 Jiaozong (1994: 15); Interview with Loot Ting Yee, March 24, 2008, Kuala Lumpur. 
542 Petaling-Huaxiao (2004). 
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Figure 5.8 Huaxiao-WC Committees and Executive Branch 
 
Source: The author. 
 
5.9. The Executive Branch 
At the central level, Huaxiao-WC executive branch was established in 1994 to serve 
more as a Jiaozong secretariat. It replaced the Education Research Center  
(教育研究中心) established in April 1984 by Thuang Pik King, the then chairman of 
Kuala Lumpur CSTA.543 The Center expanded Jiaozong’s
                                               
543 Jiaozong (1983b: 636). 
 secretariat from two general 
officers in the 1950s to 10 staff members in early 1985.  
Central-Level Working Committee  
 
Department of Executive (行政组) 
Department of Resource and Research (调查研究及资讯组)  
Department of Teachers’ Training (师资培训组) 
Department of Students Activities (学生活动组)  
Department of Publication and Promotion (出版及促销组) 
Department of Early Childhood Education (幼儿教育组 ) 






Dongjiaozong National Chinese Primary Schools Development Working 
Committee (董教总全国发展华文小学工作委员会, Huaxiao-WC) 
Standing Committee 
Chairman, treasurer, general secretary reserved for 
Jiaozong leaders. All other positions are elected from the 
General Committee 
General Committee  
Seven representatives each from Dongzong and Jiaozong  
Additional committees are appointed with nomination and 





In the 1980s, young university graduates, who later became key personnel in 
huatuan activities in Malaysia, such as Yow Lee Fung (姚丽芳 ), Tang Ah Chai  
(陈亚才 ) and Liew Kan Ba (刘崇汉 ), were recruited as Jiaozong executive officers to 
execute Jiaozong’s administrative work. More importantly, data was systematically 
collected to enable a better understanding of changes in vernacular education, 
especially at the level of Chinese primary schools.544
The 
  
Jiaozong executive branch was expanded with the formation of the  
Lim Lian Geok Cultural Development Center (林连玉基金) in December 1985 after 
the demise of the former Jiaozong Chairman Lim Lian Geok. Number of Jiaozong 
executive office was expanded to 15 members who shared various responsibilities from 
executing general affairs administration, publicity, publication, to annual 
commemoration of the Chinese Education Festival (华教节). The Festival, conducted 
every December, hosted such activities as a public memorial ceremony at Lim Lian 
Geok’s graveyard, seminars, Lim Lian Geok Awards (林连玉精神奖)
By 1994, the re-establishment of the 
 (since 1988) and 
annual fundraising dinners.  
Huaxiao-WC had seen the division of 
work into six departments: (1) Department of Executive organized and 
executed Jiaozong meeting decisions, facilitated work on propaganda, fundraising, 
finance and human resource, (2) Department of Resource and Research collected and 
compiled data, (3) Department of Teachers’ Training conducted training programs and 
nominated about 100 schoolteachers annually for training programs sponsored by 
Chinese and Taiwanese governments since 1990, 545
                                               
544 KLCSTA (2000: 661–663). 
 (4) Department of Students 
Activities conducted annual Chinese-speaking competitions, holiday camps and 
545 Interview with Yap Hon Kiat, July 22, 2010, Selangor. 
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seminars,546 (5) Department of Publication and Promotion was responsible for in-house 
publications such as Education World (教育天地) (1951–2000) and Child (孩子
) (1994–current), (6) Department of Early Childhood Education conducted parenting 
and pre-school education programs.547
In 2006, Yow Lee Fung, the chief administrative secretary since 1984, retired 
and was replaced by Yap Hon Kiat (
 
叶翰杰 ).548 In the same year, the Lim Lian Geok 
Cultural Development Center declared ‘independence’ from Jiaozong and thus reduced 
the number of staff and, above all, forfeited a key source of income from the annual 
Chinese Education Festival fundraising dinner from Jiaozong. As a result, it has been 
facing an annual deficit of some RM20,000 since 2006. 549  Unlike its sister 
organization, the Duzhong-WC, which generated income from the UEC, the expenses 
of Huaxiao-WC depended solely on public donations from fundraising campaigns. 
These included Sim Mow Yu’s eightieth birthday celebration in 1992, the 
reintroduction of Huaxiao-WC in 1994, and Jiaozong’s fifty-fifth anniversary 
celebration in 2006. Each of these occasions generated anywhere from RM60,000 to 
RM80,000, sums large enough to sustain the organization’s annual expenses for about 
three to five years.550
Since 2006, an average of 10 seminars has been conducted annually. They have 
covered topics such as Teaching Methods (for fresh graduates from the Teachers 
Training College), Respect the Teachers, and Teachers’ Psychological Health  
(for general Chinese schoolteachers in Malaysia).
 
 
                                               
546 Jiaozong (2007: 14, 177, 198). 
Attended by an annual average of 
1,500 schoolteachers, these activities aimed to “return to the fundamentals of education 
547 Jiaozong (2007: 12). 
548 Interview with Yow Lee Fung, February 17, 2009, Selangor. 
549 Interview with Yap Hon Kiat and Er Joo Tiong, July 22, 2010, Selangor. 
550 Interview with Er Joo Tiong, July 22, 2010, Selangor. 
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and reintroduce Jiaozong to the schoolteachers’ community as an organization that 
supported the Chinese community”.551 Due to Jiaozong is a non-profit organization, a 
minimal registration fees is collected to cover the cost of the activities. By way of 
‘sustainable activities’ and carefully planned budgets, Jiaozong tried to prevent running 
deficits when conducting these activities.552
We cannot collect too much money if we want to attract more 
participants to join our activities. If we charge them (the schoolteachers 
and seminar participants) too high, they may question why 
 
Jiaozong is 
trying to make money. If we charge too low, we will end up with a 
deficit and the consequence would be insufficient money to conduct 
other activities in that fiscal year.553
 
 
The pressing needs to sustain the movement’s everyday expenses financially vis-à-vis 
that of maintaining the supporters’ confidence is, in practice, difficult to balance. Too 
much emphasis on soliciting financial resources from the supporters may be perceived 
(and may be used by movement enemies to mislead supporters) as exploitation, and 
raise questions about the sincerity and fairness of the movement’s ultimate goal. Yet 
having insufficient resources, has situated the movement—in particular, the executives 
officer on the ground who have to deal with the everyday struggle to sustain the 
movement—in a very difficult position to make the impossible possible.  
The dilemma had been hidden from public knowledge, but all too often, those 
who wished to attack the movement, had used it to decertify the movement and the 
movement organizations. In the attempt to reduce financial expenses by conducting 
fewer and smaller-scale seminars, the movement suffered from having too little 
visibility when few people actually hear about or attend the seminars. 
                                               
551 Interview with Yap Hon Kiat, July 22, 2010, Selangor. 
552 Interview with Er Joo Tiong, July 22, 2010, Selangor. 
553 Interview with Er Joo Tiong, July 22, 2010, Selangor. 
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The Huaxiao-WC Sponsorship Program (全国华文小学发展基金常年 
赞助人), which was established in 1984, has generate about RM10,000 from public 
donations annually (see Figure 5.9). However, it was perceived as “not a significant 
part of Jiaozong income” by current chief executive secretary of Jiaozong,  
Yap Hon Kiat, and therefore not much effort was invested to improve it as an 
alternative fundraising source.554 Perhaps it also had to do with the fact that the 
function of the executive branch had little to do with the Huaxiao-WC; this 




Figure 5.9  Huaxiao-WC Sponsorship Program (1989–
 
2009) 
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Due to financial constraints, the executive branch employed only 17 full-time staff, and 
thus the duplication of duty across departments was common.555 About 80% of the staff 
members were graduates from college or university, and were below the age of 40. At 
the time of writing, seven of them had served for five years, one for eight years, and two 
seniors had been on staff for more than 20 years. 556  Also a result of financial 
constraints, change of leadership and insufficient human resources, the executive 
branch, and Jiaozong at large, no longer sought to challenge state authorities 
contentiously, as “it is beyond our current ability” as Yap Hon Kiat remarked.557
Not only does Yap’s lamentation demonstrate his frustrated ambition to do 
more for the office, it also shows the limitation of dreamt goal and the actual limitation 
imposed onto the ground officers. Very often, internal operative constraints, limited 
resources and conservative movement leaders have significantly narrowed down the 




The third mobilization machinery of the Chinese education movement is 
the 
 Higher Learning Center and New Era College  
Dongjiaozong
                                               
555 Interview with Yap Hon Kiat, July 22, 2010, Selangor. 
 Higher Learning Center Non-Profit Private Limited (HLC) that 
consisted of representatives from Dongzong, Jiaozong and the Merdeka University 
Company. The formation of the HLC has to be traced back to the post-1987 economic 
crisis and the infamous Operasi Lalang (see Chapter Four). Facing increasing political 
pressure, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad (1981–2003) tried to appease the Chinese 
community by approving the establishment of Southern College—the first Chinese 
community-funded college—in March 1990. Efforts to set up the college had been 
underway since 1987, but the government balked. Hence, the approval came as a 
556 Interview with Er Joo Tiong, July 22, 2010, Selangor. 
557 Interview with Yap Hon Kiat, July 22, 2010, Selangor. 
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‘surprise’ for everyone, and it helped to reinstall BN’s popularity, especially in Johore 
where the college was located. The BN preserved its two-thirds parliamentary majority 
in the 1990 General Election.  
The Vision 2020 campaign introduced in 1991 aim for Malaysia to be a 
developed, industrial state by 2020. To meet the campaign’s need for increased 
education opportunities, the government liberalized tertiary education. For instance, it 
began to allow private (and foreign) universities to establish degree-conferring 
campuses in Malaysia. Southern College’s success, timely liberalization and the 
growing importance of the Chinese language with China’s rapid economic ascendancy 
gave hope to Dongjiaozong leaders to re-try to establish a Chinese college. After a 
consultation on ‘strategies’558 with MCA Secretary General Ting Chew Peh (陈祖排
Efforts to apply for a college license in August 1994 and April 1995 were 
rejected as MOE saw no need for another Chinese community college.
) 
and Deputy Minister of Education Fong Chan Onn, HLC was established in March 
1994. It would serve as the maiden company for the New Era College.  
559 Southern 
College was already providing training for duzhong schoolteachers. Engagement and 
lobbying efforts assisted by MCA central ministers, however, led to changes in  
New Era College’s proposal to accommodate the requirement of the newly 
implemented 1996 Private Higher Education Institutions Act. MOE eventually 
approved the New Era College establishment in May 1997.560
 The HLC Board of Directors consisted of five representatives each 
from 
 
Dongzong, Jiaozong and Merdeka University 
                                               
558 Among the strategies include Dongjiaozong’s application to establish a moderate size college, laying 
low under the radar, and establish good relationship with Selangor State Education Department and 
MOE. See Dongzong (1994: 53). 
Company, and six representatives 
from HLC members (55 individual members and three organization members in total). 
559 Dongzong (1995: 305). 
560 HLC (2008b: 40). 
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All decisions were administrated by the Executive Directors (seven people) selected 
from the Board. Such cross-organization collaboration was the largest since the 
Merdeka University project. In actuality, Dongzong (through Duzhong-WC) was the 
main resource provider. For example, Duzhong-WC made an interest free loan of 
RM100,000 to HLC in 1995 and allocated four annual study loans of RM5,000 for 
HLC students. 561 The Merdeka University Company leased Kajang land for New Era’s 
premises, and Jiaozong
 
 was the collaborator of the project.  
5.11. Fundraising Campaigns 
Dongjiaozong began conducting large-scale fundraising campaigns in 1997 to 
construct a seven-storey teaching building (成人成才教学楼) and a 13-storey student 
dormitory (饮水思源宿舍 ) to fulfill New Era’s need for facilities. 562  The 
overwhelming need for financial resources saw Quek Suan Hiang spend all three terms 
as Dongzong chairman working on various fundraising campaigns at the central and 
local levels. Quek recalled, 
Dongjiaozong is an empty box; we do not have any property or source 
of income before the success of Duzhong-WC. To sustain new projects 
such as the development of New Era College, we need to unite all 
support, including those from the business-class, middle-class, 
working-class, as well as political parties.563
 
 
Every cent for New Era’s formation was generated from the community through 
various campaigns. 564  Among the larger campaigns included the 1995 national 
fundraising campaign conducted in collaboration with the United Chinese School 
Alumni Association. Thousand Men dinners (千人宴)
                                               
561 Dongzong (1996: 24; 1998: 28). 
 were organized at the state level 
562 HLC (2008b: 33)  
563 Interview with Quek Suan Hiang, March 23, 2010, Johore. 
564 See Dongzong (2002c) for list of donors. 
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to commemorate the formation of the United Chinese School Alumni Association and 
as a show of support towards New Era’s establishment. Certain states, such as Negeri 
Sembilan, jointly organized the fundraising event with state-level donglianhui and the 
CSTA. It generated some RM158,000 through the sale of dinner coupons. Among 
United Chinese School Alumni Association members at the state level, namely Perak, 
Selangor, Malacca and Johore state also donated RM20,000 each.565 The highlight of 
HLC-United Chinese School Alumni Association collaboration was the December 
1996 Thousand Men Fundraising Dinner (1214 千万心宴). Nearly 1,500 individuals 
and companies donated approximately RM1,340,000 at the dinner.566
As discussed in Chapter Three, a more popular way of fundraising was through 
charity sales, an approach widely used by 
 
Merdeka University for fundraising in the 
1960s and duzhong in its revival movement in the 1970s. Charity sales usually invited 
extensive community participation, especially from the middle- and working-classes. 
The sales lasted from a few hours to a few days, and almost everything that could be 
consumed by a Chinese family were sold: drinks (soya milk, herbal tea), dried food 
stock (rice, noodles), cooked food (roasted pork, fried rice, bahkutteh [肉骨茶]
Donations have also been collected during ceremonial events such as 
anniversaries, weddings, or traditional celebrations (hungry ghost month and 
mid-autumn festival).
), 
services (haircut, trishaw ride), arts (calligraphy, Chinese traditional paintings) and 
performances (circus, Chinese opera). Although these events did not generate as much 
money as the fundraising dinners, they nevertheless generated passion and renewed 
awareness of the Chinese education’s importance from the participants. 
567
                                               
565 Dongzong (2002c: 75–77). 
 Substantial donations have been generated from large 
566 Nanyang, December 18, 1996; Dongzong (1996: 29; 2002c: 85–103). 
567 Dongzong (1994: 33, 303). 
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organizations and wealthy individuals through the efforts of the movement leaders or 
through influential brokers. Notable examples were RM600,000 and RM30,000 
donations by the Lee Foundation (李氏基金) and by Chiew Swee Peow Chinese 
Education Trust Fund (周瑞标教育基金), respectively.568
Such funds accumulated from the public are critical for supporting the expenses 
needed to pay for the construction of the New Era College in the Kajang site. Thus, the 
success of the organization in accumulating the targeted funds is also a recognition of 
its leadership status. Not only does it demonstrate the external capacity of the leaders in 
utilizing their social networks to support the movement’s career, it also tests the 
operational capacity of the leaders to collaborate with the movement’s executive 
branch.    
 
 
5.12. A Dream Come True, or the Beginning of a Nightmare? 
The discussion in this chapter has thus far demonstrated the machinery of resource 
mobilization of the movement in terms of personal and financial resources, and the 
successful establishment of the movement’s first tertiary institution despite the 
constraints it faced with state policies. Nevertheless, the goal of having a complete 
Chinese education system did not end after having established the New Era College.  
The more challenging task was to maintain the institution, and to develop it into 
a sustainable academic institution in the competitive tertiary education market in 
Malaysia. According to former Dongzong Chairman Quek Suan Hiang, also former 
head of HLC and New Era Boards who oversaw the early development of the college, 
 
 
                                               
568 Dongzong (2002c: 75). 
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The college had a difficult beginning: it suffered a deficit of about 
RM300,000 in its first financial year. Having only 148 students in its 
first intake, most lessons were conducted in temporary containers in the 
first quarter of 1998, as fundraising for the construction of the college 
building was still underway.569
 
 
In order to tackle its fiscal shortage, Dongjiaozong launched the HLC and New Era 
College Development Fund (董教总教育中心基金, 新纪元学院建设及发展基金) 
and the New Era College Sponsorship Program (新纪元学院发展基金赞助人).570
In 1999, MOE refused to renew the college’s license due to a putative technical 
problem: according to MOE, HLC was not a ‘company limited by share’ as required by 
the 1996 Private Higher Educational Institution Act. Deputy Education Minister  
Fong Chan Onn from MCA facilitated dialogue sessions (April, May, August and 
October 1999) between New Era representatives and MOE officers (Deputy Registrar 
Yaacob Wan Ibrahim from the Private Education and Registration Control Officer  
Abu Bakar Ismail). Eventually the issue was resolved.
  
The latter (as shown in Figure 5.10) amassed an average donation of about RM170,000 
annually. Such financial resources are important for covering part of the executive 
expenses required to maintain the college.    
571
It took HLC almost four years to accumulate about RM26,000,000 to begin 
construction of the teaching building and the student dormitory in 1999. The Chinese 
community, however, was beginning to show signs of fatigue in having to pay a 
‘second income tax’—a term used to refer to donations made to Chinese education 
activities—due to the series of fundraising campaigns in the 1990s. The teaching 
building was completed in September 2001, and the student dormitory in 2002. A huge 
 
                                               
569 Interview with Quek Suan Hiang, March 23, 2010, Johore. 
570 Those who donated more than RM1,000 were named honorary sponsors (荣誉赞助人), RM500 as 
permanent sponsor (永久赞助人) and RM50 as normal sponsors. Dongzong (1998: 145–149). 
571 Dongzong internal document (January 5, 2000: 34–36). 
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dinner—Inspirational Heroes Dinner (壮志宴)—was held in July 2002 to celebrate the 
completion of the construction projects and New Era’s establishment as 
another milestone in the story of the Chinese education system in Malaysia since the 
first Chinese school was established 180 years ago.572
 
 
Figure 5.10 New Era College Sponsorship Program (1998–
 
2009) 




5.13. Students, Staff and Programs 
New Era College faced fierce competition in terms of student intakes and donations 
from the community as a result of the boom in private universities and colleges, as well 
as with other Chinese community-funded colleges, such as the Southern College 
(located in Johore), Han Chiang College (韩江学院) (established since 1999, located in 
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Penang), the MCA-backed Tunku Abdul Rahman College (established since 1969,  
six campuses nationwide) and Tunku Abdul Rahman University (拉曼大学 ) 
(established since 2001, located in Perak). 
New Era’s first college principal was Ang Tian Se (洪天赐 ) (1998–2000), a 
formal Nanyang University graduate who held a doctorate in Chemistry from Canada 
Columbia University. Within the first two years, Ang successfully established 
academic collaborations with universities in China, Taiwan, New Zealand and 
Australia. Among New Era’s first programs was the ‘two plus one program’573 in 
Bachelor of Commerce and Administration in conjunction with Victoria University of 
Wellington in New Zealand.574 Collaboration between Duzhong-WC with Taiwan 
universities also allowed HLC to conduct high quality schoolteachers’ training 
programs in both New Era and Taiwan.575
As a graduate from Peking University, Quek Suan Hiang also utilized his 
extensive personal networks to establish Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) 
with universities in China. 
  
Dongjiaozong leaders led various observation tours to 
China. These resulted in the signing of MOUs with Beijing Normal University  
(北京师范大学 ), South China Normal University (华南师范大学 ), amongst others. 
MOUs enabled credit transfer and recognition of pre-university programs conducted at 
New Era College.576 HLC also made successful bids as the sole overseas representative 
for the Higher Education in China Exhibition (中国高等教育展) in Malaysia and as 
the official student enrollment representative for Xiamen University (厦门大学
                                               
573 The program allows students to study two years of foundational curriculum at the New Era College 
and spend one year at a preferred overseas university. 
) in 
574 HLC (2009: 47). 
575  These institutions included the Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission, Republic of China 
(Taiwan) (中华民国侨务委员会), Taiwan MOE, National Taiwan Normal University (台湾师范大学) 
and National Taiwan Normal University Division of Preparatory Programs for Overseas Chinese 
Students (国立侨生大学先修班). See Dongzong (1993: 36–46). 
576 Dongzong (1995: 8); HLC (1999: 20). 
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1996, which generated two important sources of financial income for HLC  
(see Table 5.4).  
Kua Kia Soong succeeded Ang Tian Se after the latter resigned in 2000. Since 
then, the college progressed slowly but steadily, and academic departments increased 
from four in 1998 to 13 in 2010.577 The college offered lower school fees, provided 
many scholarship and loan opportunities, and a more spacious college environment for 
its students. The number of new enrollment began to climb and achieved a high of 
1,000 in 2002 (see Figure 5.11). New Era was thus able to generate income for HLC.578
 
  
Figure 5.11 New Era College Students (1998–
 
2009)  
Source: Compiled by the author with data extracted from HLC Annual Reports 
(1998–
                                               
577 Back in 1998, the college only consisted of four departments: Department of Accounting, Department 
of Finance and Business, Department of Chinese Language and Literature, and Department of 
Information Technology. See HLC (2010: 32, 242–247). 
2009). 



































About 50% of the students were duzhong graduates, a third from government schools, 
and the rest from converted Chinese schools.579 The college also provided on-the-job 
training for duzhong schoolteachers, especially those who did not have prior 
education-related training, under the Professional Teaching Program (教育专业系). 
Since 2004, non-Chinese students began to enroll in three programs taught in English 
(Art and Design, Business, and Information Technology).580 Although their numbers 
were less than 1% of the overall student population, New Era offered the Multi-Cultural 
Scholarship (多元文化奖学金)
As all of the donations to New Era College were made by the Chinese 
community in Malaysia, the college focused its marketing strategies to 
attract ethnic Chinese students only. Although non-Chinese students 
were not the priority of the college, it did not discourage or prohibit 
their enrollment.
 to non-Chinese students. During the interview with 
New Era’s deputy head of Department of Registry, Tang Pui Kwan 





The lack of qualified academic staff and political constraints applied to New Era 
limited the programs it could offer. Notably, the college had only provisional 
accreditation status according to the National Accreditation Board (Lembaga 
Akreditasi Negara) and Malaysian Qualifications Agency (Agensi Kelayakan 
Malaysia). The college was not qualified to issue a recognized certificate, and its 
students were unable to obtain study loans from the National Higher Education Fund 
Corporation. Most of its graduates who wished to receive a full degree must continue 
their studies overseas universities that had signed a MOU and agreed to academic credit 
                                               
579 Interview with Wong Wai Keat, July 27, 2010, Selangor. 
580 Interview with Tang Pui Kwan, July 29, 2010, Selangor. 
581 Interview with Tang Pui Kwan, July 29, 2010, Selangor. 
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transfer with New Era. At the time of writing, this numbered more than 90 universities 
worldwide.  
In the following figures, the author illustrated the distribution of New Era 
College’s collaboration with universities (in having a MOU) all over the world  
(Figure 5.12) and the countries in which most New Era graduate students obtained their 
degrees (Figure 5.13). Almost 75% of the all MOU collaborators are universities from 
China and Taiwan, and therefore, almost 53% of New Era graduates opted to continue 
their bachelor degree in these universities. Both tendencies demonstrated that the 
Chinese language was a significant factor in collaboration and students’ preference for 
undergraduate studies.    
 
Figure 5.12 Distribution of New Era College MOU 
 
Partners by Country 

















Source: Compiled by the author with data provided by HLC. 
 
The formation of HLC in 1994 created a platform for Dongjiaozong to call for the 
establishment of a regional network of alliance on Chinese education, Known as the 
Southeast Asian Chinese Language Teaching Convention (东南亚华文教学研讨会), 
it was established in 1995. The convention was attended by leading Chinese education 
institutions from Southeast Asian countries as illustrated in Map 5.1. Renewed interest 
in Chinese language saw the gradual liberalization of policies on the teaching of 
Chinese language by the governments in the region.582 The Malaysian government 
followed suit, resulting in official collaboration with China’s MOE as embodied in the 
signing of a historical MOU in 1997.583
                                               
582 Lin HD (2000); Leo (2007: 335–336).  
  



















Map 5.1 Southeast Asian Chinese Language Teaching Convention 
 
Source: The author. 
 
As the leading Chinese education institution in Malaysia, HLC played a crucial role in 
sharing its experiences and assisting neighboring affiliations in re-establishment 
efforts.584 For example, HLC donated a set of textbooks to schools in Cambodia, and 
waived copyright fees to allow them to reprint them for use in the country. New Era 
also introduced the Teaching of Chinese Language to Non-Chinese Teachers  
(对外汉语教学) to train non-Chinese schoolteachers in teaching Chinese in their 
vernacular language.585
To promote exchanges on the teaching of Chinese, a biannual regional 
conference hosted in rotation by members of the Southeast Asian Chinese Language 
 
                                               
584 HLC (2009: 105–115). 
585 Interview with Hong Woan Ying, July 26, 2010, Selangor. 
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Teaching Convention has been organized since 1995. In recent years, it has attracted 
Chinese government officials, scholars and educationalists.586 Dongzong’s executive 
branch acted as the convention’s secretariat and was responsible for publishing an 
annual newsletter, Southeast Asia Chinese Education Bulletin (东南亚华文教育通讯) 




5.14. New Era University 
In 2000, Vintage Heights Private Limited donated 100 acres of land located in Bandar 
Sepang Putra to be designated as the premises for the future New Era University 
campus. Vintage Heights was a joint venture among GuocoLand (Malaysia) Limited, 
Selangor Development Corporation (Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor)—
In addition, Hong Leong Group (
a state 
development agency controlled by UMNO Selangor state government prior to 2008, 
Hap Seng Consolidated Limited, Crescent Capital Private Limited and Cheltenham 
Investments Private Limited.  
丰隆集团) pledged a donation of more than 
RM2 million; GuocoLand and Hume Industries donated RM1.163 million 
altogether.587 Vintage Heights, GuocoLand and Hume Industries were subsidiaries of 
politically well-connected businessman, Quek Leng Chan (郭令灿 ), and his extensive 
Hong Leong Group empire.588 This was a win-win collaboration for both Dongjiaozong
                                               
586 The convention normally begins with reports and country overview of Chinese language teaching, 
and paper presentations and discussions on Chinese ontology, materials, teaching methods, teachers’ 
training and evaluation. 
 
and Hong Leong, as the former could now realize its ambition of developing the first 
Chinese university in Malaysia, while the latter earned even greater social respect as 
587 Malaysiakini, February 19, 2008. 
588 Gomez and Jomo (1997: 66–72). 
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generous contributors to vernacular education development. It also secured the 
potentially lucrative development of Bandar Sepang Putra. 
Hong Leong Finance, which was designated as the project manager of the  
New Era University-Sepang Campus development, raised RM3.38 million from 
donation boxes set up at its branches and a high-profile fundraising concert in 2001. 
However, all these efforts grounded to a standstill when the BN dominated Selangor 
government ordered the last minute cancellation of the Sepang Project Ground 
Breaking Ceremony in August 2001.589 “This was perceived by many as an act of 
political suppression”, said Loot Ting Yee, former Jiaozong vice chairman.590
Subsequently, the project suffered another setback when Hong Leong Finance 
withdrew from its role as the project manager in 2002. Having lost a strong 
ally, 
 
Dongjiaozong faced tremendous financial pressure to sustain the cost of the 
developing the university, whose estimated cost of construction for the first phase of 
development was at least RM16 million. Dongjiaozong also was in legal deadlock with 
Hong Leong over the contract pertaining to the transfer of the donated land. It contained 
a clause stipulating that “all land not developed by August 2007 must be returned to the 
developers”.591
The deadlock was resolved with the signing of a new MOU between the two on 
February 19, two weeks prior to the 2008 General Election. The high-profile occasion 




                                               
589 HLC (2002: 32). 
 Hong Leong Chairperson Quek Leng Chan, Selangor Chief Minister 
Mohd Khir Toyo, and representatives from Selangor Development Corporation and 
Vintage Heights. Albeit knowing that the occasion was politically motivated,  
590 Interview with Loot Ting Yee, March 24, 2008, Kuala Lumpur. 
591 The Star, February 20, 2008. 
592 MCA President Ong Ka Ting and Deputy President Chan Kong Choy. 
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Yap Sin Tian and the key members of Dongjiaozong had no choice but to concede for 
the sake of the long-term interest of the Sepang campus.593
With the establishment of the new Ministry of Higher Education,
 
594 HLC was 
able to collaborate closely with Ministry of Higher Education Deputy Minister  
Hou Kok Chung (何国忠 ) from MCA, who was also a former academic from the 
University of Malaya. However, New Era College’s application with the Ministry of 
Higher Education to be upgraded into the New Era University was rejected in 
December 2007. Under the 1996 Education Act and the 1996 Higher Education 
Institution Act, New Era College was assessed to fall short in the following categories: 
sufficient academic caliber in its staff pool (see Figure 5.14),595 full accreditation 
status, variety in its academic program, 596  academic and research capacities and 
capabilities, research publication, multi-ethnic students in admission, and a 
complimentary upgrading plan.597
Although many of these circumstances were technical, and there were other 
colleges in Malaysia, such as the Tunku Abdul Rahman College, that did not have 
difficulties being granted university status, it did seem that New Era faced more than its 
share of obstacles. The presence of principal Kua Kia Soong—a human rights activist, 
former DAP politician, and former Internal Security Act detainee who is known for his 
very outspoken, anti-BN views—has not been helpful in resolving the controversies 
surrounding the upgrading of the New Era University establishment.
  
598
                                               
593 Sinchew, February 20, 2008. 
  
594 Ministry of Higher Education, separated from MOE on March 2004, is a full ministry responsible for 
all higher education-related matters with the aim of transforming Malaysia into a center of excellence for 
higher education. 
595 Ministry of Higher Education required that a university must have at least 20% doctorate holders and 
60% master degree holders as staff. See HLC (2010: 66). 
596 By December 2009, 15 of 34 programs received the Malaysian Qualifications Agency’s approval 
(with ten of them under provisional accreditation), and three received full accreditation from the Ministry 
of Higher Education. See HLC (2010: 242–247). 
597 Letter from Ministry of Higher Education (February 14, 2008). 
598 HLC (2002: 15).   
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Figure 5.14 Distribution of New Era College Administrative and Academic 
Staff Members by Academic Qualification (1998–
 
2009) 
Note: NA = Not Available. 
 




Most importantly, Kua took advantage of HLC’s weak organization and lack of 
experience in running an academic institution to wield an extraordinary amount of 
power in the institution, from controlling the college management and staffing to 
determining the college boards’ agenda. 599 For example, in 2003, Kua refused to 
execute the Xiamen University Nanyang Research Institute Project (
                                               
599 Interview with Chai Yah Han, January 17, 2009, Penang. 
厦门大学南洋研
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Junior                   6 8 9 
Senior                   8 9 8 
Certificate                   3 2 3 
Diploma                   27 26 19 
Bachelor                   42 39 44 
Master                   36 42 36 
PhD                   3 3 8 
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究院研究计划案), a collaborative research project initiated by the New Era Board of 
Governors.600 According to Kua, “(the project) was too expensive (RM300,000) and 
there was no real academic advantage for the college”.601 This was despite the fact that 
the board had accumulated the needed financial expenses. Quek Suan Hiang 
commented that Kua simply did not understand the sentiments and meaning for  
New Era to collaborate with Xiamen University, which was set up by the prominent 
Chinese Malayan philanthropist Tan Kah Kee (陈嘉庚 ).602
As was mentioned earlier, after Yap Sin Tian was elected as 
 
Dongzong’s 
chairman in June 2005, he worked towards regaining his constituted power as 
committee member over the executive branch. The Bock Tai Hee controversy was 
replayed when Kua reached his retirement age in 2005. Although Kua’s contract with 
New Era had been renewed on an annual basis, by 2007, his retirement plan had already 
been delayed due to inability to find a ‘suitable and qualified’ successor from among 
senior staff. Tensions escalated in April 2008 when Yap proposed to set up a human 
resource hiring committee (which consisted of two directors, the principal and two 
representatives from the college) to review the employment of a new college principal 
and senior staff members.603
The time bomb exploded a week after New Era’s tenth anniversary celebrations 
in June 2008, when 14 heads of department released a statement to the Chinese press 
condemning Yap as ‘authoritative’, and demanded college ‘autonomy’. Yap, who 
chaired the New Era College senate, had ordered them out of the meeting of the  
Board of Governors a few days prior. In actuality, these heads of departments had not 
  
                                               
600 New Era College Board of Governors consisted of seven representatives from HLC, six HLC 
appointed representatives, two representatives each from the college academics, alumnus, students, the 
college principal and deputy principal. See Dongzong (1996: 287) for details regarding the project, and 
HLC (2001: 7) for details regarding the Board’s structure. 
601 Kua KS (2009: 7–8).  
602 Interview with Quek Suan Hiang, March 23, 2010, Johore. 
603 Interview with Chew Saw Eng, February 17, 2009, Kuala Lumpur. 
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been invited to attend the meeting. A carefully-strategized plan was made to preserve 
the ‘status quo’ of the college under Kua Kia Soong in order to protect the interests of 
some of the senior academic and administrative members.604
The straw that broke the camel’s back came when Yap refused to renew Kua’s 
contract in July 2008. The ensuing internal fights were furious: more than 20 academics 
and administrative staff signed a petition in protest over Yap’s decision. Led by  
Zhan Yuan Rui* (
  
詹元瑞 ),605 Chong Joon Kin,606 Zhang Ji Zuo* (张济作 )607 and 
Liang Sheng Yi*, 608  the staff mobilized students, together with some parents, to 
conduct sit-ins. Sensing an opportunity, Yap’s political enemies also struck. They 
included Lee Ban Chen, former Dongzong chief executive officer who was dissatisfied 
with Bock’s forceful resignation in 2006, and Wong Sue Kau, 
former Dongzong treasurer (1989) who was defeated by Yap in the 1989 
Selangor Donglianhui election.609
When the attacks did not show signs of waning, movement veterans Foo Wan 
Thot, Quek Suan Hiang, Sim Mow Yu and Loot Ting Yee called for self-restraint. They 
suggested a two weeks cooling-off period, which later extended a month. They also 
appointed Khew Khing Ling (
  
丘琼润), Yoong Suan (杨泉 ), Tan Yew Sing (陈友信 ) 
and Toh Kin Woon (杜乾焕
                                               
604 Interview with Chai Yah Han, January 17, 2009, Penang; Interview with Lim Ming King, February 6, 
2009, Malacca. 
) as mediators. Lacking impartiality, the mediators failed. 
Kua and his supporters broke the ‘ceasefire’ and began a second round of attacks on 
Yap. The mediators’ report released on September 4 could not arrive at a consensus 
over critical issues such as the continuity of Kua’s contract. To make matters worse, 
605 Head, Department of Academic. He served Dongzong since 1997 and New Era College since 2004. 
606 Head, Department of Education. He served Dongzong since 1997 and New Era College since 2004.  
607 Head, Department of Public Relation and Student Affairs. He served New Era College since 2003. 
608 Head of Department of Student Enrollment. He served Dongzong since 2004 and New Era College 
since 2008. 
609 Interview with Chew Saw Eng, February 17, 2009, Kuala Lumpur. 
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Tan Yew Sing and Toh Kin Woon released a pro-Kua statement that further dented 
their credibility.610
To break the deadlock, Yang Yin Chong (
 
杨应俊 ) and Pang Siew Fian 
(冯秋 萍 ) (Malacca Donglianhui), Tew Say Kop (张志开 ) (Negeri Sembilan 
Donglianhui) and Tan Tai Kim (陈大锦) (Johore Donglianhui) called a Dongzong 
Extraordinary Delegates Meeting—the first in its history. These anti-Yap figures were 
merely seizing the opportunity to demand Yap’s resignation. Kua and his supporters 
also influenced movement veteran, Sim Mow Yu, to release a statement urging all to 
“keep the status quo until the problem has been resolved”.611
Yap successfully persuaded most of the state-level 
 
donglianhui committees to 
support his plan to constrain the power of Dongzong executive branch. In the 
first-ever Dongzong Extraordinary Delegates Meeting in November 
2008, Dongzong members voted (ten-to-three) in favor of hiring a new principal. Due 
to differences in opinion between the donglianhui chairman and some state delegates, 
the votes, which were cast in confidence by the chairman, were not necessarily 
representative of the donglianhui of the entire state. Rather they were more reflective of 
individual preferences.612
In addition, some argued that New Era was, in reality, controlled by HLC, 
which constituted an alliance between 
  
Dongzong, Jiaozong and Merdeka University 
Company. Accordingly, the results of the Extraordinary Meeting only represented the 
views of Dongzong, while those of Jiaozong and Merdeka University
                                               
610 Interview with Chai Yah Han, January 17, 2009, Penang. 
 Company had 
largely been marginalized. 
611 Sim Mow Yu press statement (September 16, 2008).  
612 Interview with Lim Ming King, February 6, 2009, Malacca. 
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The 2009 New Era crisis not only re-energized the state- and central-level 
committees, it also demonstrated the internal differences between the leaders 
of Dongzong and Merdeka University Company, with the latter (represented by  
Foo Wan Thot) calling for the continued appointment of Kua. In early November 2008, 
five heads of departments resigned on the principle of ‘death is better than life with 
humiliation’ (士可杀不可辱 )
Failed to renew his contract, Kua left New Era in December 2008.  
Pua Eng Chong (
, they included Zhan Yuan Rui, Chong Joon Kin,  
Zhang Ji Zuo and Liang Sheng Yi. 
潘永忠) became New Era’s third principal in January 2009. Pua 
worked toward acquiring the college’s necessary academic accreditation and upgrading 
the institution into a full-fledged university by taking advantage of post-2008 political 
opportunities, which included a “better relationship with Ministry of Higher 
Education”.613
The most dramatic event of the entire controversy was when former New Era 
graduate, 22–year old Lim Ken Zhi (
  
林肯智
I am not a passionate or strong supporter of Chinese education, but I 
support democracy. I did that because as a leader, (Yap) refused to meet 
or communicate with the students and New Era population. The refusal 
to communicate is also a kind of violence.
) punched and fractured Yap’s cheekbone 
while the latter was reading his speech in front of 500 students, parents, schoolteachers 
and guests at the college’s 2009 convocation. The event made national headlines. Lim 
was sentenced to two days’ imprisonment and fined RM6,000. In an interview, Lim 




                                               
613 Interview with Pua Eng Chong, February 27, 2009, Selangor. 
The Yap-Kua controversy did not end with the punch delivered by Lim. Opposition 
against Yap gradually spiraled into an anti-Yap movement within the larger Chinese 
614 Malaysiakini, July 25, 2010. 
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education movement. After successfully defeating Yap and his deputy, Chow, in the 
Kuala Lumpur Confucian’ school committee re-election in September 2008,  
Sim Teck Hwa (沈德和 )—supported by the Kuala Lumpur Confucian’s principal,  
Goh Kean Seng (吴建成)—challenged Yap’s autonomy at the Selangor Donglianhui
The third wave came in June 2009 at the national 
 
election in April 2009. Yap defended his position with suppo rt from the majority of the 
school committee members of Chinese primary schools.  
  
Dongzong re-election, where 
the anti-Yap alliance, led by the Negeri Sembilan and Malacca Donglianhui, failed 
once again to challenge Yap. At the time of this writing, with the departure of Bock, 
Kua and most of the outspoken members of the movement, Yap began to rebuild the 
Chinese education movement with his trusted team members, and hopefully, to 
establish a more inclusive, representative and internally democratic movement. 
5.15. Conclusion 
The formation of Duzhong-WC in the 1970s successfully gathered experts and 
academics from the Chinese community to revive and reform the curriculum and 
educational system for duzhong. The Dongjiaozong duzhong revival movement created 
and transformed the duzhong system into that of a popular private secondary school, 
especially in the central and southern regions of West Malaysia. It also generated 
important sustainable financial resources for Dongzong through the sales of textbooks 
and collection of UEC fees. These financial resources enabled Dongzong, as the 
caretaker of Duzhong
As 
-WC, to expand the size and strength of the Chinese education 
movement.  
Duzhong-WC grew, the need for more full-time staff also increased. Under 
the leadership of Lim Fong Seng, a group of ambitious executive staff was trained to 
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become full-time movement executives, which helped to sustain the momentum of the 
movement in the 1990s and 2000s. The movement cultivated these full-time, salaried, 
and highly-educated (university degree-holders) professional social movement 
executive communities to sustain various mobilization activities of the movement. The 
discussion in this chapter has also evidently demonstrated that, without the constraints 
of a carefully implemented structured institution, such commitments may easily be 
manipulated, resulting in the power of these executive officers outgrowing that of 
the Duzhong-WC and Dongzong
Lacking in systematic division of work and rules, the leaders of 
 central committees during the post-Lim Fong Seng 
era.  
Dongjiaozong
The top-down decision-making processes also may prevent useful input from 
the lower echelons of the organization who might construct a better and more stable 
internal system. Such dilemmas may explain the observation from this chapter that, 
despite the movement having developed the structure of a highly-hierarchical 
bureaucracy, most of its decision-making remain reliant upon an authoritative and 
top-down system.  
 
were overburdened with multiple roles within the movement that eventually put a 
noticeable strain on the effectiveness and commitment in the delivery of all these 
responsibilities. Such reliance on individual capacity rather than on a carefully planned 
and executed structured system is a common phenomenon of social movements that are 
situated within non-liberal, democratic states. Although such relaxed and flexible 
system may allow social movement leaders to deal with the less predictable non-liberal, 
democratic states promptly and effectively, the system may allow opportunists to abuse 
their close relationships with the leaders to fulfill their personal agendas.  
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Another point worth noting from this chapter is the failure of Huaxiao-WC 
despite it having adopted a similar working structure as Duzhong-WC. As discussed in 
Chapter Three, Jiaozong has been significantly weakened by the shrinking local-level 
membership and low participation rate. In an effort to revive the 
weakening Jiaozong, Huaxiao-WC was re-introduced in 1994 to assist with the 
organization’s administrative and secretariat work. Although efforts such as financial 
and human resources were injected into Huaxiao-WC, they did not solve Jiaozong’s 
fundamental problems with declining membership and lack of sustainable financial 
resources. After the departure of Lim Lian Geok Cultural Development Center 
from Jiaozong in 2004, the executive branch of Huaxiao
The system’s fragility was proven when Yap Sin Tian became 
-WC could only conduct 
non-contentious activities. Its performance today is far less attractive and exciting 
compared to the 1950s.  
Dongzong 
chairman in June 2005 and led a revolutionary transformation to strengthen the role of 
the movement central committee. Thus, the pressure to sustain and strengthen its 
relationship with the authorities in return for political assistance to upgrade New Era 
College into a full university also forced a clean up within the social movement 
organizations. Over-powerful and resistance-oriented executive officers such as  
Bock Tai Hee, Kua Kia Soong and their supporters left the movement. Many more 
neutral and talented staff members also left due to inability to adapt to the new 
leadership who saw the executive staff as ‘salaried members’ and no longer a 
companion of the movement. The internal changes disappointed many; however, in the 
opinion of the current leadership, it was the only way to secure trust from state 
authorities, and to obtain approval for the upgrade of New Era College. 
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Although the movement had now openly divided into two (or more) factions, 
there are many lessons to be learnt from the personal controversies of 2006 and 2008. It 
showed that the contemporary education movement has shifted from the simple 
demand for vernacular rights into a battleground between political parties and 
individuals who wanted to use it for personal gains.  
The controversy also demonstrated the lack of skills and mechanism for conflict 
management within the current movement institution. The New Era crisis highlighted 
the need to establish a commission of enquiries, which should be empowered to pass 
judgment effectively in arbitrating internal disputes. The selection of a third party 
should be neutral and accepted by all the conflicting parties. The results of arbitration 
should be final, and obeyed. It should not cave in to political bargaining, thus avoiding 
deterioration of already troubled relationships. 
Many movement veterans have expressed their disappointment and worry over 
the future of the movement. However, the competition for power and control over 
leadership of the movement will only intensify and become more aggressive within the 
movement’s national institutions (Dongzong, Merdeka University Company 
and Jiaozong), among its state networks (donglianhui
Movement veteran, Lee Hing, commented, “We have donated our time, money 
and effort to the Chinese education movement. In so doing, we should exercise 
self-restraint and not engage in personal politics. However, what has happened in the 
past years has been disappointing. If things get too complicated, and everyone had to 
), as well as at the school level. 
What these bickering parties failed to realize was that continued internal fighting and 
regrouping into factions would only the benefit their common antagonist—the state 
authorities—to the detriment of the movement in the long run. 
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choose a camp, then I might as well spend more time with my grandchildren at home 
than to face all this nonsense”.615
Perhaps it is time for the leaders to reflect and to review the system and 
strengthen checks and balances mechanisms. This chapter has also pointed out that the 
movement has been riding on state suppression and depending on such external 
suppression to foster solidarity among its supporters. Despite the movement’s 
successful persistence over the years, the lack of efforts in developing a better, and 
more structured institution to enhance its internal strength saw the movement troubled 
by factionalism. A successful movement should be inclusive, both internally and 
externally, to mobilize the necessary support to achieve its ultimate objectives. The 
issues of academic institutions aside, 
 
Dongjiaozong must tackle the more fundamental 
issues of installing Chinese language with the official status in the constitution, so as to 
secure its mission to protect the Chinese primary schools, support the independent 
secondary schools and develop the Chinese language tertiary education institution  
(维护华小 , 支持独中 , 发展高等教育)
                                               




Chapter Six  
Damansara Save Our School Movement 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Thus far, the thesis has discussed the construction of shared grievances, leadership 
selection through the bottom-up institution process, mobilization from the extended 
network and the role of human capital at the executive branches of the social movement 
organizations as the four key factors in the persistence of the Chinese education 
movement in Malaysia. Nevertheless, the movement has also been constrained by its 
exclusive framework, creating ethnic, social and lingual barriers that limited its 
capacity to mobilize large numbers of people to overcome state constraints. 
In order to better observe the causal dynamics of institutions in social 
mobilization, this chapter illustrates Dongjiaozong’s involvement in the Damansara 
village community resistance against the state’s closure of its community school, 
Damansara Chinese Primary School (白沙罗华文小学 , Baixiao). 616
At its peak, the SOS movement was transformed from a struggle to defend the 
community right of a local school into a Chinese minority rights to receive mother 
tongue education in a multi-cultural, Malay majority-dominated state. Focusing on the 
SOS movement that lasted from 2001 to 2008 as the empirical example, this chapter 
illustrates the processes of movement institutionalization, and the role of Dongjiaozong 
in facilitating the social mobilization for the SOS movement.  
 This 
community-initiated movement manifested itself as the Damansara Save Our School 
movement (SOS movement).  
                                               
616 The school was previously known as Overseas Chinese School (华侨华文小学) prior to its relocation 
to Damansara in 1950. 
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This chapter also demonstrates the potentials and constraints of the Chinese 
education movement’s social mobilization capacity beyond the traditional target 
audience, which has been limited to only ethnic Chinese thus far. At the early phase of 
the SOS movement, the opportunities for inter-ethnic cooperation in the achievement 
of the movement’s goals had seemed promising. However, toward the end of the SOS 
movement, any hopes of inter-ethnic cooperation in social movement became a 
far-fetched idea. This chapter will analyze the factors that led to the cessation of these 
opportunities, in the hope that it will provide a renewed perspective of the possibility of 
multi-ethnic collaboration of social movements in Malaysia.   
The seven years struggle was also sustained by financial and moral support 
from a complicated nationwide collaborative social network of Chinese community 
organizations. Moreover, throughout the SOS movement, it also received support from 
even non-Chinese-speaking and non-Chinese ethnic groups. While institutionally 
written constitution, regulations and norms shaped the framework for this type of 
collaboration, individual social capital, credibility and shared grievances fueled and 
sustained its ability to mobilize support from various communities and organizations.  
Although small in size, the SOS movement made significant claims in ballot 
box politics and successfully negotiated a compromise with the BN government, which 
eventually saw the reopening of its original premises, albeit renamed as Chung Hwa 
Damansara Chinese Primary School (白沙罗中华国民型学校) in 2008. For the SOS 
movement committees and supporters alike, the reopening of the premises proved that 
MOE had miscalculated its decision of closing the primary school in 2001. It also 
attests to the miracle of everyday resistance by underdogs against the powerful state 
and the triumph of a minority community over unjust policymaking imposed on 
Chinese schools in the country.  
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6.2. Dilemmas of Malaysia’s Chinese Schools   
Baixiao is a community school that accommodated residents of the Damansara New 
Village, both (the school and the village) are by-products of the Emergency Doctrine in 
the 1950s (as discussed in Chapter Two). The village hosts 140 families in its 15-acre 
territory.617 The village and Baixiao—surrounded by heavily populated residential and 
industrial area of Petaling Jaya district618
By the 1990s, the school was hosting more Chinese students from neighboring 
communities than from the village. As discussed in Chapter Three, the government’s 
promotion of Malay national schools has limited the development of Chinese schools in 
Malaysia since the 1970s, causing severe shortage of Chinese schools in 
Chinese-concentrated cities.
—are strategically located about 10 kilometers 
west from the city center of Kuala Lumpur.  
619 As elaborated in Figure 6.1, in Petaling Jaya, eight 
Chinese primary schools are currently hosting more than the average of 2,000 students 
per school, and the numbers continue to climb yearly.620
By 2000, Baixiao was hosting 1,463 students in its tiny 0.8 acre compound. 
With 50 students in one classroom, the school operated two sessions: senior levels in 
the morning (7 am–1 pm) and elementary levels in the afternoon (1 pm–7 pm). Four 
zinc-roofed wooden classrooms built in the 1950s had expanded into 16 classrooms 




                                               
617 Interview with Hew Wah, February 25, 2009, Selangor. 
 These expansion projects were all paid for by the school committee and 
the Chinese community through fundraising campaigns.  
618 Petaling Jaya was established since 1952 to alleviate population congestion in Kuala Lumpur. 
Petaling Jaya reached a population density of 432,619 people by 2000.   
619 Since 1970s, Chinese communities nationwide have been submitting requests to establish new 
Chinese schools, many of them willing to self-fund the cost of constructions. However, these 
applications were not approved by the MOE. 
620 Shum TK (2005). 
621 In 1976, the school has only two classrooms and one office. It was replaced by a three-storey building 
comprising nine classrooms in 1982. In 1986, a second building with 11 classrooms was completed. A 
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Figure 6.1 Distribution of Chinese Primary School Students in Petaling Jaya 
(1975–2004) 
 
Source: Compiled by the author with data extracted from Shum TK (2005). 
 
The Baixiao school committee and its parents and schoolteachers’ association were 
staffed by ‘outsiders’ who were financially and socially better off than most of the 
Damansara village communities. 622
                                                                                                                                      
student activity center was built in 1989. In 1995, the pedestrian access walkway was constructed to ease 
traffic congestion at the main door.  
 As discussed in Chapter Three, the school 
committees of Chinese schools and the parents and schoolteachers’ association were 
entrusted to safeguard the school’s interests and guide its infrastructural development. 
However, when these two institutions decided to relocate the school to a larger, newer 
622 Kuang HP (May 26, 2001). 
1975 1981 1998 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Baixiao 280 630 1,361 1,401 1,453 1,597 1,932 
Chen Moh 1,590 2,859 2,656 2,597 2,589 2,591 2,595 
Han Ming 371 367 624 1,512 1,964 2,345 2,760 
Kung Man 287 252 1,180 1,709 1,825 1,913 2,019 
Subang 638 715 716 908 1,066 1,203 1,318 
Yuk Chai 580 928 2,821 3,261 3,436 3,450 3,505 
Yuk Chyun 465 711 684 830 880 970 1,166 






















premises, the decision was made based on the welfare of the students. Sadly, it was 
made without consultation or participation from the villagers who viewed the school as 
part of the property of its community.  
An application for a new school branch in 1995 was unsuccessful. The second 
attempt in 1999 to relocate the school was approved after heavy lobbying and 
intervention by the MCA politicians. In 2000, MOE formally announced that the school 
would be relocated on grounds that the Sprint Highway, where traffic, as well as air and 
noise pollution, were hazardous, failed to provide a conducive learning environment for 
Baixiao’s students.623
However, MOE’s account contradicted the Report on Environmental Impact 
Assessment released by the Sprint Highway Company in June 1997.
  
624
Lack of formal participation in the decision-making process of the school’s 
closure, the villagers were shocked and angered when the decision was made public in 
June 2000. The strong affiliation and attachment toward Baixiao led many villagers to 
oppose the school’s closure. Some of them were members of the Baixiao alumni and 
many had participated in and supported previous fundraising campaigns for the 
school’s expansion, which included the construction of a multi-purpose center and 
indoor badminton courts, which were completed in 1999.  
 It noted that the 
noise level along Damansara road from the Western Kuala Lumpur Traffic Dispersal 
Scheme was minimal and the impact of the air quality was insignificant. More 
importantly, Baixiao was not the only school in Malaysia that faced noise and air 
pollution due to the development of its neighborhood, and therefore should not be 
‘sacrificed’ as the first to be closed down on such reasoning.  
                                               
623 Sinchew, January 19, 2001. 
624 A copy of the Sprint Highway Company Environmental Impact Assessment Report (June 1997) is 
open for public reference at the Department of Environment, Malaysia. 
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To subdue the anger of the village community and strengthen its justification, 
Baixiao’s parents and schoolteachers’ association distributed 1,450 questionnaires to 
survey parents’ views about the relocation plan. However, the biased design of the 
questionnaire requested for parental signature only if the parent agreed to the location, 
and not vice versa. Out of the questionnaires returned, 87% of parents supported the 
relocation, and 3% refused; the rest had failed to respond to the questionnaire.625 The 
survey results were more a reflection of the school’s student demographics, where 
almost 75% of the school’s students came from outside the village.626
 Most ironic in this controversial relocation project was that the Baixiao students 
were forced to share premises with Puay Chai II Chinese Primary School (培才二校) at 
Bandar Utama before the completion of the new Baixiao premises located at Tropicana 
housing area (see Map 6.1 for the location of these schools).
  
627 The rush in school 
closure was speculated by some as to make way for high-value development projects at 
the school premises and its nearby area—the ‘final piece of prime land in 
Damansara’.628 Thus, the Damansara villagers also faced uncertainty regarding the 
renewal of their housing permits and land ownership. Most villagers felt that Baixiao’s 
continued existence could prevent their homeland from being demolished to give way 
to urban development.629
Above all, MOE had yet to release any written guarantee over the status of 
school ownership or any detailed planning of the construction for the new Baixiao 
  
                                               
625 A total of 144 questionnaires were voided because they were never returned to the parents and 
schoolteachers’ association. Sinchew, October 13, 2000; Guang Ming, December 14, 2000. 
626 About 25% of the school’s students (360) were from the nearby neighborhoods while 75% (1,062) 
came from further neighborhoods. See Shum TK (2005), 
627  According to Chia Oai Peng (谢爱萍), a former member of the parents and schoolteachers’ 
association of Baixiao, the premises allocated by MOE to Baixiao was given to Puay Chai by the Deputy 
Education Minister Hon Choon Kim, resulting in Baixiao having no school premises after approval of 
relocation. Nanyang, January 15, 2001. 
628 Sinchew, February 3, 2001. 
629 Sinchew, January 15, 2001. 
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premises. Many harbored fears that Baixiao would eventually ‘disappear’, or end up 




Map 6.1 Location of Baixiao (Damansara), Baixiao (Tropicana), Puay Chai 




6.3. Damansara Save Our School Movement Committee 
Damansara villagers who opposed Baixiao’s closure, led by Lee Sang (李生 ),  
Wong Kim Foong (黄金凤) and Lai Chong Kong (赖仲光) approached the two 
                                               









supporters of the relocation, namely Baixiao school committee and MCA Member of 
Parliament (MP) of Petaling Jaya, Chew Mei Fun (周美芬) (1999–2008) to negotiate 
for Baixiao’s reopening, but to no avail.631
In order to overcome these disadvantages, the villagers then turned to 
opposition party DAP politician Ronnie Liu Tian Khiew (刘天球) who later assisted 
them to form the Damansara New Village School Relocation Opposition Action 
Committee (反对共校保留白小原校争取建分校委员会 ).
 These villagers were perceived as underdogs 
due to their financial and social disadvantages. Such an asymmetrical relationship 
limited the villagers’ ability to engage or pressure the more powerful and influential 
school committees or politicians to listen to their demands.  
632
Despite villagers’ protest, Baixiao was officially shut down in January 2001. 
The first day of school on January 3, 2001 saw about 100 students gather at the 
premises of Damansara to demand the reopening of their school, which was 
well-equipped with functioning facilities. Their parents held the protest in front of the 
school, demanding justification for its closure.
 The movement 
committee was renamed as the Committee for Maintaining the School’s Original 
Premises and Seizing the New School Branch (白小保留原校, 争取分校工作委员会), 
better known to the public as Damansara Save Our School Movement Committee 
(SOSC). The change in title marked the transformation from a passive opposition to a 
progressive claim that emphasizes the relocated Baixiao at the Tropicana site as an 
extension, and not a replacement. 
633
                                               
631 Nanyang, November 7, 2000. 
 By late January, only less than 5% of 
the total school student population, or 67 students (all are from the village) remained 
632 Nanyang, December 11, 2000. 
633 Nanyang, January 4, 2001. 
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firm against the relocation.634 The exclusion of outsiders escalated the event into a 
struggle between the Damansara new village community against the BN regime.635
Most villagers who participated in SOSC were working-class commoners and 
amateurs to social movement prior to the SOS movement. Many, including the 
authorities, had expected the movement to dissolve when the issues faded from public 
and media interest, and its resources run out. In fact, in 2000, the SOS movement was 
more of an ad-hoc group focused on day-to-day struggles.  
 
SOSC gradually gained institutional strength in January 2001, with 
participation from various experienced politicians such as Ronnie Liu, and social 
activists such as Bock Tai Hee and Tang Ah Chai who acted as the movement’s 
advisors and utilized their wide networks to mobilize resources for the movement.636
The sense of injustice generated from the closure of Baixiao drew support from 
Chinese communities (both Chinese and non-Chinese-speaking alike) and non-Chinese 
ethnic groups.
 
Ronnie Liu was the chairman of Selangor DAP; Bock Tai Hee was the chief executive 
officer of Dongzong; and Tang Ah Chai was the chief executive officer of the SCAH. 
637 Chinese educationalists such as Dongzong Chairman Quek Suan 
Hiang, Jiaozong Vice Chairman Loot Ting Yee, and Chinese community leaders such 
as SCAH Chairman Ting Chee Seng, SCAH Secretary Chan Chin Chee (陈正志), and 
members from SCAH’s Language and Education Committee and Civic Rights 
Committee lent their strong support to 
                                               
634 Interview with Wong Chin Lee, July 28, 2010, Selangor. 
the movement. Other warm-hearted and 
enthusiastic individuals such as Choong Pai Chee (庄白绮), Ling Chia Nien (林嘉年), 
Wong Cheng Yoke (黄祯玉), Ong See Yong (翁诗佣), Wong Chin Lee (黄真莉), 
635 Number of students decreased from 131 in January 5 to 71 students by end of January 2001. 
636 Nanyang, January 5, 2001. 
637 A total of 3,068 Malay supporters signed the support Baixiao petition, see Sinchew, February 19, 2001 
(b). Representatives from the University Malaya Muslim Students Association also visited Baixiao, see 
Sinchew, February 9, 2001 (b). 
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Yong Kai Ping (杨凯斌 ), Sivarasa Rasiah 638
In order to accommodate students who refused the relocation to continue their 
studies, SOSC started a makeshift school in the Ruan Liang Temple (阮梁圣公庙) 
located next to the school (about 25 meters away) and held their first lessons on January 
16, 2001. The first few months were chaotic. The temporary school shelter used pieces 
of cloth as a ‘wall’ between classrooms.
 and Latifah Koya were also key 
contributors to the strengthening of SOSC in 2001.  
639 Due to uncertainties they faced regarding 
the movement’s length and scale, both SOSC and the temple school were unable to 
devise any sustainable long-term plan. 640  Financial resources were scarce, the 
movement’s directions were vague, and many who participated in the SOSC had hoped 
that the school would reopen in the short term—if not, in a few months’ time.641
SOSC’s movement repertoires at this early stage were impromptu, and lacked 
any planned schedule or strategy. Therefore, most of them failed without any 
significant impact.
  
642  The villagers, supporters and schoolchildren took turns to 
conduct sit-in strikes at government ministries (such as MOE) and especially at the 
headquarters of BN Chinese political parties, MCA and Gerakan.643 Although these 
approaches made the Chinese newspapers headlines, the ruling regime and its 
component parties saw no need to negotiate with SOSC, and simply ignored the 
villagers’ demands.644
                                               
638 Sivarasa Rasiah was an active PKR member and he won the Subang parliamentary seat in the 2008 
General Election. 
  
639 Sponsored by Kam Kei (金记), a food catering company, this type of temporary shelters are widely 
use by Malaysians as temporary extensions of the house to host parties or dinners. Nanyang, January 17, 
2001.  
640 Interview with Tang Ah Chai, February 23, 2009, Kuala Lumpur. 
641 Interview with Cheng Yok Hoon, February 23, 2009, Kuala Lumpur. 
642 Interview with Choong Pai Chee, February 24, 2009, Selangor. 
643 China Press, February 9, 2001. 
644 China Press and Sinchew, January 16, 2001; China Press, January 30 and 31, February 8, 2001; 
Sinchew, February 9, 2001. 
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SOSC’s petition to the National Human Rights Commission of Malaysia 
(Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi Malaysia) to demand the reopening of Baixiao under the right 
for community education was not followed up by SOSC due to a lack of strategic 
planning. Pahang DAP Women’s Wing Chairman Tuw Ah Mei (涂亚眉 ) who 
sympathized with the movement conducted a two week hunger strike at the SCAH 
headquarters but ended her strike due to lack of support from SOSC and deteriorating 
health. 645  About 160,000 signatures were collected from the public (15% from 
non-Chinese supporters) in support of reopening the school; however, these signatures 
were left unused.646
As the SOS movement progressed into its first anniversary, SOSC began to 
develop a more sustainable short-term strategy, and improved its organization’s 
operations as the movement gained pace. Organizational reforms mirroring 
Dongzong’s working culture of checks and balances were introduced to enhance the 
administrative management of the movement’s organization. In order to expand 
villagers’ and school parents’ participation in SOSC, almost everyone was given a 
position during the 2002 SOSC election, forming the largest committee number in 
SOSC’s history. Members of the committee were allocated into working groups with 
specific responsibilities, marking the first signs of professionalization and 
systematization.
 All these repertoires would have had more impact if the movement 
had been guided by a better-planned and more established institution.  
647 Beginning from May 2002, regular and systematic meetings were 
scheduled weekly (on Wednesdays) to evaluate the movement’s achievements and 
discuss strategies to achieve its desired objectives and targets.648
                                               
645 Baixiao internal documents, source courtesy of Baixiao Executive Secretary Lim Jian An. Data was in 
Chinese and translated into English by the author.  
  
646 Guang Ming, March 28, 2001. 
647 Interview with Bock Tai Hee, February 8, 2009, Malacca. 
648 Interview with Choong Pai Chee, February 24, 2009, Selangor. 
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Thus, Dongzong’s full intervention by 2002 not only strengthened SOSC as a 
social movement organization, but also played a crucial role in sustaining and 
continuing the struggle, both financially and organizationally. Indeed, Dongzong’s 
involvement cannot be taken for granted in spite of its reputation as the pioneering 
defender of Chinese education in Malaysia. Jiaozong’s Chairman Ong Kow Ee had 
strongly opposed the participation of schoolteachers or retired principals in the temple 
school, 
They (schoolteachers) are not authorized by the MOE to teach in the 
temporary school. This has violated the regulations governing 
schoolteachers... Donglianhui should not assign people to teach at the 
temple school. This will only worsen the current situation.649
 
  
With Ong’s resistance, Jiaozong remained distant from the SOS movement 
institutionally, but allowed the participation of its executive staff in the temple school’s 
curriculum and administrative affairs. The SOS movement was historical as it was the 
first time Dongzong was directly involved in a movement at the local level. The rapid 
escalation of the Baixiao controversy from a community conflict into a national issue, 
the failure of Selangor Donglianhui (who also opposed the school’s relocation) to 
reconcile with the Baixiao school committee and MCA, and the fear of this as another 
way of diminishing Chinese schools forced Dongzong to intervene.650 The decision was 
also supported by Dongzong members—the state-level donglianhui—who issued press 
statements that criticized MCA’s failure to protect the rights of the Chinese community 
by closing down Baixiao.651
                                               
649 Sinchew, January 5, 2001. 
  
650 Nanyang, December 31, 2000; Selangor and Kuala Lumpur Donglianhui press statements (December 
30, 2000, January 17 and March 2, 2001); Interview with Quek Suan Hiang, March 23, 2010, Johore. 
651 See press statements issued by the following organizations: Johore Donglianhui (January 31, 2001); 
Penang Donglianhui (March 3, 2001); Penang Donglianhui and Other Penang Chinese Education 
Organizations (February 18, 2001); Pahang Donglianhui (February 15 and 17, 2001);  
Kedah Donglianhui (February 15 and 25, 2001). 
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Most importantly, as argued in this thesis, relational institutions, especially the 
individual commitments of influential activists such as Bock and Tang, were crucial to 
Dongzong’s engagement in SOSC. News about the SOS movement was disseminated 
through Dongzong’s website, and SOSC was invited to, and included, in most of 
Dongzong’s activities. One of the most significant moves in January 2002 was the 
formal appo intment of Dongzong as the sole trustee of SOSC’s donation funds and 
bank account for greater accountability and transparency. With increasing public 
donations pouring into the SOSC foundation, this move boosted the community’s 
confidence that donations would be counterchecked. Moreover, Bock also utilized his 
power as Dongzong’s chief executive officer to place a full-time salaried administrative 
secretary in SOSC to facilitate between Dongzong and SOSC, administrate 
documentation, handle the gap management between SOSC and the temple school, and 
process SOSC’s requests for financial and resources from Dongzong.   
However, the overwhelming influence of Dongzong also narrowed SOSC’s 
inclusiveness. From a frame of injustice and community rights in 2001, SOSC began to 
identify itself as a struggle for the survival of a Chinese primary school struggle at the 
beginning of 2002. The change in the way it framed its cause had the effect of 
distancing many non-Chinese-speaking participants from directly participating in 
SOSC.  
In 2003, SOSC leaders faced their first major internal faction when they decided 
to depoliticize the movement and terminate Ronnie Liu’s position as the movement’s 
advisor. Although Liu and his DAP political influence were credited for the formation 
of SOSC, the influence of opposition parties such as DAP and Parti Keadilan Rakyat 
(PKR) in SOSC were attacked by BN politicians who sought to decertify the 
movement. Criticisms such as “SOSC is a tool of the opposition party to attack 
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MCA”652 and “Baixiao events had been politicized by the DAP”653 dominated the 
media and distanced support from a politically neutral public. 654 Liu’s supporters 
within SOSC, such as Chin Keh Kong (陈国光), Wong Yau King (黄耀庆) and  
Wong Yew Kong (王友光), were visibly upset about Liu’s termination. Although Chin 
and the Wongs remained in SOSC after Liu’s termination, they became antagonistic 
and were perceived as troublemakers within SOSC. Chin, who was also the headman 
for the village, utilized his position to garner support by sending damaging short 
messages from his mobile phone to members listed in SOSC’s contact list to express his 
grievances from time to time.655
 The number of supporters who came forward to offer help reached its peak in 
2003 and slowly declined after that. SOSC began to experience a bottleneck in 2004, 
especially after BN’s astounding victory, capturing almost 90% of the Parliamentary 
seats in the 2004 General Election. This came as a big blow to the opposition parties 
and their supporters. The lack of renewal of the topic for mobilization also resulted in 
waning support from the opposition parties and many villagers.
  
656
From 2004 onwards, only about 50 villagers stood firmly with the movement. 
The deteriorating turnout prompted SOSC to adapt and develop a long-term plan to 
sustain the movement and the temple school. To enhance community mobilization, 
SOSC created a variety of activities to sustain the spirit of the people and its mobilizing 
capacity. This included activities aiming to enhance the social awareness of the 
villagers, such as training classes and movies. Outdoor activities such as hiking, 
running, family days and holiday group tours aimed at fostering bonds among 
  
                                               
652 Sinchew, January 6 and February 18 (b), 2001. 
653 China Press, January 26, 2001; Sinchew, March 20, 2001. 
654 Sinchew, January 6, 2001; Nanyang, February 15, 2001; Sinchew, February 18, 2001. 
655 Interview with Choong Pai Chee, February 24, 2009, Selangor; Interview with Wong Chin Lee, 
February 25, 2009, Selangor. 
656 Guo PY (2005). 
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supporters were also organized. 657
In addition, programs such as counseling, health seminars and peer-sharing 
sessions targeted specific groups were conducted. For instance, small groups of Mulan 
and Peter Pan were formed; the former was a parent-child reading club that encouraged 
parents to share their passion for reading with their children below six years old, while 
the latter was a tuition class for Baixiao students to learn computing and English. From 
2007, SOSC’s monthly administrative meetings became more content- and update- 
focused. SOSC also conducted monthly birthday celebrations to build good 
relationships among the committee members, schoolteachers, students and the villagers. 
All these activities were conducted at the temple school, which was also a gathering 
point for the villagers to receive updates about the movement.
 Participants in these activities paid minimal 
registration fees, while SOSC utilized donated funds to subsidize most of the costs.  
658
SOSC’s transformation throughout the life span of the movement was apparent 
to observers. The first transformation was that of ordinary, poorly-educated individuals 
mobilizing themselves and others to defend their rights. Like many ordinary citizens in 
Malaysia, these supporters had, for the greater part of their lives, feared the police and 
avoided involvement in state- or politics- related controversies. Most of them had been 
unaware of the existence of Dongjiaozong, the perils of Chinese education in Malaysia, 
or the concept of human rights prior joining SOSC.  
 
Many SOSC members had received only a few years of formal education. 
SOSC Chairman Yong Yoke Song, for example, did not even graduate from primary 
school. By participating in the movement, members of SOSC from the Damansara 
villager had learned to host weekly work meetings, plan publicity activities, conduct 
and chair press conferences, manage financial accounts and deliver seminar speeches, 
                                               
657 Penang (December 2001), Kelantan (2003), Cameron Highland (July 2006) and Cherating Beach, 
Pahang (August 2007). Most of these trips lasted two days and one night. 
658 Dongzong (2008: 44). 
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and above all, many of them improved their command of the Chinese language 
considerably in the process of being involved in the movement.  
Participation in the SOS movement was on daily basis. Students’ parents such 
as Chow Ba Mei* (周八妹) participated through daily visits to the school, assisting in 
cooking meals for school students and staff at the temple school, facilitating and 
maintaining the cleanliness of the temple school, joining SOSC to distribute brochures 
during by-elections, and helping to sell donated items during fundraising campaigns. 
Thus, the simple desire to ensure that the Chinese education remained accessible for the 
next generation, has compelled these ordinary individuals to rise to the challenge of 
involving themselves in a movement that has indeed made a difference to the future of 
Chinese in Malaysia.659
Perhaps the most significant reminder of the movement was the huge billboard 
at the front entrance of SCAH at Maharajalela Road in Kuala Lumpur’s city center, 
which mirrors the billboard placed at the temple school. Installed since March 2001, it 
recorded the number of days of closure of the original Baixiao. Despite political 
pressure from various parties, SCAH Chairman Ngan Ching Wen (颜清文 , 
1997–2001), Ting Chee Seng (2001–2003) and Bong Hon Liong (黄汉良, 2003–2008) 
reiterated their firm support for Baixiao’s reopening by resisting the removal of the 





6.4. Institution Design and Constraints     
As shown in Figure 6.2, the SOS movement was constituted by SOSC and the temple 
school; it had a hybrid organizational structure of a Chinese school and huatuan. The 
procedural and structural designs closely followed the regulations and constitutions 
                                               
659 Interview with Hew Hwa, February 25, 2009, Selangor. 
660 Interview with Tang Ah Chai, February 23, 2009, Kuala Lumpur. 
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commonly practiced by huatuan in Malaysia. However, the basis of membership was a 
sponsorship system typical of a Chinese school in Malaysia. The temple school hosted 
the Annual Sponsors Meeting every year.  
 
Figure 6.2 SOSC and Baixiao Temple School Organizations 
 
Source: The author. 
 
Sponsors were the primary members of the school and had the right to nominate, 
second a motion, to vote and to be voted. Sponsorship was open to the public in 2001 
but thereafter, SOSC began to implement stricter rules in order to prevent phantom 
sponsors or political sponsors from interfering with the school’s development or 
sabotage the movement. From 2002 onwards, a sponsor had to fulfill at least one of the 
following requirements to qualify and register as a sponsor of the school:661
1. Already a sponsor after Baixiao’s Damansara premises was closed. 
  
2. Resident of Damansara New Village. 
3. Parent of students enrolled in the temple school.   
4. Alumni of Baixiao (Damansara). 
5. Teacher or principal of the temple school. 
                                               


















The selection of SOSC followed the set of rules and process of institution design—and 
incorporated elements—widely used by Chinese education movement and huatuan in 
Malaysia alike. This process not only provided legitimacy to SOSC’s tenure of power, 
it also affirmed the democratic elements of the movement through the carefully 
conducted electoral process to ensure fair and free competition among members. 
Although the number of candidates may be small, and many of them were not equipped 
with high academic qualifications, this system induced credibility and ensured the 
reliability of the internal structure by making sure that SOSC was led by the most 
appropriate person. The oath of office ceremony was, in a traditional and symbolic 
way, the platform through which the community gave its recognition, blessings, and 
support to new committees. For example, the dates and procedures of the SOSC 
election held at the temple school are described below:662
1. Nomination period: June 25 to July 7, 2003. Sponsors could nominate potential 
nominees. For example, in 2003, a total of 32 nominees were named, but only 21 of 
them were eventually selected into the committee. In 2006, 15 committee members 
were selected from 17 nominees. 
 
2. Vote counting: July 9, 2003. Votes were counted publicly before being sealed. The 
vote sealing process was monitored by representatives of Dongjiaozong and 
SCAH.  
3. Vote casting day: July 16, 2003. Sponsors casted their votes. The result was 
announced on the same night. The top 21 nominees who received the highest votes 
were elected into the committee. This was also the day when all sponsors gathered 
and passed the Baixiao progress reports and financial reports of 2005 and 2006, 
and the Baixiao Committee Sponsors General Regulations. 
                                               
662 Baixiao Annual Reports (2001–2008). 
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4. Committee members were elected by sponsors’ votes during the Annual Sponsors 
Meeting.  
5. Secondary election (复选): July 22, 2003. The 21 elected members decided the 
assignment of office-bearers among themselves.  
6. An Oath of Office Ceremony by the new committee concluded the formality. The 
ceremony was witnessed by representatives from Dongzong and major Chinese 
organizations that had taken care of Baixiao events. This annual event was among 
the few that continued to receive attention from the Chinese media. Despite this, 
not all important figures invited were willing to grace this ceremony. The event on 
December 1, 2004 to inaugurate the 2004–2006 SOSC committee members was 
inspected by Dongzong Chairman Quek Suan Hiang, Jiaozong Vice Chairman 
Loot Ting Yee and SCAH Chairman Bong Hon Liong.  
 
6.5. The Temple School 
Beyond SOSC, the other main component of the SOS movement was the temple 
school. The temple school began to operate from January 16 after the police forcefully 
sealed the Baixiao (Damansara) premises by cutting off water and electricity 
supplies—officially ceasing its operation—and warned of detaining all trespassers.663
The temple school was led by a retired Chinese primary school principal and 
long-term Jiaozong activist, Ong See Yong (翁诗佣 ), who bravely took up the 
 
All the students stranded at the Damansara premises were moved to the makeshift 
school in the Ruan Liang Temple located about 10 meters away from the Damansara 
premises. A unique feature of the temple school was its mix of schoolteachers from 
various backgrounds and holding different qualifications.  
                                               
663 Nanyang, January 13, 2001. 
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responsibility of running the controversial school as a Baixiao principal (2001–2005). 
Others who offered their help in establishing the temple school were mostly untrained 
volunteers from Dongjiaozong’s executive branch and fresh graduates from local 
universities. The former were the key persons in the educational administrative affairs 
team, comprising PKR politician Lee Kim Sim ( 李成金 ), Jiaozong Chief 
Administrative Secretary Yow Lee Fung, head of Dongzong Department of Teachers’ 
Training Wong Cheng Yoke, head of Dongzong Department of Publication  
Zeng Qing Fang* (曾庆方 ) and head of Dongzong Department of Meeting and 
Organization Zhang Xu Zhuang* (张绪庄). Their prior experiences in the Chinese 
education movement and in the duzhong management were crucial in ensuring the 
sustainability of the temple school’s administrative and academic curriculum.  
The latter, consisted of university and college graduates who filled in as 
short-term schoolteachers for the temple school especially in 2001. 664  As many 
schoolteachers were helping on a voluntarily basis, there was high turnover, which in 
turn affected the students’ academic development and progress. The part-time basis and 
high turnover of these volunteers were criticized by MCA as “detrimental to the future 
of the schoolchildren”. 665 At the end of February 2001, MOE threatened to expel 
students who refused to move into the new premises.666
In order to provide a more comfortable and conducive environment for the 
students, five air-conditioned containers-turned-classrooms and a makeshift stage for 
 Nevertheless, this failed to 
shake the parents’ determination, but highlighted instead the need to establish a more 
sustainable temple school as their resistance against the state.  
                                               
664 China Press, May 4, 2001. 
665 Sinchew, February 26, 2001; Interview with Wong Chin Lee, March 25, 2008, Selangor. 
666 Sinchew, February 26, 2001 (b); The Sun, March 3, 2001. 
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the school’s daily assembly were installed in March 2001.667 Two months later, MOE 
issued warning letters to Principal Ong and the chairman of Ruan Liang Temple and 
demanded them to terminate the illegal school operation. However, there was no 
follow-up action from the state after the warning, and thus the temple school survived 
its first difficult year successfully.668
In order to enhance students’ academic performance, the school implemented a 
full-day curriculum in 2002, with formal curriculum in the morning, and supplementary 
activities such as tuition and extra curriculum activities (chess, calligraphy and so on) 
in the afternoon.
   
669  Albeit having limited financial resources, permanent 
schoolteachers were hired in early 2002 and sent to Dongzong’s schoolteachers’ 
training program to be trained in classroom management, teaching administration, 
curriculum preparation and academic reporting.670
The schoolteachers of the temple school received modest subsidies, some as 
low as RM20 per day. This paled in comparison to the rate offered to schoolteachers in 
government-subsidized schools, which was between RM300 to slightly more than 
RM400. Moreover, Baixiao schoolteachers did not enjoy benefits of the  
Employees Provident Fund, among other benefits, like their counterparts in 
government-subsidized schools. Nevertheless, as most of these volunteer 
schoolteachers who stayed on were movement sympathizers, many understood the 
school’s financial difficulties and did not mind these disadvantages. 
  
However, many schoolteachers that joined the temple school after 2003 were 
less enthusiastic about the movement and saw Baixiao merely as an alternative teaching 
experience in a non-mainstream school, and refused to participate in movement-related 
                                               
667 Sinchew, March 8, 2001; Huang ZY (2006: 198–199).  
668 Sinchew, May 6, 2001. 
669 Baixiao Annual Report (2002). 
670 Interview with Wong Chin Lee, February 25, 2009, Selangor. 
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activities. Although the teachers’ allowance was increased to about RM1,300 per 
month, with medical benefits provided by Dongzong, most schoolteachers of the 
temple school left in less than two years often due to better job offers elsewhere.671
The school thus imposed new rules, starting from 2004, requiring all 
schoolteachers to commit their service to the school for a minimum of one year in order 
to sustain the academic development and performance of their students. Despite the 
above mentioned challenges, Baixiao temple school managed to attain a sustainable 
average of 12 full-time teaching staff and was the only school in Malaysia that was fully 
staffed by university-qualified schoolteachers, as detailed in Figure 6.3.  
  
 




Source: Compiled by the author with data extracted from SOSC (2005: 13). 
                                               
671 Interview with Wong Chin Lee, March 25, 2008, Selangor. 
School Principal: Ong See Yong (翁诗佣) 
Head of School Administrative: Wong Chin Lee (黄真莉), Rahman College, 
Bachelor of Communication (2001). 
Head of Student Diciplinery Affairs: Tan Siang Chen (陈香琴), Universiti Sains 
Malaysia, Bachelor of Communication (2004). 
Head of Students Affairs: Ling Chia Nien (林嘉年), Taiwan Tamkang University, 
Bachelor of Chinese Literature (1997). 
Schoolteachers: 
1. Zeng Qing Cai* (曾庆财), Taiwan National Chengkung University, Bachelor of 
Science in Chemistry Engineering (1987). 
2. Du Chun Mao* (杜春茂), National Taiwan Normal University, Bacherlor of 
Fine Arts (1995). 
3. Li Jia Zhi* (李嘉芝), University of Malaya, Bachelor of Education (2005). 
4. Chen Pi Hua* (陈碧华), New Era College, Bachelor of Communication (2005). 
5. Ting Shu Yun* (丁淑韵), New Era College, Bachelor of Communication 
(2005). 
6. Li Min Guang* (李明光), New Era College, Bachelor of Communication 
(2005). 




Throughout the movement’s seven years of endurance, the temple school also faced a 
student enrolment problem and a difficulty in enrolling students for the national 
examination. Although all student intakes of the Baixiao temple school from 2001 to 
2004 were mostly from Damansara village, Baixiao suffered a plunge in its student 
enrolment in 2003 (Figure 6.4).  
 
Figure 6.4 Distribution of Baixiao Student Enrollment (2001–
 
2008) 




All student intakes of the Baixiao temple school in the first phase (2001–2004) were 
from Damansara village. The small size of the temple school population made it 
possible for schoolteachers to pay greater attention to their pupils in class and outside 
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school. Students were given equal opportunities to be the class monitor, and to take 
turns to be the ‘tour guide’ to introduce the ‘school’ to visitors.672
Schoolteachers made home visits outside school hours to help parents better 
understand the needs of their child and provide advice on dealing with their child’s 
learning and behavioral difficulties, especially disciplinary problems such as low 
attendance rates and poor academic performance. In return, parents, especially from the 
Damansara village, began to participate in various SOSC or school-related activities; 
for example, some parents were responsible for preparing meals for students and 
schoolteachers, while others provided free transportation for SOSC during activities.  
  
 
Figure 6.5 Distribution of Baixiao Graduates in Different Types of Secondary 
Schools (2001–2008) 
 
Source: Compiled by the author with data extracted from Baixiao Annual Reports 
(2001–
                                               
672 Huang ZY (2006: 200–201, 207). 
2008). 
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6.6. Defending the School Premises 
As a reminder of the ultimate aim for the SOS movement, each year, the school insisted 
on hosting a School Term Opening Ceremony at the Damansara premises. The 
ceremony took less than an hour and the repertoire was brief. The school students were 
assembled to sing the national anthem and school anthem, together with the raising of 
the national, state and school flags; the event was usually concluded by a speech by the 
principal. Attempts to host the ceremony at the ‘sealed’ school premises had been 
eventful.  
In 2002, police prevented SOSC from entering the premises and threatened to 
arrest anyone who tried to do so. As a result, the ceremony was conducted at the school 
gate instead.673 Subsequently in 2003, MOE continued to reject SOSC’s request to 
open the school premises although the police force was not activated. SOSC forced its 
entry into the school.674 Although MOE continued to prohibit the SOSC from entering 
the school, there was hardly any follow-up action, so SOSC went ahead to enter the 
school premises by force to host the ceremony every year from 2003 onwards. SOSC’s 
persistence was rewarded when, as late as in January 2008, MOE, for the first time, 
voluntarily opened the school door and allowed the ceremony to take place in the 
school premises officially. 675
 Prior to the school reopening in 2009, the process to defend Baixiao premises 
was fraught with challenges. In December 2003, Selangor Education Department 
attempted to transform the abandoned Damansara Baixiao premises into a state storage 
warehouse. Five trucks tried to unload 250 boxes of old official documents into the 
 A year after that, Baixiao premises was reopened in 
January 2009.  
                                               
673 China Press, January 8, 2002. 
674 Oriental, January 6, 2004; China Press, January 4, 2006. 




 Even Mother Nature tested the Baixiao movement: a rainstorm devastated the 
temple school in May 2006. Remembered as the worst natural disaster during the 
movement, punishing winds uprooted a 70-year old giant banyan tree in the temple 
compound and flipped 60% of the school’s zinc roof, drenching most of the temple 
school facilities.
 The villagers managed to prevent the unloading process by 
summoning the Chinese press and scaring away the workers. MOE merely paid lip 
service when SOSC sought an explanation over the ploy. 
677  SOSC placed students temporarily at the abandoned school 
premises while repairing the temple school’s facilities. With help from the Damansara 
village community and public donations totaling RM22,700, SOSC successfully 
repaired the facilities and resumed normal school activities for all students in the temple 
school a few days later.678
Perhaps the more worrying threat was that coming from the Petaling Jaya 
Development Plan 1 (Draf Cadangan Pengubahan dan Rancangan Tempatan Petaling 
Jaya 1) released in April 2002. Damansara New Village was included as the potential 
redevelopment area and it worried the SOSC and the villagers that the school and the 
villagers’ homes would be swallowed by the wave of urban development. In reaction, 
SOSC mobilized about 100 villagers to sign a memorandum of objection in May 2002.  
 
SOSC also expanded its sphere of influence by participating actively in the 
Petaling Jaya resident associations and built networks with other residents, especially 
those from higher socio-economic backgrounds.679
                                               
676 China Press, December 13, 2003; Sinchew, December 20, 2003. 
 SOSC’s strong protest against the 
revised draft of the Petaling Jaya Development Plan (released in May 2005), which 
changed the status of Baixiao premises from a reserved site for educational 
677 Nanyang and Sinchew May 5, 2006; China Press, May 6, 2006. 
678 Sinchew, May 10, 2006; Baixiao Annual Report (2006). 
679 China Press, June 4, 2005; Sinchew, September 1, 2005. 
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development into an urban redevelopment site, led to Petaling Jaya Town Council 
reverting the change of land status in March 2006. 680
 
 
6.7. Encountering the Police Force  
The SOS movement remained non-violent throughout its struggle. Although the 
Federal Reserve Unit and police force were placed on standby outside the temple in 
January and February 2001, physical clashes did not materialize. The villagers use 
various ‘weapons of the weak’681
Reactions from the authorities were more off to warn away these protestors.  
The police began arresting SOS movement supporters in February 2001: four parents 
who staged a sit-in at the MOE were arrested for illegal assembly; two parents staged a 
hunger strike outside the Transport Ministry were chased away by security guards; 
forty-seven ‘jog and support Baixiao’ participants were arrested;
 to demonstrate their determination in defending the 
school, such as shaving their hair, staging sit-ins at government offices, and taking 
turns to guard the school premises.  
682 six Tunku Abdul 
Rahman College students who collected signatures in support of Baixiao were warned 
against ‘illegal assembly’. 683
 Arrests reduced in the following year. After 2002, the police sent only a 
minimal number of officers to observe major events that took place at the temple 
school, such as the annual School Opening Ceremony, 500
 However, all of them were released after a brief warning.   
th day anniversary 
celebration and 2002 annual dinner.684
 
  
                                               
680 Oriental and Sinchew, June 3, 2005; Nanyang, September 2, 2005; Baixiao Annual Report (2006). 
681 Scott (1985). 
682 Sinchew, February 19, 2001. 
683 SOS Damansara Bulletin 1 (2001: 6); Sinchew, February 19, 2001.  
684 Sinchew, May 15, 2002. 
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6.8. Media Coverage 
Media, especially Chinese newspapers and television news programs, covered the 
Baixiao controversy extensively in the first quarter of 2001. Chinese language 
newspapers, in particular, have been relying on the Chinese-speaking communities as 
their target group of consumer. The impact of such coverage on the Baixiao events was 
overwhelming especially in the early phase (December 2000–April 2001) of the 
movement. Closely studied by the author, most of the coverage framed the issues as 
injustice, anger, chaos, and helplessness, splashing the pages with images of the 
Damansara villagers and Baixiao students portrayed as the victims of the school 
closure. The effectiveness of the framing strategy was seen in the spike in donations 
flowing from various Chinese communities and the number of readers that wrote to the 
press to condemn the BN regime. 
As demonstrated in figures 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8, the Baixiao-related news coverage 
from 2000 until 2009 by three major Chinese newspapers in Malaysia (Sinchew Daily, 
Nanyang Shangpao and China Press) showed a shared pattern. There was outstanding 
news coverage on Baixiao events in the headlines, national news, regional news and 
columns sections of these newspapers in January 2001, and strong follow-up coverage 
until March 2001. Beginning from April 2001, reduced coverage on Baixiao issues 
suggests that there may be state suppression of the media.685
                                               




Figure 6.6 Newspaper Coverage on Baixiao in the Headlines Section (2000–2009) 
 













































































































































































































































Figure 6.7 Newspaper Coverage on Baixiao in the National News Section (2000–2009) 
 
















































































































































































































































Figure 6.8 Newspaper Coverage on Baixiao in the Regional News and Columns Sections (2000–2009) 
 




























































































































































































































































State interference were confirmed when an informant, who was also a senior media 
worker who wished to remain anonymous, informed the author that the state, through 
MCA, did exert political pressure on the chief editors of the various news agencies to 
reduce and minimize their coverage on Baixiao news. 686  Since then, only news 
benefiting the BN regime were reported. For instance, the completion of the Baixiao 
(Tropicana) construction in September 2001 was widely covered by the press in the 
headlines sections of the local newspapers. Concurrently, news on the original campus 
at Damansara was downgraded from the national sections to the regional sections of the 
newspapers, and occupied much smaller columns than previously.687
As coverage faded out, the public assumed the issue had been resolved.
  
688
In mid-2001, SOSC began to publish its own newspaper, the Baixiao 
Newspaper (白小报报 ), as an alternative to disseminate information about the 
movement to the public. Ten volumes were published in the first two years, but the 
number was gradually reduced to six volumes in 2003 and three volumes each in 2004 
and 2005 due to the lack of manpower and resources to sustain the publication. 
 In a 
bid to keep public support alive, SOSC organized more press conferences  
(20 conferences in 2002) and released more press statements (10 statements in 2002). 
Nevertheless, these efforts did not bear fruit. By 2006, there was a total blackout on 
Baixiao news in all Chinese newspapers. Thereafter, Baixiao relied on internet-based 
media, such as Malaysiakini and Merdeka Review to reach out to the public. In 
particular, Malaysiakini’s Chinese Editor, Yong Kai Ping, a former SOSC committee 
member, and Merdeka Review’s Huang Wen Da* (黄文达), a former SOSC head of 
student affairs, provided much needed space for Baixiao in the political news website.  
                                               
686 Interview with Chen MM, March 16, 2008, Selangor.  
687 China Press, Kwongwah, Nanyang and Sinchew, September 20, 2001.  
688 Interview with Choong Pai Chee, February 24, 2009, Selangor. 
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The printed media only resumed publication of news on Baixiao in January 
2007 as the general election approached. After the 2008 General Election, non-Chinese 
media, such as The Star (a newspaper controlled by MCA), New Straits Times, and 
Utusan Malaysia (controlled by UMNO affiliated Malaysian Resources Corporation) 
began to report about the progress of the school’s reopening in the national news 
sections of their respective newspapers.  
Table 6.1 shows the few, but nevertheless significant, coverage of Baixiao news 
on these non-Chinese printed media. These news mainly targeted 
non-Chinese-speaking Chinese communities. Their coverage confirmed that the 
non-Chinese-speaking communities in Malaysia might have been one of the key 
clusters that supported the SOS movement, and also demonstrated the state’s 
desperation to win back the support of the non-Chinese-speaking communities, which 
had been traditionally ‘ignored’ and ‘forgotten’ in most part of the Chinese education 
movement.   
 
Table 6.1 Baixiao News Coverage in Non-Chinese Newspapers 
Date New Straits Times The Star Utusan Malaysia 
May 15, 2008 – – 1 
June 26, 2008 – 1 – 
July 7, 2008 1 – – 
July 19, 2008 – 1 – 
November 28, 2008 – 1 – 
December 6, 2008 – 1 – 
December 8, 2008 1 – – 
December 22, 2008 – 1 – 
January 8, 2009 – 1 – 
 
Source: The author. 
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6.9. Networks and Alliances  
Facing the denial of access to the media, from 2002 onwards, SOSC began to distribute 
the Baixiao Newspaper (by post) to more than 2,000 huatuans nationwide. Through 
this, SOSC provided first-hand, accurate information to the wider community, and built 
closer bonds between SOSC and other communities involved in their own movements. 
In response, many huatuan—especially the custodian-based huatuans—and Chinese 
school alumnus were particularly supportive of the SOS movement. Huatuans and 
Chinese schools nationwide organized trips to visit Baixiao, provided moral support 
and donated much needed financial resources to the SOS movement, attesting to the 
strength of the Chinese community in Malaysia.689
SOSC records showed that there were 40 groups of visitors to the temple school 
in 2002; 50 groups (2,173 visitors) in 2006; and 60 groups (1,280 visitors) in 2007.
 
690 
Efforts of the BN regime to pressure huatuan leaders to end the movement had little 
impact.691
SOSC also forged alliances with other communities involved in movements of 
their own, such as the Rawang Anti-High Tension Cable movement (万挠新村反建高
压 电 缆 运 动 ) and the Semenyih Community Againts the Construction of 
Telecommunication Towers movement (士毛月居民反对电讯公司电讯塔运动). 
 MCA in particular has fallen behind significantly in the race against Baixiao 
to expand their influence. Baixiao sympathizers showed their support through 
site-visits and donation to the temple school. More than 200 traditional banners with 
Chinese slogans given by huatuans were hung all over the temple school, and 
numerous wishes signed at the school’s guest books were the best proof of the 
extensive support that the movement received from the grassroots. 
                                               
689 They included Chinese schools, alumni associations, huatuans and others. 
690 Baixiao Annual Report (2007). 
691 Oriental, December 4, 2007. 
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SOSC members also participated in the Coalition for Clean and Fair Election 
movement for a corruption-free and fair electoral system; and supported the Hindu 
Rights Action Force’s call for equality for the Indian community in Malaysia.  
In addition to these alliances, Baixiao’s strategic location in the heart of 
Petaling Jaya and the center of 23 colleges and universities made it easy for students of 
the tertiary institutions (especially those from the University of Malaya, University 
Tunku Abdul Rahman-Petaling Jaya campus) to visit and support the movement. 
Through the network among Democratic Movement of Malaysian Youth and Students  
(马来西亚学生与青年民主运动 ), 692  Chinese associations 693  and the Student 
Progressive Front (前进阵线),694 Chinese university students nationwide organized 
regular visits and voluntary activities with Baixiao.695 There were also Malay students 
from International Islamic University (especially those from the Matriculation Campus 
located in Section 17 of Petaling Jaya) who visited the Baixiao temple school.696
These university and college students had been a great help as volunteers in 
facilitating and organizing various activities for the temple school. These included the 
annual Chinese New Year reunion dinners, which hosted about 300 participants at the 
temple school to enhance solidarity among the villagers, committee members and 
parents. The dragon boat festival, mid-autumn festival, Christmas celebration, family 
day and teachers’ day were also conducted as part of the school’s events.  
  
                                               
692 Founded since 1998, this is a national student movement organization fighting to uphold human 
rights, democracy and equality.  
693 They include the Chinese Language Society of Universiti Utara Malaysia (北大华文学会), Malaysia 
Chinese Student Council of the Universiti Teknologi (工大华裔学生理事会), Pesatuan Bahasa 
Tionghua, Universiti Putra Malaysia (博特拉大学华文学会), among others.  
694  This is an underground student organization established since 2001 to promote campus 
democratization and improve inter-ethnic interaction. These include the Student Progressive Front 
branches in the New Era College, Universiti Putra Malaysia, Universiti Sains Malaysia and many more.   
695 This includes University Malaya, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Han Chiang College, Southern College 
and more. 
696 Interview with Tang Ah Chai, February 23, 2009, Kuala Lumpur. 
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In 2007, ahead of the upcoming general election, SOSC organized seminars 
(assisted by SCAH) to raise awareness and generate support from the wider 
community. These seminars discussed topics such as ‘Is Community Education a 
Dream or a Basic Human Right’ (社区教育是梦, 还是基本人权, June 14, 2007) and 
‘Where do We Go Next? Future Directions of SOS Movement’ (谈路在何方？白小保
校运动之方向, August 10, 2007) were conducted at SCAH and attended by about 50 to 
80 persons. Such activities, albeit having a small audience, were significant because 
they delivered updated news to core supporters (who were not members of Damansara 
village or SOSC). Through such opportunities, SOSC was able to engage in dialogues 
directly with their core supporters—many of them who are key players of Chinese civic 
movement organization in the capital city—to devise better strategies and generate new 
ideas to strengthen the SOS movement.      
Beyond Malaysia, the SOSC movement received considerable attention from 
Chinese communities overseas, especially from Taiwan, Hong Kong and China.697 
Hong Kong Phoenix Television (April 24, 2007) and China First Financial Daily 
conducted exclusive reports on the struggle. In February 2007, United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights to Education, Vernor Muñoz Villalobos, became the 
highest-ranking official from overseas to visit Baixiao.698
 
  
6.10. Tug of War between Political Parties  
Since the formation of the first anti-relocation committee with DAP’s assistance, the 
Baixiao issue has been perceived by many as a political issue. While MPs from the 
opposition parties were keen to show their support and made numerous visits to the 
                                               
697 For instance, National Taiwan University, Beijing Chinese Language and Culture College, Hainan 
University (中国海南岛大学) and Philippines Chiang Kai Shek College. 
698 Malaysiakini, February 6, 2007; Oriental, February 10, 2007; The Sun, April 12, 2007.  
281 
 
temple school since March 2001, reactions from the BN ruling regime’s Chinese 
component parties, especially MCA, lag behind.699
For MCA central leaders, the relocation was a just deal between MCA and 
MOE, and they did not want to waste political capital on what they considered was a 
small issue in late 2000 and early January 2001.
  
700 MCA President Ling Liong Sik 
affirmed MCA’s support of MOE’s decision by acknowledged that “Baixiao’s closure 
is a right decision”,701
However, within weeks after Baixiao’s closure, demands had begun to pile up 
and pressure was coming from Dongjiaozong and the Chinese community alike, who 
condemned the government’s policy of not building new Chinese primary schools, 
which was the fundamental cause of the Baixiao dilemma.
 and therefore refused to intervene or meet any parties of the other 
camp. 
702  After the school 
relocation disputes escalated into a national concern and a more serious problem of 
unjust treatment of Chinese primary schools by the state, MCA leaders simply avoided 
discussing the SOSC issue, and the buck was passed from one to another among 
MCA’s leaders.703
MCA cabinet member, also the Deputy Education Minister Hon Choon Kim, 
was echoing Education Minister Musa Mohamad’s statement that “MOE did not force 
the relocation; quite the opposite, MOE had approved the relocation in response to 
Baixiao’s parents and schoolteachers’ association’s request”.
  
704
                                               
699 Sinchew, March 30 and November 8, 2001. 
 Ling’s successor,  
Ong Ka Ting (2003–2008), likewise refused to interfere. Chew Mei Fun refused any 
discussion on the Baixiao issue when she met the Damansara villagers during her visit 
700 Sinchew, January 11, 2001. 
701 Sinchew, January 28, 2001.  
702 Kwongwah, February 17, 2001. 
703 Interview with Bock Tai Hee, February 8, 2009, Malacca. 
704 Sinchew, January 28, 2001. 
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to her constituency. She went as far as commenting that “if the Baixiao incident is 
politicized, there will be no room for negotiation at all, and the problems will never be 
solved”.705
When Musa Mohamad pressured the Baixiao school committee to persuade the 
remaining students to rejoin the relocated school at Puay Chai within seven days or face 
the withdrawal of approval for the relocation,
 
706  MCA’s top leaders released 
pro-government statements advising students to leave the temple school. These MCA 
leaders knew well that they needed to uphold the principle of ‘not having a branch of 
the original school’, to ensure that future relocation deals with MOE would still be 
possible, even at the expense of going against the wishes and aspirations of the 
overwhelming majority of MCA members. As such, MCA President Ling Liong Sik 
and Deputy Education Minister Hon Choon Kim repeatedly urged the Chinese 
community to “keep their promise and not demand for a new school branch”.707
However, not all MCA leaders were alike. At a lower house parliamentary 
debate on the 2007 education budget allocation in November 2006, a Serdang MP, also 
the MCA Vice President Yap Pian Hon (
  
叶炳汉), pursued the reopening of Baixiao’s 
original premises. Deputy Education Minister Hon Choon Kim defended MOE’s 
position, stating that the “Baixiao issue should not be mentioned anymore as it has been 
relocated to the newer and bigger (5.6 acre) Tropicana premises with the help of MOE. 
MOE has tried to encourage students at the temple school to rejoin the Tropicana 
branch, and is trying its best to find the best solution”.708 He insisted that Baixiao must 
understand that “once a school is relocated, the old premises must be closed down”.709
                                               
705 Sinchew, March 17, 2004. 
  
706 China Press, January 17, 2001.  
707 Sinchew, February 18, 2001. 
708 Sinchew, April 10, 2007. 
709 Sinchew, April 10, 2007. 
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Many MCA local leaders and rank-and-file did not share or agree with the 
central leadership’s position. They were dissatisfied by their leaders’ lack of political 
bargaining power and them bowing down to UMNO’s political domination despite 
being the largest Chinese political party in Malaysia.710 These state- and local- level 
MCA rank-and-file showed their displeasure with MCA leadership by providing 
tremendous support and funds for Baixiao’s reopening.711
SOSC also targeted the political opportunities during the by-elections to 
mobilize voters’ support and used them to pressure BN, especially MCA. For example, 
during the April 2007 by-election at MCA-stronghold, Machap state constituency in 
Malacca, SOSC and its supporters flooded the election campaign in the 
Chinese-majority constituency by circulating Baixiao leaflets, such as the ‘Truth about 
Baixiao’ (白小真相报) and ‘Reopening Baixiao’ (重开白小). Although MCA’s 
candidate successfully defeated DAP’s candidate in this by-election, the slight 
reduction of 481 majority votes boosted SOSC efforts to continue to ‘advertise’ their 
issues during the other by-elections. More importantly, SOSC by-election campaigns 
were generally well-received by the local Chinese communities, and were the rare and 
most direct opportunities for SOSC to meet the BN leaders in person.
  
712
Gerakan, the second largest Chinese dominated political party in BN coalition, 
had demonstrated a supportive role on the SOS movement when compared to MCA. 
Gerakan President Koh Tsu Koon, Deputy President Kerk Choo Ting, central leader 
Toh Kin Woon and Bukit Gasing MP Lim Thuang Seng (林传盛) had been fervent 
supporters and sympathizers of the SOS movement since the very beginning.
 
713
                                               
710 Nanyang, February 21, 2001; Oriental, April 11, 2007. 
  
Lim Thuang Seng in particular, has been the most supportive BN politician on the SOS 
711 Sinchew, March 13, 2001; Guang Ming, April 16 and July 16, 2001. 
712 Malaysiakini, April 3 and 8, 2007. 
713 Nanyang, February 20, 2001; China Press, February 23, 2001. 
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movement; he provided both political assistance and personal support to the SOSC. He 
was the only politician who visited Baixiao temple school annually during Chinese 
New Year, and distributed Angpow714 to all the students and staff members from his 
personal coffer.715
Baixiao found itself in a dilemma when Lim Thuang Seng requested SOSC 
members not to support the PKR candidate during Selangor’s Ijok constituency 




 Although Baixiao eventually assisted the 
opposition PKR in this by-election, it did not prevent the BN component party, 
Malaysian Indian Congress, from winning the elections with a majority vote. Knowing 
that SOSC needed support from both the ruling regime and the opposition party, SOSC 
learnt to be more careful and skeptical when participating in future election campaigns. 
From April 2007 on, only individuals from SOSC went ahead to distribute 
Baixiao-related brochures, and there was no longer mass participation from SOSC.  
6.11. The Impact of General Elections 
The SOSC was optimistic about demanding for Baixiao’s reopening in the 2004 
General Election. It established the Baixiao’s General Election Operation Unit and 
proposed the Baixiao General Election Petition, stating three appeals: (1) reopen the 
Baixiao Damansara premises immediately, (2) establish one Chinese primary school 
for each community, and (3) return the minority’s right for vernacular education. SOSC 
was mobilized in full force during the election campaign period. They participated in 
the opposition party’s election campaign at 38 strategic locations in Selangor, 
promoted Baixiao election slogan to “protect the Chinese community’s mother tongue 
                                               
714 Angpows are red packets with cash in them, given as a token of luck. 
715 Interview with Wong Chin Lee, February 25, 2009, Selangor. 
716 Merdeka Review, April 28, 2007. 
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and to support Baixiao’s reopening before canvassing for votes” (先出来捍卫母语教
育, 先支持重开白小原校, 才来拉票).  
  As discussed in Chapter Four, the ‘Abdullah Badawi factor’ saw BN’s 
overwhelming victory in the 2004 General Election and brought the SOS movement 
into a new low, with opposition parties temporarily withdrawing their interest on 
Baixiao issues after the election defeat. However, SOSC was surprised to receive a 
letter from MOE on September 27, 2005, marking the first official acknowledgement of 
the SOSC as the movement and chartering opportunities for bilateral negotiation 
between the two parties.717 SOSC tried to lobby support from the new Prime Minister 
Abdullah Badawi by submitting more than 10,000 pieces of ‘Please Listen to Us’718 
postcards, each signed by a SOS movement supporter, to the Prime Minister’s Office in 
March 2006.719 In May 2007, SOSC Chairman Yong Yoke Song offered an olive 
branch by renaming the new school on condition that the MOE reopen Baixiao’s 
original premises.720
As the 2008 General Election drew near, rumors regarding the school’s 
reopening began to spread especially after the first-time visit (since 2001) to the temple 
school by MCA President Ong Ka Ting, Vice President Chan Kong Choy and  
Chew Mei Fun in January 2008.
  
721
                                               
717 SOSC Press Release (April 29, 2008). 
 The Education Minister Hishamuddin Hussein, 
well-remembered for waving the keris (traditional Malay dagger) to defend the Malays’ 
Special Rights at the UMNO Annual General Meeting in 2005 and 2006, held a high 
profile meeting with SOSC Chairman Yong Yoke Song on February 19, 2008, four 
718 In the postcard, it wrote, “The original school of SJKC Damansara has been abandoned for nearly four 
years. Dear Pak Lah, please let our children return to their beloved school in 2005; Dengarlah Hasrat 
Kami (in Malay); 请听我们的真心话 (in Chinese)”. 
719 Nanyang, March 9, 2005.  
720 Sinchew, May 5, 2007; Malaysiakini, December 11, 2007. 
721 Malaysiakini, January 24, 2008.  
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days before the nomination day for the twelve General Election. 722 Hishamuddin 
promised, in this closely watched meeting that “the Baixiao issue would be resolved 
soon”.723
  The BN coalition suffered a massive setback in the 2008 General Election 
where it lost control of five states and failed to win the crucial two-thirds majorityin 
parliament for the second time since independence.
 His timely announcement was perceived by many as politically driven—an 
attempt to gain support from Chinese voters. Whatever his real intention was, his 
announcement failed to help BN repeat its victory in 2004. 
724 The shocking news of the death 
of SOSC Chairman Yong Yoke Song due to heart attack on March 10 further fueled the 
frustration of Baixiao supporters.725
On May 2, 2008, the newly appointed Deputy Education Minister  
Wee Ka Siong (魏家祥) made an unprecedented visit to the temple school on the orders 
of the education minister.
 Both political defeat and community tensions 
finally propelled the BN regime to resolve the Baixiao issue.  
726  On October 28, 2008, MOE finally announced that 
Baixiao premises would reopen in the new school year in January 2009. 727
                                               
722 Sinchew, January 4, 2008. 
 Baixiao was 
reopened on January 5, 2009, and renamed as Chung Hwa Damansara Chinese Primary 
School after Chung Hua Ladang Serapoh Chinese Primary School  
(巴力士拉坡中华国民型小学) was relocated from Parit, Perak, and installed into the 
723 The Sun, March 11, 2008; Sinchew, January 4, 2008.  
724 PR coalition is now in control of Kedah, Penang, Perak, Selangor and Kelantan. Two-thirds majority 
in the parliament is critical for the ruling regime, especially in deciding the new constituency boundaries 
scheduled every 10 years.   
725 More ironic is that MOE opened the school door to make way for Yong Yoke Song’s funeral 
procession, as if allowing him to say a final ‘goodbye’ to the school he had been defending to his last 
breath. 
726 China Press, April 30, 2008. 
727 The Star, May 26, 2008.  
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Baixiao Damansara premises. 728
 
 As the latter had been facing problems of 
under-enrollment, it was a compromise for both SOSC and MOE.  
6.12. Resource Accumulation 
Resource accumulation is important for a community-based movement. Baixiao had to 
raise funds to support its operations for eight years. This thesis studies three resources 
accumulation approaches, namely, the ‘One-person, One-dollar’ campaign, sales of 
merchandise, and the annual solidarity fundraising dinner. 
 
Inspired by the overwhelming success of 1960 Merdeka University’s ‘One-person, 
One-dollar’ campaign, SOSC launched the ‘One-person, One-dollar’ fundraising 
campaign in 2003, aiming to mobilize and to expand support from a wider public. By 
asking for a mere dollar donation, the organization had tapped into a large pool of new 
donors who had not thought they would want, or could have afforded, to be involved in 
the campaign. Through collecting funds at the local market and major Chinese social 
events, SOSC was able to engage individuals at a personal level. SOSC collected a 
substantial sum of RM210,000 in 2003 through this campaign and mobilized at least 
200,000 people in support of the SOS movement.




Beginning in 2002, Baixiao began to produce a series of merchandise as its publicity 
tools, as well as to be sold to generate income for the movement. These included the 
Pictorial Collection of 500 Days of the SOS Movement (2002) and merchandise such as 
(2) Baixiao Merchandise  
                                               
728 Guang Ming, January 2, 2009; Sinchew, January 5, 2009. 





 song collection in a music TV (2002), a five-year 
anniversary magazine (2006), SOS T-shirts (2001), caps (2001) and key chains. 
Although income from the sales was not the major source of financial income for the 
movement, the souvenirs were popular and memorable, especially to visitors of the 
temple school.  
The Baixiao annual solidarity and fundraising dinner was perceived by some as a 
yardstick of the movement’s popularity. Held in June annually, donations collected 
during this event were the movement’s main source of funding. Expenses at the temple 
school was about RM20,000 monthly, covering food supplies for students and staff, 
electricity and water consumption, schoolteachers’ subsidies and maintenance. Other 
expenses included SOSC publication fees and campaigns. Monies raised from the 
dinner contributed towards Damansara SOS Movement Foundation and were 
redistributed to the temple school and SOSC with detailed accounting procedures. Each 
year, companies donated items such as ginseng extract, books and cassettes to be sold 
to raise funds.  
(3) Baixiao Annual Solidarity and Fundraising Dinner 
The dinner typically ran from 6.30 pm to midnight. An average of about 100 to 
120 Chinese banquet tables (10 people per table) were hosted each year, gathering an 
average of about 1,200 supporters. Money was collected through the dinner sponsors. 
For example, those who donated RM5,000 would be named as honorary sponsors of the 
event, be invited for a ribbon-cutting ceremony and receive dinner vouchers as 
distinguished guests. Donors who donated RM1,000, RM500 or RM300, would be 
invited to a ribbon-cutting ceremony and receive dinner vouchers. Supporters could 
                                               
730 ‘Keep Our Roots’ (2001) and ‘Let’s Join the Movement’ (2004). 
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also opt to sponsor a banquet table (RM500) or purchase individual dinner vouchers at 
the price of RM50 per voucher. Resources mobilized by SOSC increased steadily as 
illustrated in Figure 6.9. 
 




Source: The author. 
 
As a result of increasing support, the dinner venue had to be changed from SCAH to a 
more spacious venue at Petaling Jaya Section 17/29 car park from year 2003 onwards. 
The permit to use the car park facility was granted by the police and Petaling Jaya Town 
Council with facilitation by Gerakan MP Lim Thuang Seng. The dinner’s repertoire 
was akin to a cultural night in an average Chinese school. Programs included songs, 























The dinner themes often mirrored closely the development of the SOS 
movement and resonated the injustice that these people felt regarding Baixiao. Some 
examples of the dinner themes included ‘Save Baixiao’ (救救白小团结宴) (2001), and 
‘Save Baixiao with Courage and Passion’ (万丈豪情救白小) (2002). Approaching the 
first 1000th day anniversary of Baixiao’s closure, the theme at the 2003 dinner called 
out to its supporters to pledge their undying support for Baixiao (爱我白小, 久久不息). 
The dinner theme became ‘Demands for Opening the School’ (重情重义为华教, 开锁
开门进原校) in 2004, ‘Distributing the Seeds of Hope’ (传播希望的种子) in 2005, 
and ‘Accompanying Baixiao’s 2000th Days’ (陪白小走过 2000天) in 2006. By 2007, 
the focus of the theme was ‘Demands for Establishment of More Chinese Primary 
Schools and Reopening of the Baixiao Premises’ (华小要增建, 白小要重开). The 
dinner in 2008 became the final episode of the movement after a promising meeting 
with Education Minister Hishammuddin Hussein with SOSC in February 2008.731
The dinner was a closely-watched event by Chinese educationalists and social 
activists in Malaysia, for it was graced annually by old and new faces from the 
rank-and-file of the movement, and heavyweight figures from Dongjiaozong,
 
732  
huatuan, 733  non-ethnic Chinese activist, 734  Gerakan, 735  and opposition parties. 736
                                               
731 Malaysiakini, April 24, 2008.  
 
Heads and representatives of various associations of the cultural and educational 
732 Quek Suan Hiang, Yap Sin Tian, Loot Ting Yee, and more. Jiaozong Chairman Ong Kow Ee was 
absent from Baixiao activities until as late as 2007. 
733 Such as Ting Chee Seng, Lee Sok Jing (李书祯), Liau Kok Fah (廖国华) from SCAH, Liu Tian Ji  
(刘天吉) from Malaysia Federation of Alumni Association of Taiwan Universities, Yap Swee Seng  
(叶瑞生) from Suara Rakyat Malaysia and many more. 
734 For example, Chairman of International Centre for Educational Excellence Megat Mohamed Amin 
attended the 2008 dinner. See Malaysiakini, June 29, 2008.  
735 Toh Kin Woon and Lim Thuang Seng.  
736 PKR: Lee Boon Chye (李文材), Sivarasa Rasiah and William Leong (梁自坚); DAP: Ronnie Liu, 




fraternities in the Klang Valley (and elsewhere) also came from across the country to 
reiterate their support for Baixiao. 
It was in these nights that speakers from the movement would insistently urge 
BN leaders to respect the aspirations of the Chinese community and allow Baixiao in 
Damansara to be reopened.737 The opposition parties had often taken the dinner as an 
opportunity to condemn MCA and UMNO for neglecting the rights of minority groups. 
Only MCA central-level leaders such as Ling Liong Sik, Hon Choon Kim,  
Ong Ka Ting and Chew Mei Fun declined repeated invitations by SOSC to grace the 
event.738 It was as late as in 2009 when the first MCA senior leader, Deputy Education 
Minister Wee Ka Siong, attended the annual dinner.739
 
  
6.13. Conclusion  
After the school premise was reopened in January 2009, a SOSC emergency meeting 
was held on January 3, where 10 out of 12 committee members casted their votes to 
support the dissolution of SOSC740 and select SOSC representatives into the new 
school committee. A faction led by Tommy Chin, Wong Yau King and  
Wong Yew Kong strongly opposed its dissolution and i
                                               
737 Sinchew, June 26, 2006. 
nsisted upon continuing the 
movement, remarking that the SOS movement, which was spawned by the lack of 
effective representation of a minority cluster, was concluded by the same problem. 
Despite such controversies, the SOSC was dissolved in April 2010. The remaining 
738 Merdeka Review, June 24, 2007. 
739 Malaysiakini, June 29, 2008.  
740 The decision to dissolve SOSC was passed in the twenty-sixth administrative meeting on March 31, 
2009. The Baixiao Sponsors Special Meeting (白小保校工委会赞助人特别大会) on May 23, 2009, 
made the following decisions: dissolve the committee (48 votes); declined (10 votes); disqualified votes 
(two); abstained (one). See Guang Ming, April 4, 2010. 
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SOSC funds of RM392,533.23 was used to form the Baixiao-SOSC University Loan 
Fund, which was administrated by Dongzong.741
The SOS movement attested to the power of the weak and demonstrated the 
struggle of underdogs versus the state. The significance of the SOS movement was 
publicly recognized. It won the Suara Rakyat Malaysia Human Rights Award and  
Lim Lian Geok Award in 2001. In addition, Baixiao principal, Wong Chin Lee, 
received the 2007 Guang Ming Warrior Award from Guang Ming Daily for her 
extraordinary perseverance. Although the SOS movement failed to achieve its ultimate 
goal of reopening Baixiao, but it successfully mobilized support from the public and 




This chapter also demonstrated the importance of having support from 
experienced social movement activists to strengthen the SOSC institution from within. 
Civic bonding with community organizations, especially through the existing Chinese 
education movement networks, provided important resources for the SOS movement in 
terms of mental and financial support. The role of Ruan Liang Temple as a shelter for 
Baixiao temple school and the support of the Damansara villagers became the crucial 
factor for the SOS movement’s successful persistence. 
  
Although participation of non-ethnic Chinese supporters in the SOS movement 
remained limited, shared concerns over Baixiao issues and the collaboration experience 
with these non-traditional supporters of Chinese education movement during the SOS 
movement had opened the window of opportunity to form inter-ethnic associational 
alliance for Dongjiaozong. Nevertheless, with the end of the SOS movement in 2010, 
the momentum to establish a more inclusive and stronger inter-ethnic alliance once 
                                               
741 Sinchew, April 14, 2010. 
742 The Star, January 8, 2009.  
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again faded. If such inter-ethnic collaboration can be successfully established in the 
future, it may offer the necessary capacity for the Chinese education movement to seize 
the political opportunities available in Malaysia after 2008.  
After 2,926 days of an uphill battle, the reopening of the school premises might 
have marked the end of SOSC’s struggle, but it did not lead to a roadmap for solving 
continuing discrimination faced by the Chinese and other minority groups in vernacular 
education. The allocation of RM1,200,000 under the cabinet’s special budget in 2001 
saw speedy completion of Baixiao Tropicana—the first fully government-funded 
Chinese primary school in Malaysia—demonstrated that many controversies can be 
resolved when political will sets in.743
                                               
743 Sinchew, February 1, 2001. 
 At the end of the day, it was the willingness of 
the Malaysian authorities to act pragmatically to accommodate the needs and voices of 
a multi-cultural society in national policymaking that paves the road for Malaysia to 
become a more just society for all. 
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Chapter Seven      
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
7.1. Introduction 
This thesis has identified two fundamental institutions—structural and relational—to 
measure the mobilization capacity and persistency of the Chinese education movement. 
As democratic institutions within non-liberal states are constrained and easily 
manipulated by the ruling regime, social movements in these states rely on relational 
institutions to channel their needs and demands for change. The flexibility of relational 
institutions that are based on informal interpersonal networks compliment the rigidity 
of their structured counterparts, thus enabling the movement to persist in pushing its 
agenda despite facing ongoing constraints imposed by the majority-dominated state.  
Dynamic state-movement interactions have resulted in movement mobilization 
mechanisms and repertoires that are adapted to the local political environment, 
indigenous norms and cultural influences. Although these mechanisms and repertoires 
may differ from those practiced in liberal democratic societies, they have proven to be 
enduring in sustaining movements in suppressive states. Above all, the thesis has 
demonstrated that despite rapid industralization and urbanization, primordial-based 
social movements, of which the Chinese education movement is a type, remain a 
significant social force in Malaysia.  
This concluding chapter is divided into four sections. This first summarizes the 
chapters and details their significance and relevance to the main argument of the thesis. 
The second section explores three significant trends on social mobilization identified 
from studying the Chinese education movement. First are the strategies and sustainence 
of endless resource mobilization efforts conducted by the Chinese education 
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movement’s activists. Second is the role of brokers and interpersonal networks in 
sustaining movement-regime interactions within a non-liberal, democratic setting. 
Third are the challenges faced by the movement in sustaining unification.   
Third section of this conclusion sketches potential future research in three levels 
of comparison. Firstly, a national comparison of social movements in Malaysia will 
explore state-movements relationships and patterns of movement repertoires in the 
country. Second, an exploration of Chinese education in other Southeast Asian 
countries will help to examine the factors that lead to movement formation, persistency 
or termination. Third, an interregional comparison will provide an understanding of the 
repertoires of social movements in non-liberal, democratic states in the Global South. 
In the final section, the role of institutions, and in particular the non-formal, 
relational institutions, are evaluated in terms of their impact on the endurance of social 
mobilization within a suppressive and majority-controlled regime. This section 
emphasizes the importance of adapting movement repertoires and mobilization 
mechanisms, especially those that have evolved through interactions with the regime 
over the years, as the key drivers to sustaining the movement. As one of the oldest 
nationwide social movements in Asia, the Chinese education movement is an 
instructive example from which important lessons may be drawn and shared with 
activists of other similar movements within non-liberal, democratic settings. 
  
7.2. Chapter Summaries and Their Significance   
Chapter One laid the foundation of the thesis and traced the rise of social movements 
studies in non-liberal, democratic contexts. The roles of extra-institutional variables in 
the execution of structural institutions were delivered in three perspectives: the 
intra-movement relationship explored the roles of SMOs and movement leaders in 
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mobilizing movement activities; the movement-state relationship was characterized by 
dynamic interactions of these conflicting parties through constant adaptation of 
movement and suppression repertoires; the inter-movement perspective asserted the 
importance of interpersonal bonds in engaging networks and building alliances with 
other social movements in the country.  
Chapter Two demonstrated the path-dependent qualities of the Chinese 
education movement during Malaya’s transition from a British colony to independence. 
Intimate collaboration between the movement and the MCA under the framework of 
the Sandajigou succesfully procured political compromises from the Malay political 
elites to incorporate Chinese schools into the national education system (rather than 
terminate the vernacular schools), and accommodate more political rights for Chinese 
immigrants as citizens in the 1950s. In return, the Alliance received support from 
Chinese voters (and other vernacular communities) and succeeded in gaining 
independence from the British in 1957.  
Nevertheless, constitutional deadlocks over the status of the Chinese’ 
vernacular language as an official language resulted in the most severe setback for 
Sandajigou. Pro-vernacular MCA leaders were forced to leave the party; movement 
leaders were punished; movement capacity was significantly weakened by a series of 
discriminative regulations imposed by the gradually oppressive UMNO-dominated 
regime. All these forced the Chinese education movement to form extra-MCA alliance 
with huatuans to continue its self-help mission to defend the distinctiveness of Chinese 
culture in Malaysia.   
Chapter Three analyzed the dynamic interactions between the ruling regime and 
the Chinese education movement following the 1969 ethnic riots. Although an elected 
government was restored after two years of emergency rule under the National 
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Operation Council, pro-Malay policies, such as the New Economic Policy in 1970,  
were also imposed. Chinese schools were marginalized by the national education 
system, and received little financial support to sustain their development or to maintain 
their facilities. Movement leaders from Jiaozong were punished by the authorities, 
instilling fear among the movement communities and supporters. Meanwhile, Chinese 
schoolteachers were incorporated as civil servants, resulting in massive drain in both 
human and financial resources for Jiaozong.  
The Chinese education movement was revived when leaders from 
Dongzong—the sister organization of Jiaozong—took over leadership. Dongzong 
launched the duzhong revival movement to mobilize the Chinese community to support 
the movement. More importantly, the timely forced closure of all English primary 
schools by the state in the late 1970s turned the wheels of fortune in favor of the 
movement—not only did it increase the popularity of Chinese primary schools as the 
preferred primary education institutions, it also reinstated the role and importance of 
the Chinese school committees that had, traditionally, been acting as the management 
arm of Chinese primary schools.   
Chapter Four revealed the role of leaders, brokers and alliances in mobilizing 
the movement within Malaysia’s testy political landscape. This chapter in particular 
traced the movement repertoires adopted by four leaders, namely, Lim Fong Seng, Foo 
Wan Thot, Quek Suan Hiang and Yap Sin Tian, which varied from competitive 
resistance to cooperative collaboration. The variation in strategies often relied on each 
leader’s capacity to engage support from Chinese politicians in the ruling regime and 
the opposition parties, the capability of the movement to mobilize participational and 
financial resources from supporters, and the strength of the leader’s alliance with 
huatuans.    
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Chapter Five was dedicated to evaluating and affirming the movement’s 
capability for learning and adaptation, which resulted in the creation 
of Duzhong-WC, Huaxiao-
This chapter also detailed the success of Duzhong-WC in generating financial 
resources for the movement. However, this also resulted in the domination of 
Dongzong leaders in the movement. Overburdened with multiple roles within the 
movement, the leaders manifested noticeable strain in their effectiveness and 
commitment in delivering their responsibilities, which, in turn, resulted in the 
increasing domination of the executive staff in maintaining the movement’s daily 
activities. Delayed efforts to restore the balance of power resulted in open conflict 
between the factions and consequent division of the movement community.     
WC and HLC as the movement’s mobilization machinery. 
The machinery was organized in terms of national, state and thematic working 
committees, with extensive support from full-time executive branches to maintain the 
everyday needs of the movement. Through systemic intra-movement networks as well 
as alliances with huatuans, the machinery has been critical to the mobilization of 
participants for the Chinese education movement.   
Chapter Six focused on the correlations among institutions, alliance and social 
mobilization through the case study of the Damansara SOS movement. Experienced 
Chinese education movement activists strengthened the SOS movement committee, 
which comprised Damansara villagers, who were novices in social movements. 
Resources and support from the Chinese education movement and its’ wider huatuan 
networks provided sustainable resources for the survival of the SOS movement.  
More importantly, grievances that culminated in the SOS movement attest to 
the suffering of the urban poor who received support even from non-ethnic Chinese 
communities that shared similar grievances. This became a window of opportunity for 
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the Chinese education movement to expand its influences beyond the Chinese-speaking 
community. Unfortunately, the momentum for expanding its support base faded when 
the BN ruling regime gave in and reopened the school premises after a series of political 
setbacks in the 2008 General Election. The end of the SOS movement saw the Chinese 
education movement return to an ebb as it languished in its comfort zone, (mis)placing 
its priorities on maintenance and persistence, rather than re-strategizing how to achieve 
its aims through a more progressive form of resistance.  
 
7.3. Social Mobilization in Non-Liberal Democracies  
Thus far, the thesis has pondered over the survival of anti-regime social movements in 
repressive states and questioned the role of institutions in sustaining social movement 
activities, in prolonging their existence, and in increasing their opportunities for 
success. This section identifies three criteria, namely, constant resource mobilization, 
relationship with the non-liberal democratic regime, and unification of diversity, as key 
variables to the persistency of a minority social movement despite facing ongoing 
constraints imposed by a majority-dominated and non-liberal, democratic state. 
 
7.4. Constant Resource Mobilization 
Resource mobilization has been one of the most visible yardsticks for measuring the 
popularity of a movement and the influence of its leaders. Constant needs for financial 
resources to sustain the development of Chinese schools at the local level and maintain 
movement activities at the national level resulted in the evolution of various 
mobilization mechanisms that have been adapted to the political norms of Chinese 
culture in twentieth century Malaysia. 
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 Although all Chinese primary schools and converted Chinese secondary 
schools have been incorporated into the national system and have thus been entitled to 
state’s education budget, the promotion of the Malay-medium national schools by the 
BN ruling regime as the school for all Malaysians has resulted in unequal distribution 
of state resources. As discussed in Chapter Three, the Malay-medium schools have 
become the sole beneficiary of the national budget since independence, while other 
vernacular schools have faced severe financial scarcity in sustaining, let alone 
developing, themselves. 
Such structural constraints have forced Chinese schools to depend on public 
donations to survive. Education is an expensive enterprise. Although teachers’ salaries 
are government-supported, other expenses are not. These expenses require substantial 
sums of money annually and therefore involve constant, wearying fundraising. The 
contribution from the Chinese communities varied according to their economic 
capacity: the wealthy business entrepreneurs, the urban-middle-class and the 
working-class.   
Chinese schools—as the most autonomous yet fundamental units of the Chinese 
education movement—depend on two primary mechanisms to mobilize the local 
Chinese community to contribute financially: the school committees and fundraising 
campaigns.  
Members of the school committees contribute a ‘second income tax’—on which 
the Chinese schools rely upon as their core financial income—to the schools they run. 
The willingness of school committee members to donate stem from culturally-, 
socially-, economically- and politically-driven motivations.   
Culturally, individuals with financial resources or political connection are 
expected to take the lead in safeguarding the community’s common goods. Communal 
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pressure, which could be self- or other-imposed, have ensured continuous commitment 
of community elites to commit to supporting the needs of Chinese schools. Such 
phenomenon is strongly held, especially within dense Chinese community settings, 
where the community’s ties remain strong and are based predominantly on 
interpersonal interactions.  
The benefits of paying a ‘second income tax’ are multiple. School committee 
members generally received respect and praise from the community for their altruism. 
Social recognition strengthens personal and social capital and expands business 
opportunities. As many Chinese entrepreneurs are constrained by bumiputera 
economic policies in Malaysia, they have to rely on interpersonal relationships and 
day-to-day social connections to sustain and expand their small-to-medium-sized 
enterprises.  
While the financially-advantaged businessmen dominated the Chinese school 
committees, interaction between the business and middle classes has increased since 
the 1980s. As a result of Malaysia’s rapid industrialization and urbanization, 
increasingly more Chinese moved from rural areas to cities for work and business 
opportunities. As elaborated in Chapter Three, the state’s promotion of national schools 
stalled the development of vernacular schools. Therefore, the Chinese community 
faced fierce competition to enroll their children into over-crowded Chinese schools in 
urban neighborhoods that are already heavily populated with Chinese. To ensure 
successful enrollment into their preferred schools, many urban middle-class parents 
seek to establish patronage relationships with school committees so as to have the upper 
hand over the school committees’ quota on recommending new enrollments.   
The other mechanism most Chinese schools have been depending upon for 
income is the fundraising campaign. The income resulting from these activities goes 
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towards maintaining school facilities (tables and chairs, library facilities), developing 
school facilities (computer rooms, sports complex), expanding school premises and so 
on. Middle-class parents have been willing to support these donation campaigns 
primarily to ensure their children have access to better facilities and thus a head start in 
a competitive and result-oriented education system.  
However, the participation of these parents in the donation campaigns is passive 
and limited. Most donate to the school that hosts their children, and are reluctant to 
support other Chinese schools; they are willing to donate financially but rarely organize 
or participate as members of fundraising committees; and many of them tend to stop 
donating upon their child’s graduation from the school. 
Although the financially- and socially-inferior working-class community 
remain on the periphery of the Chinese schools structure, they have been the most loyal 
and extensive supporters of local mobilization campaigns. Albeit contributing a much 
less significant amount compared to their business-class and middle-class counterparts, 
their participation rate has been disproportionately higher than the latter, as was 
demonstrated in the success of the ‘One-person, One-dollar’ donation campaign that 
has been popularized since the 1950s; it continues today to be the most popular 
fundraising repertoire. Although novices in social movements, they are passionate 
volunteers at fundraising events and charity sales because of a simple belief—to ensure 
access to Chinese schools for their children, and for future generations. Acting on their 
beliefs on the importance of Chinese schools has proven to be impactful, as shown in 
Chapter Six. Despite having no financial or political privileges, the Damansara 
villagers successfully resisted the state and were able to reopen the community’s school 
after seven long years of constant struggle.   
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While the financial needs of Chinese schools at the local level have been 
sustained through periodic fundraising campaigns and donations from the school 
committees, the needs of movement headquarters at the national level is attained 
through the national mechanisms administrated by Dongjiaozong. Over the course of 
60 years, Dongzong and Jiaozong have grown from a conceptual national collaboration 
between Chinese school committees and schoolteachers into one of the largest, most 
well-established and most resourceful SMOs in Malaysia. 
The success of the duzhong revival movement in the 1970s, as Chapter Five 
elaborated, has been able to generate a sustainable source of income to support the 
executive expenses of Dongzong. In contrast, the weaker partner of the Chinese 
education movement—Jiaozong—continues to face annual financial deficits in 
sustaining their operational costs. The reintroduction of Huaxiao-WC in 1994 failed to 
generate a sustainable source of income for Jiaozong. Plagued by conservative leaders 
and passive members who constrained its ability to expand, the fading Chinese 
schoolteachers’ organization failed to produce new appealing issues to compete with 
other Chinese organizations for resources and support. In 2001, Jiaozong also lost its 
key annual income from the Lim Lian Geok Cultural Development Center’ Chinese 
Education Festival fundraising dinner after the foundation declared its ‘independence’ 
from Jiaozong.   
Facing growing deficits year after year, executive officers at Jiaozong began to 
depend on unsustainable channels for public donations. It survived by conducting 
small-scale seminars, which have been the only visible activities that kept Jiaozong 
connected to its remaining audience, namely, Chinese schoolteachers. The seminars 
include motivational talks, training workshops and seminars on topics closely related to 
the contemporary needs of Chinese schoolteachers. A minimal registration fee is 
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usually collected to cover the cost of the activities. Although the seminars harness great 
potential as a means to generate income to replenish Jiaozong’s bleeding coffers, the 
non-profit nature of Jiaozong has prevented it from exploiting these activities as a 
source of income. As for the movement’s executives, they would rather remain in the 
red than risk being perceived by the few remaining supporters to be profit-driven.  
In the history of the Chinese education movement, various national level 
fundraising campaigns have been conducted when significant sums of money were 
needed. As seen in Chapter Four, a series of campaigns were conducted in the early 
1990s to support the construction of the movement organization’s new headquarters in 
Kajang. Movement leaders were responsible for planning the campaigns and 
mobilizing their social capital to gather support from the larger community. The 
execution and administration of these fundraising campaigns fall on the full-time 
executive officers at Dongzong and Jiaozong, which totaled about 120 staff members. 
The organized networks and processes enabled the central branches of both 
organizations to mobilize extensive support from grassroots members in fundraising 
campaigns. 
The collective cultural identity represented by the Chinese education movement 
has been a key factor to the successful mobilization of resources nationwide over the 
years. Dongjiaozong has always framed itself as a defender of Chinese culture to attract 
ardent support from the Chinese-speaking community, and has adopted repertoires that 
are closely identified with the elements and trappings of Chinese culture in all of its 
campaigns. As this thesis has demonstrated, fundraising dinners, bazaars, traditional 
plays, and likewise events that highlight the concept of charitable, voluntary and 
righteous actions to protect the weak have attracted extensive community participation. 
Large amounts of donations have also been collected through the ‘One-person, 
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One-dollar’ campaign, or during ceremonial events such as anniversaries, weddings 
and religious celebrations. These campaigns generate much passion and renewed 
awareness of the importance of preserving Chinese education from the participants.  
Nevertheless, that fundraising campaigns had taken a toll on the two 
organizations began to surface by the mid-1990s, as some campaigns fell short of their 
targeted goals. As time wore on and the movement aged, ossification set in as 
repertoires became less impulsive and more rigid. Movement leaders—in particular 
those who had come into power in the 1990s—preferred to work within moderate and 
predictable settings, rather than in settings that are spontaneous, creative and 
unplanned. These ‘predictable’ settings survived the narrow and liquid liberal space in 
Malaysia; more importantly, working in these settings does not ‘irritate’ the 
Malay-dominated regime. Lacking a stable collective bargaining channel through 
democratic institutions in the state, it is therefore in the best interest of the movement 
leaders to adopt these low-risk and ‘effective’ approaches in delivering their demands. 
The movement also has tried to publicize the positive results of its campaigns in 
the Chinese vernacular press from time to time—visual, physical or symbolic—to 
boost the morale and confidence of its supporters. It has also been highlighting 
transparent check-and-balance mechanisms to instill confidence in the proper use of 
public donations. In spite of these efforts, the aging movement, overwhelmed by the 
impact of ossification, bureaucratization and centralization, has been slowly losing its 
dynamism and momentum.  
The 2001 eruption of the Damansara SOS movement provided a dynamic 
opportunity for Chinese educationalists to reenergize the education movement. The 
Damansara community, which was perceived as underdogs due to its low economic and 
social status, had, in spite of its limited resources, inspirationally resisted state 
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suppression. Through the everyday forms of resistance and non-confrontational 
repertoires, it achieved its goal of reopening the school premises (albeit having 
conceded to the state’s condition of installing a relocated school from Perak).  
The Chinese education movement and the Damansara SOS movement 
subsequently developed into a symbiosis. The latter utilized the existing networks and 
support system from the former to mobilize resource campaigns and receive extensive 
contributions (in terms of moral support and financial contributions) throughout the 
seven years of the struggle. The Chinese education movement, in return, benefited from 
opportunities to engage with the younger generation of movement activists (many of 
whom are university graduates), the working-class and non-ethnic Chinese 
Malaysians—three clusters that had yet to be actively involved in the Chinese 
education movement—to expand its support base. 
Since the 2008 General Election, the movement has been presented with 
increasing political opportunities as the BN ruling regime began to relent in approving 
the establishment of the first Chinese university in Malaysia. At the time of this writing, 
MCA senior politicians continue to broker between the BN regime with movement 
leaders led by Yap Sin Tian. However, the vast amount of resources needed to support 
this massive project divided movement leaders, as some questioned the ability and 
capacity for the movement to run a university.  
In addition, there are calls from movement supporters, especially the reformist 
cluster, for re-examination of the movement’s goals, directions and strategies in the 
face of globalization and changing needs of the Chinese community. If the New Era 
University project were to go ahead, the movement must confront the pressing need to 
change its approach to be more inclusive, and to engage support from non-ethnic 
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Chinese populations in Malaysia, as well as ethnic Chinese throughout Southeast Asia 
in particular, and from the rest of the world in general.     
 
7.5. Relationship with the Non-Liberal Democratic Regime 
Opportunities for movement mobilization vary with the changing realities of political 
circumstances. Social movements constrained under a non-liberal, democratic political 
context and oppressive state face more difficulties in encapsulating their demands. The 
Chinese education movement has been able to co-exist with the heavy-handed state by 
exploiting the limited space in the non-liberal, democracy system, maneuvering its 
interests through brokerage by MCA politicians, and drawing opportunities through 
constantly adapting its movement strategies.  
The movement has been condemned by the BN ruling regime—in particular, 
the Malay-ethnic political party, UMNO, the dominant partner in the ruling 
coalition—as a threat to national unity. Demands from the movement have threatened 
the interests of the ethnic Malays, forcing the UMNO-led regime to face considerable 
political pressure to maintain its image as the protector of the Malays. Over the years, 
the regime has imposed constraints on the movement through threats, manipulating by 
way of resource distribution, retraction of schoolteachers’ teaching permits and 
citizenship, co-optation of movement leaders, and so on.  
 Although the regime can, and has been, manipulating the electoral procedures 
to its own advantage to narrow the room for contenders to curb politicking, it cannot 
limit civil liberties outright by arresting and incarcerating opponents and civilians. In 
fact, the electoral system remains a significant mechanism in legitimatizing the 
regime’s domestic power, despite distorted democratic institutions. As majority of the 
constituencies in Malaysia are mixed, contesting parties need the support of voters from 
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all ethnic groups to secure victory in elections. Therefore, although tensions have 
waxed and waned over time between the movement and the state, the BN ruling regime 
risks offending the larger Chinese community in Malaysia—thus losing their electoral 
support—if it chooses overly coercive measures to suppress or terminate the 
movement. 
Moreover, long-term confrontation between the regime and the 
Chinese-dominated Malaya Communist Party (from 1949 until the Peace Accord in 
1989 that led to the cessation of militant activities) has been a costly battle for the 
regime, economic and politically, as discussed in Chapter Two. To discourage the 
Chinese community from supporting the communists, the regime allowed it to express 
its grievances through non-violence means, such as by participating in its education 
movement. The movement has thus been tolerated by the state during the years of 
battling the communists, and helps to explain the movement’s continued existence. 
While social movements in matured democratic states could deploy 
demonstrations and adopt explicit anti-state stances to express grievances in achieving 
demands, these forms of resistance tend to receive strong reactions from BN. Instead, it 
has been containing, co-opting and suppressing movements by proactive, albeit often 
covert, repressive measures or through counter-movement strategies, as elaborated in 
Chapter Four. In turn, movement activists have learned to adapt their repertoires to 
lower risks. This is a second factor that has led to the movement’s prolonged 
endurance. 
Chapter Four also showed how the movement developed parallel institutions in 
reaction to opportunities available in the tightly contended political environment. The 
onslaught of discriminative and assimilative state-imposed policies gave the movement 
leaders little choice but to move out of their comfort zone to form strategic alliances in 
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the 1980s. Dongjiaozong collaborated with the Gerakan in the alliance of three 
campaign (1982) and established the 15-Huatuan alliance (1983) that allowed the 
Malaysian Chinese civic movement to reach its height at the mass assembly at Tianhou 
Temple in 1987.  
In the face of such a powerful social force from the Chinese civic community 
and mounting challenges from the severe internal faction within UMNO, Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohamad decreed the infamous Operasi Lalang in 1987 to contain 
escalating political tension. Four activists from the education movement were among 
the 107 detained for purportedly fanning anti-government sentiments and threatening 
national security. Operasi Lalang not only enabled Mahathir to freeze political 
challenges and divert focus away from internal party faction to interethnic relations; it 
was also an important wake-up call for the movement.  
After 1987, the Chinese education movement strengthened its structural 
institution by expanding the number of senior committee members. Overwhelming 
pressure from the regime also prompted the movement’s chairman, Lim Fong Seng, to 
seek political collaboration with the DAP—the leading opposition party—in the 1990 
dual coalition system campaign. It challenged the BN in the general election, as was 
discussed in Chapter Four.  
Nevertheless, not everyone within the movement agreed with the collaboration. 
As one of the largest social movements in the country, the political partnership (with 
ruling regime or opposition parties) failed to garner sufficient support from the 
movement community, which was divided internally by its own political affiliations. 
Most supporters preferred to take a politically neutral and non-aggressive approach to 
attain their demands, such as refusing to send their children to the national school, 
providing financial support to Chinese schools and the movement.  
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 There were times when Dongjiaozong successfully pressured the state into 
compromising on these demands. Chapter Five provided examples: the tender rights of 
school canteens and cooperative shops in late 1990s, and the Vision Schools project in 
early 2000s. More often than not, the movement has only been able to obtain limited 
concessions from the state, as was the case with the controversy regarding the teaching 
of mathematics and science English in early 2000s.  
The successful coexistence of the Chinese education movement also has been 
due to the result of MCA’s (and to some extend, Gerakan’s) brokerage efforts. Because 
conflicting interests had limited the degree of trust between the UMNO and the Chinese 
education movement, therefore, the role of broker, especially those delivered by a BN 
entity has been important. MCA politicians have shuttle between UMNO leaders and 
movement leaders to mediate interactions, bridge the needs of both sides, and enable 
compromises through negotiations. In doing so, MCA has established a working 
relationship with the Chinese education movement and has exploited this as a political 
model for it in gaining increased support from the Chinese community. Through this 
approach, the movement has found the most efficient channel in maneuvering its 
interests and in influencing and pressuring for change in the state’s process of 
agenda-setting. The UMNO-led BN regime also has contained the movement and its 
leaders by occasionally responding to movement demands. 
The impact of brokerage was exemplified by MCA’s first president Tan Cheng 
Lock, as was seen in Chapter Two, was able to persuade UMNO’s president, Abdul 
Rahman, to attend a secret negotiation with the movement’s leaders at Tan’s residence 
in Malacca in 1955. This led to a social contract between the movement and the 
Alliance government. As head of the Sandajigou, Tan also strengthened his status 
among the Chinese education movement community.  
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 MCA’s second president, Lim Chong Eu, was an equally progressive broker for 
the movement. The pressure to gather support from Chinese voters in competition with 
the growing socialist front forced Lim and his team to be more committed to 
accommodating the needs of the Chinese education movement, such as advocating for a 
more open and inclusive education policy and according official status to the Chinese 
language in the nation’s constitution, also seen in Chapter Two. Although Lim 
achieved substantial success in excluding the regime’s controversial ‘ultimate 
objective’ of making Malay as the main medium of instruction in all schools as stated in 
Article 12 of the 1957 Education Ordinance—a key factor that has, ironically, ensured 
the continued existence of Chinese schools in post-independence Malaya. 
Nevertheless, such a pro-movement and pro-Chinese community stand became a great 
threat for UMNO and non-Chinese-speaking MCA elites. The reality that Malaysian 
politics is elite-based forced Lim to resign and to be replaced by a more submissive, 
pro-UMNO leader, Tan Siew Sin, in 1962.   
Since then, although there was no lack of passionate sympathizers of the 
movement who came into power with MCA, the weakening of MCA within the BN 
coalition has limited the usefulness of brokerage significantly. These intermediate 
agencies could only act as buffers to provide important and timely tip-offs, and 
strategic suggestions that had benefited the movement in strategizing its response ahead 
of state suppression.  
For example, as was discussed in Chapter Four, MCA politicians (in particular 
the deputy education minister) would ‘process’ memorandums based on the demands 
laid out in the proposals drafted by Chinese education movement activists. These 
documents would then be brought to the BN cabinet’s attention for negotiation with the 
other component parties through MCA National Education Bureau. Although the 
312 
 
contents of these memorandums remain the same, the BN regime, however, has been 
more willing to accede to the demands of its component parties than those made 
directly by the social movement.  
Beginning in the 1990s, MCA has grown increasingly reliant on Chinese 
education-related issues to gain political support from Chinese voters. The number of 
rural Chinese schools successfully relocated to urban areas and the special funds 
received by the Chinese schools from the state were widely reported by MCA to gain 
support from these voters in the general elections. Although such ‘self-advertisement’ 
was successful in the 1990s, its effects gradually faded.  
The interactions between the state and the movement are neither rigid nor 
linear; they evolve through continual interactions. MCA’s repetitive and over-reliance 
on its intermediate political strategies was widely criticized by the Chinese community 
in the 2008 General Election as insufficient to secure the minority’s rights. Led by the 
gradually strong opposition alliance—the Pakatan Rakyat—which demanded 
fundamental political reforms to ensure a free, fair and just political system for all. As 
was discussed in Chapter Four, BN lost its traditional two-third dominance of the 
parliament in 2008, and MCA suffered one of its worst and most humiliating battles 
since independence, or at least since 1969. 
Although the BN regime has never been supportive of the Chinese education 
movement, it has yet to terminate the movement by force. The movement’s prolonged 
existence is the result of a successful co-existence with the suppressive regime. Facing 
a non-liberal, democratic state, which has had the power and tendencies to manipulate 
its law enforcement system to crack down on movement supporters, the movement has 
learnt to adapt its movement activities and switched from a resistance-oriented to a 
negotiation-oriented approach. Although such adaptation has effectively reduced the 
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risks and costs of sustaining the movement and prolonged its existence, it has also 
decreased the movement’s capacity to reach its ultimate aims.   
 
7.6. Unification of Diversity  
As one of the largest social movements in Malaysia, the Chinese education movement 
is supported by an extensive number of heterogeneous agencies. The vast numbers of 
supporters, each playing different roles, have varied levels of commitments to and 
expectations from the movement. Such internal division—categorized into three 
factions, namely, (1) the division between Dongzong and Jiaozong, (2) problems of 
movement exclusiveness, and (3) tensions between the conservatives and the 
reformists—have impeded the movement’s efforts at unification.  
The movement is commonly perceived by its supporters and the public as a 
collaboration between the national umbrella association of Dongzong and Jiaozong. 
However, power relationships between these two sister organizations have not been 
mutual. As was shown in Chapter Two, outspoken Jiaozong leaders successfully led 
the movement’s resistance in the 1950s and 1960s. However, strong suppression from 
the state—such as the revocation of Jiaozong Chairman Lim Lian Geok’s citizenship, 
deportation of Jiaozong Advisor Yan Yuan Zhang, dismissal of Jiaozong Vice 
Chairman Sim Mow Yu from all political positions in MCA, among others—drastically 
reduced the Jiaozong’s leadership capacities. 
Chapter Three demonstrated that Jiaozong’s activity plunged when the state 
drafted all Chinese schoolteachers into the civil servant system and limited their 
involvement in anti-state activities. The establishment of the officially-recognized 
National Union of the Teaching Profession in 1974 replaced the role of Jiaozong as the 
sole representative organization for schoolteachers. Failing to overcome these changed, 
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Jiaozong’s role in the movement changed from that of a leader to a collaborator by the 
1980s.  
The collaborative relationship between Jiaozong and Dongzong was effectively 
maintained during the 1980s when they were housed under the same roof in the 
Jiaozong building in downtown Kuala Lumpur. Movement-related activities were 
conducted within a shared workspace, enabling like-minded individuals to develop 
emotional bonds and trust that helped to strengthen and unify the movement. Strong 
interpersonal relationships among leaders through which information, human resources 
and financial resources were shared solidified the movement. 
Unfortunately, the disparities in resource capacities were magnified with the 
growing accomplishment of Dongzong in the 1990s. Rising as the leader of the 
movement, it continued to make milestones with the completion of a larger and more 
well-equipped movement headquarters at Kajang. In contrast, with dwindling 
membership and drained resources, Jiaozong’s significance among Chinese 
schoolteachers continued to fade; this led to the domination of Chinese schools 
principals in the senior positions of the organization.  
Today, Jiaozong has become a mere shadow of its past. Chapter Three 
highlighted saw how it has been softening its approach in its dealings with the state to 
protect the interests of the Chinese schoolteachers’ community. By adopting a less 
risky, and more moderate approach, the Dongzong-led Chinese education movement 
has been perceived as ‘conservative’ by many, but such an approach remains the best 
way to solve the dilemma within these sister organizations.   
Another obstacle to movement unification has been the division between 
conservatives and reformists. The former have consisted of core leaders of the 
movement, while the latter were predominantly senior members of the movement’s 
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executive branch. In the 1970s, to resist the suppressive state measures, structural 
institutions with thematic working committees were established to facilitate the needs 
of the duzhong revival movement. Since then, increasing numbers of full-time and 
professional personnel joined the executive branch to meet the managerial and 
operational needs of the movement, as was highlighted in Chapter Five. The 
participation of these dynamic non-business and non-teaching individuals was 
significant in sustaining the movement.  
With the successful establishment of this executive community, 
decision-making in the movement has been divided into the leadership branch 
consisting of elected movement committees which dealt with external pressures, and 
the salaried executive branch which managed day-to-day operations of the movement. 
These two levels of decision-making have successfully generated amiable social capital 
between the huatuan societies and the movement actors in joint pursuit of their shared 
goal of furthering the interests of Chinese Malaysians.  
Conflicts between the conservatives and the reformists began to surface after 
Lim Fong Seng’s retirement from the movement. Failure of the dual coalition system 
campaign with DAP in the 1990 resulted in a clear division between the pro-MCA 
conservatives and pro-DAP reformists. Both factions, with the former dominating the 
leadership branch and committees, and the latter dominating the executive branch, 
began to manipulate the unwritten norms of the movement to exert their influence. As 
was argued in Chapter Five, although the movement has developed characteristics of a 
matured structured institutions over time, such as written constitutions, rules and 
regulations; yet, these institutions only serve to fulfill the procedural needs and as 
symbols of formality, rather than as channels for meaningful participation. Unwritten 
norms dominate the actual implementation of the movement.  
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Although movement leader Quek Suan Hiang (Dongjiaozong’s leader from 
1993 to 2005) was able to accommodate the interests of both sides by focusing most of 
the movement’s attention on accumulating financial resources to support the 
construction of the movement’s headquarters in Kajang, the tug of war between the 
factions continued. To consolidate power and control of the institutions and operations 
of the movement, both factions installed their preferred candidates as new committee 
members of the movement.  
By 2008, competition for power between the reformists and the conservatives 
had escalated into a full-blown conflict that eventually led to the departure of the 
reformist faction. The conflict divided the movement largely into three factions:  
(1) the conservatives—who now control Dongjiaozong, (2) the reformists—who were 
forced to leave Dongjiaozong, and were later reassembled under the Lim Lian Geok 
Cultural Development Center and demanded for structural reform of the Chinese 
education movement, and (3) those—mostly veterans of the movement—who were 
frustrated by the power struggle between the former two factions. Although the 
reformists have yet to succeed in overthrowing the core leaders of Dongjiaozong at the 
time of writing, infighting has had nevertheless a destructive influence on the 
movement.    
The factionalism in part stems, ironically, from the movement’s exclusiveness. 
To strengthen internal unity, sustain collective identity, and justify its legitimacy as the 
defenders of the Chinese community, the movement has constructed the movement’s 
activities based on the injustice and discrimination suffered by the Chinese community.  
The exclusiveness of the injustice frame has been an effective in mobilizing 
support from the Chinese community. The greater the suppression by the state, the 
higher the mobilization capacity and support the movement received from the Chinese 
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community nationwide. As was shown in Chapter Four, continuous attempts from the 
state to ‘convert’ Chinese schools into a Malay-dominated national system in the 1980s 
unwittingly led to unification of the political power of the ethnic Chinese as was on 
display in the demonstration staged at Tianhou Temple in 1987.  
To enhance and maintain the movement’s exclusiveness, it has been staffed 
exclusively by ethnic, and Chinese-educated, Chinese. The core movement community 
generally ‘discriminates’ against applicants who are not Chinese-educated. Preferences 
are given to graduates from institutions that are not yet recognized by the state, such as 
duzhong, Nanyang University or Taiwanese universities. Many outsiders see this as a 
form of Chinese chauvinism, stemming from inferior complex and lack of appreciation 
towards the multicultural reality of the Malaysian society. In fact, the policy of 
exclusion has isolated many individuals with great potential from accessing the 
movement’s leadership. 
The domination of an exclusive community within the movement also has 
prevented the movement from establishing interethnic alliances. The language barrier 
has been the hardest hurdle to overcome, as most members of the movement 
community lack the linguistic capacity to reach out to supporters of other ethnic groups. 
While all of them speak fluent Chinese, only a few can speak Malay or English fluently. 
Moreover, as one of the oldest social movements in Malaysia, the disparity in strength 
may have made it more difficult for the Chinese education movement to collaborate 
with other smaller, newer social movements.  
Although the support of non-ethnic Chinese individuals in the Damansara SOS 
movement demonstrated great potential for interethnic collaboration against state 
suppression (Chapter Six), the Chinese education movement leaders failed to capitalize 
on this potential. By 2008, while other movement groups in Malaysia had taken 
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advantage of the political opportunity to broach a variety of issues ranging from human 
rights, grievances of minority groups, and to demand for greater state reformation, 
Dongjiaozong’s response—or lack thereof—was disappointing.  
Factionalism may potentially create more space for democracy, competition, 
dynamism and choice; however, failure to manage internal rivalry may do more harm 
than good. Burdened by exclusiveness, conservatism and internal faction, 
Dongjiaozong has failed to extend itself beyond a contained pressure group to play a 
more significant role in domestic contentious politics. 
 
7.7. Suggestions for Future Research  
There are three potential areas for future research: national comparative studies with 
other social movements in Malaysia, regional comparative studies on the development 
of Chinese education in Southeast Asia, and cross-regional comparative studies of 
minority social movements in non-liberal, democratic states in Asia, Latin America and 
Africa. 
Due to limitation of time and a lack of funding to conduct additional fieldwork, 
an important area that this thesis could not include is comparison of the Chinese 
education movement with other social movements in Malaysia. Such comparative 
studies may reveal if patterns of movement repertoires differ between exclusive-based 
social movements (those based on ethnic, cultural and religious issues) and 
inclusive-based social movements (those based on environment, human rights and 
democratization issues).  
A national comparison of movements constrained under the same political 
system can strengthen the causal implication of the role of informal, relational 
institutions in sustaining movement persistency. By comparing regime reactions  
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(in particular, the heterogeneous agents within the regime) towards multiple social 
movements at the same time, movement demands can be generalized.    
The author also proposes future research to take a step further and compare the 
differences in the development of Chinese education movements in Southeast Asia. 
Despite demographic differences and varied development in post-colonial political 
institutions, it remains a puzzle why, in spite of the establishment of a significant 
number of Chinese schools in the early twentieth century in most of Southeast Asia, 
only the Malaysian version of Chinese education system continues to survive.  
There are several regional comparative on Chinese education, notably Murray 
(1964) and Watson (1973). However, there has been little follow-up to their work since 
then. With the rise of China, realization of the increasing importance of Chinese 
schools as language- and cultural-learning institutions may allow researchers to 
generalize the impact of China’s political economy influence in the region. There are 
complexities, similarities and differences among Chinese communities and the 
formation of intercommunity networks in the region. 744
The author also suggests making a broader comparative study on minority 
social movements in non-liberal, democratic states across Asia, Latin America and 
Africa. Research on social movement repertoires of non-democratic states thus far has 
concentrated exclusively on one region, with hardly any cross-regional comparative 
studies available. Despite geographical and cultural differences, similarities such as 
colonization, problems of multiculturalism, and transitions in political ideology along 
 Therefore, a bottom-up, 
culturally and politically sensitive approach to a regional comparative study may be 
worthwhile.  
                                               
744 Literature on transitions in Chinese identities in the region included but are not limited to Suryadinata 
(2007), Yen CH (2008), Tong CK (2010). For literature on Chinese in Indonesia, see Hoon CY (2008), 
Suryadinata (2008), Turner (2008), Dieleman, Koning and Post (2011); Chinese in the Philippines, see 
Ang (2004) and Zhou NJ (2007); Chinese in Thailand, see Hong and Li (2006), Chansiri (2008). 
Literature written on Chinese in Laos, Cambodia, Burma and Brunei remain rare. 
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the democracy-anarchy spectrum allow comparison of social movements in these 
non-liberal, democratic states to be made.745
 
 Making such comparisons will enable 
scholars to better understand variations in social movement phenomena across different 
political settings, especially in the trend of movement repertoires, the role of social 
capital and formation of alliances, and how social movements overcome constraints 
from formal institutions.  
7.8. Concluding Remarks 
This thesis has demonstrated that the capacity for social mobilization and endurance of 
a social movement depend on structural and relational institutions. The former 
delineate the role and responsibilities of each agency within the movement, install 
legitimate status upon social movement leaders to lead the movement, and enable these 
leaders to mobilize support from members and the larger communities. 
As social movements comprise large numbers of agencies and individuals, 
having formal, structural institutions is, on its own, insufficient for engaging strong 
inter-agency commitments to the movement. Here is where relational 
institutions—with their more organic, dynamic and adaptive nature—can supplement 
and fill the gaps of structural institutions.   
Due to the lack of access to democratic institutions, social movement leaders 
develop working relationships with members of the ruling regime to realize their 
demands through brokerage efforts. Brokers enable an informal yet important channel 
for conflicting parties to seek a common ground. Through bridging and enabling 
constructive interactions between conflicting parties, brokers strengthen their political 
                                               
745 Other cross-region comparative studies included Baud and Rutten (2004), Moyo and Yeros (2005), 
Shigetomi and Makino (2009), Tsikata and Golah (2010). For literature on social movements in Africa, 
see Mamdani and Wamba-Dia-Wamba (1995) and Prempeh (2006); on Latin America, see Escobar and 
Alvarez (1992), Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar (1998), Eckstein (2001) and Veltmeyer (2004); on East 
Asia, see Khun and Guiheux (2009), Broadbent and Brockman (2010). 
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importance within the regime’s entity and receive support from the movement 
community for aiding and facilitating the movement’s interests into the state’s core 
decision-making bodies. However, the impact of brokerage is supplementary rather 
than primary, for brokerage alone seldom procures the ultimate goals of a social 
movement.  
Movement repertoires may vary from aggressive to collaborative, manifest to 
latent. Unlike social movement activists in democratic states who enjoy freedom from 
fear to express their demands openly, the choice of movement repertoires within 
non-liberal, democratic states are determined by the lessons social movement activists 
learnt from their previous interactions with the state. As interactions between social 
movement and the state are considerably influenced by the local political structure and 
social environment, social movement activists adjust their activities and repertoires 
according to the local milieu. Therefore, movement leaders who are constrained by a 
non-liberal, democratic setting have to choose the most efficient, most rewarding, least 
risky approach to mobilize support from the community.  
The rigidity and ineffectiveness of democratic institutions within suppressive 
states has also given rise to strategies that rely on interpersonal relationships to meet the 
movement’s demands rather than through formal channels. Movement leaders expand 
their influence through social capital, and form networks and alliances with 
like-minded individuals and organizations. Although this form of collaboration may be 
fragile, and can collapse upon changes in leadership, it remains the most accessible and 
speedy approach for social movements to form a strong anti-state alliance under 
oppressive conditions. 
Although political opportunity and resources available to a social movement 
may be scarce, the internal movement solidarity is the most significant factor to 
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successful social mobilization. Tension between factions is unavoidable; therefore, it is 
vitally important for the movement to be equipped with the ability to manage these 
challenges through a well-structured institution or through a well-connected and 
authorized leader. A united movement will be able to resist heavy repression from its 
traditional enemy, the state; but a divided movement will be too fragile and be easily 
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Appendix 1 List of Interviewees 
(The names of all civil servants are disclosed here in order to protect their identities. Their names are replaced with a code of initials assigned by the 
author).   
No. Date Name Position Interview Location 
Voice 
Record 
1 February 10, 2008 Lu SS Retired Chinese primary school principal. Penang Yes 
2 February 12, 2008 Tang Hong Heng (陈虹罃) Assistant general manager, Kwangwahyitpoh. Penang Yes 
3 February 21, 2008 Leow Jing Yee* (廖静仪) Principal, Penang Chinese Girls Private High School.  Penang No 
4 February 22, 2008 Janet Pillai NGOs activist. Penang No 
5 February 24, 2008 Lim KC Retired Chinese primary schoolteacher. Penang Yes 
6 February 24, 2008 Tan Kok Chye General secretary, Penang Tan Kongsi. Penang Yes 
7 February 24, 2008 Tan JC Retired Chinese primary school principal. Penang Yes 
8 March 5, 2008 Tan LH Retired Chinese schoolteacher. Penang Yes 
9 March 16, 2008 Chen MM Senior journalist.  Selangor Yes 
10 March 17, 2008 Choong Woei Chuan (钟伟前) Head, Dongzong Department of Resource and Information Affairs. Selangor No 
358 
 
11 March 24, 2008 Loot Ting Yee (陆庭瑜) Chairman, Lim Lian Geok Cultural Development Center; Former Jiaozong vice chairman. Kuala Lumpur Yes 
12 March 24, 2008 Yow Lee Fung (姚丽芳) 
Chief operating officer, Lim Lian Geok Cultural 
Development Center; Former Jiaozong chief 
administrative secretary. 
Kuala Lumpur Yes 
13 March 25, 2008 Wong Chin Lee (黄真莉) Principal, Baixiao Temple School. Selangor No 
14 March 26, 2008 Sim Mow Yu (沈慕羽) Former Jiaozong chairman. Malacca Yes 
15 December 24, 2008 Lee LS Retired Chinese secondary schoolteacher. Penang Yes 
16 December 30, 2008 Leong Tzi Liang (林子量) Executive officer, Penang School Alumni Association. Penang No 
17 January 5, 2009 Yang Yun Gui (杨云贵) Chairman, Penang Donglianhui.  Penang NA 
18 January 6, 2009 Goh Mai Loon (吴美润) Former Dongzong-WC subcommittee member.  Penang NA 
19 January 7, 2009 Yeoh Ban Eng (杨万荣) Former Jiaozong vice chairman. Penang NA 
20 January 14, 2009 Leong Tzi Liang Follow-up interview. Penang NA 
21 January 15, 2009 Sim JT Retired Chinese school principal. Penang NA 
22 January 16, 2009 Kho Hai Meng (许海明) Dongzong Standing Committee. Penang NA 
23 January 17, 2009 Huang CC Retired Chinese schoolteacher.  Penang NA 
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24 January 17, 2009 Chai Yah Han (蔡亚汉) 
Former chairman of Penang Chinese School Alumni 
Association; Former Dongzong General Committee 
member. 
Penang NA 
25 January 19, 2009 Ng Miew Luan (黄妙鸾) Deputy principal, Hanjiang College. Penang NA 
26 January 20, 2009 Yeoh LC Retired Chinese school principal. Penang NA 
27 January 21, 2009 Kho Hai Meng Follow-up interview. Penang NA 
28 February 6, 2009 Lim Ming King (林明镜) Dongzong executive committee member; Malacca Donglianhui committee. Malacca NA 
29 February 8, 2009 Bock Tai Hee (莫泰熙) Former Dongzong chief executive officer. Malacca NA 
30 February 9, 2009 Pang Siew Fian (冯秋萍 Deputy chairperson, Malacca Donglianhui. ) Malacca NA 
31 February 11, 2009 Goh Kean Seng (吴建成) Principal, Confucian Private Secondary School. Kuala Lumpur NA 
32 February 12, 2009 Lee Kim Jii (李金芝) Researcher, University of Tunku Abdul Rahman. Selangor NA 
33 February 17, 2009 Yow Lee Fung  Follow-up interview. Kuala Lumpur NA 
34 February 17, 2009 Chew Saw Eng (周素英) Chairperson, Malaysia United Chinese School Alumni Association. Kuala Lumpur NA 
35 February 18, 2009 Yau Teck Kong (姚迪刚) President, Federation of Alumni Associations of Taiwan Universities of Malaysia. Selangor NA 
36 February 21, 2009 Thock KP University lecturer. Selangor NA 
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37 February 23, 2009 Cheng Yok Hoon (曾玉芬) Senior executive, Lim Lian Geok Cultural Development Center.  Kuala Lumpur NA 
38 February 23, 2009 Tang Ah Chai (陈亚才) SOSC advisor.  Kuala Lumpur NA 
39 February 23, 2009 Low Hing King (刘庆祺) President, Nanyang University Alumni Association of Malaya. Kuala Lumpur NA 
40 February 24, 2009 Choong Pai Chee (庄白绮) Former SOSC executive secretary; Former Dongzong executive officer.  Selangor NA 
41 February 25, 2009 Wong Chin Lee Follow-up interview. Selangor NA 
42 February 25, 2009 Lim Jian An (林建安) Executive secretary, SOSC Selangor NA 
43 February 25, 2009 Hew Hwa (邱俊华) Acting president, SOSC. Selangor NA 
44 February 25, 2009 Lee SH Senior reporter. Selangor NA 
45 February 27, 2009 Pua Eng Chong (潘永忠) Principal, New Era College. Selangor NA 
46 February 27, 2009 Shum Thin Khee (沈天奇) Head, Dongzong Department of Organization and Publicity. Selangor NA 
47 January 30, 2010 N. Ganesan Advisor, Hindu Rights Action Force.  Penang NA 
48 February 3, 2010 Leong Tzi Liang Follow-up interview. Penang NA 
49 March 9, 2010 Teoh Shiaw Kuan (张少宽) Historian on Chinese history in Malaysia. Penang NA 
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50 March 23, 2010 Quek Suan Hiang Former Dongzong chairman; Former Johore Donglianhui chairman.  (郭全强) Johore NA 
51 May, 2010 Er Joo Tiong Follow-up interview. Email interview NA 
52 July 19, 2010 Wong Chin Lee Follow-up interview. Selangor NA 
53 July 22, 2010 Lai Soon Ket (赖顺吉) Head, Dongzong Department of Organization Affairs. Selangor NA 
54 July 22, 2010 Leong Kuan Yee (梁君仪) Administrative Officer, Dongzong Department of Organization Affairs. Selangor NA 
55 July 22, 2010 Poon Tong Lin (潘棠莲) Head, Dongzong Department of Finance and Personnel. Selangor NA 
56 July 22, 2010 Er Joo Tiong Follow-up interview. Selangor NA 
57 July 22, 2010 Yap Hon Kiat (叶翰杰) Chief administrative secretary, Jiaozong.  Selangor NA 
58 July 22, 2010 Dong SA Dongzong executive officer (since 1990s). Selangor NA 
59 July 26, 2010 Poh Wan See (傅琬诗) Head, HLC Administrative Office. Selangor NA 
60 July 26, 2010 Hong Woan Ying (孔婉莹) Head, New Era College Public and International Relation Office. Selangor NA 
61 July 26, 2010 Sung Bee Lan (宋美兰) Senior executive, New Era College Department of Human Resource. Selangor NA 
62 July 27, 2010 Dong SB Dongzong executive officer (since 2000s). Selangor NA 
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63 July 27, 2010 Dong SC Dongzong executive officer (since 2000s). Selangor NA 
64 July 27, 2010 Lim Kee Song (林纪松) Senior executive, Dongzong Department of Association Affairs Selangor NA 
65 July 27, 2010 Wong Wai Keat (黄伟豪) Executive officer, New Era College Department of Student Enrollment. Selangor NA 
66 July 27, 2010 Dong SD Dongzong executive officer (since 1980s). Selangor NA 
67 July 27, 2010 Choong Ee Hoong (钟一泓) Assistant Executive Officer, Dongzong Department of Organization Affairs. Selangor NA 
68 July 28, 2010 Liao Yang Ting (廖燕玲) Assistant Executive Officer, Dongzong Department of Organization Affairs.  Selangor NA 
69 July 28, 2010 Wong Chin Lee Follow-up interview. Selangor NA 
70 July 28, 2010 Lee Hing (吕兴) Deputy chairman, Merdeka University Company. Selangor NA 
71 July 29, 2010 Tang Pui Kwan (邓珮君) Deputy head, New Era College Department of Registry. Selangor NA 
72 July 29, 2010 Dong SE Dongzong executive officer (since 1990s). Selangor NA 
73 July 29, 2010 Dong SF Dongzong executive officer (since 2000s). Selangor NA 
74 July 30, 2010 Dong SG Dongzong executive officer (since 1990s). Selangor NA 
Note: * marked a name translated into hanyupinyin and not an official name. 
NA = not applicable (from 2009 and onwards, the author no longer request for voice recording the interview). 
Source: The author. 
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Appendix 2 List of Jiaozong’s Members 
No. Name Year of Registration 
United State-Level  
1 Johore (柔佛州华校教师公会联合会) 1969 
2 Pahang (彭亨州华校教师公会联合会) 1979 
3 Perak (吡叻州华校教师会联合会) 1947 
4 Sarawak (砂拉越州华小教师会联合会) 2002 
Johore 
5 Central Johore (柔中区华校教师公会) 1962 
6 Kluang District (柔佛居銮区华校教师公会) 1952 
7 Muar (麻坡华校教师公会) 1939 
8 Pontian District (笨珍华校教师公会) 1961 
9 Segamat District (柔佛昔加末华校教师公会) 1948 
10 Southern Johore (柔南华校教师公会) 1952 
Kedah 
11 Central Kedah (吉中华校教师公会) 1950 
12 Northern Kedah (吉北华校教师公会) 1949 
13 Southern Kedah (吉南华校教师公会) 1953 
Kelantan 
14 Kelantan (吉兰丹华校教师公会) 1968 
Kuala Lumpur 
15 Kuala Lumpur (吉隆坡华校教师公会) 1949 
Malacca 
16 Malacca (马六甲华校教师公会) 1940 
Negeri Sembilan 
17 Negeri Sembilan (森美兰华校教师公会) 1946 
Pahang 
18 Bentong (文冬华校教师公会) 1974 
19 Cameron Highlands (金马仑华校教师公会) 1980 
20 Eastern Pahang (东彭华校教师公会) 1953 
21 Jerantut (而连突华校教师公会) 1984 
22 Kuala Lipis (立卑华校教师公会) 1957 
23 Raub (劳勿华校教师公会) 1950 
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24 Temerloh and Bera (淡马鲁暨百乐县华校教师公会) 1955 
Penang 
25 Penang (槟城华校教师公会) 1940 
Perak 
26 Batang Padang (马登巴冷华校教师公会) 1937 
27 Batu Gajah District (吡叻华怡乡区华校教师会) 1946 
28 Hilir Perak District (下吡叻区华校教师公会) 1947 
29 Ipoh (怡保市华校教师公会) 1946 
30 Kampar and Gopeng District (金宝务边区华校教师公会) 1949 
31 Kuala Kangsar (江沙县华校教师公会) 1995 
32 Manjung (曼绒华校教师公会) 1945 
33 Northern Perak (北吡叻华校教师会) 1946 
Perlis 
34 Perlis (玻璃市华校教师公会) 1951 
Sabah 
35 Sabah (沙巴华校教师总会) 2005 
Sarawak 
36 Bintulu (民都鲁华小教师公会) 2008 
37 Kuching and Samarahan (晋汉省华小教师会) 1997 
38 Meradong (马拉端县华小教师会) 1945 
39 Miri (砂拉越美里省华校教师公会) 2001 
40 Sarikei (泗里街华人教师会) 1940 
41 Sibu (诗巫华人教师公会) 1940 
42 Sri Aman (斯里阿曼暨木中省华校教师公会) 1999 
Selangor 
43 Selangor (雪兰莪华校教师公会) 1953 
Terengganu 
44 Terengganu (登嘉楼华校教师公会) 1955 
Source: The author. 
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Appendix 3 List of Dongzong’s Members  
No. Name of Association Year of Registration 
1 The State of Johore Chinese School Managers and Teachers’ Association (柔佛州华校董教联合会) 1949 
2 The Council of Perak Chinese School Committees  (吡叻华校董事会联合会) 1952 
3 Negeri Sembilan Chinese School Committees Council  (森美兰华校董事会联合会) 1953 
4 The Penang and Province Wellesley United Chinese School Management Association (槟威华校董事会联合会) 1953 
5 
The United Chinese School Committees’ Association of 
Selangor and Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur  
(雪兰莪暨吉隆坡联邦直辖区华校董事会联合会) 
1954 
6 Kelantan Chinese School Committees and Teacher’s Association (吉兰丹华校董事教师联合会) 1954 
7 Malacca Chinese Education and Progressive Association  (马六甲华校董事会联合会) 1955 
8 United Chinese School Committees’ Association of Kedah  (吉打华校董事会联合会) 1956 
9 
The United Association of Private Chinese Secondary 




The Sarawak United Association of Private Chinese 




The United Chinese School Committee of Managers Pahang 
(彭亨华校董事会联合会) 1989 
12 
The Sarawak United Association of Chinese Primary Aided 
School Committee (砂拉越津贴华文小学董事联合) 1990 
13 
Persatuan Ahli-Ahli Lembaga Pengurus Sekolah-Sekolah 
Cina Perlis (玻璃市华校董事会联合会) 1996 
14 Gabungan Lembaga Pengurus Sekolah-Sekolah Cina Negeri Terengganu (登嘉楼华校董事会联合会) 2001 




Appendix 4 List of Converted Chinese Secondary Schools in Malaysia 
No. Name of School 
Johore (3) 
1 SMJK Pai Chee (培智国民型中学) 
2 SMJK Pei Hwa (培华国民型中学) 
3 SMJK Seg Hwa (昔华中学) 
Kedah (4) 
4 SMJK Chio Min (觉民国民型中学) 
5 SMJK Keat Hwa (1) (吉华国民型中学一校) 
6 SMJK Keat Hwa (2) (吉华国民型中学二校) 
7 SMJK Sin Min (新民国民型中学) 
Kelantan (2) 
8 SMJK Chung Cheng Kota Bharu Kelantan (中正国民型中学) 
9 SMJK Chung Hwa (中华国民型中学) 
Kuala Lumpur (2) 
10 SMJK Chong Hwa Kuala Lumpur (中华国民型中学) 
11 SMJK Confucian Kuala Lumpur (尊孔国民型中学) 
Malacca (5) 
12 SMJK Katholik (公教国民型中学) 
13 SMJK Notre Dame Convent (圣母女子国民型中学) 
14 SMJK Pulau Sebang (普罗士邦国民型中学) 
15 SMJK Tinggi Cina (马六甲国民型华文中学) 
16 SMJK Yok Bin (育民国民型中学) 
Negeri Sembilan (3) 
17 SMJK Chan Wa (振华国民中学) 
18 SMJK Chi Wen (启文国民型中学) 
19 SMJK Chung Hua (庇劳中华国民型中学) 
Pahang (7) 
20 SMJK Chung Ching (中竞国民型中学) 
21 SMJK Chung Hwa (中华国民型中学) 
22 SMJK Hwa Lian (华联国民型中学) 
23 SMJK Katholik (公教国民型中学) 
24 SMJK Khai Mun (启文国民型中学) 
25 SMJK Tanah Putih (丹那布爹国民型中学) 
26 SMJK Triang (直凉国民型中学) 
Penang (10) 
44 SMJK Chung Hwa Confucian (槟城孔圣庙中华中学) 
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45 SMJK Chung Ling Butterworth (北海钟灵国民型中学) 
46 SMJK Chung Ling Pulau Pinang (摈城钟灵国民型中学) 
47 SMJK Convent Datuk Keramat (槟城修道院国民型中学) 
48 SMJK Heng Ee (恒毅国民型中学) 
49 SMJK Jit Sin (大山脚日新国民型华文中学) 
50 SMJK Penang Chinese Girls’ (槟华国民型女子中学) 
51 SMJK Phor Tay (菩提国民型华文中学) 
52 SMJK Sacred Heart (圣心国民型中学) 
53 SMJK Union (协和中学) 
Perak (17) 
27 SMJK Ave Maria Convent (圣母玛利亚国民型中学) 
28 SMJK Ayer Tawar (爱大华国民型中学) 
29 SMJK Choong Hua (中华国民型中学) 
30 SMJK Dindings (天定国民型中学) 
31 SMJK Hua Lian (华联国民型中学) 
32 SMJK Krian (吉辇国民型中学) 
33 SMJK Katholik (公教国民型中学) 
34 SMJK Nan Hwa (南华国民型中学) 
35 SMJK Pei Yuan (培元国民型中学) 
36 SMJK Perempuan Perak (吡叻女子国民型中学) 
37 SMJK Poi Lam (培南国民型中学) 
38 SMJK Sam Tet (三德国民型中学) 
39 SMJK San Min Teluk Intan (三民国民型中学) 
40 SMJK Shing Chung (兴中国民型中学) 
41 SMJK Tsung Wah (崇华国民型中学 ) 
42 SMJK Yuk Choy (育才国民型中学) 
43 SMJK Yuk Kwan (育群国民型中学) 
Perlis (1) 
54 SMK Perlis (玻璃市国民型中学) 
Sabah (8) 
55 SMK Chung Hwa (丹南中华国民型中学) 
56 SM Ken Hwa (根华国民型中学) 
57 SM Lok Yuk Likas (乐育国民型中学) 
58 SM Lok Yuk Mile1 (乐育国民型中学) 
59 SM Shan Tao (善导国民型中学) 
60 SM Sung Siew (双修国民型中学) 
61 SM Tiong Hua (中华国民型中学) 




63 SMJK Tung Hua (敦化国民型中学) 
64 SMK Chung Cheng (中正国民型中学) 
65 SMK Chung Hua Miri (美里中华中学) 
66 SMK Chung Hua (中华国民型中学) 
67 SMK Kai Chung (开中国民型中学) 
68 SMK Kuching High (古晋高级国民型中学) 
69 SMK Kwong Hwa (光华国民型中学) 
70 SMK Tinggi Sarikei泗里街高级国民型中学) 
71 SMK Tiong Hin (中兴国民型中学) 
72 SMK Tong Hua (东华国民型中学) 
Selangor (5) 
73 SMJK Chung Hwa (中华国民型中学) 
74 SMJK Katholik Petaling Jaya (公教国民型中学) 
75 SMJK Kwang Hua (光华国民型中学) 
76 SMJK Yoke Kuan (育群国民型中学) 
77 SMJK Yu Hua (育华国民型中学) 
Terengganu (1) 
78 SMJK Chung Hwa Wei Sin (中华维新国民型中学) 
Notes: 
SMJK = Sekolah Menengah Jenis Kebangsaan 
SMK = Sekolah Menengah Kebangsaan 
SM = Sekolah Menengah 
 
Source: The author.  
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Appendix 5 List of Duzhongs in Malaysia  
No. Name of School 
Johore (9) 
1 Chinese High School (峇株吧辖华仁中学) 
2 Chong Hwa High School Kluang (居銮中华中学) 
3 Chong Hwa High School S.B.R. (新文龙中华中学) 
4 Chung Hwa High School (麻坡中化中学) 
5 Foon Yew High School (新山宽柔中学) 
6 Foon Yew High School (Kulai Branch) (宽柔中学古来分校) 
7 Pei Chun High School (笨珍培群独立中学) 
8 Pei Hwa High School (利丰港培华独立中学) 
9 Yong Peng High School (永平中学) 
Kedah (3) 
10 Keat Hwa High School (亚罗士打吉华独立中学) 
11 Sekolah Menengah Sin Min (亚罗士打新民独立中学) 
12 Sin Min High School (双溪大年新民独立中学) 
Kelantan (1) 
13 Kelantan Chung Hwa Independent High School (吉兰丹中华独立中学) 
Kuala Lumpur (4) 
14 Chong Hwa Independent High School (吉隆坡中华独立中学) 
15 Confucian Private Secondary School (吉隆坡尊孔独立中学) 
16 Kuen Cheng High School (吉隆坡坤成女子中学) 
17 Tsun Jin High School (吉隆坡循人中学) 
Malacca (1) 
18 Pay Fong High School (马六甲培风中学) 
Negeri Sembilan (2) 
19 Chung Hua High School (芙蓉中华中学) 
20 Port Disckson Chung Hua Middle School (波德申中华中学) 
Penang (5) 
21 Chung Ling Private High School (槟城钟灵独立中学) 
22 Han Chiang High School (槟城韩江中学) 
23 Jit Sin Independent High School (大山脚日新独立中学) 
24 Penang Chinese Girls Private High School (槟城槟华女子独立中学) 
25 Phor Tay Private High School (槟城菩提独立中学) 
Perak (9) 
26 Hua Lian High School (太平华联中学) 
27 Sekolah Tinggi Nan Hwa (Suwa) (曼绒南华独立中学) 
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28 Pei Yuan Private High School (金宝培元独立中学) 
29 Poi Lam High School (怡保培南中学) 
30 Sekolah Menengah San Min (Suwa) (安顺三民独立中学) 
31 Shen Jai High School (怡保深斋中学) 
32 Tsung Wah Private Secondary School (江沙崇华独立中学) 
33 Yik Ching High School (班台育青中学) 
34 Yuk Choy High School (Private) (吡叻育才独立中学) 
Sabah (9) 
35 Beaufort Middle School (沙巴保佛中学) 
36 Kian Kok Middle School (沙巴建国中学) 
37 Lahad Datu Middle School (沙巴拿笃中学) 
38 Papar Middle School (沙巴吧巴中学) 
39 Pei Tsin High School (古达培正中学) 
40 Sabah Chinese High School (斗湖巴华中学) 
41 Tenom Tshung Tsin Secondary School (丹南崇正中学) 
42 Tshung Tsin Secondary School (沙巴崇正中学) 
43 Yu Yuan Secondary Schoo (山打根育源中学) 
Sarawak (14) 
44 Batu Kawa Min Lit Secondary School (石角民立中学) 
45 Catholic High School (诗巫公教中学) 
46 Chung Hua Middle School No. 1 (古晋中华第一中学) 
47 Chung Hua Middle School No. 3 (古晋中华第三中学) 
48 Chung Hua Middle School No. 4 (古晋中华第四中学) 
49 Citizen Middle School (诗巫公民中学) 
50 Guong Ming Middle School (诗巫光民中学) 
51 Kai Dee Middle School (民都鲁开智中学) 
52 Kiang Hin Middle School (诗巫建兴中学) 
53 Ming Lik Secondary School (泗里奎民立中学) 
54 Pei Min Middle School (美里培民中学) 
55 Riam Road Middle School (美里廉律中学) 
56 Serian Public Secondary School (西连民众中学) 
57 Wong Nai Siong Secondary School (诗巫黄乃裳中学) 
Selangor (4) 
58 Chung Hua Independent High School Klang (巴生中华独立中学) 
59 Hin Hua High School (巴生兴华中学) 
60 Kwang Hua Private High School (巴生光华独立中学) 
61 Pin Hwa High School (巴生滨华中学) 
Source: The author. 
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Appendix 6 Distribution of Chinese Schoolteachers’ Association Membership (1982–2009) 
a) 1982–1997 
CSTA 1982 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
United State-Level 
Johore 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Pahang 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 
Perak 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 
Johore 
Central Johore – – – – – – – – 382 186 201 207 
Kluang – – – – – – – 217 – 204 201 210 
Muar 166 167 188 188 189 187 264 – 335 – 215 267 
Pontian – – – – – – 191 189 189 222 197 197 
Segamat – – – 360 – – 353 355 357 142 365 368 
Southern Johore – – – 202 – – – – – 337 – 440 
Kedah 
Central Kedah 260 254 271 264 275 300 257 300 – 320 – 400 
Northern Kedah – 453 400 – – 441 – 458 – 300 250 258 
Southern Kedah 211 – – 181 169 157 163 198 206 172 172 174 
Kelantan – 185 232 218 223 211 204 204 222 226 235 – 
Kuala Lumpur – 749 758 796 821 885 755 720 725 722 903 1,028 
Malacca 240 245 232 230 260 331 356 378 386 401 406 386 




Bentong 110 96 92 110 122 110 150 162 162 165 160 139 
Cameron Highlands – – – – – – – – 75 – – 85 
Eastern Pahang 130 160 168 176 175 168 177 162 156 156 151 174 
Jerantut – – – – – – – – 93 51 76 – 
Kuala Lipis 55 59 56 51 50 50 50 – 60 – 52 50 
Raub – – 86 103 87 120 120 110 – – 136 138 
Temerloh Bera – 78 101 101 – – 91 99 134 112 158 195 
Penang 607 623 665 663 709 720 466 467 481 527 567 610 
Perak 
Batang Padang – – – – 169 171 191 204 204 175 – – 
Batu Gajah – 98 100 100 87 89 92 – – 90 – – 
Hilir Perak 150 165 168 150 140 158 188 198 198 198 198 198 
Ipoh – 169 193 204 180 169 182 167 – 176 176 224 
Kampar Gopeng 118 – 202 202 196 – 182 184 179 179 180 160 
Kuala Kangsar – – – – – – – – – – 112 – 
Northern Perak 268 265 256 262 218 233 224 235 253 257 283 289 
Manjung 303 – 241 244 265 265 – – – 245 245 296 
Perlis – – 95 106 114 120 117 112 115 115 132 150 
Sibu – – – – – – – – – – 471 – 
Selangor – 340 346 348 348 348 353 377 373 380 406 505 




CSTA 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
United State-Level 
Johore 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Pahang 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Perak 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Sarawak  – – – – – – 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Johore 
Central Johore 426 434 439 439 439 455 455 471 486 489 509 534 
Kluang 198 192 198 245 261 270 322 325 350 365 410 431 
Muar 268 295 310 320 330 340 405 496 475 495 495 350 
Pontian 200 200 219 219 239 239 282 282 313 322 290 325 
Segamat 400 380 428 400 299 300 350 391 469 350 368 368 
Southern Johore 508 488 500 605 572 653 650 736 740 898 900 847 
Kedah 
Central Kedah 300 300 400 300 300 300 300 310 310 310 320 322 
Northern Kedah 209 209 446 468 488 501 498 502 496 551 556 448 
Southern Kedah 170 173 180 198 213 214 260 201 244 244 292 292 
Kelantan 170 240 249 247 193 193 258 258 261 259 248 248 
Kuala Lumpur 1,047 1,086 1,008 1,080 1,120 1,049 1,038 1,142 1,221 1,352 1,398 1,255 
Malacca 454 482 506 504 521 520 528 533 532 531 533 531 




Bentong 135 126 122 130 135 132 158 173 177 178 187 187 
Cameron Highlands 85 76 86 68 111 88 91 80 91 95 106 115 
Eastern Pahang 169 169 182 188 191 212 246 268 286 296 286 298 
Jerantut 61 59 62 60 71 75 81 78 78 76 78 100 
Kuala Lipis 50 50 51 50 53 50 52 48 49 53 65 60 
Raub 135 121 145 112 119 128 150 163 166 172 181 174 
Temerloh Bera 187 196 229 229 197 209 210 230 237 249 254 233 
Penang 639 706 523 560 560 595 603 603 620 625 656 687 
Perak 
Batang Padang 197 196 198 181 186 216 210 204 231 250 250 255 
Batu Gajah 80 123 179 189 189 190 189 189 195 217 209 209 
Hilir Perak 199 198 196 193 198 198 196 196 198 196 196 196 
Ipoh 208 142 215 240 223 223 255 292 311 317 324 324 
Kampar Gopeng 168 198 186 198 186 186 188 231 235 240 250 270 
Kuala Kangsar 140 140 152 102 102 102 139 92 80 80 80 89 
Northern Perak 298 301 300 286 290 291 292 292 292 292 298 299 
Manjung 287 287 261 261 286 286 300 330 330 400 400 400 
Perlis 152 152 132 132 142 140 137 135 123 142 130 143 
Sabah – – – – – – – 600 892 1,004 1,138 1,256 
             

















Source: Compiled by the author with data from Jiaozong Annual Reports (1982–2009).
             
Sarawak 
Bintulu – – – – – – – – – – 99 118 
Kuching Samarahan 682 754 778 839 870 896 890 918 974 1,020 1,020 1,020 
Meradong – 124 122 134 134 164 157 155 155 156 169 169 
Miri – – – 173 189 247 292 318 342 385 420 444 
Sarikei – 160 580 250 247 284 280 271 271 273 307 344 
Sibu 580 595 620 600 620 600 750 760 770 800 905 959 
Sri Aman – – – – – – – 120 147 167 165 165 
Selangor 518 542 614 620 656 737 873 913 1,221 1,292 1,322 1,332 
Terengganu – 189 210 200 190 220 229 220 222 210 197 196 
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Appendix 7 List of Translated Words 
 




Civilisational Islam  Islam Hadhari  
Coalition for Clean and Fair Election  Gabungan Pilihanraya Bersih dan Adil 
Financial management committee  Lembaga pengurus kewangan 
Integrated Schools Project  Rancangan Sekolah Integrasi 
Malay-reserved land  Tanah Simpanan Melayu 
Malaysian Higher School Certificate  Sijil Tinggi Persekolahan Malaysia 
Malaysian National Primary Syllabus  Kurikulum Bersepadu Sekolah Rendah 
Malaysian People’s Movement Party  Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia 
Malaysian Qualifications Agency  Agensi Kelayakan Malaysia 
Movement to Eliminate PPSMI  Gerakan Mansuhkan PPSMI 
National Accreditation Board  Lembaga Akreditasi Negara 
National Cultural Policy  Dasar Kebudayaan Negara 
National Economic Advisory Council  Majlis Perundingan Ekonomi Negara 
National Front coalition  Barisan Nasional 
National Higher Education Fund  Perbadanan Tabung Pendidikan Tinggi  
 Corporation  Nasional 
National Human Rights Commission of  Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi Malaysia 
Malaysia  
National Justice Party  Parti Keadilan Nasional 
National Union of the Teaching Profession  Kesatuan Perkhidmatan Perguruan 
Kebangsaan Malaysia 
Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party  Parti Islam Semalaysia 
People’s Alliance  Pakatan Rakyat 
People’s Coalition Gagasan Rakyat  
People’s Justice Party Parti Keadilan Rakyat 
Petaling Jaya Development Plan  Draf Cadangan Pengubahan dan 
Rancangan Tempatan Petaling Jaya  
Primary School Evaluation Test  Ujian Pencapaian Sekolah Rendah 
Selangor Development Corporation  
Sons of the earth  Bumiputeras 
Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri 
Selangor 
Student Integration Program  Rancangan 
Teaching and Learning Science and  Pengajaran dan Pembelajaran Sains 
Mathematics in English    dan Matematik dalam Bahasa  
Integrasi Murid Untuk 
Perpaduan 
   Inggeris 
United Malays National Organisation  Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu  
   Bersatu 






b) Original Text in Chinese 
(* marked a name translated into hanyupinyin and not an official name). 
English/Roman 
Academic Adoption Program  白小原校生领养计划 
Original Text 
Agent-based 
Administrative Officer  助理 
Alliance of Three  三结合 
人制 
Ang Tian Se  洪天赐 
Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce 马来西亚中华总商会 
and Industry of Malaysia   
Assistant Administrative Officer  事务助理 
Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce 彭亨中华总商会 
and Industry Pahang  
Association of Chinese National in Cambodia 柬埔寨柬华理事总会 
Awareness Campaign for Chinese Primary 华小董事觉醒运动 
Schools’ School Committees   
Baixiao Newspaper  白小报报 
Bahkutteh 肉骨茶 
Baixiao Sponsors Special Meeting  白小保校工作委员会赞助人特别大
会 
Beijing Normal University  
Bo Sun Zhong*  博孙中 
北京师范大学 
Bock Tai Hee  莫泰熙 
Bong Hon Liong  黄汉良 
Campaign to Strengthen the Role of School 强化华小董事会运动 
Committees in Chinese Primary Schools  
Cantonese 广东话 
Chairmen Group 
Chan Chin Chee  陈正志 
主席团 
Chan Kong Choy 陈广才 
Chen Moh Chinese Primary School 精武华文小学  
Chen Li Qun*  陈利群 
Chen Pi Hua*  陈碧华 
Chen Wing Sum  曾永森 
Cheng Ji Mou 陈济谋 
Cheng Ho University 郑和大学 
Chew Mei Fun  周美芬 
Chew Saw Eng  周素英 
Chia Oai Peng  谢爱萍 
Chian Heng Kai  陈庆佳 
Chiew Swee Peow Chinese Education Trust 
Chief Executive Officer 首席行政主任 
周瑞标教育基金  




Chin Choong Sang  陈松生 
孩子 
Chin Keh Kong  陈国光 
Chin Peng  陈平 
China Press  中国报 
Chinese assembly halls  华人大会堂 
Chinese associations  华文学会 
Chinese Cultural Congress  
Chinese Education Card  华教卡 
全国华人文化节 
Chinese Education Festival  
Chinese Education Self-Improvement and 华教自强团结晚宴 
Unity Dinner   
华教节 
Chinese Education Working Committee  华教工作委员会 
Chinese guilds and associations 华团 
Chinese Language Society of Universiti 北大华文学会 
Utara Malaysia   
Chinese Resource and Research Centre  华社资料研究中心 
Chinese school committees chairman  董事长 
Chinese schoolteachers’ associations  华人教师公会 
Chinese secondary schools  华文中学 
Chinese Solidarity Conventions  全国华人团结大会 
Chong Joon Kin  
Chong Khoon Lin  张崑灵 
张永庆 
Chong King Liong  张景良 
Chong Min Chang  钟敏章 
Choong Pai Chee  庄白绮 
Chow Ba Mei*  周八妹 
Chung Hua Ladang Serapoh Chinese 巴力士拉坡中华国民型小学 
Primary School  
Chung Hwa Damansara Chinese Primary 白沙罗中华国民型学校  
School  
Chung Hwa (High School) 中华 (中学) 
Chung Ling (High School) 钟灵 (中学) 
Committee for Maintaining the School’s 白小保留原校, 争取分校工作委员会 
Original Premises and Seizing the New  
School Branch  
Clerk  事务员 
Confucian (High School) 尊孔 (学校) 
Damansara Chinese Primary School  白沙罗华文小学 
Damansara New Village School Relocation 反对共校保留白小原校争取建分校 
Opposition Action Committee   委员会 
Damansara Save Our School movement 救救白小运动 
David Chen  陈充恩 
DDDF Investment Committee  独中基金投资小组 
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December 1996 Thousand Men Fundraising  1214 千万心宴
Declaration on Vernacular Education  母语教育宣言 
 
Dinner  
Democratic Movement of Malaysian Youth 马来西亚学生与青年民主运动 
and Students   
Department of Association Affairs  会务与组织局 
Department of Chief Executive Office  首席行政办公室 
Department of Computer  电脑局 
Department of Curriculum  课程局 
Department of Early Childhood Education  幼儿教育组
Department of Examination 考试局 
  
Department of Executive  
Department of Finance  财务局 
行政组 
Department of Maintenance  庶务局 
Department of Personnel  人事局 
Department of Physical Education  体育局 
Department of Promotion  文宣局 
Department of Publication and Promotion  
Department of Publishing 出版局 
出版及促销组 
Department of Resource and Information  资讯局 
Department of Resource and Research  调查研究及资讯组
Department of Students Activities   
  
学生活动组
Department of Students Affairs 学生事务局 
  
Department of Teachers’ Education  教师教育局 
Department of Teachers’ Training   
Department of Vocational and Technical 技职教育局 
Education   
师资培训组 
Dewan Perhimpunan Tiong-Hwa Terengganu 登嘉楼中华大会堂  
Deputy Chief Executive Officer 副首席行政主任 
Ding Pin Song  丁品松 
Dongjiaozong  董教总 
Dongjiaozong Converted Chinese Secondary 董教总全国国民型中学工作委员会 
Schools Working Committee   
Dongjiaozong Duzhong Development Fund 董教总全国华文独中发展基金 
Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center 董教总教育中心非营利有限公司  
Non-Profit Private Limited   
Dongjiaozong National Chinese Primary  董教总全国发展华文小学工作委员  
Schools Development Working  会  
Committee 
Dongjiaozong National Conference for 全国发展华文独中运动大会  
Duzhong Development   
Dongjiaozong National Independent 董教总全国发展华文独立中学工作  
Chinese Secondary School Working   
 Committee     
委员会 
Du Chun Mao*  杜春茂 
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Dual Coalition System  两线制 
Duzhong Development Committee  独中发展小组 
Duzhong Education Alliance  独中教育联盟 
Duzhong Principals’ Association  
Duzhong Seminar  华文独中研讨会 
独中校长理事会 
Duzhong-WC Sponsorship Program  全国华文独中发展基金常年赞助人 
Duzhong-WC Working Guidelines  
Ecole Chinoise Lieu-tou  寮都公学 
董教总全国华文独中工作委员会组
织细则 
Education Affairs  学务 
Education Research Center  
Education World  
教育研究中心 
Educational Affairs Working Committee 
教育天地 
Eng Ling Chinese Primary School, Perak  永宁华小 
学务委员会 
Establishment of New Independent Chinese 申办华文独中备忘录 
Secondary Schools   
Family Learning Centre  
Executive Officer 执行员 
Federation of Alumni Associations of 马来西亚留台校友会联会总会 
Taiwan Universities of Malaysia   
亲子学苑组 
Federation of Chinese Associations in Johore 柔佛中华总会 
Federation of Chinese Associations Malaysia 中华大会堂总会 
Federation of Chinese Associations of 吉兰丹中华大会堂  
 Kelantan 
Federation of Chinese Association Sabah 沙巴州中华大会堂 
Federation of Chinese Guilds and 马来西亚华人行业社团总会 
Associations   
Federation of Hainan Association Malaysia 马来西亚海南公会联合会 
Federation of Hakka Association Malaysia  马来西亚客家公会联合会 
Federation of Hokkien Association Malaysia  马来西亚福建社团联合会 
Federation of Kwangtung Association 马来西亚广东会馆联合会  
 Malaysia  
Federation of Malaya Chinese Senior 高师职总 
Normal Graduate Teachers’ Union   
Federation of Teochew Association Malaysia  马来西亚潮州公会联合会 
Fifteen Leading Chinese Guilds and 十五华团领导机构  
Associations (15-Huatuan)  
Fong Chan Onn  冯镇安 
Foo Wan Thot  胡万铎 
Fujian province, China 福建省 
General Affairs 总务 
General Secretariat Office  行政部 
General officer 坐办 
Goh Chee Yan  吴志渊 
Goh Kean Seng  吴建成 
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Grand Three Associations of Chinese 三大机构华文教育中央委员会 
Education (Sandajigou)  
Gu Hsing Kuang  顾兴光 
Guangxi Association Malaysia  马来西亚广西公会总会 
Guiding Principles of Educational Reform 独中教育改革纲领
 Secondary Schools   
 
of Malaysian Independent Chinese  
Guiding Principles of Malaysian 华文独立中学建议书
Han Chiang College  韩江学院 
 
Independent Chinese Secondary Schools 
Han Chiang (High School) 韩江 (中学) 
Handbook of Chinese Education Workers  华教工作者手册 
Hanyupinyin  汉语拼音 
He Yong Liang*  何永良 
Harmony and Union University 协和大学 
Higher Education in China Exhibition  
Head of Department 行政主任 
Hokkien  福建话 
中国高等教育展 
Hon Choon Kim 韩春锦 
Hong Leong Group  
Honorary sponsors  
丰隆集团 
Hoo Huo Shan  胡火山 
荣誉赞助人 
Hou Heng Hua*  侯亨桦 
Hou Kok Chung  
Hua Lian Duzhong  
何国忠 
华联
Huang Wen Da*  黄文达 
独中 
Huang Yun Yue 黄润岳 
Huang Zhen Bu*  黄振部 
Huatuan Anti-Invasion National Convention  华团反侵略大会 
Huaxiao-WC Sponsorship Program  全国华文小学发展基金常年赞助人 
Huaxiao-WC Working Guidelines 董教总发展华文小学工作委员会简 
Hungry Ghost Festival  中元祭 
   章 
Implementation of the Joint Declaration of 贯彻华团联合宣言 
National Huatuans memorandum   
Independent Chinese secondary schools 华文独立中学 
Indonesia Eastern Language Cultural Center 印尼雅加达东方语言文化中心 
Industrial Index  工商指南 
Inspirational Heroes Dinner  
Join BN, Rectify BN 打进国阵, 纠正国阵 
壮志宴 
Joint Conference of Chinese School 全马华校董教联席会议 
Committees and Schoolteachers in Malaya   
Joint Declaration of National Huatuans  全国华团联合宣言 
Kajang Fah Kiew Chinese School Premises 加影华侨学校产业受托会  
 trustees  
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Kam Kei  金记 
Kang Chin Seng  江真诚 
Kang Siew Khoon  江秀坤  
Kedah Chinese Chamber of Commerce and 吉打中华总商会 
Industry  
Kelantan Chung Hwa Independent High 吉兰丹中华独立中学 
 School  
Kerk Choo Ting  郭洙镇 
Khew Khing Ling  
Khing Ming Chinese Primary School  竟明华小 
丘琼润 
Khoo Kay Peng  邱继炳 
Khoo Seong Chi  邱祥
Khor Peng Teng 许平等 
炽 
Kluang Chong Hwa High School  居銮中华中学 
Koh Kim Leng  许金龙 
Koh Swe Yong  辜瑞荣 
Koh Tsu Koon  许子根 
Kua Kia Soong  柯嘉逊 
Kuala Belait Chung-Hua Middle School 马来奕中华中学 
Kuang Hee Pang  
Kuala Lumpur University 吉隆坡大学 
Kuen Cheng (High School) 坤成 (女中) 
邝其芳 
Kuomintang  国民党 
Kwongwahyitpoh  光华日报 
Ladang Hillside Chinese Primary School  丘晒园华小 
Lai Chong Kong  赖仲光 
Lai Soon Keat  
Lau Pak Kuan  刘伯群 
赖顺吉 
Lee Ban Chen  李万千 
Lee Boon Chye  李文材 
Lee Chang Jing 李长景 
Lee Foundation  
Lee Hau Shik 李孝式 
李氏基金 
Lee Kim Sai  李金狮 
Lee Kim Sim  李成金 
Lee San Choon  李三春 
Lee Sang  李生 
Lee Sok Jing  李书祯 
Lee Thean Hin  李天兴 
Leong Yew Koh  梁宇皋 
Leung Cheung Ling  梁长龄 
Li Da Ting*  李达庭 
Li Jia Zhi*  李嘉芝 
Li Hui Jin*  李惠衿 
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Li Min Guang*  李明光 
Li Yi Qiang* 李毅强 
Li Yue Tong*  李岳通 
Liau Kok Fah  廖国华 
Liang Sheng Yi* 梁胜义 
Liew Chin Tong  刘镇东 
Liew Kan Ba  
Lim Ah Lek 林亚礼 
刘崇汉 
Lim Chong Eu  林苍佑 
Lim Chong Keang  林忠强 
Lim Fong Seng 林晃升 
Lim Geok Chan  林玉静 
Lim Kee Song  
Lim Ken Zhi  
林纪松 
Lim Keng Yaik  林敬益 
林肯智 
Lim Kit Siang  林吉祥 
Lim Lian Geok  林连玉 
Lim Lian Geok Awards  
Lim Lian Geok Cultural Development Center  
林连玉精神奖 
Lim Thuang Seng  林传盛 
林连玉基金 
Lin Yu Lian*  林玉莲 
Lin Mei Yan*  林美燕 
Ling Chia Nien  林嘉年 
Ling Liong Sik  林良实 
Liu Huai Gu* 刘怀谷 
Liu Tian Ji  刘天吉 
Loot Ting Yee  陆庭瑜 
Low Sik Thong  刘锡通 
Mah Cheok Tat  马卓达 
Malacca Chinese Chamber of Commerce 马六甲中华总商会 
and Industry   
Malaya Chinese Senior Normal Graduate 马来亚联合邦华文高级师范 
Teachers Union   
Malaysia Chinese Student Council of 工大华裔学生理事会 
Universiti Teknologi
Malaysian Chinese Association  马华公会 
   
Malaysian Chinese Organisations Election 华人社团大选诉求 
Appeals  
Malaysian Federated San Kiang Association  马来西亚三江总会 
Malaysian Seven
Management Handbook for Chinese 华小管理机制指南 
Primary Schools   
 Major Clans Association  七大乡团协调委员会 
MCA Central Working Committee  马华中央工作委员会 
Memorandum for the Return of Vernacular 还我母语教育各忘录 
Education   
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Memorandum of General Demands on 本邦华人对教育总要求 
Chinese Education  
Memorandum on National Cultural Policy  
Memorandum Opposing the Conversion of 反对改方言学校为国民学校宣言 
Vernacular Schools into National Schools   
国家文化备忘录 
Memorandum to Accord Rightful Status to 争取华文地位备忘录 
Chinese Language   
Merdeka College  独立学院 
Merdeka University  独立大学 
Merdeka University Formation Working  马来西亚独立大学筹备工作委员会 
Committee   
Merdeka University Founders’ Assembly 马来亚独立大学发起人大会 
Merdeka University (Limited) Company  独立大学有限公司 
Mid-lunar month celebration  中秋节 
Multi-Cultural Scholarship 
Myanmar Mandalay Fuqing School 曼德勒福庆学校 
多元文化奖学金 
Nan Hwa Duzhong  南华独中 
Nanyang Shangpao  南洋商报 
Nanyang University  南洋大学 
Nanyang University Alumni Association of 马来亚南大校友会 
Malaya   
National Chinese Civic Rights Committee  全国华团民权委员会 
National Convention for the Strive for 全马华人注册社团争取公民权大会 
Citizenship of Chinese Registered Guilds 
and Associations  
National Convention of Chinese School 全马教师公会代表大会 
Teachers’Associations in Malaya   
National Convention of the Chinese School 全国华校董教大会 
Committees and Schoolteachers   
National Convention on Chinese Education’ 全马华文教育扩大会议 
Expansion   
National Duzhong School Committees and 全国独中董事及校长联席会议 
School Principals Joint Meeting   
National Huatuan Cultural Consultation 全国华团文化咨询委员会  
Committee  
National Huatuan Cultural Foundation  全国华团文化基金 
National Huatuan Cultural Program  全国华团文化工作总纲领 
National Huatuan Cultural Working 全国华团文化工作委员会  
 Committee  
National Huatuan Education Policy 全国华团教育政策委员会  
 Committee  
National Seminar for Converted Chinese 全国国民型中学董事交流会 
Secondary Schools Committees   
National Taiwan Normal University  
National Taiwan Normal University 
台湾师范大学 
国立侨生大学先修班  
Division of Preparatory Programs for  
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 Overseas Chinese Students  
National-type primary schools  国民型学校 
National Union of Heads of Schools  全国校长职工会 
Negeri Sembilan Chinese Assembly Hall 森美兰中华大会堂 
New Era College  
New Era College Development Fund  董教总教育中心基金, 新纪元学院建 
新纪元学院 
   设及发展基金 
New Era College Sponsorship Program  
New Era College student dormitory  
新纪元学院发展基金赞助人 
New Era College teaching building  
饮水思源宿舍 
Newsletter on the Chinese education  华教导报 
成人成才教学楼 
Ngan Ching Wen  颜清文 
Ngeow Yin Ngee  饶仁毅 
Old Friends Association  老友联谊会 
Omar Ong Yoke Lin  翁毓麟 
One-Person, One-Dollar for Merdeka 一人一元独大法律基金 
 University Legal Fee   
Ong Ka Ting  黄家定 
Ong Keng Seng  王景成 
Ong Kow Ee 王超群 
Ong See Yong  翁诗佣 
Ong Swee Kok  王瑞国 
Ong Tin Kim  王添庆 
Overseas Chinese School      华侨华文小学 
Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission 
Pang Chong Leong  彭忠良  
中华民国侨务委员会 
Pang Siew Fian 冯秋
Pei Yuan Duzhong 培元独中 
萍 
Penang Chinese Education Working 槟城州华文教育工委会
Penang Chinese Girls’ High School  槟华女中 
  
Committee  
Penang Chinese Town Hall  槟州华人中华大会堂 
Perak Chinese Assembly Hall 吡叻中华大会堂 
Perak Duzhong Development Working 吡叻州发展华文独中工作委员会
 Committee  
  
Perak duzhong revival movement  
Pergabungan Persatuan- Persatuan Cina 砂劳越华人社团总会联合会 
吡叻州华文独中复兴运动 
 Sarawak   
Perlis Chinese Chamber of Commerce and 玻璃市中华总商会 
Industry  
Permanent sponsor  
Pesatuan Bahasa Tionghua Universiti Putra 博特拉大学华文学会 
Malaysia   
永久赞助人 
Philippines Chinese Education Research 华文教育研究中心 
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 Center   
Poi Lam Duzhong  
Presidential association  主席区 
培南独中 
Princess Hang Li Poh  汉丽宝公主 
Professional Teaching Program  
Proposals on the Draft of 1990 Education Act  对 1990年教育法令草案的修改建议 
教育专业系 
Protest Assembly of National Chinese 全国华团政党抗议大会议 
Huatuan and Political Parties   
Pua Eng Chong  
Pua Kiam Wee  潘俭伟 
潘永忠 
Puay Chai II Chinese Primary School  培才二校 
Quek Jing Chuan*  郭镜川 
Quek Ju Chuan*  郭巨川 
Quek Leng Chan  
Quek Suan Hiang 郭全强 
郭令灿 
Rawang Anti-High Tension Cable movement  万挠新村反建高压电缆运动 
Ronnie Liu Tian Khiew  刘天球 
Ruan Liang Temple  阮梁圣公庙 
Sample of Working Guidelines for Malaysian 马来西亚华文小学董事会工作手册 
Chinese Primary School Committees  样本 
San Min Duzhong  三民
Sandajigou’s National Convention of  三大机构华文教育中央委员会全国 
Chinese Education in Malaya   华文教育大会 
独中 
Second Pan-Malayan CSTA Conference  全马教师公会第二次代表大会 
Secondary election  复选 
Segamat Central Site Chinese Primary School 中央华小 
Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall (SCAH) 雪兰莪中华大会堂 
Selangor Hokkien Association  雪兰莪福建会馆 
Semenyih Community Againts the  士毛月居民反对电讯公司电讯塔 
 Construction of Telecommunication  运动 
Towers movement 
Seminar of National Chinese Leaders in 全马华人领袖座谈会 
Malaya   
Sensible reasoning  
Senior Executive 高级执行员 
Seven Chinese Education Related Guilds 华教界七华团 
and Associations (7-Huatuan)  
情理法 
Sha Yun Yeo  沙渊如 
Shen Jai Duzhong  深斋
Shen Ting*  
独中 
Shum Thin Khee  
沈亭 
Sim Mow Yu  沈慕羽 
沈天奇 
Sim Teck Hwa  
Sinchew Daily  星洲日报 
沈德和 
Singapore Chinese Teachers’ Union 中学华文教师会 
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Social organization  社团 
Soo Thien Ming 苏天明 
Soon Jian Chinese Primary School, Kedah  循然华小 
South China Normal University  
Southeast Asia Chinese Education Bulletin  
华南师范大学 
Southeast Asian Chinese Language 
东南亚华文教育通讯 
东南亚华文教学研讨会
Southern College  南方学院 
 
Teaching Convention  
State-level alliance of Chinese school 董事联合会  
committees’ association (donglianhui)  
Student Progressive Front  前进阵线 
Suggestions on the Ninth Malaysia Plan  
Sun Yat Sen 孙中山 
第九大马计划的建议书 
System-based  
Tan Cheng Lock 陈祯禄 
体制 
Tan Cheng Lock Chinese Primary School 陈祯禄华文小学 
Tan Kah Kee  
Tan Cheng Lock University 陈祯禄大学 
Tan Seng Giaw  陈胜尧 
陈嘉庚 
Tan Siang-Chen  陈香琴 
Tan Siew Sin  陈修信 
Tan Tai Kim  
Tan Tiong Hai  陈东海 
陈大锦 
Tan Yew Sing  
Tang Ah Chai  
陈友信 
Tang Pui Kwan  邓珮君 
陈亚才 
Teaching Chinese Language in Southeast 东南亚华文教学研讨会特辑
Teaching of Chinese Language to 
 
Asia Seminar Papers   
对外汉语教学
Teh Hon Seng  郑云城 
 
Non-Chinese Teachers   
Teng Chang Khim  邓章钦 
Tew Say Kop  
Thailand Chinese Community School 华文民校协会 
Association  
张志开 
Thousand Men dinners  
Thuang Pik King  
千人宴 
Tiananmen Square  天安门广场 
庄迪君 
Tianhou Temple  天后宫 
Ting Chew Peh  
Ting Shu Yun*  丁淑韵 
陈祖排 
Toh Kin Woon  
Tongmenghui  同盟会 
杜乾焕 
Too Joon Hing  朱运兴 
Torch Movement  火炬运动 
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Torch Relay  华教火炬行 
Traditional Chinese script  繁体字 
Tree-planting ceremony  百万松柏献华教 
Tsun Jin (High School) 循人 (中学) 
Tsung Wah Duzhong  崇华
Tunku Abdul Rahman College  拉曼学院 
独中 
Tuw Ah Mei  涂亚眉 
Tunku Abdul Rahman University 拉曼大学 
Twenty-First Century Old Friends Club  21世纪老友 
UEC Junior Level  华文独中统一考试 (初中) 
UEC Senior Level  华文独中统一考试 (高中) 
UEC Vocational and Technical  
Unified Curriculum Subcommittee 
华文独中统一考试 (技术) 
Unified Examination Certificate  华文独中高初中统一考试 
独中统一课程编委会 
Unified Examination Subcommittee 
Unified Federation of Malaysian Chinese 中华大会堂联合会 
Assembly Hall   
独中统一考试委员会 
United Chinese School Alumni Association  华校校友会联合会总会 
United Chinese School Committees’ 华校董事联合会总会 
Association    
United Chinese Schoolteachers’ Association 华校教师会总会 
United Press  联合日报 
Vietnam Ho Chi Minh City Representative 越南胡志明市代表 
Wai Sin Chinese Primary School, Perak  维新华小 
Wan Jia An*  
Wang Guo Feng*  王国丰  
万家安 
Wang Wen Han*  王文汉 
Wang Yoon Nien  汪永年 
Wee Ka Siong  魏家祥 
Wen Tien Kuang  温典光 
White Terror 白色恐怖 
William Leong  梁自坚 
Wong Cheng Yoke  黄祯玉 
Wong Chin Lee  黄真莉 
Wong Kim Foong  黄金凤 
Wong Pow Nee  王保尼 
Wong Sue Kau  
Wong Yau King  黄耀庆 
黄仕寿 
Wong Yew Kong  王友光 
Wu Teh Yao  吴德耀 
Xiamen University  
Xiamen University Nanyang Research 
厦门大学 
厦门大学南洋研究院研究计划案
Xu Min Yan*  余明炎 
  
Institute Project  
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Yan Yuan Zhang*  严元章 
Yang Qing Liang*  杨清亮 
Yang Ya Ling 杨雅灵 
Yang Yin Chong 
Yap Hon Kiat  
杨应俊 
Yap Pian Hon  
叶翰杰 
Yap Sin Tian 叶新田 
叶炳汉 
Yap Swee Seng  叶瑞生 
Ye Hong En*  叶鸿恩 
Ye Xia Guang*  叶夏光 
Yeoh Ban Eng 杨万荣 
Yì  
Yik Ching Duzhong  
义 
育青
Yong Kai Ping  杨凯斌 
独中 
Yong Xu Ling  杨旭龄 
Yong Yoke Song  熊玉生 
Yoong Suan  
Yow Lee Fung  
杨泉 
Yuk Choy Duzhong  
姚丽芳 
育才
Zeng Dun Hua*  
独中 
Zeng Qing Cai*  曾庆财 
曾敦化 
Zeng Qing Fang*  曾庆方 
Zhan Yuan Rui*  
Zhang Ji Zuo*  
詹元瑞 
Zhang Xi Chong*  
张济作 
Zhang Xu Zhuang*  张绪庄 
张喜崇 
